SEE TX R RAP RULE 47.2 FOR DESIGNATION AND SIGNING OF OPINIONS.

Before McKEITHEN, C.J., KREGER and HORTON, JJ.

*1 In this mandamus proceeding, M. seeks relief from temporary orders in a suit affecting the parent child relationship.[1] M. filed an emergency motion for a protective order in which he alleged that one of the children made an outcry of abuse against the children's mother, W. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court signed an order that found M. had placed the children at significant risk of danger to their physical and emotional welfare. The trial court entered temporary orders that provided for no contact between M. and the children. The temporary orders also required M. to surrender control of the children's 529 college savings plans to W. The trial court further authorized forensic examination of two cellular phones that had been admitted into evidence during the hearing, ordered W.'s counsel to designate a forensic examiner to perform the examination, and ordered M. to pay $5,000 to W.'s attorney for the services of a forensic examiner. Finally, the trial court ordered M. to pay W.'s attorney's fees in the amount of $11,500.

In his first issue, M. complains that the trial court has refused to include a reporter's record of the interview that the trial court conducted in chambers with the parties' oldest child, A. The Family Code authorizes the trial court to interview a child in chambers. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.009 (West 2008). A reporter's record of the interview has been transcribed and a copy has been filed with the mandamus record under seal. See id. § 153.009(f). We overrule issue one.

In his second issue, M. presents several related complaints concerning the cellular phones of M. and A.M. contends the phones were illegally seized. The record shows that M. voluntarily tendered the phone to opposing counsel during cross-examination for the limited purpose of reading an exchange of text messages between M. and A. when opposing counsel marked and offered the phones into evidence. When opposing counsel began reading text exchanges between M. and other persons from M.'s phone, M. objected to the invasion of his privacy. Rather than return the cellular phones to their owners (or, in the case of the child, to a person possessing the right to control the child's communications) at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court retained the phones in evidence and authorized counsel for W. to select an expert to perform a forensic examination of the data contained within the devices. In its order, the trial court found that there is a reasonable probability that there is discoverable information relating to the proceedings and that it is necessary to preserve evidence regarding the safety and welfare of the children.

Although the cellular phones were admitted in evidence, the evidentiary purpose of the exhibits concerned a limited amount of data stored on the devices, not the devices themselves. The relevant data was read into the record during the emergency hearing. For purposes of the emergency hearing, the unpublished data and the physical devices served no purpose. The trial court erred in admitting the cellular phones into evidence. Furthermore, the phones could have been withdrawn from evidence because the devices were currently being used by M. and A. during their daily activities and the data that had been published during the hearing could easily have been reproduced for the record. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 75b(a).

*2 The trial court retained the cellular phones for the express purpose of making them available to W.'s forensic examiner. The order permits W. to have access to the devices after the hearing had concluded because the trial court determined that the devices probably contain data that will be relevant to future proceedings. The suit affecting the parent child relationship is an actively pending case in which future evidentiary hearings have been scheduled.

Opposing counsel made an oral motion for a forensic examination of the cellular phones during the emergency hearing, which was granted and included in the trial court's order. However, such an oral motion for electronic discovery is not a permissible discovery device. See In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309, 315 (Tex.2009). Rule 196.4 provides that, “[t]o obtain discovery of data or information that exists in electronic or magnetic form, the requesting party must specifically request production of electronic or magnetic data....” Tex.R. Civ. P. 196.4. This was not done in this case. The Texas Supreme Court has expressly summarized the proper procedure under Rule 196.4. In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d at 322. The trial court should limit discovery so that the burden of production does not outweigh its likely benefit. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 192.4(b). A party from whom discovery is sought is entitled to protection from an unreasonable invasion of personal, constitutional, or property rights. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 192.6. After a proper discovery request is submitted in writing, the responding party may assert objections and privileges by withholding the privileged information and producing a privilege log. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 193.3(a).

In this case, the trial court determined that additional data that had not been published during the emergency hearing could be relevant in future proceedings, and the trial court articulated grounds for retaining the actual exhibits in safekeeping pending further proceedings. Because the cellular phones were admitted into evidence without having first been produced through the normal discovery procedures or through a subpoena duces tecum, M. never had an opportunity to object to the scope of such discovery request or assert privileges that would prevent the opposing party from freely perusing the information contained on the devices. The trial court attempted to address the obvious privilege issues by ordering an in camera review of the data, but by ordering the review to occur after the opposing party's expert had examined the data, the trial court provided no protection at all.

Guiding precedent requires strict compliance first with the rules of discovery to choose the least intrusive means of retrieval and direct access to another party's electronic storage devices is discouraged. In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d at 316, 322; In re Clark, 345 S.W.3d 209, 212–13 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2011, orig. proceeding). The trial court must address a party's objections and privilege, privacy, and confidentiality concerns by providing a mechanism through which the party may withhold from discovery any information that is privileged or confidential and instead provide a privilege log of non-exempt communications. Id., see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 193.3(a), (b), (c). Because the trial court ordered intrusive discovery of the cellular phones for use in future hearings without first having the parties comply with Rule 196 and without providing an adequate mechanism for the assertion of objections and privileges concerning data that had not been published in the previous hearing, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 196; see also Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 315–16. “Mandamus relief is available when the trial court compels production beyond the permissible bounds of discovery.” Id. at 322.

*3 M. also contends the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay certain fees and expenses because there were no pleadings on file to support the orders. In addition, M. seeks mandamus relief from provisions in the April 19, 2012 temporary order that modify the temporary orders signed on January 10, 2012. M. cites no caselaw or statutory authority in support of his arguments that the orders violated due process. See Tex.R.App. P. 52.3(h) ( “The petition must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the appendix or record.”). In a mandamus proceeding, the relator has the responsibility for showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex.1994) (orig.proceeding). These particular arguments have been inadequately briefed and will not be considered. Tex.R.App. P. 52.3(h); In re Fountain, No. 01–11–00198–CV, 2011 WL 1755550, at *5–6 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 2, 2011, orig. proceeding) (mem. op. on reh'g).

M. contends that the trial court's temporary order removing M. as joint managing conservator and ordering that he have no contact with the children was an abuse of discretion and a violation of due process. M. argues that there is no sound basis for him not to remain a joint managing conservator and no evidence to overcome the presumption that the standard possession order is in the best interest of the children. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 153.131, 153.252 (West 2008). These presumptions are rebuttable. Id. While a modification suit is pending, the trial court may make an order that effectively changes custody if the order is necessary to protect the children's safety and welfare. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 156.006 (West Supp.2011). In this case, the trial court heard evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that the order was necessary to prevent significant impairment of the children's physical health and emotional development. See id.

We are confident that the trial court will vacate that part of its order of April 19, 2012, that orders a forensic examination of the cellular phones in the court's possession and for payment of the fees associated with such examination. The writ of mandamus shall issue only in the event the trial court fails to act in accordance with this opinion. Our temporary order staying parts of the trial court's order is lifted.

PETITION CONDITIONALLY GRANTED.