Before addressing Defendants' Motions, the Court finds it appropriate to refer to its August 21, 2007 Order, which Defendants acknowledge in their August 22, 2007 Reply (doc. 160), and which the Court entered before the instant motions were ripe for review (doc. 157). Such Order addresses the context of the discovery and evidence in this case (Id.). The Court took the government's assertion in good faith that its case “is based upon proffers made by Berkeley employees and not on email communication” (Id.). The Court further noted that “to whatever extent this case is reliant on documentary evidence, all such evidence is completely accessible by Defendants” (Id.). The Court concluded that “Defendants are now on notice that the Court is adverse to any sort of complaints that discovery should be deepened or extended” while ordering the government to disclose its evidence to Defendants at the September 27, 2007 hearing (Id.). With these conclusions in mind, the Court does not see discovery disputes in this matter that will not be resolved by the September 27, 2007 hearing. In any event, the Court addresses Defendants' motions, seriatum:

Defendants complain they are presently without the means or knowledge to determine, “what, from [the] undifferentiated and enormous universe of emails and other electronic information, the Government intends to use, what constitutes Brady materials, what documents are material to the defense, and how to authenticate documents that the defense believes are material to the trial” (doc. 141). They argue the government has failed, despite earlier representations, to identify the specific sources of electronically stored information (Id.). They further argue that “hard copy discovery production is in similar disarray” and that “to narrow the scope of discovery disputes it now behooves the government to identify what small percentage of these materials will be used as evidence at trial” (Id.). Defendants itemize in table format electronically stored information they contend the government has failed to produce to them, as well as questions they have formulated based on the discovery the government has provided (Id.). They argue the questions they have raised require a magistrate judge or a special master for their resolution now, or otherwise the trial risks to be complicated with discovery problems (Id.).

*2 The government responded to Defendants' motion, arguing there is no need to appoint a magistrate judge or special master because Defendants' allegations are without merit (doc. 153). The government then proceeds to address with great specificity each of Defendants' itemized questions, also in table format, and concludes that Defendants' demands are for information “they currently possess; to which they are not entitled; which do[es] not fall within the ... parameters of Rule 16 ...; or which simply does not exist” (Id.). The government argues that although Defendants argue that the volume of discovery the government turned over to them is cumbersome, Defendants' own motion shows they clearly have the ability to search and use the evidence (Id.).

Defendants, as noted above, acknowledge in their Reply the Court's August 21, 2007 Order, noting that because the government must particularize its evidence and witnesses at the September 27, 2007 hearing, the requirements of Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(ii) will be fully met (doc. 160). However, Defendants argue they are further entitled under Rule 16 to copies of evidence that are material to the preparation of their defense, and any evidence obtained from or that belongs to Defendants (Id. citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i) and (iii)). They reiterate five specific requests which in their view are unresolved by the government's Response: 1) any and all materials provided to the government by the Federal Trade Commission and/or Attorneys General, 2) all Brady material, 3) two Wagner interview reports, 4) documents received from the U.S. Postal Service, and 5) I.P. logs from Nuvox and Verio (Id.). In addition, Defendants argue, rather forcefully, that the government takes an “unprecedented” view that it is not required to produce a copy of a computer the government has imaged or copied, a contention supported by no reference to case law, to Rule 16 or its advisory committee notes, or to the policies upon which the rule was enacted (Id.).

Having reviewed this matter, the Court finds the government's position well taken on Defendants' “Omnibus” motion. The Court is satisfied that the government has been complying with its Rule 16 obligations. The Court finds it difficult to understand how Defendants are prejudiced when the government has already turned over everything it has imaged or copied. The Court sees nothing unprecedented here. Clearly, as argued by the government, Defendants' motion demonstrates they are capably navigating the discovery, which primarily all came from Defendants in the first place. As for Defendants' five specific requests, the Court agrees that, as a matter of clarification, all Brady material within the universe of non-privileged evidence that the government has in its possession, should be produced a week prior to the trial date. United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1283 (6th Cir.1988)(compliance with Brady doctrine is achieved with disclosure of exculpatory information in time for effective use at trial), United States v. Farley, 2 F.3d 645, 654 (6th Cir.1993), United States v. Solomonyan, 452 F.Supp.2d 334, 352-53 (S.D.N.Y .2006)(immediate disclosure of Brady materials not required where government represents that it will produce such materials in a timely fashion). The government has indicated it has already provided Defendants with all materials made available to it by the F .T.C., and Defendants' concerns regarding other F.T.C. materials are based on speculation. The government further indicates it is unaware of whether any I.P. logs exist on the materials it obtained from Verio, and it does not plan to use such evidence at trial. The Court is unconvinced that the balance of Defendants' reiterated requests fall within the scope of Rule 16. Should the government determine that any such documents are material to the preparation of the defense, then it should certainly produce them.

*3 Defendants' second motion, although styled as a motion pertaining to hard copy discovery as opposed to electronic discovery, is virtually the same in substance as the “Omnibus” motion. The government argues as much in its Response (doc. 153). The Court finds the government's position well-taken, and denies Defendant's motion for the same reasons it denies the Omnibus motion.

Defendants move the Court for an order authorizing a pretrial subpoena to all the internet service providers utilized by Steven Warshak and/or his corporate entities, arguing that such request comports with the requirements of United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699-700 (1974)(in order to require pretrial production, the moving party must show 1) the documents are evidentiary and relevant, 2) that they are not otherwise procurable in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence, 3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in advance of trial and that failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial, and 4) that the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a “fishing expedition.”)(doc. 143). Defendants argue the internet protocol (“I.P.”) logs they seek are relevant because they “should detail whether anyone changed passwords or other account information without proper authorization, or improperly accessed email accounts” (Id.). Defendants argue they cannot procur the documents in advance of trial by exercising due diligence, as they have asked for the I.P. logs from the government, and the government would not produce them, and neither would Nuvox without legal process (Id.). When Defendants filed a lawsuit against Nuvox, the state court judge believed the documents should be obtained through this Court (Id.).

Defendants argue if they are unable to access the information in advance of trial, there won't be time to process it and make use of it, and such records are vital to Defendants' ability to bring particularized motions to suppress (Id.). Finally Defendants argue they bring their motion in good faith, and that the request would put no burden on the internet service providers (Id.).

The government responds that Defendants fail under Nixon to establish that the information they seek from internet service providers is evidentiary and relevant, or that they must obtain as much information in as many categories as their proposed subpoenas relate (doc. 153). The government submits that unless Defendants can supplement their motion with more specific and compelling facts, it should be denied (Id.).

Having reviewed this matter, the Court finds the government's position well-taken. Defendants premise their claim of relevance on speculation, and have not met their burden of demonstrating how they are impeded from preparing for trial. For these reasons, the Court denies Defendants' motion.

*4 Defendant Amar Chavan moves the Court for relief from deadline to file motions in limine and for severance (docs.170, 179). As the Court has set no deadlines as to liminal motions, and in fact welcomes such motions even in the course of trial, the Court can dispose of the former part of Chavan's motion as moot.

Defendant Chavan also asks for leave to file a Motion to Sever, which he states he cannot formulate until after the September 27, 2007 hearing (doc. 170). Defendant argues he is at risk to be prejudiced in this case, as he was a mere low-level information technology employee who at worst engaged in some conduct at the instruction of superiors that has never before been proven illegal (Id.). Citing United States v. Tsanges, 582 F.Supp. 237 (S . D.Ohio, 1984), Defendant Chavan argues this Court has in the past ordered separate trials where it found danger of unfair prejudice to co-Defendants by association with a co-Defendant who was an attorney (Id.). Here, Chavan signals, an attorney is a co-Defendant (Id.).

The government responds that Defendant Chavan is properly joined, and a Defendant is not entitled to severance simply because there is greater proof against a co-Defendant (doc. 178, citing United States v. Harris, 9 F.3d 493, 500 (6th Cir.1993)). The government quotes United States v. Welch, 97 F.3d 142, 148 (6th Cir.1993), for the proposition that “juries are presumed capable of sorting evidence and separately considering each account and each Defendant” (Id.). The government contends that Defendant Chavan was not a low-level information technology employee, but rather Chief Information Officer (Id.). Finally, the government argues that the Tsanges court found severance appropriate where there was no conspiracy charged (Id.). Here, Tsanges is inapplicable, argues the government, as a Defendant Chavan is charged with conspiracy, and as such, there is a prima facie presumption of proper joinder (Id.).

Having reviewed this matter, the Court again finds the government's position well-taken. The Court finds no basis to sever Defendant Chavan's case from those of his co-Defendants. The government is correct that joinder is presumptively proper among co-Defendants, Tsanges, 582 F.Supp. At 239, and the government's production of its evidence on September 27, 2007, should have no bearing on the question. For these reasons, the Court denies Defendant Chavan's motion.

For the reasons indicated herein, the Court finds the instant motions without merit, moot, or rendered moot by the September 27, 2007 hearing. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants' Omnibus Electronic Discovery Motion (doc. 141), Defendants' Motion for Pretrial Subpoenas to Internet Service Providers Pursuant to Rule 17(c) (doc. 143), Defendants' Motion for Rule 16 Discovery (doc. 144), and Defendant Chavan's Motion for Relief from Deadline to File Motions in Limine and Severance (doc. 170). The Court further CLARIFIES that it has set no deadline for motions in limine, and that the government should produce all Brady materials one week prior to the trial of this matter.

*5 SO ORDERED.