In attendance were Donald E. Haviland, Jr., Jay W. Chamberlin, counsel to Plaintiff, and Mark S. Melodia, Alexis Gabrielle Cocco, and Nipun J. Patel, counsel to Defendants The Coca-Cola Company, Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., Keystone Coca-Cola and Bottling and Distribution Corporation, Keystone Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Keystone Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc., and Keystone Coca-Cola Bottling Corporation (collectively, “Defendants” for the purpose of this Order).

When a party seeks production of ESI, the responding party is “best situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies appropriate for preserving and producing [its] own electronically stored information.” The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Principles 38 (2007), http://thesedonaconference.org/publication/The S̈edona P̈rinciples [hereinafter “Sedona Principles”]; seeFord Motor Co. v. Edgewood Properties, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418, 427 (D.N.J. 2009); see also Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 96, 106 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting Ford Motor Co., 257 F.R.D. at 424) (recognizing that the Sedona Principles are “the leading authorities on electronic document retrieval and production”). The burden lies with the party requesting discovery to show that a responding party's production of ESI was inadequate and that additional efforts are warranted. Sedona Principles at 43; seeParks, LLC v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 5:15-cv-00946, 2015 WL 5042918, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2015) (“Necessarily ... a party moving to compel another party to respond to a discovery request must ... inform the Court of how the response received to that request—if any—is deficient.”). If the requesting party seeks to have the responding party search the information of additional custodians, the requesting party should be able to articulate a basis for the court to find that ESI in the possession of the additional custodians would be different from, and not simply duplicative of, information that the responding party has already produced. See City of Sterling Heights Gen. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Prudential Fin., Inc., No. CIV.A. 12-05275, 2015 WL 5055241, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2015) (compelling a party to search the information of additional custodians because the requesting party provided information that “support [ed] a fair inference” that some of those custodians may possess additional, non-cumulative information); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (requiring a court to limit any discovery that is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative”). Here, while Plaintiff explained why he believes that these additional individuals may have some connection to the events at issue in this action, he did not articulate any basis to believe that Defendants' search and production of responsive documents was inadequate; in other words, why they would be in possession of additional non-cumulative responsive information. Additionally, Defendants represented that they sampled the data of one of these additional custodians and found that each relevant document contained in that data had already been produced. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (directing courts to consider whether “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”).

Plaintiff did not articulate an adequate basis to conclude that his additional proposed search strings would uncover additional responsive information. However, Defendants conceded, based on sampling they conducted of each of these terms, that the term “mofo” or (“morrison” w/5 “foerster”) generated “some potentially responsive documents.” Defendants oppose reviewing these documents because doing so “will result primarily in additional entries on a privilege log and will not provide Plaintiff with additional documents.” The purpose of the privilege log, however, is to allow the opposing party visibility into the responsive documents that are being withheld on the basis of privilege and to challenge the assertion of privilege if necessary. If Defendants fail to do so, Plaintiff has no means to assess this assertion of privilege, nor could Defendants satisfy their obligations under Rule 26(b)(5)(A).

Plaintiff has not supplied a basis to conclude that the temporal parameters Defendants chose for their search of ESI was improper. Additionally, Defendants represented that they are willing to search for and provide any prior versions of internal policies and procedures that Plaintiff requests.

The names and addresses of class members are not, per se, “within the scope of legitimate discovery.” See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 353-56 (1978). Thus, “courts ordinarily will not permit putative class counsel to obtain discovery of class members' identities at the precertification stage.” See Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions: Law and Practice § 11.1 (12th ed. database updated Dec. 2015). Courts have also expressed “concern that plaintiffs' attorneys may be seeking such information to identify potential new clients, rather than to establish the appropriateness of [class] certification.” Dziennik v. Sealift, Inc., No. 05-CV-4659, 2006 WL 1455464, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006). Here, however, Defendants' redactions have impacted Plaintiff's ability to understand the documents Defendants have produced and how they relate to each other. Accordingly, Defendants shall provide a means for Plaintiff to identify relationships between the individuals who are referenced in these documents, either by their initials or by a numerical identifier.

A meeting to discuss claims of privilege can be highly productive, because it “enable[s] the defendant's representative or counsel to more completely state the reason for the claimed privilege as opposed to the cryptic reasons offered in the index” and also “enable[s] plaintiff to query counsel and/or a representative of the defendant to test the claimed privilege as is permitted under existing case law.” See Kelchner v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 469, 472 (M.D. Pa. 1987).