*4 Here, despite API's repeated attempts to distance itself from the Valdez
litigation, it is clear that API and its members do have an actual interest in the outcome of that litigation. API's own documents reveal that it “represents over 250 companies involved in all aspects of the oil and gas industry.” Respondents Exh. 5. At the hearing, API's counsel argued, somewhat disingenuously, that since the Valdez
litigation affects only a small number of those 250 members, it is of little interest to API's other members or to the organization as a whole. Tr. 29-32. However, API's admission that 29 percent of its income comes from the Valdez
defendants and their corporate principals weakens API's claim that it acted solely as a neutral third party during the negotiations, sheds some light on its immediate decision to cancel the production once the Valdez
defendants openly objected, and materially distinguishes API from the pure non-party witness identified in Rule 45. Moreover, even if the relationship between API and the Valdez
defendants were less substantial, it seems certain that the precedential value of the Valdez
case is a matter of real concern to a large portion of the petroleum industry. Nor has API denied that this suit is of great public importance generally. Further, there can be little doubt that API, which in 1989 had gross receipts of $58 million and a net worth of $17 million, see
Petitioners' Exh. B, would be able to absorb at least some of the costs of production and copying. Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 28 Fed.R.Serv.2d 580 (D.D.C.1979) (given non-party professional association's “obvious and understandable substantial interest in the outcome,” costs of compliance held to be “business overhead”). This is especially true in comparison with the financial situation of petitioners, who are five disparate classes of Native Alaskans, fishermen, business persons, property owners, and cannery workers affected by the spill. Thus, although new Rule 45(c) does require petitioners to bear the major portion of the costs of producing and copying the documents, API equitably should bear 29 percent of the total cost, the same percentage as the proportion of API's income attributable to dues paid by the defendants and their principals. This figure takes into account the special circumstances recited above, while still ensuring that API could easily and sufficiently protect itself from significant expense within the meaning of the Rule, by simply assessing this special expense to the defendants, who are its members and a principal source of its revenue.