Adrian Vasquez, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., d/b/a Princess Cruises, a foreign corporation, Defendant CASE NO.: 12–22022–CIV–KING/GARBER Signed September 09, 2013 Counsel Robert Joannes Dickman, Jr., Coral Gables, FL, Philip Dixon Parrish, Philip D. Parrish PA, Ira H. Leesfield, Leesfield & Partners, P.A., Robert D. Peltz, The Peltz Law Firm, Thomas B. Scolaro, Leesfield Leighton & Partners, Miami, FL, Michael Keith Roberts, II, Nooney and Roberts, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiff. Jeffrey Bradford Maltzman, Steve Holman, Maltzman & Partners, PA, Coral Gables, FL, for Defendant. Garber, Barry L., United States Magistrate Judge REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS *1 THIS CAUSE is before the Court by Order of Reference from Senior United States District Court Judge James Lawrence King. Pursuant to such reference, the Court has received defendant Princess Cruise Lines' Motion for Sanction Against Plaintiff Adrian Vasquez and his Counsel Regarding Discovery Abuses (DE 101), the plaintiff Adrian Vasquez's response (DE 114), and Princess's reply (DE 121). The parties have also filed a number of exhibits (DE 101, 115–118, 121) and Princess has submitted supplemental briefing (DE 113) regarding the Court's continued jurisdiction to hear this matter, to which Vasquez did not respond.[1] Having considered the file and having held a hearing on the matter, the Court RECOMMENDS GRANTING Princess's motion IN PART for the reasons that follow. 1. Factual Background A group of birders were aboard the cruise ship Star Princess, sailing in the Pacific Ocean, off the coasts of Central and South America. The three birders claim that, sometime in the afternoon of March 10, 2012, they spotted what appeared to be a fishing boat, a mile or so in the distance. After observing the boat through their spotting scopes and binoculars, they concluded that someone on the boat was continuously waving some sort of material, in an apparent attempt to get the attention of the Star Princess and that the signaler seemed to be in great distress. One of the birders took photographs of the boat and the sighting was reported to the cruise ship's personnel, as well as to the Coast Guard. The record does not clearly reflect what further action, if any, was taken by either the cruise ship or the Coast Guard. In the meantime, also in the Pacific, three Panamanian fishermen were adrift on another boat, a small, open-hulled fishing vessel, that had lost power. Tragically, before they could be rescued, two of the three perished. The sole survivor, the plaintiff here, Adrian Vasquez, was rescued, some thirty days after his ordeal had begun, off the coast of the Galapagos Islands. Upon seeing news of the rescue, the bird watchers presumed that the rescued boat, named the Fiftycent (or some variation thereof), and the one that they had seen on March 10th, weeks earlier, were one and same and came forward with the story of their sighting. They provided the media with the photographs they had taken and that they alleged depicted the boat that Vasquez had been adrift on. Two of the birders testified at depositions, months after the ordeal, in October 2012, that the photographs that they had taken, and which were widely publicized by the media, depicted the distressed vessel that they had seen on March 10th. They both further testified extensively about seeing a man aboard the drifting boat who appeared to continuously motion for help by waving a blue shirt and orange life vest. Both birders claimed that the photographs, marked as exhibits during the deposition and which were published by the media, were the only photos that either of them had taken of any boats from their cruise. And, although Vasquez initially claimed that he had seen a big boat pass him by sometime in the morning hours of March 6th, upon further reflection, he later amended his account which ultimately paralleled the birders' time line. *2 Two months later, however, the two birders, in December 2012, recanted their testimony as to the identification of the boat that they contended had been in distress. Apparently, despite initially claiming not to have taken any other photos of boats during the trip, the birders found two other photos of a boat, amongst the 1000–plus that they had taken. Upon discovery of these photographs, the birders said that they realized they had made a grave error and had mistakenly identified the boat they had seen as the one that was depicted in the published photos. Instead, after more careful review, they determined that this newly identified boat, a large fishing trawler, was actually the one that they had seen in distress on March 10, 2012–not the much smaller, open-hulled Fiftycent. In correcting their testimony, the birders clarified that they had never seen anyone signaling for help from the small boat that was shown in the published photographs and which were entered as exhibits during their depositions and which Vasquez had positively identified as being the Fiftycent. From the outset, Princess has questioned whether the published photographs actually depicted the Fiftycent, and, moreover, whether its ship could have possibly passed within sight of the adrift Fiftycent based on the coordinates of the travel of the two vessels and various analyses of wind and current patterns. 2. Procedural Background Vasquez filed a three count complaint for damages that he alleged he sustained as a result of Princess's failure to come to his aid as his boat drifted powerlessly in the Pacific Ocean. Vasquez's complaint was later consolidated with related cases filed on behalf of or through Vasquez's deceased shipmates. After extensive discovery, the birdwatchers' revelation that they had misidentified the distressed vessel, prompted all but Vasquez to dismiss their cases with prejudice. After what appears to have been vigorous attempts at negotiation between Princess and Vasquez, Vasquez filed, on March 4, 2013, a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice. The next day, Princess filed the instant motion for sanctions, asking the Court to dismiss Vasquez's case with prejudice and to assess expenses against the plaintiff or his counsel. 3. Princess's Motion for Sanctions Princess's motion for sanctions is based on a number discovery abuses, in addition to what Princess refers to generally as “bad faith conduct,” on the part of Vasquez and his counsel. Much of Princess's complaints center around: (a) a number of videos that Vasquez possessed that were taken as he was rescued; (b) the script in which the name Fiftycent was painted on Vasquez's boat; (c) two sworn statements that Vasquez made to a Panamanian court; (d) various news interviews involving Vasquez; and (e) several instances where Vasquez changed his testimony. Vasquez and his counsel counter that Princess has brought its motion only to harass, in an attempt to coerce Vasquez into dismissing his case with prejudice. In fact, according to Vasquez, it is actually Princess's motion, and not Vasquez's conduct, that is the fraud upon the Court. Vasquez also argues that the motion is untimely and moot. a. The Videos On the day that they rescued Vasquez from his ordeal at sea, members of the crew of the Duarte V took four cell phone videos of him. Princess complains that: (i) Vasquez concealed the existence of the four videos; (ii) Vasquez's counsel denied having any knowledge of the videos at a hearing before the district court in August 2012; and (iii) Vasquez evaded authenticating the videos in response to requests for admission. Although many of the grounds upon which Princess complains technically fail, the Court is nonetheless troubled by Vasquez and his counsels' handling of the videos. Much of the parties' arguments with respect to these videos center around whether Vasquez and his counsel technically complied with various procedural rules and discovery requests. But many of these arguments tend to distract from the heart of the issue. For example, Princess's complaint that Vasquez's failure to produce the videos was violative of Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure misses the mark. Rule 26(a) simply requires a party to produce, without awaiting a discovery request, information that the party has in its possession and which that party may use to support its claims. Rule 26(a) specifically exempts evidence that a party intends to use solely for impeachment. Thus, technically speaking, if Vasquez did not intend to use the videos at trial to establish his claims or planned to use the videos solely for impeachment, for whatever strategic reasons he may have had in mind, then there is no requirement that Vasquez produce them under this rule. *3 Similarly, Princess's choice of phrasing in its interrogatories and requests for production did not technically require Vasquez to produce the videos. In its interrogatories, Princess directs Vasquez: to “[i]dentify all evidence and witnesses that support your contention that the boat observed by [the birders] from Star Princess on March 10, 2012 was the boat you were adrift on” (Def.'s Interrogs. 3; DE 106–6, 5); and to “[i]dentify all evidence and witnesses that support your contention that the boat observed by passengers on the Star Princess was the adrift boat known as ‘Fiftycent’ ” (Def.'s Interrogs. 4; DE 106–6, 6). If, on the other hand, Princess had requested evidence that would tend to refute, as well as support, Vasquez's contentions, his argument here would carry more weight. But because of the inartful wording of these interrogatories, Vasquez would not have been required to reveal or produce the videos in response. Because the boat depicted in the videos differs from the boat depicted in the photographs from the birders, the videos would not support Vasquez's contentions and therefore there would be no need to identify them. Likewise, Princess's requests for production asked for: “all documents which you contend prove the vessel spotted by passengers on the Star Princess was the Fiftycent” (Def.'s Req. for Produc. 2; DE 101–8, 3); and “all documents which support the allegations raised in the applicable Complaint you have asserted against the Defendants” (Def.'s Req. for Produc. 1; DE 101–8, 2). The videos, because they depict a boat other than that shown in the photographs provided by the birders, would not prove or support Vasquez's allegations. In fact the videos would arguably disprove the allegations. So, again, technically there is nothing improper about Vasquez not providing the videos in response to these clumsily worded requests. But all of this merely distracts from the crux of the problem. Despite Princess's inartfully presented motion, the Court finds Princess's underlying point well taken. These four videos depict, among other things, Vasquez while he was still aboard the Fiftycent, at the very moment of his rescue, and Vasquez aboard the Duarte V, with the Fiftycent shown tied alongside (including a video tour of the Fiftycent). Considering that Vasquez's complaint hinged on whether or not the Star Princess sailed within sight of the adrift Fiftycent; and considering that establishing that would have rested primarily on whether the adrift boat that the birders saw and took pictures of was in fact the Fiftycent, then it would seem to follow that Vasquez would want to use these videos, apparently the only known images of the Fiftycent, to support his claim. Princess posits that the only reason that Vasquez would not want to use the videos at trial or would not otherwise use them to prove his allegation is that he thought the videos might reveal a different boat than the one depicted in the photographs submitted by the birders. And, in fact, Vasquez does not dispute that the depiction of the Fiftycent in the videos appears to show a markedly different boat than the boat shown in the birders' photographs. Vasquez's counsel simply defends the decision not to disclose the videos thusly: “We certainly did not omit the video from disclosure because we thought it helped the defendant.” (Pl.'s Resp; DE 114, 7 (emphasis added).) Vasquez and his counsel attempt to have this Court believe that, since there was no dispute that Vasquez was rescued or that he had been aboard the Fiftycent, there would have been no probative value to the videos, one way or another. But the videos clearly depict the Fiftycent. And the birders had a photograph of a boat they thought had been in distress. Surely production of the video would help one determine whether or not these two boats were at least arguably one and the same. For counsel to pretend otherwise is galling. The Court is also troubled by Vasquez's responses to Princess's attempts to have the videos authenticated. Princess, in a request for admission, asked Vasquez to “[a]dmit that the video attached hereto ... depicts Adrian Vasquez on the date he was rescued.” Although Vasquez at least admitted that he was indeed depicted in the video, he did so while also objecting that he has: *4 no information regarding the identity of the individual who allegedly took this video, the manner in which it was taken, the accuracy of the matters asserted therein, the date on which it was purportedly taken and whether the video produced by the Defendant is an actual unedited, unfiltered and verbatim reproduction of the original video. (Pl.'s Resp. to Req. for Admis. 1; DE 101–9, 2.) Vasquez's categorical denial of having any information whatsoever about who took the video, how or when it was taken, or the accuracy of the information contained therein was improper, evasive, and only served to obscure the truth. Just three weeks after submitting his responses to Princess's request for admission, Vasquez stated during a deposition that someone from the boat that rescued him took various videos of him and the Fiftycent on the day of his rescue. (Pl. Dep. 84–95; DE 101–1, 22–25). He said that in addition to being present while the videos were taken, he had taken copies of the videos home with him and viewed them upon his return to Panama, in March 2012. (Id. at 91–92; DE 101–1, 24). In light of Vasquez's description of his familiarity with the videos, his and his counsel's objections in response to Princess's request for admissions that Vasquez has “no information” whatsoever about the videos are frivolous, deceptive, and misleading. By not correcting his testimony, Vasquez and his counsel have run afoul of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(1)(A) which requires parties to timely correct responses that are false or incorrect. On the other hand, the Court does not find fault with Vasquez's counsel's responses in open court regarding the videos. At an August 20, 2012 hearing, counsel for Princess announced that it had recently discovered a number of videos depicting Vasquez and his rescue by the Duarte V. Princess stated, for the first time, that the videos clearly showed that the boat that the birdwatchers had initially identified as the distressed vessel was in fact not the Fiftycent. Vasquez's counsel's request to reserve comment seems entirely appropriate. They couldn't have known for sure which videos Princess was talking about since Princess hadn't provided them prior to the hearing. Having just heard for the first time Princess's new defense theory, regarding the boat depicted in the videos, it seems reasonable that Vasquez's counsel would seek to review the videos that Princess was referring to before making any statements about them before Judge King. b. The Name Painted on Vasquez's Boat The Court also does not find fault with Vasquez's responses to questions about the name of the boat that he was adrift on. Princess propounded upon Vasquez a request for admission that asked him to “admit that the boat Adrian Vasquez was adrift on has the name [‘]FIFTYCENT’ painted on its port side.” (Pl.'s Req. for Admis. 4; DE 101–9, 5). Although Vasquez again presented the same litany of objections that he had thrown up in response to questions about the filming of the videos, as described more fully above, he ultimately at least admitted that indeed that was the name painted on the boat. Princess's main complaint with Vasquez's answer is that it was subject to the caveat that the name was not painted in “the style or font shown.” (Id.) The Court finds nothing objectionable about this caveat and finds Princess's ire here to be much ado about nothing. The script of the painting of the name on the boat surely is quite different than the style or font used in the print of the request for admission. This seems to the Court thoroughly unremarkable and cautions Princess's counsel that this kind of misplaced quibbling only detracts from the genuine issues that are at play in this case. c. The Sworn Statements *5 Princess next raises a number of issues regarding two statements that Vasquez had given to the First Superior Court of the First Judicial District of Panama regarding his ordeal. The first of these two sworn declarations, Vasquez gave just a few days after his rescue, on March 29, 2012. Two days later, he returned to the court, this time accompanied by his Panamanian counsel. In both declarations, Vasquez recounts the story of how he came to be adrift on the Fiftycent, what happened during his ordeal at sea, including the tragic demise of his two shipmates, and some details regarding his eventual rescue. Princess takes issue with a number of factual inconsistencies it perceives between the two declarations themselves as well as with other evidence in the case. For example, Princess points out that, in his first statement, Vasquez “makes no mention [of] a cruise ship or any similar large white ship passing Plaintiff's adrift boat.” (Pl.'s Mot. 10; DE 101, 10.) While in his second statement, according to Princess, he “claims a cruise ship passed their adrift boat.” (Id.) Upon examination of the two statements, the Court does not find anything alarming about the so-called inconsistencies that Princess highlights. In the first statement, Vasquez said that “[o]ne day a big boat passed by us, we made signs but they never paid any attention to us.” (Pl.'s 1st Stmt. DE 101–10, 6.) In the second statement, he describes a “cruise ship” that passed them, “the one that is of a white color” and that “was big.” (Pl.'s 2nd Stmt. DE 101–2, 7.) While the second statement includes the additional detail that the big boat that he saw was white, this does not make the statements inconsistent; one statement just has more detail than the other. The Court fails to understand what Princess finds so compelling about these two descriptions. The Court is equally unimpressed by discrepancies between the date on which Vasquez says he saw the big (white) boat pass him and the date on which the birders say they saw what they thought was a boat in distress. It is not surprising that the dates don't match up since the birders have since said they were mistaken about the boat that they saw adrift. Furthermore, Vasquez consistently described events in relation to the number of days he estimated since his boat's motor had quit. It would not be surprising that his estimates were not particularly accurate. The Court finds nothing about these inconsistencies as presented by Princess that would rise to the level of sanctionable conduct. On the other hand, that Vasquez categorically denied, during his deposition, meeting with any governmental entities regarding his ordeal and rescue is indeed troubling. This denial, coupled with Vasquez's counsel's failure to correct the deposition testimony or attempt to in anyway reconcile his testimony with the existence of the two statements, indicates a lack of candor. Regardless of any costs incurred by opposing counsel, such deception serves to severely hamper the orderly and efficient progression of the judicial process. Compounding this problem is Vasquez's counsel's response to Princess's motion which states: “Princess never requested nor inquired about statements taken by third parties.” (Pl.'s Resp. DE 114, 9.) This is directly contradicted by Princess's counsel's deposition questions to Vasquez: “Do you know if any Panamanian or Ecuadorian government agency is investigating what happened to you?” (Pl.'s Dep. 181; DE 101–1, 47.) And then: “Has anybody from the government of Panama or the government of Ecuador ever met with you to find out what happened?” (Id.) And finally: “Have you ever given a recorded statement about what happened to you while you were adrift ... ?” (Id.) Even if Vasquez's counsel had argued that Vasquez hadn't understood the deposition questions, which argument they did not raise, the Court finds it inexcusable that his counsel would try to get around the inconsistent testimony by stating that Princess never even asked about the declarations. d. The Interviews *6 Princess also complains that Vasquez and his counsel concealed their appearances in various media reports about Vasquez's ordeal. In particular, Princess points to Vasquez's improper response to a discovery request that asked Vasquez to produce: “Any and all press releases, press statements, issued by or on behalf of Plaintiffs' or their law firms relating to the incident alleged in your Complaint.” (Pl.'s Req. for Produc. 2; 101–7, 3.) Vasquez responded: “None in written or audio form in Plaintiff's or Plaintiff attorney's possession.” (Id.) Based on its later receipt from Vasquez and his counsel of, as Princess describes, “a large stack of news stories that included written and videotaped statements from Vasquez,” Princess concludes that Vasquez's initial discovery response was “at best misleading and at worse [sic] completely false.” (Pl.'s Mot. DE 101, 12.) The Court does not understand what the production of “news stories” might have to do with a request for “press releases” and “press statements.” Vasquez raises this issue in passing in its response and the Court finds the point well-taken. Princess has not submitted any support for what appears to be its contention that Vasquez should have understood that by asking for “press releases” and “press statements” that what Princess was really looking for were news articles in which Vasquez or his counsel might have appeared or given interviews. Again, this appears to be an instance of Princess overreaching in its allegations of discovery abuses. The Court finds nothing improper about Vasquez's response, especially in light of Princess's failure to allege that any such “press releases” or “press statements” even exist. e. Inconsistent Testimony Princess's last allegation revolves around the time line of when Vasquez alleged the cruise ship passed him. In Vasquez's answers to Princess's first set of interrogatories, he said that he saw a large white ship sometime between March 5th and March 7th. In his second sworn statement to the Panamanian court, he claimed to have see a cruise ship in the morning of March 6th. He also said he saw the cruise ship in the morning when interviewed by a journalist. After the birders said that they saw the distressed ship in the afternoon of March 10th, however, Vasquez amended his interrogatory response such that it then matched their testimony. In his deposition, Vasquez repeated the change and testified that the large white ship passed him in the afternoon rather than in the morning. With respect to the discrepancy in the dates, Princess alleges that Vasquez changed his testimony just so that it would be consistent with the birders' testimony. In response, Vasquez argues that it would be “unfair and unrealistic” to expect Vasquez to know the exact date and time at which he was passed by the cruise ship during his thirty-day ordeal adrift. To a certain extent, the Court finds Vasquez defense of the discrepancy compelling. It is understandable that Vasquez, after drifting for days or weeks without food, water, or a watch, would be off in his date and time estimates. What is troublesome, however, is Vasquez's later wholesale adoption of the birders' time frame. One would not be surprised if Vasquez acknowledged that he was initially just making his best guess regarding the time of day and the date and to later allow for the possibility that he misremembered the timing. But it is another thing entirely for Vasquez to later state with certainty that he clearly remembered the cruise ship passing him in the afternoon rather than morning. In other words, it would not be unrealistic for Vasquez to be unsure of the timing. What seems unlikely is that Vasquez would be able to answer the question with such certainty, one way or the other, and it is this that the Court finds troubling. 4. Discussion Based on the above analyses, the Court finds sanctions in this case warranted. With respect to the videos taken of Vasquez when he was rescued, as discussed in detail above in section 3.a., first, the Court finds Vasquez and his counsel have not been forthcoming about the reasons why the rescue videos were not produced. Second, Vasquez's objections to Princess's discovery requests about the videos were unjustified. Vasquez and his counsel also appear to have concealed information about Vasquez's sworn declarations to the Panamanian court, as described in section 3.c, and further, have not adequately explained how Vasquez became more certain about when he saw the white ship with the passage of time. a. Local Rule 26.1 As an initial matter, Vasquez relies on Southern District of Florida Local Rule 26.1(h) to support his proposition that Princess's motion is untimely. Local Rule 26.1(h) warns that the “[f]ailure to file a discovery motion within thirty (30) days [of the occurrence of the grounds for the motion], absent a showing of reasonable cause for a later filing, may constitute a waiver of the relief sought.” The rule is permissive and does not require a court to find that the issue has been waived. Furthermore, in this case, the Court does not find reliance on Rule 26.1 warranted because the issues presented have not been clouded by the passage of time. Although Rule 26.1 might allow the Court to deem Princess's request waived, there is nothing in the rule that would require it to do so. Case law is replete with examples of courts considering discovery sanctions well past the thirty day time line set forth in rule 26.1. Based on the factual development in this case and its current procedural posture, the Court recommends declining to find that Princess has waived its right to raise the issues in its motion. b. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(2) *7 As set forth in more detail in section 3.a., Vasquez improperly failed to admit the authenticity of the rescue videos. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(2), upon such a failure and “if the requesting party later proves a document to be genuine ... the requesting party may move that the party who failed to admit pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in making that proof.” (Emphasis added). A court is required to order the failing party to pay the expenses later incurred in establishing authenticity unless one of four exceptions apply: (1) the request is found to be objectionable; (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance; (3) the failing party reasonably believed it might prevail on the matter; or (4) other good reason exists. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 37(c)(2). In this case, Princess seeks reimbursement of expenses that were incurred prior to Vasquez's failure to authenticate. The court cannot read the word “later” out of the rule. This combined with an assessment of the importance of the admission sought in light of the fact that Princess had already authenticated the video, prevents the mandatory imposition of expenses. This is not to say that sanctions aren't warranted at all; after all, Vasquez and his counsel have clearly frustrated the goals and purposes of the discovery rules by the many violations as recounted above. However, the mandatory imposition of expenses dictated by Rule 37(c)(2) does not apply here—the rule simply does not provide a mechanism by which parties can seek reimbursement for expenses incurred prior to violations. Princess would have incurred the expenses even if Vasquez had properly authenticated the video. The Court will therefore look to its own discretion, as also suggested by Princess, in fashioning appropriate sanctions. c. Sanctions As discussed in detail, above, in section 3.a., by failing to correct Vasquez's responses to Princess's request for admissions, Vasquez and his counsel have violated Rule 26(e). Because of this violation alone, aside from the cumulative effect of the other discovery abuses set forth above, pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1), the Court is granted the authority to order the payment of reasonable expenses and further has the sanctions listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vi) at its disposal. Furthermore, federal courts have inherent powers to impose sanctions where litigation abuses are found to have hampered the judicial process. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991). Thus where various litigation abuses may not fit neatly into a particular rule of civil procedure, the inherent power serves to “fill in the interstices” where a litigant's bad-faith conduct interferes with the orderly disposition of a case. Id. Without a doubt, Vasquez and his counsel's conduct has risen to this level. Counsel has an overarching duty of candor to the court. Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). Vasquez's counsel had an on-going duty to inform the Court of any development which may have affected the outcome of the case. Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1117 n. 83 (11th Cir. 2001). Regardless of whether counsel's conduct was intended to multiply the proceedings or not, a court may impose sanctions for the type of egregious conduct that occurred during discovery in this case. Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny's, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2007). Pursuant to the authority granted by Rule 37(c)(1)(C), as well as a court's inherent authority to punish behavior that “mires the judicial machinery,” In re Ocon, 2009 WL 405370, *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 19, 2009)(internal citations omitted), the Court recommends that Princess's Motion for Sanctions be granted, though only in part. Although a severe sanction, the Court recommends that this case be dismissed with prejudice. Based on the pattern of conduct cataloged in the preceding pages, Vasquez and his counsel have hampered the judicial process to such a degree that no lesser sanction than dismissal with prejudice will be adequate in preventing further such misconduct, especially in light of Vasquez's prior voluntary dismissal of his case. Vasquez's voluntary dismissal (without prejudice) forecloses the feasibility of lesser sanctions. In this scenario especially, such a sanction would not be considered a particularly draconian outcome: by Vasquez's own admission, Vasquez's voluntary dismissal without prejudice is itself “tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice.” (Pl.'s Resp. DE 114, 3.) In addition to dismissal with prejudice, Princess also asks that Vasquez and his counsel be ordered to reimburse Princess for upwards of $15,000 for expenses incurred for various investigations and for the costs of deposing Vasquez. Based on its own expertise in such matters, as well as some of the questionable tactics pursued by Princess itself in this litigation,[2] the Court finds this amount excessive. This is especially so in light of the fact that many of the expenses had been incurred well before any of the misconduct. Furthermore, the Court finds that, as far as the plaintiff, Vasquez, himself is concerned, dismissal with prejudice serves as an adequate sanction. All of this, however, is not to say that Vasquez's counsel should escape scot-free. Thus, in addition to the dismissal with prejudice, the Court also recommends that Vasquez's counsel, both domestic and Panamanian, jointly and severally, be ordered to pay $2,500.00 to Princess as sanctions. Based on its own expertise on the subject, the Court finds that the expenses actually necessitated by Vasquez and his counsel's misconduct falls far short of what Princess is claiming. Furthermore, this amount takes into account Princess's own discovery abuses, which it has conceded, and should therefore serve to deter the improper conduct exhibited by both parties. Thus, taking into account the scope of the expenses and the behavior at issue this amount reflects an appropriate sanction. 5. Summary *8 Having carefully considered the parties' filings, and for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Princess's Motion for Sanctions (DE 101) be GRANTED IN PART such that: 1. Vasquez's complaint should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and 2. Vasquez's counsel, both domestic and Panamanian, jointly and severally, should be assessed $2,500.00, to be paid to Princess. Pursuant to Local Magistrate Judge Rule 4(b), the parties have fourteen days from the date of this Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with the Honorable James Lawrence King. See also28 U.S.C. § 636. Failure to file timely objections may bar the parties from attacking on appeal the factual findings contained herein. LoConte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745, 750 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988). RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. Footnotes [1] As Vasquez declined to file a brief, as ordered by Judge King, regarding the question of the Court's jurisdiction to consider the motion for sanctions, the Court finds the issue conceded. [2] For example, as Princess admits, it failed to file its own Rule 26 disclosures. Further, the Court is not impressed by Princess's counsel's failure to contact opposing counsel about the rescue videos prior to the August 20, 2012 hearing before Judge King.