Schmid, 13 F.3d at 79 (citing for example Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 986 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.1993). Appropriate sanctions are determined on a case-by-case basis “keyed to the degree of fault on the part of the party accused of [spoliation] and the degree of prejudice to the opponent.” Id. at 81. See id .
(striking the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness in its entirety was too severe where the evidence was not altered with the intent to interfere with the opponent's investigation, and, given that the plaintiff's theory was defective design, the specific injury-causing product was not crucial to the opponent's case, therefore, the prejudice was minimal); Liafail, Inc. v. Learning 2000, Inc., Nos. C.A. 01–599–GMS, C.A. 01–678–GMS, 2002 WL 31954396 (D.Del. Dec. 23, 2002) (adverse inference jury instruction would be imposed if the plaintiff failed to produce documents pursuant to discovery order) (stating at *4, “jury would be permitted to infer that [the plaintiff's] bad faith alone is sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the missing evidence was unfavorable to that party”); Mosel Vitelic Corp. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 162 F.Supp.2d 307, 314 (D.Del.2000) (an adverse inference jury instruction as well as the possible award of attorneys' fees were warranted where the spoliating party's attorney discarded or destroyed all prior drafts of an opinion letter, but potential for prejudice was minimal in that “the only real loss Micron might suffer is the potential to obtain treble damages”); In re Wechsler, 121 F.Supp.2d 404 (dispositive sanction warranted where the spoliating party destroyed the evidence to prevent inspection by opponent and the destruction substantially prejudiced the opponent such that it could not establish its claims). A measure of the appropriateness of a sanction is whether it “restore [s] ‘the prejudiced party to the same position he would have been in absent the wrongful destruction of evidence by the opposing party.’ “ West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir.1998)).