{"favorites":{},"caseDigest":{"id":18191,"deleted":false,"created_at":"2014-10-21T08:10:41.934-06:00","updated_at":"2020-05-27T11:33:52.638-06:00","last_published_at":"2020-05-27T11:29:30.774-06:00","is_digested":false,"pdf":"formal_op._46620200527-4-gk6r52.pdf","published_revision":{"id":57942,"name":"Formal Op. 466","full_text":"

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","cite":"American Bar Association","judge":"Am. Bar Ass'n","decision_date":"2014-04-24T00:00:00.000-06:00","case_digest_id":18191,"published":true,"created_at":"2017-10-23T10:31:52.516-06:00","updated_at":"2020-05-27T11:29:30.161-06:00","judge_type":"","court_id":null,"key_case":false,"non_subscription":false,"internal_notes":null,"sign_off":null,"notes":"","google_scholar_link":"","opinion":{"url":"https://ediscoveryassist.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/case_digest_revision/opinion/57942/aba_formal_opinion_466.pdf"},"opinion_cache":null,"in_dropbox":false,"cached_tag_list":"Ethics Opinion","no_link_found":false,"autolinked_full_text":"

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","last_reviewed_on":"2016-02-16","qc_complete":true,"linked_federal_rules":"","tag_overturn":false,"rule_overturn":false,"unpublished":false,"needs_update":null,"google_scholar_text":"","full_text_verified":true,"google_scholar_text_type":"westlaw","full_case_visibility":false,"modal_ready":false,"formatting_errors":false,"style_errors":false,"opinion_pdf_attached":false,"display_opinion_file":false,"court_display_name":"","parsed_attributes":null,"full_name":null,"mdl":null,"parser_qc_complete":false,"parser_issue_type":null,"use_eda_format":false,"case_title":"AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ","docket_number":"","counsel":"AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 321 N. Clark Street, Chicago, Illinois 60654-4714 Telephone (312) 988-5328 CHAIR: Paula J. Frederick, Atlanta, GA ■ T. Maxfield Bahner, Chattanooga, TN ■ Barbara S. Gillers, New York, NY ■ Amanda Jones, Chicago, IL ■ Donald R. Lundberg, Indianapolis, IN ■ Myles V. Lynk, Tempe, AZ ■ J. Charles Mokriski, Boston, MA ■ Ellen A. Pansky, South Pasadena, CA ■ Jennifer A. Paradise, New York, NY■ Richard H. Underwood, Lexington, KY CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: Dennis A. Rendleman, Ethics Counsel, Mary McDermott, Associate Ethics Counsel","decision_title":"Formal Opinion 466 Lawyer Reviewing Jurors’ Internet Presence","body_text":"

Unless limited by law or court order, a lawyer may review a juror’s or potential juror’s Internet presence, which may include postings by the juror or potential juror in advance of and during a trial, but a lawyer may not communicate directly or through another with a juror or potential juror.

A lawyer may not, either personally or through another, send an access request to a juror’s electronic social media. An access request is a communication to a juror asking the juror for information that the juror has not made public and that would be the type of ex parte communication prohibited by Model Rule 3.5(b).

The fact that a juror or a potential juror may become aware that a lawyer is reviewing his Internet presence when a network setting notifies the juror of such does not constitute a communication from the lawyer in violation of Rule 3.5(b).

In the course of reviewing a juror’s or potential juror’s Internet presence, if a lawyer discovers evidence of juror or potential juror misconduct that is criminal or fraudulent, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.

The Committee has been asked whether a lawyer who represents a client in a matter that will be tried to a jury may review the jurors’ or potential jurors’1 presence on the Internet leading up to and during trial, and, if so, what ethical obligations the lawyer might have regarding information discovered during the review.

Juror Internet Presence

Jurors may and often will have an Internet presence through electronic social media or websites. General public access to such will vary. For example, many blogs, websites, and other electronic media are readily accessible by anyone who chooses to access them through the Internet. We will refer to these publicly accessible Internet media as “websites.”

For the purposes of this opinion, Internet-based social media sites that readily allow account-owner restrictions on access will be referred to as “electronic social media” or “ESM.” Examples of commonly used ESM at the time of this opinion include Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, and Twitter. Reference to a request to obtain access to another’s ESM will be denoted as an “access request,” and a person who creates and maintains ESM will be denoted as a “subscriber.”

Depending on the privacy settings chosen by the ESM subscriber, some information posted on ESM sites might be available to the general public, making it similar to a website, while other information is available only to a fellow subscriber of a shared ESM service, or in some cases only to those whom the subscriber has granted access. Privacy settings allow the ESM subscriber to establish different degrees of protection for different categories of information, each of which can require specific permission to access. In general, a person who wishes to obtain access to these protected pages must send a request to the ESM subscriber asking for permission to do so. Access depends on the willingness of the subscriber to grant permission.2

This opinion addresses three levels of lawyer review of juror Internet presence:

passive lawyer review of a juror’s website or ESM that is available without making an access request where the juror is unaware that a website or ESM has been reviewed;
active lawyer review where the lawyer requests access to the juror’s ESM; and
passive lawyer review where the juror becomes aware through a website or ESM feature of the identity of the viewer;

Trial Management and Jury Instructions

There is a strong public interest in identifying jurors who might be tainted by improper bias or prejudice. There is a related and equally strong public policy in preventing jurors from being approached ex parte by the parties to the case or their agents. Lawyers need to know where the line should be drawn between properly investigating jurors and improperly communicating with them.3 In today’s Internet- saturated world, the line is increasingly blurred.

For this reason, we strongly encourage judges and lawyers to discuss the court’s expectations concerning lawyers reviewing juror presence on the Internet. A court order, whether in the form of a local rule, a standing order, or a case management order in a particular matter, will, in addition to the applicable Rules of Professional Conduct, govern the conduct of counsel.

Equally important, judges should consider advising jurors during the orientation process that their backgrounds will be of interest to the litigants and that the lawyers in the case may investigate their backgrounds, including review of their ESM and websites.4 If a judge believes it to be necessary, under the circumstances of a particular matter, to limit lawyers’ review of juror websites and ESM, including on ESM networks where it is possible or likely that the jurors will be notified that their ESM is being viewed, the judge should formally instruct the lawyers in the case concerning the court’s expectations.

Reviewing Juror Internet Presence

If there is no court order governing lawyers reviewing juror Internet presence, we look to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct for relevant strictures and prohibitions. Model Rule 3.5 addresses communications with jurors before, during, and after trial, stating:

A lawyer shall not:

(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;

(b) communicate ex parte with such a person during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order;

(c) communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:

(1) the communication is prohibited by law or court order;

(2) the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or

(3) the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment . . .

Under Model Rule 3.5(b), a lawyer may not communicate with a potential juror leading up to trial or any juror during trial unless authorized by law or court order. See, e.g., In re Holman, 286 S.E.2d 148 (S.C. 1982) (communicating with member of jury selected for trial of lawyer’s client was “serious crime” warranting disbarment).

A lawyer may not do through the acts of another what the lawyer is prohibited from doing directly. Model Rule 8.4(a). See also In re Myers, 584 S.E.2d 357 (S.C. 2003) (improper for prosecutor to have a lay member of his “jury selection team” phone venire member’s home); cf. S.C. Ethics Op. 93-27 (1993) (lawyer “cannot avoid the proscription of the rule by using agents to communicate improperly” with prospective jurors).

Passive review of a juror’s website or ESM, that is available without making an access request, and of which the juror is unaware, does not violate Rule 3.5(b). In the world outside of the Internet, a lawyer or another, acting on the lawyer’s behalf, would not be engaging in an improper ex parte contact with a prospective juror by driving down the street where the prospective juror lives to observe the environs in order to glean publicly available information that could inform the lawyer’s jury-selection decisions. The mere act of observing that which is open to the public would not constitute a communicative act that violates Rule 3.5(b).5

It is the view of the Committee that a lawyer may not personally, or through another, send an access request to a juror. An access request is an active review of the juror’s electronic social media by the lawyer and is a communication to a juror asking the juror for information that the juror has not made public. This would be the type of ex parte communication prohibited by Model Rule 3.5(b).6 This would be akin to driving down the juror’s street, stopping the car, getting out, and asking the juror for permission to look inside the juror’s house because the lawyer cannot see enough when just driving past.

Some ESM networks have a feature that allows the juror to identify fellow members of the same ESM network who have passively viewed the juror’s ESM. The details of how this is accomplished will vary from network to network, but the key feature that is relevant to this opinion is that the juror-subscriber is able to determine not only that his ESM is being viewed, but also the identity of the viewer. This capability may be beyond the control of the reviewer because the notice to the subscriber is generated by the ESM network and is based on the identity profile of the subscriber who is a fellow member of the same ESM network.

Two recent ethics opinions have addressed this issue. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Professional Ethics, in Formal Opinion 2012-27, concluded that a network-generated notice to the juror that the lawyer has reviewed the juror’s social media was a communication from the lawyer to a juror, albeit an indirect one generated by the ESM network. Citing the definition of “communication” from Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed.) and other authority, the opinion concluded that the message identifying the ESM viewer was a communication because it entailed “the process of bringing an idea, information or knowledge to another’s perception— including the fact that they have been researched.” While the ABCNY Committee found that the communication would “constitute a prohibited communication if the attorney was aware that her actions” would send such a notice, the Committee took “no position on whether an inadvertent communication would be a violation of the Rules.” The New York County Lawyers’ Association Committee on Professional Ethics in Formal Opinion 743 agreed with ABCNY’s opinion and went further explaining, “If a juror becomes aware of an attorney’s efforts to see the juror’s profiles on websites, the contact may well consist of an impermissible communication, as it might tend to influence the juror’s conduct with respect to the trial.”8

This Committee concludes that a lawyer who uses a shared ESM platform to passively view juror ESM under these circumstances does not communicate with the juror. The lawyer is not communicating with the juror; the ESM service is communicating with the juror based on a technical feature of the ESM. This is akin to a neighbor’s recognizing a lawyer’s car driving down the juror’s street and telling the juror that the lawyer had been seen driving down the street.

Discussion by the trial judge of the likely practice of trial lawyers reviewing juror ESM during the jury orientation process will dispel any juror misperception that a lawyer is acting improperly merely by viewing what the juror has revealed to all others on the same network.

While this Committee concludes that ESM-generated notice to a juror that a lawyer has reviewed the juror’s information is not communication from the lawyer to the juror, the Committee does make two additional recommendations to lawyers who decide to review juror social media. First, the Committee suggests that lawyers be aware of these automatic, subscriber-notification features. By accepting the terms of use, the subscriber- notification feature is not secret. As indicated by Rule 1.1, Comment 8, it is important for a lawyer to be current with technology. While many people simply click their agreement to the terms and conditions for use of an ESM network, a lawyer who uses an ESM network in his practice should review the terms and conditions, including privacy features – which change frequently – prior to using such a network. And, as noted above, jurisdictions differ on issues that arise when a lawyer uses social media in his practice.

Second, Rule 4.4(a) prohibits lawyers from actions “that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person . . .” Lawyers who review juror social media should ensure that their review is purposeful and not crafted to embarrass, delay, or burden the juror or the proceeding.

Discovery of Juror Misconduct

Increasingly, courts are instructing jurors in very explicit terms about the prohibition against using ESM to communicate about their jury service or the pending case and the prohibition against conducting personal research about the matter, including research on the Internet. These warnings come because jurors have discussed trial issues on ESM, solicited access to witnesses and litigants on ESM, not revealed relevant ESM connections during jury selection, and conducted personal research on the trial issues using the Internet.9

In 2009, the Court Administration and Case Management Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States recommended a model jury instruction that is very specific about juror use of social media, mentioning many of the popular social media by name.10 The recommended instruction states in part:

I know that many of you use cell phones, Blackberries, the internet and other tools of technology. You also must not talk to anyone at any time about this case or use these tools to communicate electronically with anyone about the case . . . You may not communicate with anyone about the case on your cell phone, through e- mail, Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, or on Twitter, through any blog or website, including Facebook, Google+, My Space, LinkedIn, or YouTube. . . . I expect you will inform me as soon as you become aware of another juror’s violation of these instructions.

These same jury instructions were provided by both a federal district court and state criminal court judge during a three-year study on juries and social media. Their research found that “jury instructions are the most effective tool to mitigate the risk of juror misconduct through social media.”11 As a result, the authors recommend jury instruction on social media “early and often” and daily in lengthy trials.12

Analyzing the approximately 8% of the jurors who admitted to being “tempted” to communicate about the case using social media, the judges found that the jurors chose not to talk or write about the case because of the specific jury instruction not to do so.

While juror misconduct via social media itself is not the subject of this Opinion, lawyers reviewing juror websites and ESM may become aware of misconduct. Model Rule 3.3 and its legislative history make it clear that a lawyer has an obligation to take remedial measures including, if necessary, informing the tribunal when the lawyer discovers that a juror has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding. But the history is muddled concerning whether a lawyer has an affirmative obligation to act upon learning that a juror has engaged in improper conduct that falls short of being criminal or fraudulent.

Rule 3.3 was amended in 2002, pursuant to the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission’s proposal, to expand on a lawyer’s previous obligation to protect a tribunal from criminal or fraudulent conduct by the lawyer’s client to also include such conduct by any person.13

Model Rule 3.3(b) reads:

(b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.

Comment [12] to Rule 3.3 provides:

Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure if necessary, whenever the lawyer knows that a person, including the lawyer’s client, intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding.

Part of Ethics 2000’s stated intent when it amended Model Rule 3.3 was to incorporate provisions from Canon 7 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code) that had placed an affirmative duty upon a lawyer to notify the court upon learning of juror misconduct:

This new provision incorporates the substance of current paragraph (a)(2), as well as ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7- 102(B)(2) (“A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that a person other than the client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal”) and DR 7-108(G) (“A lawyer shall reveal promptly to the court improper conduct by a venireperson or juror, or by another toward a venireperson or juror or a member of the venireperson’s or juror’s family, of which the lawyer has knowledge”).Reporter’s Explanation of Changes, Model Rule 3.3.14

However, the intent of the Ethics 2000 Commission expressed above to incorporate the substance of DR 7-108(G) in its new subsection (b) of Model Rule 3.3 was never carried out. Under the Model Code’s DR 7-108(G), a lawyer knowing of “improper conduct” by a juror or venireperson was required to report the matter to the tribunal. Under Rule 3.3(b), the lawyer’s obligation to act arises only when the juror or venireperson engages in conduct that is fraudulent or criminal.15 While improper conduct was not defined in the Model Code, it clearly imposes a broader duty to take remedial action than exists under the Model Rules. The Committee is constrained to provide guidance based upon the language of Rule 3.3(b) rather than any expressions of intent in the legislative history of that rule.

By passively viewing juror Internet presence, a lawyer may become aware of a juror’s conduct that is criminal or fraudulent, in which case, Model Rule 3.3(b) requires the lawyer to take remedial measures including, if necessary, reporting the matter to the court. But the lawyer may also become aware of juror conduct that violates court instructions to the jury but does not rise to the level of criminal or fraudulent conduct, and Rule 3.3(b) does not prescribe what the lawyer must do in that situation. While considerations of questions of law are outside the scope of the Committee’s authority, applicable law might treat such juror activity as conduct that triggers a lawyer’s duty to take remedial action including, if necessary, reporting the juror’s conduct to the court under current Model Rule 3.3(b).16

While any Internet postings about the case by a juror during trial may violate court instructions, the obligation of a lawyer to take action will depend on the lawyer’s assessment of those postings in light of court instructions and the elements of the crime of contempt or other applicable criminal statutes. For example, innocuous postings about jury service, such as the quality of the food served at lunch, may be contrary to judicial instructions, but fall short of conduct that would warrant the extreme response of finding a juror in criminal contempt. A lawyer’s affirmative duty to act is triggered only when the juror’s known conduct is criminal or fraudulent, including conduct that is criminally contemptuous of court instructions. The materiality of juror Internet communications to the integrity of the trial will likely be a consideration in determining whether the juror has acted criminally or fraudulently. The remedial duty flowing from known criminal or fraudulent juror conduct is triggered by knowledge of the conduct and is not preempted by a lawyer’s belief that the court will not choose to address the conduct as a crime or fraud.

Conclusion

In sum, a lawyer may passively review a juror’s public presence on the Internet, but may not communicate with a juror. Requesting access to a private area on a juror’s ESM is communication within this framework.

The fact that a juror or a potential juror may become aware that the lawyer is reviewing his Internet presence when an ESM network setting notifies the juror of such review does not constitute a communication from the lawyer in violation of Rule 3.5(b).

If a lawyer discovers criminal or fraudulent conduct by a juror related to the proceeding, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.

1. Unless there is reason to make a distinction, we will refer throughout this opinion to jurors as including both potential and prospective jurors and jurors who have been empaneled as members of a jury.

2. The capabilities of ESM change frequently. The committee notes that this opinion does not address particular ESM capabilities that exist now or will exist in the future. For purposes of this opinion, key elements like the ability of a subscriber to control access to ESM or to identify third parties who review a subscriber’s ESM are considered generically.

3. While this Committee does not take a position on whether the standard of care for competent lawyer performance requires using Internet research to locate information about jurors that is relevant to the jury selection process, we are also mindful of the recent addition of Comment [8] to Model Rule 1.1. This comment explains that a lawyer “should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.” See also Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551 (Mo. 2010) (lawyer must use “reasonable efforts” to find potential juror’s litigation history in Case.net, Missouri’s automated case management system); N. H. Bar Ass’n, Op. 2012-13/05 (lawyers “have a general duty to be aware of social media as a source of potentially useful information in litigation, to be competent to obtain that information directly or through an agent, and to know how to make effective use of that information in litigation”); Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N. Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2012-2 (“Indeed, the standards of competence and diligence may require doing everything reasonably possible to learn about jurors who will sit in judgment on a case.”).

4. Judges also may choose to work with local jury commissioners to ensure that jurors are advised during jury orientation that they may properly be investigated by lawyers in the case to which they are assigned. This investigation may include review of the potential juror’s Internet presence.

5. Or. State Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2013-189 (“Lawyer may access publicly available information [about juror, witness, and opposing party] on social networking website”); N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers Ass’n, Formal Op. 743 (2011) (lawyer may search juror’s “publicly available” webpages and ESM); Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, supra note 3 (lawyer may use social media websites to research jurors); Ky. Bar Ass’n, Op. E-434 (2012) (“If the site is ‘public,’ and accessible to all, then there does not appear to be any ethics issue.”). See also N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 843 (2010) (“A lawyer representing a client in pending litigation may access the public pages of another party’s social networking website (such as Facebook or MySpace) for the purpose of obtaining possible impeachment material for use in the litigation”); Or. State Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2005-164 (“Accessing an adversary’s public Web [sic] site is no different from reading a magazine or purchasing a book written by that adversary”); N.H. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3 (viewing a Facebook user’s page or following on Twitter is not communication if pages are open to all members of that social media site); San Diego Cnty. Bar Legal Ethics Op. 2011-2 (opposing party’s public Facebook page may be viewed by lawyer).

6. See Or. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 5, fn. 2, (a “lawyer may not send a request to a juror to access non-public personal information on a social networking website, nor may a lawyer ask an agent to do so”); N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 5 (“Significant ethical concerns would be raised by sending a ‘friend request,’ attempting to connect via LinkedIn.com, signing up for an RSS feed for a juror’s blog, or ‘following’ a juror’s Twitter account”); Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, supra note 3 (lawyer may not chat, message or send a “friend request” to a juror); Conn. Bar Ass’n, Informal Op. 2011-4 (friend request is a communication); Mo. Bar Ass’n, Informal Op. 2009-0003 (friend request is a communication pursuant to Rule 4.2). But see N.H. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3 (lawyer may request access to witness’s private ESM, but request must “correctly identify the lawyer . . . [and] . . . inform the witness of the lawyer’s involvement” in the matter); Phila. Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 2009-02 (lawyer may not use deception to secure access to witness’s private ESM, but may ask the witness “forthrightly” for access).

7. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, supra, note 3.

8. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, supra note 5.

9. For a review of recent cases in which a juror used ESM to discuss trial proceedings and/or used the Internet to conduct private research, read Hon. Amy J. St. Eve et al., More from the #Jury Box: The Latest on Juries and Social Media, 12 Duke Law & Technology Review no. 1, 69-78 (2014), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1247&context=dltr.

10. Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, Proposed Model Jury Instructions: The Use of Electronic Technology to Conduct Research on or Communicate about a Case, USCOURTS.GOV (June 2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2012/jury- instructions.pdf.

11. Id. at 66.

12. Id. at 87.

13. Ethics 2000 Commission, Model Rule 3.3: Candor Toward the Tribunal, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2k_rule.... 3.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).

14. Ethics 2000 Commission, Model Rule 3.3 Reporter’s Explanation of Changes, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2k_rule.... 3rem.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).

15. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2002) to N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.5(d) (2013) (“a lawyer shall reveal promptly to the court improper conduct by a member of the venire or a juror....”).

16. See, e.g., U.S. v. Juror Number One, 866 F.Supp.2d 442 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (failure to follow jury instructions and emailing other jurors about case results in criminal contempt). The use of criminal contempt remedies for disregarding jury instructions is not confined to improper juror use of ESM. U.S. v. Rowe, 906 F.2d 654 (11th Cir. 1990) (juror held in contempt, fined, and dismissed from jury for violating court order to refrain from discussing the case with other jurors until after jury instructions delivered).

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