Essentially, the hearing officer found that VCU did not act improperly in giving the appellant, Doris Hickman, a Group III Notice and terminating her from her employment as an administrative staff assistant in the president's office. The Group III Notice and termination were for appellant's having sent, without the president's or anyone else's permission, emails addressed to the president to persons outside the president's office. Not only was this something that even the most novice secretary or administrative assistant should have known was improper without being told, the hearing officer specifically found that:

Hearing Officer's Decision of December 15, 2003, at 3 (footnotes omitted).

Appellant's challenge to the hearing officer's decision is three-fold. First, she argues that the specific charge against her-“Unauthorized removal of state records, state property, and the property of other persons and breaches of confidentiality”-is invalid because one cannot “remove” email. The court disagrees. While it is true that the original emails remained on the office computer after they were sent by appellant to others, copies of those emails were “removed” when appellant forwarded them out of the office. Moreover, even if the court is wrong-and the court certainly does not profess to be an expert in the field of computers or computer terminology-and emails are not technically “copied” or “removed” when they are forwarded or sent to someone other than the addressee, the charge against appellant also included “breaches of confidentiality.” Whatever the correct terminology might be for what appellant did with the president's emails, it was a breach of confidentiality. Appellant's argument on this point is rejected.

The court also rejects appellant's second ground for reversal: the hearing officer's admitting into evidence the fact that appellant had made a false statement in her employment application. Specifically, appellant said in her application that she had never been convicted of a felony when, in fact, she had been. Appellant contends that since the Group III Notice for which she was terminated did not charge her with falsifying her employment application, any consideration of such falsification by the hearing officer was improper. As the hearing officer pointed out, however, a hearing officer must consider “all circumstances-both mitigating and aggravating-in determining whether the discipline meted out by an agency is commensurate with the offense.” Hearing Officer's Decision on Reconsideration dated December 29, 2003, at 4. The admission of the false statement in the application was proper.

*2 Lastly, appellant argues that the hearing officer's decision should be reversed because he allowed into evidence two “Written Counselings” offered by VCU as aggravating circumstances. It is appellant's positions that the counselings were not reprimands or otherwise disciplinary in nature and should not have been considered. Again, however, the hearing officer was required to consider all relevant circumstances in deciding whether VCU's action in issuing the Group III Notice and in terminating appellant was appropriate, and the written counselings were part of those circumstances. It was entirely appropriate for him to admit them into evidence.

Finding no error in the hearing officer's decision, it will be affirmed. A copy of an order is enclosed.