Boone v. TFI Family Servs., Inc.
Boone v. TFI Family Servs., Inc.
2016 WL 3124850 (D. Kan. 2016)
June 3, 2016

Gale, Kenneth G.,  United States Magistrate Judge

Privacy
Failure to Produce
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Summary
The Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant TFI to produce 172 GB of ESI relating to TFI's foster placements involving four children. The Court found that the requested information was both nonprivileged and relevant, and that Defendant's concerns could be addressed through a protective order.
Additional Decisions
NAOMI BOONE, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of the minor M.P.D.B., deceased, Plaintiffs,
v.
TFI FAMILY SERVICES, INC., a private, not-for-profit corporation; et al., Defendants
Case No. 14-2548-JTM-KGG
United States District Court, D. Kansas
Signed June 03, 2016

Counsel

Bernard T. Schmitt, Schmitt Mulhern, LLC, Kansas City, MO, Bridgette Fu, Michaela Shelton, Shelton Law Office, PA, Michael W. Wharton, Couch Pierce King & Wharton Chtd., Overland Park, KS, for Plaintiffs.
Derek G. Johannsen, Heather R. Marengo, John G. Schultz, Franke Schultz & Mullen, PC, Kansas City, MO, Gregory A. Lee, Kelly J. Trussell, Jenna R. Seematter, Sloan Eisenbarth Glassman McEntire & Jarboe, LLC, Corliss Scroggins Lawson, David W. Davies, III, Kansas Department for Children and Families, Topeka, KS, for Defendants.
Gale, Kenneth G., United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL

*1 Now before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. (Doc. 194.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed their federal court Complaint against Defendants alleging violations of their civil rights, as well as multiple tort claims, stemming from the circumstances surrounding the death of M.P.D.B., a minor. (Doc. 1, at 2.) M.P.D.B. was placed in the custody of the Department for Children and Families (“DCF”) on July 10, 2012, for placement while still residing with his paternal grandmother. (Doc. 59, at 4.) DCF assigned the placement and monitoring of M.P.D.B. to TFI Family Services, Inc. (“TFI”). (Id.) TFI placed M.P.D.B. in the custody of his natural father, Lee Davis III. (Id.) A Court Order then removed M.P.D.B. from the custody of TFI and placed him with his father. (Id.) On March 5, 2012, M.P.D.B. died from a brain injury. (Id., at 5.) Davis pleaded no contest to the second degree murder of M.P.D.B. and Davis' live-in girlfriend pleaded guilty to the second degree murder of M.P.D.B. (Id.) In Plaintiffs' words, “[t]he heart of [their] claim is TFI's reckless and highly inappropriate decision to place M.B. with his father.” (Doc. 194, at 2.)
The present motion stems from Requests for Production that Plaintiffs served on Defendant TFI seeking ESI “relating to TFI's...placements involving four children who are subjects of” certain KDHE administrative cases. (Id., at 3.) After certain discussions between the parties, TFI eventually produced 172 GB of ESI. According to Plaintiff, Defendant “did not produce ESI concerning the foster children who were the subject of the [aforementioned] KDHE administrative actions.” (Id.)
DISCUSSION
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b) states that
[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at state in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
As such, the requested information must be both nonprivileged and relevant to be discoverable.
Defendant contends that the information sought is irrelevant on its face because the discovery request sought information regarding foster children in out-of-home placements. (Doc. 221, at 5.) Defendant argues that the policies and procedures relating to M.B.’s placement were entirely different – and thus irrelevant – because M.B.’s case involved reintegration with a biological parent as opposed to out-of-home foster care. (Id., at 5-6.) The Court does not agree that the request seeks irrelevant information. Rather, the Court finds that the request is relevant on its face as it seeks evidence which could be germane to Plaintiffs' theory of pattern or habit, the negligence claim, or the issue recklessness in support of a punitive damages claim.
*2 Defendant has not presented a compelling argument that the differences between the “reintegration” decision-making process and a foster placement decision makes this request factually irrelevant. For example, if one of the requested cases involved TFI disregarding a history of violence in a foster home, this would be relevant to the allegations of negligence in the present case regardless of the reintegration/foster home distinction.
Defendant also argues that, pursuant to the changes to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26, the discovery sought is not proportional to the needs of the case. As stated above, in determining the proportionality argument, the Court will look at “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1); see also Blair v. Transam Trucking, Inc., No. 09-2443-EFM-KGG, 2016 WL175446, *2 (D. Kan. April 9, 2016). Defendant has failed to establish that its resources or burden of the potential expense outweighs the undeniably important nature of the issues at stake in this case and the facially relevant nature of the request.
The Court notes Defendant's argument that the requested information is inadmissible pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 404 and 406. (See Doc. 221, at 15-18.) Whether the actual evidence produced will be admissible at a subsequent trial is not the standard for this discovery motion.
Finally, Defendant argues that the information requested implicates “confidential and private information.” (Doc. 221, at 19.) It is well-established in this District that private or confidential documents are not necessarily shielded from discovery because “privileged” and “confidential” are two distinct concepts. See Kendall State Bank v. West Point Underwriters, LLC, No. 10–2319–JTM–KGG, 2013 WL 593957, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 15, 2013) (citing McCloud v. Board of Geary County Comm'rs, No.2008 WL 1743444, at *4 (D. Kan. April 11, 2008) (holding that even assuming certain records are “ ‘private’ or confidential, this does not mean the records are privileged and/ or nondiscoverable”)). Defendant's concerns be addressed through a protective order.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Compel (Doc. 193) is GRANTED as more fully set forth herein. Supplemental responses shall be served on or before July 1, 2016.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated at Wichita, Kansas, on this 3rd day of June, 2016.