*1 A jury returned a verdict against Chandra Kamhout on her complaint against The Vons Companies, Inc. (Vons) and E. & J. Gallo Winery (Gallo). Kamhout appeals from the judgment, and Vons and Gallo cross-appeal, challenging the superior court's determination that their memorandum of costs was untimely. We reverse the court's rejection of the memorandum of costs and remand for further proceedings, but we otherwise affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

On September 27, 2005, Kamhout filed suit against Vons and Gallo. The record on appeal does not contain Kamhout's complaint, but the special verdict form indicates that the sole cause of action submitted to the jury was a claim for negligence. The jury found that both Vons and Gallo were negligent but that their negligence was not a substantial factor in causing harm to Kamhout.

At trial, Kamhout testified as follows concerning the facts underlying her claim: In the morning of November 19, 2004, Kamhout was shopping at a Vons grocery store. As she walked past a wine display, her right flip-flop “brushed the front of the wine display, like the front corner of it.” The wine bottles in the display “started teeter-tottering,” and one bottle fell and broke on her foot. It did not break the skin, but Kamhout's “toenail was broken” and “there was like a little mark, red mark like just below my big toe where that big bone is.” Two more bottles fell but did not hit Kamhout's foot. The store manager and two other Vons employees came to assist Kamhout, who was crying from the pain. Kamhout left the store “[m]aybe about ten minutes” after the accident. She went to urgent care later that day, where x-rays of her foot revealed that “it wasn't broken,” and she was prescribed “[e]xtra strength Tylenol.” Kamhout was next seen by a doctor five days later, by which time she had already retained a lawyer.

Kamhout introduced evidence that the incident with the bottle caused her to suffer from “complex regional pain syndrome” (formerly known as “reflex sympathetic dystrophy”). Defendants introduced evidence that Kamhout did not suffer from complex regional pain syndrome but rather was either malingering or suffering from certain preexisting psychiatric disorders (somatoform disorder or factitious disorder).

The trial court entered judgment on March 28, 2008. Certain documents in the record indicate that the clerk mailed the judgment to the parties on the same day it was entered, but the record contains no certificate of mailing by the clerk. The judgment itself does not state that it was mailed upon order by the court or under section 664.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.[1] It does not state that it was mailed by the clerk at all.

Defendants served notice of entry of judgment on April 4, 2008. On April 17, 2008, defendants filed a memorandum of costs. On May 7, 2008, Kamhout filed a motion to strike the memorandum of costs “or portions thereof.” Kamhout argued both that the memorandum of costs was untimely and that some of the claimed costs should not be awarded because they were unnecessary, unreasonable, or not authorized by statute. The court agreed that the memorandum of costs was untimely and on that basis refused to award costs to defendants.

*2 Kamhout also moved for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that defense counsel had committed misconduct by repeatedly referring to Kamhout's use of illegal drugs. On May 22, 2008, the court denied the motion.

Kamhout timely appealed from the judgment. Defendants timely appealed from the order determining that their memorandum of costs was untimely.

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Kamhout argues that the verdict is not supported by substantial evidence because “the jury found[ ] that [d]efendants were negligent in the manner in which the wine display was constructed and maintained,” “[i]t is undisputed that a bottle fell on [Kamhout's] foot,” and it is also “uncontroverted that ... Kamhout sustained some form of injury (at the very least a contusion to her right foot) as a result of the wine bottle falling on her foot.” As a result, according to Kamhout, the evidence cannot sustain the jury's finding of a lack of causation. We are not persuaded.

The jury heard evidence that cast doubt on Kamhout's credibility, including expert testimony that she was malingering. For example, the jury heard evidence that in March 2007, Kamhout went to an emergency room with an ace bandage wrapped around her wrist, complaining of a swollen hand after her cat scratched her. After the ace bandage was removed and the hand was elevated, the swelling reduced, but the emergency room physician later returned to Kamhout's room and found Kamhout with the ace bandage “wrapped tightly around her wrist” and noted that “immediate swelling had returned to her right hand, and the right hand was in the previous state.” The jury could reasonably infer from that episode that Kamhout was deliberately inducing symptoms in order to receive medical care.

The jury was free to disbelieve Kamhout's testimony on every issue, including her account of how the accident took place. (See, e.g., Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1204.) Kamhout testified that her right flip-flop merely “brushed the front of the wine display, like the front corner of it,” but the jury could reasonably have disbelieved her. No other evidence excluded the possibility that the accident was caused in a way that had nothing to do with defendants' negligence (for example, Kamhout might intentionally have bumped into the display so forcefully that bottles would have fallen off even if the display had not been negligently constructed or maintained).[2] The jury thus could have reasonably and consistently found that defendants were negligent but that Kamhout had failed to show it was more likely than not that defendants' negligence was a substantial factor in causing the harm (if any) that Kamhout suffered.

Kamhout argues to the contrary that “[t]here was simply no other evidence offered at trial as to how the incident occurred.” Putting aside the issue of the surveillance video (which we address post ), the absence of other evidence as to how the incident occurred is entirely understandable, because no one witnessed it. The point is that if the jury did not believe Kamhout—and the record contains more than sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that she was not credible—then the jury could have reasonably concluded that she failed to show it was more likely than not that the accident happened in the manner she described. On that basis, the jury could have reasonably concluded that she failed to show it was more likely than not that defendants' negligence was a substantial factor in causing her harm.

*3 For similar reasons, we reject Kamhout's argument that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that the verdict was not sufficiently against the weight of the evidence, within the meaning of section 657, to warrant a new trial. (See Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1176 [“Generally, rulings on new trial motions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion”].) The jury had ample evidence to justify a reasonable inference that Kamhout was not credible, and, for the reasons already given, the jury could have reasonably concluded that her lack of credibility was fatal to her case. The trial court therefore did not exceed the bounds of reason by concluding that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 272 [“ ‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason’ “].)

Kamhout argues that defense counsel violated the trial court's in limine rulings by “repeatedly refer[ing] to [Kamhout's] drug use” in closing argument. On that basis she argues that defense counsel's conduct constituted “[i]rregularity in the proceedings” within the meaning of subdivision (1) of section 657 and that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting the new trial motion on that ground. We disagree.

Before trial, Kamhout moved in limine to exclude evidence that she had entered drug rehabilitation in 1994, when she was 22 years old. The court initially granted the motion, excluding the evidence under Evidence Code section 352 because Kamhout's drug abuse and rehabilitation treatment were so remote in time that the risk of prejudice outweighed their probative value.

At a later pretrial hearing, when presented with evidence that Kamhout used marijuana and cocaine in January 2008, the court changed its ruling on the motion and allowed evidence of Kamhout's illegal drug use and treatment but only insofar as it related to expert opinions concerning the diagnosis and treatment of her condition. In so ruling, the court informed the parties that it would not “permit the defense to argue that because [Kamhout] may have taken drugs in the past or may have taken them recently that she's not credible or that she is a bad person or she's not to be believed.” The court also ruled that although “an expert witness obviously cannot testify as to whether or not a witness generally is credible,” a psychiatric or medical expert can testify about whether the expert “believes what she's being told by the patient as to whether or not the person is malingering” or whether “the person has some other motives for the type of ailment they're describing.”

At trial, Kamhout testified on direct examination during her case in chief concerning her drug abuse and treatment in 1994 and her drug use in 2008. She also testified that in the course of her treatment for the conditions allegedly resulting from the incident with the wine bottle, she has taken Neurontin, Methadone, Zanaflex, Xanax, Prednisone, Zoloft, and Percocet.

*4 Other evidence concerning the prescriptions Kamhout received indicates that she obtained prescriptions for the same drugs at the same time from different doctors and was using four different pharmacies. For example, she obtained a prescription for a 45–day supply (180 pills) of Percocet from one doctor on November 9, 2005. On December 5, 2005, she obtained another prescription for Percocet from the same doctor, and then 17 days later she obtained another Percocet prescription (150 pills) from a different doctor. Eight days later, on December 30, 2005, she obtained a prescription for another 45–day supply (180 pills) of Percocet from the first doctor.

The trial record contains expert testimony concerning “what we call drug-seeking behavior. There are people who report pain in order to obtain medication.” One expert testified that a “red flag” for drug-seeking behavior is “that the person has been seeing multiple physicians and getting prescriptions for two or three different locations but not telling any of the other people”; this is known as “doctor shopping.” Another expert testified that Kamhout's history of drug abuse was “important to the diagnosis of somatoform pain disorder.”

On appeal, Kamhout argues that defense counsel's references in closing argument to Kamhout's drug use were improper and violated the court's in limine ruling. In particular, Kamhout argues that defense counsel (1) referred to her “as a ‘drug addict,’ ‘a cocaine addict,’ and ‘a failure,’ “ (2) relied on her drug use as a basis to attack her credibility and accuse her of “ ‘deliberately lying,’ “ (3) argued that she was lying about not having used illegal drugs between 1994 and 2008, and (4) attacked her character by arguing that her use of illegal drugs showed that she “was a bad person.” We are not persuaded.

First, counsel's reference to Kamhout as a “drug addict” was not improper. Kamhout herself admitted her drug abuse and rehabilitation in 1994, and an expert testified that Kamhout's history of drug abuse was important for the diagnosis of her current condition. For the same reasons, the reference to Kamhout as a “cocaine addict” (before entering rehabilitation) was not improper. The reference to Kamhout as a “failure” was based not on her history of drug use but on other aspects of her employment and personal history, and Kamhout has not identified any basis for finding it improper.

Second, defense counsel accused Kamhout of “deliberately lying to her treating doctors” and thereby “manipulate[ing] them into prescribing narcotic pain medications.” The argument was supported by the evidence and was not improper, given the evidence concerning drug-seeking behavior, doctor shopping, and their relevance to the diagnosis of Kamhout's condition.

Third, Kamhout testified that she did not use illegal drugs between her rehabilitation treatment in 1994 and the incident in January 2008. It was not improper for defense counsel to argue, on various grounds, that her testimony on that point was “implausible.”

*5 Fourth, Kamhout testified on direct examination about having been “a very, you know, hands-on strict mother” to her son and about all of the activities she used to engage in with him, and she went on to testify that because of her ailments resulting from the incident with the wine bottle she does not feel like she is “a very good mother anymore,” is “not as involved in his life” as she used to be, and cannot, for example, attend her son's basketball games because it is “very difficult” for her to sit on the bleachers “for hours on end.” At one point in closing argument, defense counsel responded to that testimony as follows: “The next thing she wants us to believe is that she was a good mother. She was a cocaine addict for the first several years of her son's life, and then she was in rehab.... She can go to parties and take illegal drugs [a reference to the January 2008 incident], but she can't go to his basketball games?” Again, the argument was not improper. All of the facts to which counsel referred were supported by Kamhout's own testimony, and it was not improper for counsel to argue on the basis of those facts that, contrary to Kamhout's suggestion, the incident with the wine bottle has not interfered with Kamhout's purportedly good parenting.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant Kamhout's motion for new trial on the basis of defense counsel's references to drug use.

Kamhout argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Kamhout's motion in limine seeking to impose various sanctions against defendants on the basis of Vons' alleged concealment and spoliation of evidence, namely, a surveillance video recording of the incident with the wine bottle. Among the sanctions Kamhout requested were (1) the exclusion of any evidence, including opinion testimony, contradicting her account of how the incident occurred, and (2) a finding that defendants negligently constructed and maintained the wine display. The court denied the motion in its entirety. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion.

A declaration from a Vons “Loss Prevention Manager,” submitted in opposition to Kamhout's motion in limine, states the following relevant facts: At the time of the incident with the wine bottle, the Vons store at which the incident took place “had in-store surveillance cameras connected to a digital computer system. The cameras were constantly in operation and whatever they observed was temporarily captured on a computer hard drive.” “[T]he normal practice of the store was to maintain the video images on the hard drive for approximately eighteen ... days, at which time it would be recorded over.” Store management was supposed to copy surveillance video footage to a compact disk (CD) if the footage “captured customer injuries of a significant nature”; the decision to do so “depended on the type and degree of injury and whether the customer required the assistance of paramedics at the scene.” Any time a CD was created, it would be sent to Vons' “Public Liability Department.” The “loss prevention manager” conducted a search to attempt to discover whether a CD of Kamhout's incident with the wine bottle was ever created, and he was unable to find any evidence that such a CD was ever created. In particular, he found that the “Public Liability Department” had “no record that a copy of the video of the incident was made.”

*6 Rick Ziegler, the manager of the Vons store at which the incident occurred, testified at trial that it was “Vons policy” that the assistant manager “should copy that incident onto a computer disk,” and he admitted having testified at his deposition that the assistant manager “did burn a disk on that day.” He also testified, however, that he never actually saw a CD made by the assistant manager “with a date or Ms. Kamhout's name or anything like that.” Ziegler further testified that the video recording would remain on the hard drive of the computer “for at least 30 to 60 days.” Ziegler gave a similar account in excerpts of deposition testimony that Kamhout submitted in support of her motion in limine.

After the incident occurred, store management reported it to Vons' “general liability department.” Andrew Salcido, a senior claims examiner in the department, began an investigation within 24 to 72 hours of the incident. He spoke with Ziegler and asked him “to send in everything that he could on this incident.” Salcido testified that he never received a copy of the video footage. He also testified that he does not recall doing anything to follow up when he did not receive a copy of the video recording.

The incident occurred on November 19, 2004, and Kamhout retained an attorney within five days afterward. Her attorney first contacted Salcido by letter dated April 21, 2005. Salcido wrote back to Kamhout's attorney on May 3 and June 8, 2005, asking for “information to help us investigate and evaluate your client's claim,” but he received no response.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kamhout's motion in limine. (New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1422 [rulings on requests for discovery sanctions are reviewed for abuse of discretion]; Gordon v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1103, 1111 [evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion]; Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App .4th 1331, 1337–1338 [standard of review for ruling on motion in limine is determined by substance and effect of motion].) The only evidence that a CD copy of the video recording ever existed is Ziegler's testimony that the assistant manager made a CD. Ziegler did not testify that he saw the CD being made, and he testified that he never actually saw the CD himself. Vons submitted evidence that no CD had ever been made and that if it had, then it could no longer be located. Kamhout retained counsel within five days of the incident, but counsel did not contact Vons until five months after the incident. In the meantime, Vons had no reason to believe that the video footage needed to be preserved or that the incident with the wine bottle was of any consequence—no paramedics were summoned, Kamhout's skin was not even broken, and she left the store within ten minutes of the incident and made no further contact. And even if the recording would, in the ordinary course of business, have been stored on the hard drive for 30 to 60 days (as Ziegler testified) rather than 18 days (as stated in the loss prevention manager's declaration), the hard drive copy would have been overwritten long before Kamhout's counsel contacted Vons. For all of these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to find that Vons had engaged in misconduct warranting sanctions.[3]

*7 On a related point, Kamhout argues that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting her from presenting evidence that “on at least three prior occasions, Vons engaged in spoliation of videotape evidence from surveillance cameras showing other incidents .” Having reviewed the cited portion of the reporter's transcript, we are not persuaded.

The trial court did not prohibit Kamhout from presenting evidence and argument that Vons committed spoliation in this case, but the court did provisionally conclude under Evidence Code section 352 that it would cause undue consumption of time “to litigate what happened [in] four other cases where the videotape may have disappeared.” Nonetheless, the court stated that “at some point in the trial if [Kamhout] wanted to make an offer of proof based on the state of the evidence, I'll consider it. But at this point, it's highly unlikely I'm going to allow that evidence.” After some further discussion, the court reiterated both its provisional ruling and its willingness to revisit the issue upon request. Kamhout does not claim (or cite any portion of the reporter's transcript showing) that she made such a request or presented the offer of proof that the court expressly invited.

The trial in this matter spanned several weeks, with jury selection beginning on February 11, opening statements on February 14, closing arguments on February 29, and the jury's return of the verdict on March 4. The court did not prohibit Kamhout from presenting evidence and argument that Vons committed spoliation of the surveillance video of the incident with the wine bottle. The court did not abuse its discretion by provisionally determining, under Evidence Code section 352, that it would cause undue consumption of time to hold three or four additional mini-trials within this trial in order to allow the jury to evaluate Kamhout's allegations that Vons had committed spoliation in three or four other cases. (Akers v. Miller (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1147 [rulings on the exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 352 are reviewed for abuse of discretion].) Nor did the court abuse its discretion by expressly inviting Kamhout to request reconsideration of the issue and to make an offer of proof, an invitation that Kamhout apparently declined.

Defendants contend that the trial court committed legal error when it determined that their memorandum of costs was untimely. Reviewing the issue de novo (Crocker National Bank v. City and County of San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881, 888), we agree.

Under rule 3.1700(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court, “[a] prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of mailing of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under ... section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first.” Defendants served and filed their memorandum of costs within 180 days of entry of judgment and within 15 days of defendants' service of written notice of entry of judgment, and no party served notice of entry of judgment earlier. The memorandum of costs was therefore timely as long as it was not filed and served more than “15 days after the date of mailing of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under ... section 664.5” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1).)

*8 Kamhout contends that when the clerk mailed the judgment to the parties, that constituted “mailing of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under ... section 664.5” within the meaning of rule 1700(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court. We disagree. “[T]o be a clerk's mailed notice of entry of judgment under section 664.5, the notice ‘must affirmatively state that it was given upon “order of the court” or “under section 664 .5.” ‘ “ (Palmer v. GTE California, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1265, 1274, quoting Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide Weather Ins. Agency, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 51, 64.) The judgment does not state that it was to be mailed by the clerk, or notice was to be given by the clerk, by “order of the court” or “under section 664.5.” The judgment does not state that it was to be mailed by the clerk at all. The mailing of the judgment therefore did not constitute “mailing of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under ... section 664.5” within the meaning of rule 1700(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court.[4]

Because the trial court concluded that the memorandum of costs was untimely, the court did not address Kamhout's other arguments that the claimed costs were in various ways excessive or improper, and the court did not exercise any discretion it might have in determining the proper amount of recoverable costs. We therefore remand for further proceedings on the memorandum of costs and Kamhout's motion challenging it.

DISPOSITION

The order finding defendants' memorandum of costs untimely is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on both the appeal and the cross-appeal.