Clarke v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
Clarke v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
2009 WL 1838995 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
June 22, 2009
Freeman, Debra C., United States Magistrate Judge
Summary
The Court denied Chase's request to keep a July 2005 internal e-mail privileged, and directed them to produce it to Plaintiffs. The Court also noted that the declarations submitted by Chase had been produced to Plaintiffs, except for one which was produced in redacted form.
Additional Decisions
Andrew CLARKE, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., Defendant
v.
J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., Defendant
No. 08 Civ. 02400(CM)(DF)
United States District Court, S.D. New York
June 22, 2009
Freeman, Debra C., United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
*1 Defendant JPMorgan Bank, N.A., sued herein as J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (“Chase”), has requested that the Court revisit its ruling of May 21, 2009, requiring Chase to produce in discovery a July 2005 internal e-mail. In its May 21 Order (Dkt.81), the Court found that Chase had not adequately demonstrated that the e-mail in question was privileged. After the issuance of the Court's Order, Chase sought to make such a demonstration, by submitting to the Court a number of declarations of Chase employees. (See Letter to the Court from Sam S. Shaulson, Esq., dated May 27, 2009, enclosing declarations of Mark Calandra, Christa Lyons, and Simon Lane, dated May 27, 2009; see also Letter to the Court from Sam S. Shaulson, Esq., dated June 8, 2009, enclosing a supplemental declaration of Christa Lyons, dated June 8, 2009.[1])
Upon receiving Chase's submissions, the Court held a conference with all counsel on June 17, 2009. Having now considered the parties' arguments at that conference, and having considered all of the parties' written submissions, including Chase's most recent submission, which shows the particular portions of the e-mail that Chase now contends are privileged (see Letter to the Court from Sam S. Shaulson, Esq., dated June 18, 2009, and attachments thereto), the Court adheres to its prior determination that Chase has not met its burden of showing that the document—or any portions of the document—are privileged.
If anything, the declarations submitted by Chase show that the e-mail does not contain legal advice. Although Chase had previously argued that the e-mail contained a recommendation by one or more lawyers to their corporate client as to how Chase should ensure FLSA compliance, two of the submitted declarations show that, rather than having been asked to make a recommendation, in-house counsel had been charged with making a corporate decision as to whether certain jobs would be reclassified. Both Mr. Calandra and Mr. Lane, in their declarations, specifically state that it was their understanding that Chase's “decisions” regarding the exemption status of various job titles “were being made by” Chase's lawyers. Indeed, Mr. Calandra states that, “[i]n fact, members of the Senior Leadership Team were expecting Chase's lawyers to make decisions about the exemption status of certain positions and to inform the Senior Leadership team of those decisions” (emphasis added); similarly, Mr. Lane states that he “expected to be updated on those decisions” (emphasis added). This is consistent with the overall tenor of the e-mail, which, upon a close read, does not advise the corporation with respect to whether certain jobs should, or should not, be reclassified under the FLSA, but rather states that reclassification decisions “have been made,” and describes when the implemented changes would be effective. Although the Calandra and Lane declarations also note that the e-mail conveyed the “reasons” for counsel's decision, the reasons that may be provided for a business decision that has already been made, even where that decision has been made by counsel based on a legal analysis, is not advice to a client.[2]
*2 For these reasons as well as those stated in the Court's initial decision, Chase's request that the Court revise its prior ruling is denied. Chase is directed to produce the July 2005 e-mail to Plaintiffs, forthwith.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
These declarations were initially submitted to the Court for in camera review, based on a contention by Chase that the declarations themselves contained privileged information. It is the Court's understanding, however, that the declarations have since been produced by Chase to Plaintiffs, except that the June 8, 2009 Lyons declaration has been produced to Plaintiffs in redacted form.
Where litigation is anticipated, a lawyer's thought process in reaching certain conclusions might be protectable as work product, but, here, the reclassification decision was apparently made, at least in part, to avoid potential litigation, not “ ‘because of’ existing or expected litigation.” United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir.1998).