*1 Feather River Anesthesia Medical Group and others sued the Fremont-Rideout Health Group and others for unfair competition. This discovery dispute is specifically between Feather River Anesthesia Medical Group (“Feather River”) and Fremont-Rideout Health Group (“Fremont-Rideout”).

Discovery was initiated in March 2002. Almost a full year later, Feather River filed a motion to compel further responses to Request for Production of Documents and for Award of Sanctions. The trial court granted the motion to compel and awarded monetary sanctions in the amount of $6,455. Upon a motion for clarification, the trial court modified its order, but upheld the sanctions against Fremont-Rideout. Fremont-Rideout appeals the award of sanctions.

On appeal, Fremont-Rideout asserts (1) its objections were substantially justified, (2) the court applied the incorrect standard in its award of sanctions, and (3) the award of sanctions was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 27, 2000, Feather River entered into an agreement with Fremont-Rideout to provide exclusive anesthesia services for a period of three years. The agreement would automatically renew for a three-year term unless either party provided written notice of intent not to renew at least 240 days prior to the expiration of the current term. The agreement provided for renegotiation of compensation after the end of each 12-month period if requested within 60 days of the end of each 12-month term. Feather River sought to exercise this renegotiation clause in a May 2001 letter to Fremont-Rideout. The contractually mandated negotiations between Fremont-Rideout and Feather River broke down, which resulted in Fremont-Rideout obtaining anesthesia services from another provider.

Feather River filed a complaint in January 2002 against Fremont-Rideout for unfair business practices and unfair competition, violation of the Cartwright Act, and various tort and contract claims.

In April 2002, after discovery was initiated, Fremont-Rideout filed a motion to disqualify McDonough, Holland and Allen (McDonough). Feather River associated in as counsel, Salem and Green, in response to the pending disqualification motion. The principal partner, David Salem, was a former member of McDonough and active participant in the prior representation of Fremont-Rideout. On May 23, 2002, the trial court granted the motion and disqualified McDonough.

On June 4, 2002, Fremont-Rideout filed a motion to disqualify Salem and Green. Feather River associated in as counsel Downey, Brand, Seymour and Rohwer, LLP in response to the disqualification motion against Salem and Green. This motion was denied in September 2002.

Feather River served its first set of Form Interrogatories and Requests for Production (“RFP No. 1”) on Fremont-Rideout, March 14, 2002. The parties stipulated to a June 14, 2002, due date for RFP No. 1. Fremont-Rideout mistakenly provided Feather River with draft, not final, responses on June 14, 2002. In a letter dated June 18, 2002, Feather River informed Fremont-Rideout of the deficiencies in the discovery responses. By June 20, 2002, Fremont-Rideout submitted new responses by objecting to each request. Fremont-Rideout's primary objection was on the basis that Feather River's counsel of record was subject to disqualification. Feather River's counsel, Salem and Green, had previously represented Fremont-Rideout and was subject to disqualification. Fremont-Rideout also objected to the requests to the extent they infringed on the attorney-client, physician-patient, work product, and peer review confidentiality privileges.

*2 Feather River served its second set of Form Interrogatories and Requests for Production (“RFP No. 2”) on Fremont-Rideout, on June 21, 2002.

On June 28, 2002, after McDonough had been disqualified and while the motion to disqualify Salem and Green was pending, Feather River filed its first motion to compel. On August 2, 2002, the court granted Feather River's motion to compel and ordered Fremont-Rideout to provide further responses to RFP No. 1 and RFP No. 2 within 10 calendar days after the decision regarding the Salem and Green disqualification motion. Fremont-Rideout provided responses and produced documents on September 23, 2002. The responses repeated objections asserting attorney-client, work product, physician-patient, or peer review confidentiality privileges.

On its belief that Fremont-Rideout failed to provide adequate responses to both RFP No. 1 and RFP No. 2, Feather River sent a meet and confer letter to Fremont-Rideout's counsel, Eileen Ridley, on October 28, 2002. The letter set out the alleged defects and deficiencies in Fremont-Rideout's responses. In a letter dated December 23, 2002, Fremont-Rideout responded to Feather River's letter and defended Fremont-Rideout's responses, but did not supplement the responses.

Feather River sent a second meet and confer letter on January 24, 2003, to Fremont-Rideout. On February 6, 2003, Fremont-Rideout responded with another letter rather than providing responses to the RFP's. Fremont-Rideout eventually provided a privilege log and supplemented its document production on February 14, 2003. Unhappy with the supplemental document production and asserting Fremont-Rideout failed to address the deficiencies contained in the responses, Feather River sent a final meet and confer letter March 4, 2003. The letter informed Fremont-Rideout that Feather River would file a motion to compel if it failed to respond sufficiently by March 7, 2003. Fremont-Rideout's responsive letter defended its responses, but did not amend the responses or supplement production.

On March 10, 2003, Feather River filed its second motion to compel Fremont-Rideout to answer RFP No. 1 and RFP No. 2 in the manner required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031. Feather River also requested an award of sanctions for the misuse of the discovery process pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2023, subdivision (a)(4)-(6). The matter was set for hearing on April 14, 2003.

The trial court granted Feather River's motion to compel and awarded sanctions in the amount of $6,455 against Fremont-Rideout and counsel. The trial court required Fremont-Rideout to submit further responses in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031. The trial court ordered Fremont-Rideout to provide further responses and produce documents withheld based on overruled objections, including privileged documents. The trial court required Fremont-Rideout to assert whether responsive documents existed, whether they had the responsive documents and, if not, who had them.

*3 Fremont-Rideout filed a motion for clarification and stay of the court's April 14, 2003, order due to concerns involving the privileged nature of some of the information directed to be produced and the trial court's apparent denial of objections based on privilege. The court granted the request for stay and clarification and set arguments for May 9, 2003. During oral argument, Fremont-Rideout raised the privilege objections, but did not object to the remainder of the April 14 order.

On May 14, 2003, the trial court issued an order granting (1) further relief to Feather River by requiring further clarification by Fremont-Rideout; (2) limited relief to Fremont-Rideout, by protecting privileged documents; and (3) the same award of sanctions. The court ordered Fremont-Rideout to produce further responses regarding efforts made to retrieve electronic data. The court modified the April 14 order by striking the requirement to produce certain documents which Fremont-Rideout had claimed were privileged, but required Fremont-Rideout to list all privileged documents withheld in a privilege log. The court did not disturb most of the relief granted to Feather River by the April 14 order. Finally, the court denied Fremont-Rideout's request that the sanction award be vacated.

DISCUSSION

Fremont-Rideout contends the award of sanctions imposed by the trial court was an abuse of discretion and should be reversed. Fremont-Rideout asserts the court's May 14 order, which partially modified the prior order and upheld Fremont-Rideout's privilege objections, established that the sanctions against Fremont-Rideout were awarded in error. We disagree.

In evaluating whether the trial court erred in imposing discovery sanctions, we use the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (Foothill Properties v. Lyon/Copley Corona Associates (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1557.) “[The sanction] can be overturned only if it was not based on a reasoned judgment or is at odds with ‘ “ ‘legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.’ “ ‘ “ (Ibid.) A trial court has broad discretion to impose discovery sanctions “subject to reversal only for arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical action.” (Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Cropper (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 901, 904.) The appellant has the burden of establishing abuse of discretion. (Young v. Rosenthal (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 96, 114.)

A court may impose monetary sanctions for failure to comply with the Civil Discovery Act or for other misuses of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023, subd. (b)(1).) Misuses of the discovery process include: “(4) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. [¶] (5) Making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery. [¶] ... [¶] (6) Making, without substantial justification, an evasive response to discovery.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023, subd. (a)(4)-(6).)

Moreover, the trial court “shall impose a monetary sanction under [Code of Civil Procedure] Section 2023 against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to an inspection demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031, subd. (m).) The unsuccessful party has the burden of convincing the court it acted with “substantial justification” in opposing the motion. (California Shellfish Inc. v. United Shellfish Co. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 16, 25.)

*4 After having six months to respond to discovery requests, Fremont-Rideout provided Feather River with evasive responses and boilerplate objections, a blatant misuse of the discovery process. Fremont-Rideout's first response to discovery was not a response, but instead contained only general objections, at least some of them unwarranted. After Feather River's first motion to compel, Fremont-Rideout finally provided incomplete responses and produced some documents. Feather River made several attempts to meet and confer with Fremont-Rideout before it filed its second motion to compel. Feather River, among other things, sought assurance from Fremont-Rideout that it had provided complete responses and produced all relevant documents.

Fremont-Rideout argues that it acted with substantial justification because it successfully opposed Feather River's motion to compel. In its clarification of the April 14 order, the court sustained Fremont-Rideout's original privilege objections but left the remainder of the order intact. Hence, Fremont-Rideout was not the prevailing party. The April 14 order granting the motion to compel also directly contradicts Fremont-Rideout's assertion that it complied in good faith with its obligations under the Civil Discovery Act throughout the discovery process and was substantially justified in opposing the motion. Hence, Fremont-Rideout failed to carry its burden of proving it acted with substantial justification in opposing the motion. (California Shellfish Inc. v. United Shellfish Co., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.)

Fremont-Rideout also asserts the court “did not find that [Fremont-Rideout's] opposition to the motion to compel was not substantially justified.” In fact, the court gave no reasons for awarding sanctions against Fremont-Rideout. Fremont-Rideout, citing this silence, contends the court impliedly found the opposition to the motion to compel was substantially justified when it sustained Fremont-Rideout's original privilege objections and thus applied the improper standard in imposing sanctions. This contention is without merit. Throughout the May 9, 2003, clarification hearing the court discussed Fremont-Rideout's burden to convince the court that it acted with substantial justification in opposing the motion to compel. In the same order sustaining some of Fremont-Rideout's objections, the trial court again ordered the sanctions. From this it is readily apparent that the trial court concluded Fremont-Rideout's conduct in other regards was not substantially justified.

Fremont-Rideout claims: “The evidence on record establishes that [Fremont-Rideout], before and after the April 14th hearing on the motion to compel, complied in good faith with its obligations under the Civil Discovery Act and did not engage in any abuse of the discovery process, let alone act in a manner that would merit sanctions.” It then immediately refutes its own claim, admitting that some of the information the trial court ordered Fremont-Rideout to disclose had been requested by Feather River and had not already been disclosed. That Fremont-Rideout's objections to disclosure of the some of the evidence may have been valid does not make its refusal to disclose other discoverable evidence substantially justified.

*5 In some respects, Fremont-Rideout's narration of the procedural history of this case departs from reality. For example, Fremont-Rideout asserts: “[T]he Court ultimately denied [Feather River's] motion and upheld [Fremont-Rideout's] objections.” Even in its order clarifying the original order, the trial court imposed on Fremont-Rideout several obligations-discovery remedies-to insure full compliance with its duties under the Discovery Act. Fremont-Rideout had to report, with respect to electronic data, the authority and expertise of the person who searched the data and give assurances that the person searching the data had access to all relevant data. It was required to give assurances that it made efforts to retrieve any relevant data that may have been deleted. The court required Fremont-Rideout to confirm by further response that it had provided in a privilege log reference to all documents concerning which it was claiming a privilege. Fremont-Rideout was required to provide further responses to Feather River specifically stating that they were not withholding any document based on the fact that the documents were in the hands of someone else. These are just the duties imposed on Fremont-Rideout in the order granting clarification of the original order. Fremont-Rideout makes no argument that the trial court did not have authority under the Civil Discovery Act to impose these duties as a result of Fremont-Rideout's discovery abuse. This appeal attacks the sanctions, not the discovery remedies.

Fremont-Rideout contends the trial court mistakenly believed it was not awarding sanctions but instead was awarding mandatory costs. In response to Fremont-Rideout's argument that its conduct did not warrant sanctions, the court stated: “I guess there's a couple of ways to look at it. Sanctions are not really sanctions in the sense that anybody gets reported to the State Bar. Sanctions are provided in the code to cover the costs of bringing these things into court.” Nothing in this quote reveals that the trial court felt it was compelled to make the award just to cover Feather River's costs. Indeed, the trial court went on to discuss whether Fremont-Rideout had substantial justification for its conduct, reflecting its knowledge of the proper standard for awarding sanctions.

Finally, the court's order imposing sanctions was not defective for failing to specify the basis for sanctions. The trial court is not required to make findings at all. (Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 256, 261.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff shall recover its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 27(a).)