Shaidnagle v. Adams Cnty.
Shaidnagle v. Adams Cnty.
2014 WL 11370454 (S.D. Miss. 2014)
December 2, 2014
Gargiulo, John C., United States Magistrate Judge
Summary
The court denied the motion and amended motion for additional electronic discovery, as the documents submitted in support of the motion did not warrant it. The court noted that the jail's computer system electronically tracks and stores information relating to each detainee, but that a detainee's individual signature is not stored in the system. Any booking documents printed from the system will not contain the detainee's signature.
Jumel H. Shaidnagle, Individually and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Nicholas L. Pastor, Deceased, and the Estate of Nicholas L. Pastor, Deceased, Plaintiffs
v.
Adams County, Mississippi, Laura Smith, Charles Mayfield, Jr., Ronald Dunmore, James Allred, Charles Harrigill, Gary Conn, and Lakeisha Owens Defendants
v.
Adams County, Mississippi, Laura Smith, Charles Mayfield, Jr., Ronald Dunmore, James Allred, Charles Harrigill, Gary Conn, and Lakeisha Owens Defendants
CASE NO.: 5:13-cv-112-DCB-JCG
United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Western Division
Signed December 02, 2014
Counsel
Michael T. Jaques, Alicia S. Hall, Sessums, Dallas & Morrison, PLLC, Ridgeland, MS, for Plaintiffs.Rebecca B. Cowan, Currie, Johnson, Griffin & Myers, PA, J. Lawson Hester, Jason Edward Dare, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP, Jackson, MS, Lucien C. Gwin, III, Gwin, Lewis, Punches & Kelley, LLP, Natchez, MS, David D. O'Donnell, Sidney R. Hill, III, Clayton O'Donnell, PLLC, Oxford, MS, for Defendants.
Gargiulo, John C., United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER DENYING [146] MOTION TO COMPEL AND DENYING [154] AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL
*1 Before the Court is the motion [146] and amended motion [154] to compel production of electronically stored information and/or for leave to conduct discovery of electronic information filed by Plaintiff Jumel Shaidnagle. A response [163] and supplemental response [164] was filed by Defendant Adams County. A reply was not filed by Plaintiff. After reviewing the facts and considering applicable law, the Court finds that the motion and amended motion should be denied.
Background
Nicholas Pastor was taken into custody and booked into the Adams County jail on July 28, 2012. The Incident Report generated by Pastor's arrest states “SGT KEITH MYLES ARRESTED NICHOLAS PASTOR ON LUNACY PROTECTIVE ORDER FOR CHANCERY COURT. NICHOLAS IS TO BE HELD UNTIL HEARING.” [154-7, p.1].
The Intake Form generated during the booking process contains Pastor's signature. [154-7, p.2]. The Intake Form states that Pastor was not designated for “Suicide Watch” and that Pastor was not identified as having a “Mental Illness.” Id. The Intake Form identifies Defendant Ronald Dunmore as the “Searching Officer” and Defendant Laura Smith as the “Intake Officer.” Id. The Intake Form also contains Defendant Dunmore's signature. Id.
The respective signatures of Pastor and Dunmore also appear on three (3) other documents generated during the booking process: (i) a form listing all personal property surrendered by Pastor to jail officials; (ii) a form listing all personal property provided to Pastor by jail officials; and (iii) a medical form questionnaire. [154-7, p.3-5]. The medical questionnaire states that Pastor had been “hospitalized for emotional problems” on July 27, 2012. [154-7, p.5].
On July 28, 2012, Pastor committed suicide while detained in the Adams County jail. Shortly thereafter, Defendant Owens re-printed a copy of Pastor's Intake Form from the jail's computerized booking/intake program. Affidavit of Takeisha Owens [163-4, ¶5]. The re-printed Intake Form does not identify Pastor as having a “Mental Illness” and does not designate Pastor as being on “Suicide Watch.” Id. Defendant Owens' signature is the only signature appearing on the re-printed Intake Form. Id.
This lawsuit was filed by Plaintiff on July 29, 2013. [1]. Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that Pastor was a known suicide risk at the time of his arrest and that Defendants should have placed Pastor on suicide watch in the Adams County jail. [25]. Plaintiff contends that Pastor's in-custody suicide was caused by Defendants' failure to identify and protect Pastor from his known suicidal tendencies. Id. Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that Pastor's classification and incarceration as a non-suicidal detainee was proper and in accordance with the jail's policies under the circumstances.
In this discovery motion, Plaintiff seeks to compel electronic discovery and/or for leave to conduct electronic discovery to determine whether Pastor was placed on suicide watch prior to his suicide in the jail. Plaintiff's motion is supported by two (2) documents produced in discovery by Defendant Adams County: (i) a screenshot of Pastor's booking information in the jail's computerized intake/booking program; and (ii) a re-printed Intake Form containing Pastor's current booking information in the jail's computer program. [154-2]. Both documents show that Pastor was identified as having a “Mental Illness” and that Pastor was designated for “Suicide Watch” when he was booked into the Adams County jail on July 28, 2012. Both documents therefore directly contradict the booking documents generated and signed by Pastor on July 28, 2012.
*2 In response, Defendant Adams County contends that Pastor's booking information was modified in the jail's computer program after Pastor's suicide. [163, ¶9] (“... and that CLT00419 only shows that someone entered the SOMS system sometime after Mr. Pastor's death and altered his classification.”). The designer of the jail's computer program submitted an affidavit stating that the jail's computer program electronically tracks and stores information relating to each detainee booked in the Adams County jail. Affidavit of Martin William Elder [163-9]. The booking information saved in the computer system can be re-printed by jail officials. Id. A detainee's individual signature is not stored in the computer booking/intake system. Id. Any booking documents printed from the jail's computer system therefore will not contain the signature of a detainee. Id. Only the signature of the jail official that re-printed the booking information will appear on the reprinted documents. Id. A detainee therefore must physically sign any documents containing his/her booking information. Id.
The response filed by Defendant Adams County also states that the computer system's “security audit file” became corrupted and was subsequently deleted by the system designer, Mr. Elder, sometime between March 7, 2014 and March 10, 2014. [163, ¶10]. Defendant consequently contends that additional electronic discovery will not help explain the undisputed post-suicide changes made to Pastor's information that currently exist in the jail's computer booking/intake system. Id.
Plaintiff did not file a reply. The discovery and motions deadlines lapsed on October 1, 2014. This matter is currently set for a pretrial conference on January 12, 2015, and for a jury trial on February 9, 2015.
Analysis
I. Plaintiff's motion to compel and/or conduct electronic discovery should be denied pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C).
Plaintiff's motion is supported by two (2) documents produced by Defendant Adams County during discovery: (i) a screenshot of Pastor's booking information in the jail's computerized intake/booking program; and (ii) a re-printed Intake Form containing Pastor's current booking information in the jail's computer program. Neither document warrants the additional electronic discovery requested by Plaintiff.
First, neither document shows that Pastor was placed on suicide watch when he was booked into the Adams County jail because Pastor's signature does not appear on either document. The absence of Pastor's signature is significant because a detainee's individual signature is not saved in the jail's computerized booking/intake program. A booking document therefore must first be printed from the computer system before it can be signed by a detainee. Any information contained in a booking document signed by a detainee reflects the booking information that existed in the computer system when that document was printed. In this case, all the documents containing Pastor's signature show that he was not placed on “Suicide Watch” and that he was not identified as having a “Mental Illness” when he was booked into the jail on July 28, 2012. This conclusion is re-affirmed by Defendant's response, as well as by the deposition testimony of Adams County's Rule 30(b)(6) representative. [163, ¶6] (“... the deposition of Adams County's Rule 30(b)(6) deponent, Charles Hargill, is consistent with the position Adams County has taken at all times in this matter—that when Mr. Pastor was booked into the Adams County Jail, he was not placed on suicide watch.”).
Second, neither document shows that Pastor was placed on “Suicide Watch” prior to his suicide. Shortly after Pastor was found deceased, Defendant Owens re-printed Pastor's Intake Form from the jail's computer system. Like the Intake Form signed by Pastor, the Intake Form re-printed by Defendant Owens shows that Pastor was not placed on “Suicide Watch” and that Pastor was not identified as having a “Mental Illness” in the jail's computer system when the Intake Form was re-printed by Defendant Owens.
*3 Both documents submitted in support of Plaintiff's motion establish that Pastor's booking information in the jail's computer program was altered after his suicide. Defendant Adams County has conceded this fact. It therefore remains undisputed that Defendants classified and incarcerated Pastor as a non-suicidal detainee at all times prior to his suicide on July 28, 2012. As a result, Plaintiff's request for additional electronic discovery to determine whether Pastor was placed on suicide watch is unnecessary. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel electronic discovery and/or for leave to conduct electronic discovery should be denied pursuant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (“On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that: ... (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.”).
II. The denial of additional discovery is not prejudicial to Plaintiff.
Adams County incorrectly argues that the unexplained post-suicide changes to Pastor's booking information are irrelevant. [163, ¶11]. It is undisputed that Pastor had a constitutional right to be protected from known suicidal tendencies.[1] “The key to proving a violation of this right is for the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with subjective deliberate indifference.” Matis v. Johnson, 262 Fed.Appx. 671, 673 (5th Cir. 2008). “The deliberate indifference standard requires a showing that the defendant knew the detainee faced a substantial risk of serious harm, yet disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the risk.” Id.
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Pastor was a known suicide risk and that Defendants should have placed Pastor on “Suicide Watch” while he was detained in the Adams County jail. Plaintiff also alleges that Pastor's in-custody suicide was caused by Defendants' improper failure to place Pastor on “Suicide Watch.” It is now undisputed that Pastor's booking information in the jail's computer system was changed after Pastor's suicide to show that he was placed on “Suicide Watch” and that he was recognized to have a “Mental Illness” when booked into the jail. A factfinder could determine that such circumstantial evidence is relevant to the “knowledge” and/or “subjective deliberate indifference” of Defendants in light of Plaintiff's allegations. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842-43, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1981-82 (1994) (“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.”).
Adams County has also conceded that the post-suicide changes to Pastor's booking information in the jail's computer system cannot be explained. Presumably, the motive for the post-suicide changes made to Pastor's booking information also cannot be explained. The absence of any explanation for the post-suicide changes could also be relevant under the circumstances. Id. at n. 8 (“While the obviousness of a risk is not conclusive and a prison official may show that the obvious escaped him, see infra, at 1982, he would not escape liability if the evidence showed that he merely refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to exist ...”). Accordingly, the denial of additional electronic discovery is not prejudicial to Plaintiff in light of the other undisputed facts in this case.
*4 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the [146] Motion and the [154] Amended Motion to Compel Defendant Adams County's Production of Electronic Stored Information/Discovery and/or for Leave to Conduct Limited F.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) Deposition to Obtain and Authenticate Electronic Discovery is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this the 2nd day of December, 2014.
Footnotes
Compare [135] Defendant Smith's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment (“ ‘A pretrial detainee has a clearly established right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be protected from known suicidal tendencies.’ Matis v. Johnson, 262 Fed.Appx. 671, 673 (5th Cir. 2008).”) with [175] Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (“ ‘The failure to provide pre-trial detainees with adequate protection from their known suicidal impulses is actionable under § 1983 as a violation of the detainee's constitutional rights.’ Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1992)”).