Frost, Gregory L., United States District Judge
In an employment discrimination suit by a group of female employees against a bank, the court granted an adverse inference against defendant for failure to institute a litigation hold.
Plaintiffs claimed that defendant subjected female employees to conditions of employment substantially different than those for male employees, including purposely directing wealthy clients away from female employees at a major call center. To prove their claim, plaintiffs sought discovery of defendant’s login data records that indicated which skills were assigned to individual consultants. Skill assignment controlled the queue order in which a mortgage consultant was placed. Defendant failed to produce the requested information and plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the data’s production. Plaintiffs further asserted that defendant violated a litigation hold by continuing to engage in routine data purging. A magistrate judge ruled in favor of plaintiffs and ordered defendant to produce the requested documents.
Defendant not only failed to follow the magistrate’s order, but also continued to delete data. Defendant insisted that the data deletion was based on an assumption that the litigation at hand involved only a single mortgage consultant and not a class. The court noted that was not a plausible assumption because a magistrate judge had previously ordered defendant to produce the exact data in question. Plaintiffs moved for discovery sanctions in response to defendant’s failure to preserve.
In granting plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions the district court found that: "[d]efendant’s failure to establish a litigation hold is inexcusable. The multiple notices that should have triggered a hold and Defendant’s dubious failure if not outright refusal to recognize or accept the scope of this litigation and that the relevant data reaches beyond the statutory period present exceptional circumstances that remove the conduct here from the protections provided by Rule 37(e)."
Defendant’s culpability in destroying the data was beyond negligence, and justified a greater sanction than an adverse inference alone. However, the court held that the defendant’s actions were not egregious enough to warrant a default judgment for the plaintiffs. The court reasoned that the appropriate sanction combined a denial of defendant’s pending motion for summary judgment and an adverse inference instruction.
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant
Counsel
*168 David J. Staudt, Debra M. Lawrence, Baltimore, MD, Solvita A. McMillan, Cleveland, OH, Deborah A. Kane, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiff.Angelique Paul Newcomb, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Eve Melinda Ellinger, Ice Miller LLP, Columbus, OH, Mark S. Dichter, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Tracy Stott Pyles, Littler Mendelson, Columbus, OH, for Defendant.
ORDER
**4 Objections, motions, applications, and requests relating to discovery shall not be filed in this Court, under any provision in Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 or 37 unless counsel have first exhausted among themselves all extrajudicial means for resolving the differences. After extrajudicial means for the resolution of differences about discovery have been exhausted, then in lieu of immediately filing a motion under Rules 26 and 37, Fed.R.Civ.P., and S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 37.2, any party may first seek an informal telephone conference with the judicial officer assigned to supervise discovery in the case.
To the extent that extrajudicial means of resolution of differences have not disposed of the matter, parties seeking discovery or a protective order may then move for a protective order or a motion to compel discovery pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c) or 37(a). Such motion shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum and by a certification of counsel setting forth the extrajudicial means which have been attempted to resolve differences. Only those specific portions of the discovery documents reasonably necessary to a resolution *171 of the motion shall be included as an attachment to it.