The defendants-in-interpleader are George Yuen (“Yuen”), the decedent's former partner, and the Estate of Robert von Tobien (the “Estate”), the sole beneficiaries of which are Barbara von Tobien, the decedent's sister, and Katharina Merklein and Susanne von Tobien, the decedent's half-sisters. In the motion before the Court, Yuen seeks summary judgment on the basis that he alone is entitled to the proceeds of the Accounts. For the reasons set forth below, we grant Yuen's motion.

Yuen and the decedent were in a relationship from approximately 1982 to 1999. Estate's R. 56.1 ¶¶ 17–18; Morin Decl. Ex. E. During that time, the couple cohabitated a condominium in Manhattan and owned a home in East Hampton, New York as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.[2] Estate's R. 56.1 ¶ 17; Morin Decl. Ex. E. Approximately five years after the couple's separation, the decedent moved to South Africa. Estate's R. 56.1 ¶ 19. There, he purchased and/or developed Kimilili Farm (Pty) Ltd. (the “Farm”), a cheese-producing dairy. Id. ¶ 25; Morin Decl. Ex. B ¶ 12. The decedent lived and worked in South Africa until September 22, 2010, when he died of leukemia. Estate's R. 56.1 ¶ 6; Morin Decl. Ex. B ¶ 15.

After the decedent's death, the Estate requested that Chase produce documentation concerning the disposition of the Accounts, see Estate's R. 56.1 ¶ 9, which were then valued at approximately $800,000, see Weiss Decl. Ex. E. By letter dated August 22, 2011, Chase notified the Estate that, after a “diligent search” of its records, Chase was unable to locate the beneficiary designation form that the decedent executed relative to the Accounts. Yuen's R. 56.1 ¶ 10; Weiss Decl. Ex. F. However, Chase noted that its beneficiary database listed the decedent's mother, Beate von Muehlen, as the primary beneficiary of the Accounts and Yuen as the contingent beneficiary. Weiss Decl. Ex. F. Because the decedent's mother predeceased the decedent,[3] Chase concluded that it would distribute the funds to Yuen. Id. The Estate disputed Chase's approach, see Morin Decl. Ex. A, and this interpleader action followed.

On May 31, 2012, the parties deposed Geoffrey Parr (“Parr”), a deferred compensation analyst at Chase. See Weiss Decl. Ex. D (hereinafter “Parr Dep.”) at 4:10–12. During his deposition, Parr described the general practices and procedures he follows when distributing a deferred compensation account, including the Accounts at issue here. Parr testified that, once per month, he receives a “status change report” that provides the names of participants in the deferred compensation program who have recently deceased. Id. 12:21–13:12. Upon learning of a participant's death, Parr “check[s] to see if the deceased has a beneficiary.” Id. 20:25–21:2. At the time the decedent died, Chase maintained its beneficiary designation information in Excel spreadsheets.[4] Id . 75:19–22. Accordingly, when Parr learned of the decedent's death, he consulted the decedent's spreadsheet, see id. 43:25–44:4, a copy of which Chase has produced here (the “Spreadsheet”),[5] see Weiss Decl. G.

*2 The Spreadsheet, dated “9/16/97,” contains two rows.[6] Weiss Decl. G. The first row lists 37 headings from left to right, and the second row provides the data, if any, that corresponds to those headings. Id. Thus, where the first row provides the “Employee Last Name” heading, the second row states “Von Tobien” directly underneath. Id. In some instances, the second row does not contain any information. Id. For example, where the first row states “Updated By,” the second row is blank. Id. In other instances, the second row is populated with data. Id. Most notably, where the first row states “Primary 1” and “Contingent 1,” the second row lists the names of Beate von Muehlen (i.e., the decedent's mother) and Yuen, respectively. Id.

During his deposition, Parr indicated that the decedent's employer—J.P. Morgan & Co. Incorporated (“J.P.Morgan”)—created the Spreadsheet prior to its merger with The Chase Manhattan Corp. in 2000. Parr Dep. 30:13–20; see also Morin Decl. Ex. H. (providing Chase's corporate history). Because Parr began his employment as a deferred compensation analyst in 2009, see Parr Dep. 10:7–8, he stated that he did not have personal knowledge concerning the population of the Spreadsheet's cells. See, e.g., id. 31:6–9 (Q: “There is no enter date here. Is there a reason for that?” Parr: “I would not know.”). Nevertheless, Parr testified that he relied upon the Spreadsheet as an accurate representation of the decedent's beneficiary designation as of September 1997. See, e.g., id. 38:2–8 (Parr stating that the Spreadsheet provides the decedent's primary and contingent beneficiaries “as of that September 1997 date”); id. 30:13–16 (Parr testifying that he believed J.P. Morgan populated the Spreadsheet with information from the decedent's beneficiary designation form).

During his deposition, Parr stated that Chase did not have any records indicating that the decedent changed his beneficiary designation subsequent to September 1997. Id. 40:18–41:2, 60:20–24, 71:2–7. According to Parr, if Chase had received a beneficiary designation change form, Chase would have added a new row to the Spreadsheet. Id. 71:13–17, 75:14–76:2, 77:17–78:3. Because the Spreadsheet did not contain a third row, Parr concluded that the decedent's original election governed. See id. 60:8–15 (Q: “Does [the Spreadsheet] indicate to you who the beneficiary to Mr. von Tobien's deferred compensation account is?” Parr: “Primary beneficiary is Beate von Muhlen.” Q: “Does this document indicate v/ho the contingent beneficiary is?” Parr: “Yes. Contingent is George Yuen.”). A “screen shot” from Chase's beneficiary database is consistent with Parr's conclusion: the database identifies the decedent's mother and Yuen, respectively, as the primary and contingent beneficiaries of the Accounts.[7] Weiss Decl. Ex. H.

Parr testified that, once he establishes a decedent's beneficiary, he locates the corresponding beneficiary designation form, as such form contains the beneficiary's address.[8] Parr Dep. 20:19–21:5, 43:22–44:11. Parr stated that there are three possible locations where a decedent's beneficiary designation form might exist: in files that Chase maintains on-site, in files that Chase stores off-site, and/or in an electronic database called “iVault.” Id. 48:12–17, 49:13–17. In this case, Parr did not find the decedent's beneficiary-designation form in any of these locations.[9]Id. 48:18–22; Weiss Decl. Ex. F. Nevertheless, Parr relied upon the Spreadsheet as an accurate representation of the decedent's beneficiary designations. Parr Dep. 63:20–64:5, 78:14–18. Accordingly, when Parr learned that the decedent's mother (the primary beneficiary) had predeceased the decedent. Parr notified Yuen (the contingent beneficiary) that he was entitled to the Accounts. Id. 64:12–25; Weiss Decl. Ex. E.

*3 Based on the foregoing, Yuen contends that the undisputed facts demonstrate that he alone is entitled to the proceeds of the Accounts. The Estate disagrees. It argues that the absence of the beneficiary designation form and the relationship between Yuen and the decedent “support the alternative conclusions that there exists insufficient evidence with respect to the validity of the purported” designation or, alternatively, that the decedent “changed his beneficiary designation on a form that Chase has not been able to locate.” Weiss Decl. Ex. C at 4. In support of their respective positions, Yuen and the Estate adduce evidence concerning the disposition of the decedent's other assets.

Yuen offers a beneficiary designation form that the decedent executed in relation to his retirement account, 401(k) account, group life insurance policy, and business travel accident insurance policy in October 1998 (i.e., approximately 13 months after the decedent allegedly completed the beneficiary designation form for the Accounts at issue here). See id. Ex. I. The form executed in October 1998 lists the decedent's mother, Yuen, and the decedent's sister (Barbara Siess) as primary beneficiaries. Id. In addition, the form identifies the decedent's nieces (Ellen Siess and Annelie Siess) as contingent beneficiaries. Id.

The Estate offers, inter alia, documentation related to the decedent's individual retirement account (“IRA”), see Morin Decl. Ex. G, and life insurance policy, see Weiss Decl. Ex. C at 15–20. With respect to the IRA, the documentation establishes that, as of 1989 and 1990, the decedent's mother was the primary beneficiary of the account, and Yuen and the decedent's nieces (Ellen Siess and Annelie Siess) were contingent beneficiaries. Morin Decl. Ex. G at 5–6. However, in or around 2010, the decedent changed the designation, making the Farm the sole beneficiary of the IRA. Id. at 2–4.

Similarly, the evidence concerning the life insurance policy demonstrates that, in or around August 2010, the decedent received a change of beneficiary form from Northwestern Mutual, the policy provider.[10] Weiss Decl. Ex. C at 15. The form designates the Farm as a 70 percent direct beneficiary of the policy. Id. at 16, 19. However, the form is unsigned, see id. at 16, and it is undisputed that the decedent did not execute it prior to his death, see Estate R. 56.1 ¶ 27.

In addition to providing evidence related to the decedent's IRA and life insurance policy, the Estate also offers a draft will from 2010, see Weiss Decl. Ex. C at 9–13, and a declaration from Susanne von Tobien, the decedent's half-sister, see Morin Decl. Ex. B. The draft will designates a trust for the benefit of the Farm as the primary beneficiary of the decedent's estate. Weiss Decl. Ex. C at 9–10. The draft will provides: “Should the [Farm], for whatever reason, no longer be operational and/or be liquidated, then the Trustees will terminate the trust and distribute the remaining trust assets to [the decedent's] sister, Barbara von Tobien, ... halfsister, Katharina Merklein [,] and halfsister, Susanne von Tobien (or the survivor of them).” Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted). Once again, the will is unsigned, see id. at 9–12, and it is undisputed that the decedent did not execute it, see Estate R. 56.1 ¶ 26.

*4 In her declaration, the decedent's half-sister explains that, a “few days” before the decedent passed away, he told her that “he planned to build up a trust based on all his assets for the benefit [of] the farm and the people who shared their lives with him.” Morin Decl. Ex. B ¶¶ 16–17. During this same conversation, the decedent allegedly said that he planned to designate the Farm as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy. Id. ¶ 17.

According to the decedent's half-sister, the decedent further stated that he “did not make a request for any changes” to the beneficiaries of the Accounts, because he had previously appointed his mother as the sole beneficiary. Id. ¶ 19 (emphasis added). Because the decedent's mother had already passed away, the decedent purportedly said that the Accounts “would without a doubt pass to the estate.” Id. According to the decedent's half-sister, the decedent also said that he did not intend to change the joint tenancy of the home he owned with Yuen. See id. ¶ 18 (explaining that the decedent “had a great sense for ethical codes”).

Chase filed this action on December 15, 2011, naming Yuen and the Estate as defendants-in-interpleader. On or around August 15, 2012, Chase provided the Clerk of the Court all funds contained in the S & P 500 Index Account, together with the aggregate sum of installment payments due under the DIBA plan. See So–Ordered Stip. Providing for Discharge of Interpleader Pl. and Payment of Disputed Funds to Ct. ¶ 2, Aug. 14, 2012, Dkt. No. 17. Accordingly, Chase was terminated as a party to this action on August 14, 2012. Id. ¶ 3. Yuen moved for summary judgment on September 13, 2012, and briefing was completed on October 18, 2012. We heard oral argument on Yuen's motion on May 6, 2013.[11]

A motion for summary judgment is appropriately granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In this context, “[a] fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and an issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Ramos v. Baldor Specialty Foods, Inc., 687 F.3d 554, 558 (2d Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). When making this determination, “the Court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment” is sought. Winfield v. Trottier, 710 F.3d 49, 52 (2d Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

On a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating ‘the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’ “ Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 607 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Where that burden is carried, the nonmoving party “must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts and may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.” Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

*5 In its effort to defeat Yuen's motion for summary judgment, the Estate contends that (A) Yuen has failed to establish the admissibility of the Spreadsheet and (B) even if the Spreadsheet is admissible, a reasonable jury would ascribe insufficient weight to the document to rule in Yuen's favor. We disagree.

In determining the admissibility of electronically stored information, a court must consider, inter alia, (1) the best evidence rule, see Fed.R.Evid. 1002; (2) hearsay and its exceptions, see id. 801, 803–04, 807; and (3) authenticity, see id. 901(a),[12] See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D.Md.2007); 5 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 900.07. Analyzing those factors here, we find that the Spreadsheet is admissible evidence.

Where a party seeks to prove the contents of a writing, the best evidence rule requires that party to produce the original writing. Fed.R.Evid. 1002. However, if “all of the originals are lost or destroyed, and not by the proponent acting in bad faith,” the party may rely on secondary evidence to prove the contents of the unproduced original. Id. 1004(a); see also United States v. Tarantino, No. 08 Cr. 655(JS), 2012 WL 5430865, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2012) (noting that “ ‘[t]he admissibility of secondary evidence is within the broad discretion of the trial judge’ ”) (quoting United States v. Chang An–Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 557 (2d Cir.1988)).

Here, there is no allegation that the beneficiary designation form was ever in Yuen's possession, let alone that Yuen lost or destroyed the document in bad faith. To the contrary, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Chase was unable to locate the document after a “diligent search” of its records. Weiss Decl. Ex. F; see also Parr Dep. 56:23–57:8 (Parr testifying that he and his colleague, Mohane Patel, personally searched for the form). On these facts, the best evidence rule does not apply, and Yuen may offer secondary evidence (the Spreadsheet) to prove the contents of the unproduced writing (the beneficiary designation form). See, e .g., United States v. Whittingham, 346 Fed. App'x 683, 685 (2d Cir.2009) (upholding the district court's admission of secondary evidence to prove the content of unproduced videotapes when it was a third party, and not the proponent of the secondary evidence, who lost the videotapes).

The business record exception to the hearsay rule provides for the admission of a “record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis” when the following conditions are satisfied:

Fed.R.Evid. 803(6). The primary purpose of these requirements is to ensure that the creator of the document had “no motive to falsify” it. United States v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 574 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the “trustworthiness” of the document is the “principal precondition to admissibility.” United States v. Strother, 49 F.3d 869, 874 (2d Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court of Appeals has adopted a “generous view” of Rule 803(6), “construing it to favor the admission of evidence if it has any probative value at all.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also Kaiser, 609 F.3d at 574. To establish a proper foundation for a document offered into evidence as a business record, the custodian or other qualified witness “need not have personal knowledge” of the creation of the document, United States v. Williams, 205 F.3d 23, 34 (2d Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted), or even identify a person who does, see Ret. Plan of Unite Here Nat'l Ret. Fund v. Kombassan Holding A.S., 629 F.3d 282, 289 (2d Cir.2010) (noting that “[t]here is no requirement that the person whose first-hand knowledge was the basis of the entry be identified, so long as it was the business entity's regular practice to get information from such a person.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).[14] To the contrary, a document is admissible under Rule 803(6) if it is “integrated” into the testifying entity's records “and relied upon in its day to day operations.” United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 801 (2d Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Brown, 223 Fed. App'x 13, 14–15 (2d Cir.2007).

Here, we find the Spreadsheet easily admissible under Rule 803(6). Although J.P. Morgan created the Spreadsheet, it is undisputed that Chase incorporated the Spreadsheet into its records, see, e.g., Weiss Decl. Ex. F; Parr Dep. 26:22–27:3, and relied upon the document when distributing the Accounts, see, e.g., Parr Dep. 63:20–64:5, 78:14–18. Therefore, contrary to the Estate's contention, it is immaterial that the Spreadsheet was not authenticated by someone with personal knowledge of its creation.[15] See, e.g., Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 800–01 (admitting a toll receipt incorporated into the records of the testifying entity and rejecting the argument that Rule 803(6) required that the document “be authenticated by a person with first-hand knowledge of the [creating entity's] record system”); see also United States v. Wood, No. 08–CR–92A, 2009 WL 2157128, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 15, 2009) (collecting cases).

*7 Indeed, the Spreadsheet is not the type of evidence that is so susceptible to fabrication that it warrants further authentication. As the Estate itself concedes, J.P. Morgan and Chase had absolutely no incentive to falsify or alter the decedent's beneficiary elections.[16] Tr. 5–6. The entities did not generate the Spreadsheet for “personal purposes” or “in anticipation of any litigation.” Kaiser, 609 F.3d at 574 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). To the contrary, they created and kept the document for the sole purpose of distributing the decedent's Accounts, a process in which they were entirely disinterested. Taken together, these facts clearly demonstrate the trustworthiness of the Spreadsheet. See, e.g., 5 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 900.07[1][b][i] (“[A] company's trust in its computer records for routine business decisions is strong circumstantial evidence of the records' reliability.”); In re Blech Sec. Litig., No. 94 Civ. 7696(RWS), 2003 WL 1610775, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2003) (admitting a document as a business record when, inter alia, its creator had “no motive to lie”).

Finally, we find that the Spreadsheet satisfies the remaining foundational requirements of Rule 803(6). It is undisputed that J.P. Morgan created the document “in the course of a regularly conducted business activity,” seeFed.R.Evid. 803(6)(B), and not “in response to unusual or isolated events.” Phoenix Assocs. III v. Stone, 60 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Parr Dep. 30:13–20 (Parr expressing his belief that J.P. Morgan created the Spreadsheet to record the decedent's beneficiary elections). It is similarly uncontested that Chase kept the Spreadsheet in the course of its regularly conducted activity. See, e.g., Parr Dep. 29:17–20 (Parr testifying that spreadsheets form part of Chase's Access database).

Nevertheless, in a last-ditch effort to justify the Spreadsheet's exclusion, the Estate suggests that “[w]e have no idea” whether the document was made at or near the time of the events it memorializes. Tr. 8; see also Estate Mem. 15–16. However, it is undisputed that J.P. Morgan populated the Spreadsheet from a fixed record, rather than a transient event, thus making this argument essentially irrelevant. Moreover, the date of the Spreadsheet—“9/16/97,” supra n. 6—is “self-evident on the face of the record.” 5 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 803.08[5]. In this circumstance, it would “involve a great and unnecessary burden to require separate evidence” that J.P. Morgan created the Spreadsheet contemporaneously with the event it records. Id. Therefore, we conclude that the Spreadsheet constitutes a business record under Rule 803(6) and, thus, is properly excluded from the hearsay rule.

The proponent of evidence must substantiate “that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). This hurdle is not “particularly high.” United States v. Tin Yat Chin, 371 F.3d 31, 37 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir.2007) (describing the standard for authentication as “minimal”) (internal quotation marks omitted). To clear it, “[t]he proponent need not rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity, or to prove beyond any doubt that the evidence is what it purports to be.” Gagliardi, 506 at 151 (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the proponent simply must demonstrate that “a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity.” Id.

*8 In this case, Yuen has already established a proper foundation to admit the Spreadsheet as a business record. See supra Section II(A)(2). Therefore, “no additional foundation is necessary” to authenticate the document. 5 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 900.07[1][b][i]; see also Van Sweden Jewelers, Inc. v. 101 VT, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 253, 2012 WL 4074620, at *6 (W.D. Mich. June 21, 2012) (“[W]here Plaintiff can establish a foundation showing that the evidence satisfies the requirements of Rule 803(6), the Rule 901 authentication requirements are also met, and no additional foundation is necessary to admit the evidence.”). Thus, the Spreadsheet is properly admitted.

In light of the admissibility of the Spreadsheet, see supra Section II(A), Yuen has demonstrated that (1) Chase's beneficiary database identifies the decedent's mother and Yuen, respectively, as the primary and contingent beneficiaries of the Accounts, see Weiss Decl. G; Parr Dep. 60:8–15; (2) Chase does not have any record of the decedent changing these designations, see Parr Dep. 40:18–41:2, 60:20–24, 71:2–7[17]; and (3) the decedent's mother predeceased the decedent, leaving Yuen as the sole remaining beneficiary, see Estate's R. 56.1 ¶ 23; Morin Decl. Ex. C.

Because Yuen has established the absence of a genuine dispute with respect to these facts, the Estate must “present evidence that would be sufficient to support a jury verdict” in its favor. Stanacard, LLC v. Rebtel Networks, AB, 680 F.Supp.2d 483, 491 (S.D.N.Y.2010); see also Burt Rigid Box, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 302 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir.2002). Rather than carrying that burden, the Estate offers mere “conjecture or surmise,” which is insufficient to defeat Yuen's motion. McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In its effort to demonstrate a genuine dispute with respect to the Spreadsheet's contents, the Estate argues that “inaccuracies in [Chase's] documentation abound,”[18] Estate Mem. 11, and that a reasonable jury might conclude that the decedent designated more beneficiaries than J.P. Morgan recorded in the Spreadsheet, id. 3; Tr. 4–5. To substantiate this claim, the Estate notes that the decedent elected two additional beneficiaries (his nieces) in relation to his IRA, see Morin Decl. Ex. G at 5–6, and three additional beneficiaries (his sister and his nieces) relative to other retirement accounts, see Weiss Decl. Ex. I. However, the Estate does not offer any direct evidence that the decedent took similar action with respect to the Accounts at issue here. See, e .g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Gonzalez de Castilla, 184 F.Supp.2d 365, 376 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (noting that “speculation cannot substitute for proof”). In the absence of such evidence, a jury considering the rightful beneficiaries of the Accounts would be forced to engage in “speculation and conjecture,” rendering its ultimate decision a “guess.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

*9 The Estate further contends that a reasonable jury might conclude that the decedent changed his designations on a form that Chase did not enter into the Spreadsheet and cannot find now. See Weiss Decl. Ex. C at 4. In support of this position, but without offering any reason that Chase would have failed to record any designation change, the Estate notes that:

Once again, however, the Estate has failed to offer any direct proof that the decedent took similar action with respect to the Accounts at issue here.[19] In any event, the evidence concerning the disposition of the decedent's other assets would support distributing the Accounts to the Farm—not to the Estate.

Finally, the Estate argues that a reasonable jury might find that the decedent did not intend to bequeath the Accounts to Yuen, with whom the decedent ended his relationship in 1999. Estate's R. 56.1 ¶ 18; Morin Decl. Ex. E; see also Morin Decl. Ex. B ¶ 19 (the decedent's half-sister stating that the decedent expressed his belief that the Accounts would pass to the Estate). However, even assuming, arguendo, that the decedent did not intend for Yuen to inherit the Accounts, the Estate has not proffered—and this Court has not found—any authority for the proposition that a decedent's intent, standing on its own, is sufficient to overcome evidence of the beneficiary designations that the decedent made during life. Quite to the contrary, in analogous disputes concerning the rightful beneficiary of life insurance benefits, courts have repeatedly held that “ ‘[m]ere intent ... is not enough; there must be some affirmative act or acts on the part of the insured’ “ to effect a cognizable change in beneficiaries. MetLife Life & Annuity Co. v. Sobie, 326 Fed. App'x 3, 5 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting McCarthy v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 704 N.E.2d 557, 560 (N.Y.1998)).[20] It is undisputed that there were no such affirmative acts here. See supra n. 19.

For the foregoing reasons, we find that Yuen is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We have reached that conclusion based on our determination that there is no genuine dispute of fact with respect to the dispositive issues that (1) Chase's beneficiary database, as reflected by the Spreadsheet, identifies the decedent's mother as the primary beneficiary of the Accounts and Yuen as the contingent beneficiary; (2) Chase does not have any record of the decedent changing these designations; and (3) the decedent's mother predeceased the decedent, leaving Yuen as the sole remaining beneficiary. The record is immutable and complete with respect to these facts. Although the Estate has offered speculation concerning Chase's records and the decedent's intent, the Estate has not adduced any evidence that would support a jury verdict in its favor. To the contrary, the Estate would ask the jury to distribute the Accounts on the basis of hypotheticals and guesswork.

*10 For the foregoing reasons, Yuen's motion for summary judgment (docket no. 19) is granted.

This background is derived from Defendant George Yuen's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(a) ( “Yuen R. 56.1”); filed September 13, 2012; the Declaration of Jed M. Weiss in Support of Defendant George Yuen's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Weiss Decl.”), filed September 13, 2012, and the exhibits annexed thereto; Defendant Estate of Robert von Tobien's Response to Defendant George Yuen's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(b) ( “Estate R. 56.1”), filed October 5, 2012; and the Declaration of John T. Morin in Opposition to Defendant George Yuen's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Morin Decl.”), filed October 5, 2012, and the exhibits annexed thereto. When citing to specific pages of the exhibits annexed to the Weiss and Morin Declarations, we refer to the page numbers provided in the ECF header.

In or about 2006, Yuen unilaterally severed the joint tenancy, thus creating a tenancy in common. Estate's R. 56.1 ¶ 21; Morin Decl. Ex. D.

The decedent's mother passed away on May 10, 2010. Estate's R. 56.1 ¶ 23; Morin Decl. Ex. C.

Parr testified that, subsequent to the decedent's death, Chase implemented a new database (“Access”) that imported beneficiary designation information from the Excel spreadsheets. See Parr Dep. 27:4–29:20.

The Estate objects to the admissibility of the Spreadsheet. See, e.g., Estate R. 56.1 ¶ 11. We address the Estate's evidentiary objections in infra Section II(A).

The date on the Court's copy of the Spreadsheet is illegible. See Weiss Decl. G. Nevertheless, during Parr's deposition, the parties indicated that the Spreadsheet is dated September 1997. See, e.g., Parr Dep. 37:16–19. In addition, in its Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Yuen's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Estate confirms that “the ‘Date Updated’ is 9/16/97.” See Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Def. George Yuen's Mot. for Summ. J. (hereinafter “Estate Opp'n”) 10.

The Estate disputes the relevance of the screen shot, which allegedly only reflects the data contained in the underlying Spreadsheet. See Estate R. 56.1 ¶ 13.

Parr stated that the “main reason” he locates the beneficiary designation form is to obtain the beneficiary's address. Parr Dep. 45:2. However, Parr also indicated that he consults the beneficiary designation form to verify the spreadsheet's accuracy. Id. 44:18–23.

Parr stated that he finds the beneficiary designation form in a “majority” of the cases. Id. 22:6–9.

Although the correspondence from Northwestern Mutual is dated August 29, 2011, see Weiss Decl. Ex. C at 15, the decedent died approximately 11 months prior to that date, on September 22, 2010, see Estate's R. 56.1 ¶ 6. In accordance with the Estate's Rule 5S.1 Statement, id. ¶ 27, we assume that Northwestern Mutual sent the documentation to the decedent in August 2010, not 2011.

Citations preceded by “Tr.” refer to the transcript of oral argument.

The Estate does not dispute that the Spreadsheet is relevant, see Fed.R.Evid. 401, or that it satisfies Rule 403's probative-prejudice balancing test, see id. 403.

It is undisputed that the Spreadsheet contains hearsay. At the first level, the “keystrokes” that populated the Spreadsheet represent the inputter's extrajudicial statement concerning the contents of the decedent's beneficiary designation form. 5 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 900.07[1][a]. At the second level, “the information input” (i.e., the data from the decedent's beneficiary designation form) reflects the extrajudicial assertion of the decedent himself. Id.

See also United States v. Towns, No. 11–50948, 2013 WL 1809758, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 30, 2013) (“What is more important—and actually required—is the testimony of the custodian who ensures such records are free from adulteration after the fact.”) (footnote omitted).

Similarly, it is irrelevant that the face of the Spreadsheet does not identify the document's author. See, e.g., Saks Int'l, Inc. v. M/V Export Champion, 817 F.2d 1011, 1013–14 (2d Cir.1987) (admitting tallies prepared by the “unidentified employees” of a company that provided the records to the testifying entity).

Indeed, it seems improbable, if not impossible, that J.P. Morgan fabricated the decedent's beneficiary elections in the first instance. As the Estate acknowledges, the names of Beate von Muehlen and Yuen did not appear out of thin air. Tr. 3–4.

See also Fed.R.Evid. 803(7) (providing for the admission of “[e]vidence that a matter is not included in a [business] record” where, as here, “[1] the evidence is admitted to prove that the matter did not occur or exist; [2] a record was regularly kept for a matter of that kind; and [3] neither the possible source of the information nor other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness”).

In support of this position, the Estate notes that Chase is comprised of a “complex array of organizations,” Estate Mem. 11, and that its “thorny problems with record keeping” were exacerbated by various mergers and acquisitions in the 2000s, “the 9/11 terrorist attacks,” and the “financial crisis” of 2008, id . 12–13. In other words, the Estate offers nothing more than unsubstantiated speculation, which is “inappropriate for consideration” on a motion for summary judgment. Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep't, 706 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir.2013).

To the contrary, the Estate's evidence suggests that the decedent did not seek to alter the beneficiaries of the Accounts. See Morin Decl. Ex. B ¶¶ 16, 19 (the decedent's half-sister stating that, a “few days” before his death, the decedent said he “did not make a request for any changes” to the beneficiaries of the Accounts, because he had previously appointed his mother as the sole beneficiary).

See also Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 301 (2009) (noting that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act “forecloses any justification for enquiries into nice expressions of intent”).