Plaintiff suffered the amputation of a leg in 2007 causing her limitations in her ability to walk, lift, and bend. Defendant hired Plaintiff in May 2010. Plaintiff complained about how her supervisor treated her and even threatened reporting her supervisor's allegedly discriminatory conduct to government entities. Plaintiff was terminated from her job on August 16, 2011. Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on November 28, 2011. Plaintiff received her Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC on April 30, 2012. On June 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed her complaint in this Court.

In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), gender harassment and hostile work environment under Title VII, insufficient compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and conversion. Plaintiff requested relief for a wide range of damages, which she summarized in a document produced in response to Defendant's written discovery requests. Plaintiff's summary of damages noted her requests for back pay, overtime pay, lost employment benefits, front pay, and compensatory damages for her emotional distress and psychological damages. In addition, Plaintiff indicated her intent “to seek damages for the financial hardship suffered after her termination from Defendant including, but not limited to, her Indiana tax lien, lawsuit against her filed by Heights Finance Corp., and having to relocate from Medaryville ... to Lowell, Indiana.” Doc. No. 24-6. Lastly, Plaintiff requested “attorney's fees and costs of litigation, pre– and post-judgment interest, and punitive and/or liquidated damages from Defendant.” Id.

Unsatisfied with Plaintiff's discovery responses regarding Plaintiff's medical information and records, her job search history, her Facebook account information and data, and other information bearing on her declared financial hardship, Defendant filed its Motion to Compel Discovery on April 10, 2013. Plaintiff filed her response in opposition on April 29, 2013. Defendant filed a reply on May 8, 2013.

*2 Defendant subsequently served subpoenas for employment information on three non-parties who employed Plaintiff prior or subsequent to her employment by Defendant. Concerned about privacy issues with the release of her employment information, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Quash Non-Party Subpoenas on May 24, 2013. Defendant filed its response in opposition on June 10, 2013. Plaintiff filed a reply on June 19, 2013.

Before the motion to quash could be resolved, two of Plaintiff's employers produced the requested information. As a result, Plaintiff then filed her Motion for Protective Order regarding her other employment records on June 19, 2013. Defendant filed its response in opposition on July 8, 2013. Plaintiff filed a reply on July 18, 2013.

Because the substance of all three discovery motions is related, Defendant filed a motion on July 8, 2013, asking the Court for a status conference or oral argument to discuss the motions. As discussed below, the Court was able to reach its conclusion regarding the three discovery motions without hearing from the parties. Therefore, the Court now DENIES Defendant's motion for a status conference or oral argument. [Doc. No. 43]. The remaining three motions are addressed below.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(1) permits discovery into “any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” For the purpose of discovery, relevancy will be construed broadly to encompass “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter[s] that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Chavez v. Daimler Chrysler, 206 F.R.D. 615, 619 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351(1978)). Discovery under Rule 26, however, is not an invitation to the proverbial fishing expedition. “Once an objection has been raised to a [discovery] request, the party seeking discovery must demonstrate that the request is within the scope permitted under Rule 26(b) [after which,] the responding party has the burden of showing some sufficient reason why discovery should not be allowed.” Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 138 F.R.D. 115, 118-19 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (internal citations omitted).

This Court has broad discretion when deciding whether to compel discovery and may deny discovery to protect a party from oppression or undue burden. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Sattar v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d 1164, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998); Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 495-96 (7th Cir. 1996). In ruling on a motion to compel, “a district court should independently determine the proper course of discovery based upon the arguments of the parties.” Gile, 95 F.3d at 496. In responding to a motion to compel discovery, the court may issue a protective order to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).

In its motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's discovery responses are incomplete as to (1) Interrogatory Nos. 11-13 and Request Nos. 7 and 21 regarding Plaintiff's medical information and records; (2) Interrogatory No. 14 and Request No. 13 regarding Plaintiff's job search history; (3) Request No. 4 seeking Plaintiff's Facebook information and data; and (4) Interrogatory Nos. 7 and 10 and Request Nos. 9-11, 17, and 20 regarding Plaintiff's tax lien, unpaid debt due to an adverse legal judgment, relocation, total household financial status, and Plaintiff's other employment. In response, Plaintiff objected generally to the discovery requests identified above as overbroad, seeking information that is either not relevant to this issues raised in this case or not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, and confidential. In addition, Plaintiff states that she has provided Defendant with the information necessary to defend against her claims. Defendant contends that Plaintiff raised a broad range of damages through her complaint, initial disclosures, and written discovery responses justifying all the above discovery requests.

*3 Defendant has shown that its discovery requests are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence because they relate to issues raised by Plaintiff's own damages claims in this action. First, while the primary thrust of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant is related to the amputation of her leg, Plaintiff also seeks damages to compensate for the emotional distress and psychological effects of Defendant's conduct. Plaintiff's medical information and records, beyond those available from the three doctors already identified to Defendant, could reasonably lead to admissible evidence as to the extent that Defendant's conduct caused Plaintiff's mental issues. Therefore, Defendant's request for all information related to Plaintiff's history of depression and any treatment by counselors is within the proper range of discovery in this matter. Producing all of Plaintiff's medical records over the course of her lifetime would likely be excessive as Plaintiff suggests. Fortunately, Defendant's discovery requests do not seek any information or records unrelated to the disability or injuries allegedly caused by Defendant. See Doc. Nos. 24-1 at ¶¶ 11–13, 24-2 at ¶¶ 7, 21.

Similarly, Plaintiff's Facebook information and data, as requested in Request No. 4, could reasonably lead to admissible evidence that proves or rebuts Plaintiff's claims and alleged damages. Plaintiff has thus far refused to produce any responsive social media information contending that the request for all Facebook account data for the specified period of time is too broad and must be narrowly tailored to issues raised in this case citing E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Mgmt., 270 F.R.D. 430, 436 (S.D. Ind. 2010). Evidently, the parties attempted but failed to reach agreement on a protective order limiting the scope of production for Plaintiff's Facebook account data. Even so, Defendant clearly agrees that the standard put forth in Simply Storage Mgmt. applies here. See Doc. No. 29 at 8. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to receive Facebook documentation as to issues raised in this case. Having produced nothing as to Request No. 4, Plaintiff has not met its discovery obligation and must now do so.

Second, through the Damages Summary Plaintiff produced along with her discovery responses, Plaintiff made her family's financial health an issue in this case. See Doc. No. 24-6 (“Alderson intends to seek damages for the financial hardship suffered after her termination from Defendant including, but not limited to, her Indiana tax lien, lawsuit against her ..., and having to relocated from Medaryville ... to Lowell, Indiana.”). Plaintiff has already produced her own W-2s and 1099s, which do provide necessary information as to her income. However, it does not provide any information as to financial standing of her family, which must be determined to ascertain whether the financial hardship she claims exists, and if it does, to what extent.

As Plaintiff suggests, tax returns are somewhat confidential in nature. Arguably then, unnecessary disclosure of tax returns should be avoided in order to support the effective implementation of tax laws. See Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 74-75 (7th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases). However, tax returns are not privileged and must be produced upon a discovery request if they are related to matters put into issue in a lawsuit. Id. at 74. Plaintiff protests Defendant's assertion that she has put her family's financial information at issue in this case by stating that she “has not claimed that Defendant caused her to move to find work.” Doc. No. 27 at 2. That may be true in a literal sense as there are no allegations that Defendant directed Plaintiff to move to find work. However, Plaintiff has alleged that a direct result of Defendant's termination of her employment was the relocation of her family. See Doc. No. 24-6. Because her whole family moved, the entire family's financial situation is at issue in this case making Plaintiff's tax returns, filed jointly with her husband, relevant and discoverable. Therefore, Plaintiff must produce her tax returns and other documents regarding the assets and liabilities attributable to those in her household as requested in Interrogatory Nos. 7 and 10 and Request Nos. 9-11, 17, and 20.

*4 Lastly, over Plaintiff's objection, Defendant's has shown that its requests for information regarding Plaintiff's job search history, including information from Plaintiff's CareerBuilder.com account, are relevant to Plaintiff's alleged damages and mitigation of those damages, especially as related to the alleged financial hardship she and her family endured as a result of Defendant's conduct. Plaintiff believes that her Indiana Department of Workforce Development (“IDWD”) file to which she already granted Defendant access provided sufficient information about her job search history after her termination to allow Defendant to defend against her claims. However, Defendant has shown that its request is not redundant of the information provided in the IDWD file because the IDWD file did not provide answers to all the questions Defendant asked or information related to all the issues Plaintiff raised. Moreover, the broad scope of discovery allowed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 does not limit any party, including Defendant, from seeking information from multiple sources regarding the same issue. Therefore, Defendant's Interrogatory No. 14 and Request No. 13 regarding Plaintiff's job search history are proper and must be answered by Plaintiff.

In sum, Plaintiff has put her mental and physical health as well as her family's financial situation at issue in this case. As a result, Defendant is entitled to Plaintiff's medical information and records, her Facebook account data, her tax returns, her financial information reflecting her family's assets and liabilities, and details of her job search history since her termination, including her CareerBuilder.com records. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to compel. [Doc. No. 23]. The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to respond fully to Defendant's Interrogatory Nos. 7 and 10-14 and Request Nos. 4, 7, 9-11, 13, 17, and 20-21 by September 6, 2013.

Non-party subpoenas are a discovery tool available to all parties under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. “The scope of material obtainable by a Rule 45 subpoena is as broad as permitted under the discovery rules.” Graham v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 206 F.R.D. 251, 253 (S.D. Ind. 2002). However, a court that issues a subpoena, even if it is a non-party subpoena, must quash or modify it if compliance with the subpoena “requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter... or subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A). To determine whether a subpoena is unduly burdensome, a court weighs a number of factors including relevance, need, the breadth of the document request, the time period covered by it, the particularity with which the documents are requested, the burden imposed, and non-party status. WM High Yield v. O'Hanlon, 2006 WL 3197152 at 4 (S.D. Ind. 2006). “A party has standing to move to quash a subpoena addressed to another if the subpoena infringes upon the movant's legitimate interests.” Microsoft Corp. v. Tech. Enterprises LLC, No. 1:07-mc-210-DFH-TAB, 2008 WL 424613, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 13, 2008) (quoting United States v. Raineri, 670 F.2d 702, 712 (7th Cir. 1982)). The movant seeking to quash a subpoena bears the burden of proving that it is unduly burdensome. See LaSalle Nat'l Assoc. v. Nomura Asset Capital Corp., 2003 WL 21688225, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2003). A court “must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that ... the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

On May 15, 2013, Defendant served subpoenas on non-parties Saco Industries, Inc. (“Saco”), Plaintiff's current employer; and Transport Leasing Contract, Inc. (“Transport Leasing”) United Consumers Club (“United”), Plaintiff's former employers. Doc. No. 38-4 at ¶ 4. In those subpoenas, Defendant asked the employers to provide “all applications and hiring-related records, pay and benefit information, records of hours worked, any complaint made by or against Jeanette Alderson, performance records (evaluations, etc.), disciplinary records, and end of employment records” by May 28, 2013. Doc. No. 33-8. Plaintiff received copies of the unsigned subpoenas via e-mail from Defendant no later than May 9, 2013. After informing Defendant that it opposed service of the subpoenas and would likely file a motion to quash if they were served, Plaintiff received a letter dated May 10, 2013, from Defendant indicating that the subpoenas would be served by May 15, 2013, regardless of the objection.[1] Assuming that the subpoenas had been served without receiving copies of the served subpoenas from Defendant, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to quash on May 24, 2013.[2] Plaintiff has standing to file the instant motion to quash even though the subpoenas is not directed at her because she has a legitimate interest in protecting the confidentiality of much of the information contained in her employment records and in protecting the quality of her relationships with her employers. See Woods v. Fresenius Med. Care Grp. of N. Am., 106CV1804RLY-WTL, 2008 WL 151836, *1 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2008).

*5 In the instant motion, Plaintiff first argues that Defendant provided insufficient notice of its intent to serve the three subpoenas as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. Specifically, Plaintiff argued that Defendant never clarified when it was going to send out the subpoenas despite Plaintiff's request in communications with Defendant's counsel on May 9th and 10th to be given notice. Defendant, however, cited its May 10, 2013, letter to Plaintiff in which it informed Plaintiff that it intended to serve the subpoenas on May 15th. Defendant then alleged that Plaintiff delayed unduly by waiting to file her motion to quash until May 24th even though she had known about the subpoenas since May 9th. Plaintiff responded by claiming that she filed the motion to quash as promptly as possible after May 15th after allowing time to receive the served subpoenas in the mail as she anticipated she would.

This is one of those instances where the parties are propelling accusations of intentional use of improper discovery tactics back and forth like a tennis ball in a heated match at Wimbledon. Assuming that both parties met their professional obligations to conduct themselves with integrity and honesty but just failed miserably to communicate effectively with opposing counsel about service of the subpoenas, the Court finds that Defendant provided Plaintiff with sufficient notice of its intent to serve the three subpoenas and Plaintiff timely filed the instant motion to quash.

Second, Plaintiff opposed the non-party subpoenas arguing that (1) production of the information requested would violate Plaintiff's privacy rights; (2) the information requested had no more than marginal and attenuated relevance to the issues in this case; (3) she had already produced all the necessary information; and (4) Defendant could obtain additional information regarding Plaintiff's employment history through less intrusive means, especially Plaintiff's deposition.[3] Plaintiff supports its arguments generally by citing multiple cases where courts have quashed subpoenas to employers that broadly ask for entire personnel files. However, other courts have refused to quash subpoenas to employers when the requests are “limited in scope and ... appear to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Maxwell v. Health Ctr. of Lake City, Inc., 3:05CV1056-J-32MCR, 2006 WL 1627020, *3 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2006); see also Brady v. Cent. Ind. Reg'l Blood Ctr., Inc., No. 1:99-MC-19, 1999 WL 33912610, *2 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 6, 1999). Defendant seizes upon this argument appropriately.

Defendant has not requested Plaintiff's entire personnel files from the employers. Defendant has shown that it has reason to believe that information regarding her compensation, performance, hiring, and end of employment as delineated in the subpoenas could lead to discovery of admissible evidence regarding Plaintiff's broad range of damages as well as defenses to the overall employment discrimination claims. Specifically, the subpoenaed records may reveal other causes of Plaintiff's alleged emotional distress; explanations as to the gap in Plaintiff's employment history that could inform any conclusion regarding the causation of Plaintiff's financial hardship and the mitigation of her damages; and further insight into Plaintiff's conduct prior to her termination. Despite Plaintiff's focus on the relevance of her employment information solely to calculating back pay and front pay, the requested information clearly bears on a much broader range of pertinent issues in this case. The truth of this is only affirmed by the information already produced by Saco and Transport Leasing[4], which included new, relevant facts not provided by Plaintiff in her previous discovery responses and evidence that could be used to impeach Plaintiff's credibility. See Doc. Nos. 38-6, 38-7.

*6 Lastly, Plaintiff argues that her employment records should not be produced simply for the purpose of impeaching her credibility. The Court also acknowledges that a non-party subpoena served for the sole of purpose of fishing for evidence to impeach Plaintiff's credibility would not be proper. See Woods v. Fresenius Med. Care Grp. of N. Am., 106CV1804RLY-WTL, 2008 WL 151836, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2008). However, that is not the sole purpose of the subpoenas addressed here. Moreover, Defendant has demonstrated that it has not received complete job search history information from Plaintiff despite its previous discovery requests, which suggests to the Court that other sources, such as the three employers, could provide the requested information but also that Plaintiff may be hiding something. This gives sufficient reason to suspect that the three employers could have information reflecting on Plaintiff's credibility.

In sum, because Defendant has narrowed the scope of the requested information to matters at issue in this case, the Court finds that the non-party subpoenas are properly before the non-parties. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to quash. [Doc. No. 30]. Non-parties Saco Industries, Inc., Transport Leasing Contract, Inc., and United Consumers Club are ORDERED to comply with the subpoena to the extent they have not already done so by September 6, 2013.

Through the instant motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to enter a protective order instructing Saco, Transport Leasing, and United not to comply with the subpoenas issued by Defendant on May 15, 2013. As to any responses already produced, Plaintiff asks the Court to bar the use of any evidence included in the responses and to order Defendant to return any documents to the non-parties. Plaintiff's motion merely mirrors her Motion to Quash Non-Party Subpoenas already addressed above. Because the Court has found that the non-party subpoenas were proper and has ordered Saco, Transport Leasing, and United to comply with the subpoenas, the relief Plaintiff seeks is no longer available. Therefore, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff's motion. [Doc. No. 40].

(1) The Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to compel discovery. [Doc. No. 23]. Plaintiff is ORDERED to respond fully to Defendant's Interrogatory Nos. 7 and 10-14 and Request Nos. 4, 7, 9-11, 13, 17, and 20-21 by September 6, 2013.

(2) The Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to quash non-party subpoenas. [Doc. No. 30]. Non-parties Saco Industries, Inc., Transport Leasing Contract, Inc., and United Consumers Club are ORDERED to comply with the subpoenas served by Defendant on May 15, 2013, to the extent they have not already done so by September 6, 2013.

(3) The Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff's motion for protective order. [Doc. No. 40].

(4) The Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff's motion for status conference or oral argument. [Doc. No. 43].

SO ORDERED.

Dated this 22nd day of August, 2013.

Defendant's May 10th letter did not identify May 15, 2013 specifically, but stated: “Given the timing here, Ferrellgas intends to serve these subpoenas by mid-week next week.” Doc. No. 38-3 at 2. May 10, 2013, was a Friday. May 15, 2013, was a Wednesday.

Plaintiff notes that as of June 19, 2013, she had not received copies of the served subpoenas despite her specific request dated June 3, 2013. See Doc. No. 39 at 5.

Evidently, Plaintiff's deposition was scheduled for June 20, 2013. The Court has received no indication whether that deposition occurred.

The Court need not address Defendant's argument that the motion to quash is moot as to Saco and Transport Leasing because they responded to the subpoena before the motion to quash was filed because it is denying the motion to quash on substantive grounds that apply to all three non-parties.