Blair v. Pride Industries, Inc.
Blair v. Pride Industries, Inc.
2015 WL 10818665 (W.D. Tex. 2015)
July 17, 2015
Castaneda, Robert F., United States Magistrate Judge
Summary
The Court ordered Defendant to produce any ESI that is relevant to the case, noting that ESI can provide evidence that is not available in other forms. The Court also noted that Defendant should not use reflexive objections to avoid or delay producing even unobjectionable documents.
Alma Rosa Blair, Plaintiff,
v.
Pride Industries, Inc., Defendant
v.
Pride Industries, Inc., Defendant
EP-14-CV-00183-DCG-RFC
Signed July 17, 2015
Castaneda, Robert F., United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER GRANTING/DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
*1 On July 13, 2015, a hearing was held on Plaintiff's motion to compel filed on June 12, 2015 (Doc. 51), and Defendant's response filed on June 19, 2015 (Doc. 53). Attorney Enrique Chavez, Jr., appeared on behalf of Plaintiff, and Abe Gonzalez appeared on behalf of Defendant. In the motion, Plaintiff sought to compel production of documents in response to Requests for Production (“RFP”) 1, 2, 4–7, 11–13, and 17–20. (Doc. 51) The parties filed pre-hearing notices that they had been able to narrow the issues in contention to RFPs 1 (j, k, l, m, n), 17, 18, and 19. (Docs.55, 56) After consideration of the pleadings and the arguments of counsel, as set forth below, the Court sustains in part and overrules in part Defendant's objections to Plaintiff's requests for production. Consequently, the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff's motion to compel.
Rule 26 allows “discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b).
[T]he court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(C).
General objections that requests for production are overly broad, burdensome, oppressive and irrelevant, fail to voice a successful objection if they do not go on to specifically address how each request is subject to each objection; there is no basis to assert such objections simply to preserve them without providing the specific basis for each objection to each request. Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 477 (N.D.Tex.2014).
In responding to Rule 34 discovery requests, a reasonable inquiry must be made and if no responsive documents or tangible things exist, the responding party should so state with sufficient specificity to allow the court to determine whether the party made a reasonable inquiry and exercised due diligence. Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 485. Responding to requests for production “subject to” and or “without waiving objections” is manifestly confusing at best and misleading at worst. Id. The responding party has the burden of responding to the requests to the extent the requests are not objectionable and must explain the extent to which such request is overbroad, irrelevant, unduly burdensome, or otherwise objectionable so that both the requesting party and the court can determine the scope of what has been produced and what may remain to be produced if such objections are overruled. Id., at 24. Rule 26(g) was enacted “to bring an end to the ... abusive practice of objecting to discovery requests reflexively–but not reflectively–and without factual basis.” Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 487 (quoting Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Svs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D.Md.2008)).
*2 When an objection has been raised, once the moving party satisfies the burden of showing that the materials or information sought is relevant to the action or will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, the responding party has the burden to show some sufficient reason why discovery should not be allowed, which requires the responding party to clarify, explain, and provide additional support for their objections. See Export Worldwide, Ltd v. Knight, 241 F.R.D. 259, 263 (W.D.Tex.2006). The party resisting discovery has the burden to establish, for example, that the material or information sought is irrelevant, overly broad, or unduly burdensome or oppressive. Spiegelberg Mfg., Inc. v. Hancock, 2007 WL 4258246, *1 (N.D.Tex.2007).
I. Request for Production 1 (j, k, l, m, n)
Plaintiff's motion to compel addressed both Plaintiff's RFPs 1(ESI) and 2 (hardcopy) seeking Plaintiff's personnel file, composed, as Plaintiff defined, of various types of information enumerated in numerous subparts. (Doc. 51:9) During the parties' pre-hearing conference, the parties were able to narrow the contested subparts to RFP 1[1] j, k, l, m, and n. (Docs.55, 56–2)
Plaintiff requested:
(j) All emails and attachments to and from Plaintiff's supervisors' email accounts about Plaintiff.
(k) All emails and attachments to and from Plaintiff's managers' accounts about Plaintiff.
(l) All emails and attachments to and from Defendant's Human Resources personnel about Plaintiff.
(m) All text messages and instant messages to and from Plaintiff's supervisors' and managers' accounts about Plaintiff.
(n) All text messages and instant messages to and from Defendant's Human Resources personnel about Plaintiff.
(Doc. 51–1:3)
Defendant initially responded as to all subparts of RFP 1(a)-(w):
Defendant objects to this Request as over broad, unduly burdensome, irrelevant, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This Request defines “employee file” to include any and all documents related to Plaintiff no matter their location, date, or subject matter. That is improper because Plaintiff cannot define “employee file” to include all documents related to Plaintiff. Moreover, asking for all documents related to Plaintiff, without specifying a particular topic, is over broad and unduly burdensome. Further, Defendant objects to specific parts of this Request as irrelevant because they ask for documents not relevant to Plaintiff's claims or Defendant's defenses. Defendant also objects to this Request as unreasonably cumulative of the same documents requested in Request No. 2, which can be provided more conveniently.
(Doc. 51–1:4) Although Defendant stated that it objected to specific parts as irrelevant, such specific parts were not identified. Id.
In Defendant's response to Plaintiff's motion to compel, Defendant generally objected to Plaintiff labeling all of the documents requested in the subparts of RFP1 as Plaintiff's employee file. (Doc. 53:4–5) Again without identifying any specific subpart, Defendant argued that Plaintiff was the human resources manager, such that her name and signature appear on numerous documents for numerous employees, e.g. personnel forms, change forms, benefits documents, disciplinary documents, etc ..., that are irrelevant to Plaintiff's claims. Id. Defendant requested that the Court deny Plaintiff's request for “any document, email, or text message that ever mentioned Plaintiff.” Id. (citing Regan–Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641, 649–650 (10th Cir.2008) (agreeing that “all documents ... that refer to, mention or relate in any way to Plaintiff, Whitlock, or the litigation or the allegations, facts and circumstances concerning the litigation” is overly broad)).
*3 In its pre-hearing notice, Defendant objected specifically to RFP 1(j-n) because they are not limited to any particular topic or subject matter that would make them relevant to this case. (Doc. 55:2– 3) Defendant argues that this request simply asks for documents “about Plaintiff” and as such is over broad. Id.
Defendant's objections that RFP 1(j-n) are cumulative requests, imposing an undue burden, and not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, are all overruled based on Defendant's failure to lodge these objections against specific these subparts of the request or to support them with facts and explanation.
First, Defendant lodged the same cumulative objections in response to RFP 1 and RFP 2, except that regarding RFP 2 Defendant agreed to produce “Plaintiff's personnel file” however Defendant defined that term, without providing any indication of what requested documents would be contained in such file and which would not. (Doc. 51–1:5)
Further, Defendant did not, at any time, produce evidence or specific facts to demonstrate the burden involved in responding to these subparts. Counsel stated that Plaintiff's name will be on numerous types of documents, that such emails would need to be reviewed by the Human Resources Director as well as in-house counsel. However, Defendant did not provide any information from any preliminary queries run to determine how many emails would potentially be involved or to estimate how long it would take to review or how much it would cost.
Additionally, Defendant provided no explanation for how emails and texts to and from Plaintiff's managers, supervisors, and human resources personnel, that were about Plaintiff, would not be reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Nor did Defendant provide reasons why none of these emails would be relevant to Plaintiff's claims.
Defendant's objection that the request was over broad, however, was further articulated, characterizing the request as one for: any and all documents related to Plaintiff, no matter their location, date, subject matter, or topic (Doc. 51–1:4); or “any document, email, or text message that ever mentioned Plaintiff” (Doc. 53:4–5); or documents about Plaintiff not limited to any particular topic or subject matter that would make them relevant (Doc. 55:2–3). Plaintiff did not request any and all documents related to Plaintiff, no matter their location, date, subject matter, or topic. Nor did she request all documents, emails or text messages that ever mentioned Plaintiff.
Plaintiff tailored her request to those emails and texts to and from limited specified individuals that are about Plaintiff. The time frame of such emails should be naturally limited to the time Plaintiff applied for the position in 2010 to the present time, likely with a decreasing number of responsive emails occurring after her termination date in 2012 and after the EEOC process was complete in 2013, spanning a total of approximately five years. This is not unreasonable in scope.
Defendant's argument that, as the human resources manager, Plaintiff's name and signature would appear on numerous documents for numerous employees that would not be relevant to Plaintiff's claims is well taken. (See Doc. 53:4–5) Plaintiff's request for emails and text and instant messages “about Plaintiff” however, would appear to exclude emails containing documents merely signed by Plaintiff or where Plaintiff's name appears on another employee's form based merely on her occupying the position of human resources manager.
*4 Defendant's objection that the request was over broad, therefore, is overruled; Plaintiff's motion to compel production of RFP 1(j-n), given the Court's interpretation thereof stated above, is granted; and Defendant is ordered to produce all emails and attachments and all text messages and instant messages to and from the accounts of Plaintiff's supervisors, Plaintiff's managers, and Defendant's Human Resources personnel that are about Plaintiff from the time Plaintiff applied for a position with Defendant to the current time.
II. Request for Production 17
In RFP 17, Plaintiff requested that Defendant produce “all records memorializing Defendant's obligations to employ disabled individuals pursuant to its contract and agreements with the United States Federal Government.” (Doc. 51–2:16) Defendant responded: “Defendant objects to this Request as over broad, unduly burdensome, irrelevant, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence because it is not limited in time or scope.” (Doc. 51–2:16)
In the pre-hearing notice, Defendant stated that “Defendant will produce applicable laws, regulations, and rules applicable to the Ft. Bliss location where Plaintiff worked. Those are the only responsive documents in addition to what has already been produced. Therefore, there is nothing else to produce.” (Doc. 55:3) (emphasis added) Defendant stated at the hearing that Defendant could complete this production within fourteen days.
Defendant did not elaborate on how the requested documentation would be irrelevant or “not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” given the claims asserted and did not provide any facts to support its claim that providing such documentation as requested would be unduly burdensome. Given Defendant's pre-hearing notice, it appears that these objections were asserted reflexively and not reflectively. See Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 487. The Court overrules these objections.
Because the request contains no time or location limitation whatsoever, however, the Court sustains, in part, Defendant's objection that the request is overly broad. To the extent the request covers the time period of Plaintiff's employment with Defendant, 2010 to 2012, and the Defendant's obligations under its contract with the United States Government relating to its work on Ft. Bliss, the objection is overruled. See Conboy v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., 140 Fed. Appx. 510 (5th Cir.2005) (affirming the district court's ruling limiting the scope of the plaintiff's discovery request). The Court orders Defendant to produce “all records memorializing Defendant's obligations to employ disabled individuals pursuant to its contract and agreements with the United States Federal Government” that cover Defendant's work on Ft. Bliss over the years 2010 to 2012.
III. Request for Production 18
In RFP 18, Plaintiff requested that Defendant produce “all government contracts requiring Defendant employ disable individuals.” (Doc. 51–2:16) Defendant objected to the request as “over broad, unduly burdensome, irrelevant, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence because it is not limited in time or scope. The requirements can be found in Federal Acquisition Regulation 8 and the Javitts Wagner O'Day Act.” (Doc. 51–2:16)
In its pre-hearing notice, Defendant stated that “Defendant's contract with Ft. Bliss–where Plaintiff worked–does not contain language indicating that Defendant is required to employ individuals with disabilities. Therefore, there is no contract to produce in response to this Request.” (Doc. 55:3) Defendant indicated at the hearing that any contract Defendant has with the United States Government at locations other than Ft. Bliss, spanning fourteen states and D.C., had not been reviewed, and were not relevant. Defendant did not quantify the burden of discovery in terms of hours or dollars involved, but stated that it would require reviewing contracts from fourteen different states each of which might be one or two or three year contracts, and reviewing all of the regulations that those contracts cite. This is insufficient to establish that the discovery request is unduly burdensome. It appears to the Court that these objections were asserted reflexively and not reflectively. See Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 487. The Court overrules this objection.
*5 Plaintiff argued that Plaintiff should be able to obtain any such contracts nationwide, but did not sustain her burden of demonstrating that contracts beyond those which applied to her work at Ft. Bliss were relevant. Because the request contains no time or location limitation whatsoever, the Court sustains, in part, Defendant's objection that the request is overly broad. To the extent the request covers the time period of Plaintiff's employment with Defendant, 2010 to 2012, and the Defendant's contract with the United States Government relating to Defendant's work on Ft. Bliss, the objection is overruled. See Conboy, 140 Fed. Appx. 510. The Court orders Defendant to produce “all government contracts requiring Defendant employ disable individuals” that cover Defendant's work on Ft. Bliss over the years 2010 to 2012. If there are no documents responsive to such request, Defendant shall respond as such.
IV. Request for Production 19
In RFP 19, Plaintiff requested that Defendant produce “all certifications Defendant provided to the United States Federal Government and any division or subdivision of the United States Federal Government (e.g. Department of Army) about classification of employees as disabled.” (Doc. 512:16) Defendant objected to the request as “over broad, unduly burdensome, irrelevant, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence because it is not limited in time or scope. Defendant further objects to this Request as vague and ambiguous because it is not clear what is being asked.” (Doc. 51–2:16)
Defendant did not elaborate on how such documentation would be irrelevant given the claims asserted and did not provide any facts to support its claim that providing such documentation as requested would be unduly burdensome. In fact, in its pre-hearing notice, Defendant agreed to supplement its response to this request to state that there are no documents responsive to this request. (Doc. 55:3) This again indicates to the Court that these objections were asserted reflexively and not reflectively. See Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 487.
Defendant also objected that the request is vague and ambiguous. At the hearing, Defendant clarified that Defendant does not provide such certifications that state “We hired x and he is disabled.” While this may be one valid interpretation of the request, it is narrower than a commonsense reading of the request would produce, which includes any certification that addresses the disabled classification of employees as a whole workforce as opposed to only certifications of specific individuals as disabled. The Court overrules these objections.
The Court, however, sustains, in part, Defendant's objection that the request is overly broad. The request contains no time or location limitation whatsoever; it is not limited to the time period Plaintiff worked for Defendant, nor is it limited to government contracts performed under the AbilityOne[2] Program or through Defendant's affiliation with Source America, or to Ft. Bliss more specifically. Plaintiff did not meet its burden of showing that any such certification beyond these limitations would be relevant to her claims or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Thus, Plaintiff's motion to compel is granted and Defendant shall produce “all certifications Defendant provided to the United States Federal Government and any division or subdivision of the United States Federal Government (e.g. Department of Army) about classification of employees as disabled” with respect to Defendant's contract at Ft. Bliss between 2009 and 2013, one year before and one year after Plaintiff's term of employment with Defendant. If there are no documents responsive to such request, Defendant shall respond as such.
*6 Defendant adamantly denied Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant's objections were “boilerplate objections” that confuse the discovery process to such an extent that they should be waived. (Docs.51, 53:2) However, Defendant failed to provide argument or explanation supporting its objections and failed in most instances to respond to any unobjectionable part of these requests. The responses Defendant provided in its pre-hearing notice should have been the responses it initially provided to Plaintiff. Defendant urged the Court to not modify the requests in order to not encourage Plaintiff's discovery tactics. Defendant, however, in most instances failed in its initial responses to acknowledge, identify, or provide any scope of the requested documents that the Defendant found to be unobjectionable. Had Defendant produced such materials and explained the scope in which it had done so, the Court may have found Defendant's production sufficient. The Court will not find fault with one party over the other, as both are complicit in an inefficient discovery process. It is not the Plaintiff that is narrowing the scope of her requests at this juncture, but the Court that is determining the extent to which Defendant should have produced the requested documents as unobjectionable, i.e., the extent to which Defendant's objections are overruled. The Court would discourage Defendant's use of reflexive objections to avoid or delay producing even unobjectionable documents. See Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 487.
V. Attorney Fees and Costs
Plaintiff requested an award of attorney's fees and costs in prosecuting the instant motion. Doc. 51:13) As Plaintiff withdrew certain requests and limited the scope of others, and certain of Defendant's objections were sustained, the Court finds an award of expenses would be unjust. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5). Accordingly, each party shall bear its own costs.
After consideration of the pleadings and the arguments of counsel, and for the reasons stated above, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is Granted in Part as follows:
RFP 1(j-n): Defendant shall produce all emails and attachments and all text messages and instant messages to and from the accounts of Plaintiff's supervisors, Plaintiff's managers, and Defendant's Human Resources personnel that are about Plaintiff from the time Plaintiff applied for a position with Defendant to the present.
RFP 17: Defendant shall produce all records memorializing Defendant's obligations to employ disabled individuals pursuant to its contract and agreements with the United States Federal Government that cover Defendant's work on Ft. Bliss over the years 2010 to 2012. If there are no documents responsive to such request, Defendant shall respond as such.
RFP 18: Defendant shall produce all government contracts requiring Defendant employ disable individuals that cover Defendant's work on Ft. Bliss over the years 2010 to 2012. If there are no documents responsive to such request, Defendant shall respond as such.
RFP 19: Defendant shall produce all certifications Defendant provided to the United States Federal Government and any division or subdivision of the United States Federal Government (e.g. Department of Army) about classification of employees as disabled with respect to Defendant's contract at Ft. Bliss between 2009 and 2013, one year before and one year after Plaintiff's term of employment with Defendant. If there are no documents responsive to such request, Defendant shall respond as such.
Except as stated above, Plaintiff's motion to compel is otherwise DENIED.
SIGNED and ENTERED on July 17, 2015.
Footnotes
Both Plaintiff's and Defendant's pre-hearing notice refer RFP 2 (j, k, l, m, n), without specifically noting what those subparts requested, which included: (j) Plaintiff's payroll history, payroll, and compensation files; (k) Plaintiff's employee benefits files for the duration of all employment periods with Defendant; (l) Plaintiff's training files; (m) Plaintiff's application and new hire orientation file; and (n) all witness statements taken concerning Plaintiff during all investigations about Plaintiff. (Docs.55, 56–2) At the hearing, it was determined that the subparts actually in contention are those listed in RFP 1(j, k, l, m, n), as discussed herein.
At the hearing, Defendant indicated that Pride Industries operates under ReadyOne guidelines. The Court understands this to refer to the AbilityOne Program under which a company must affiliate with either NIB or Source America to be eligible for government contracts under the AbilityOne Program.