*1 In this case, Plaintiff Largan Precision Co., Ltd. (“Largan”) alleges a patent infringement action against Defendant Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. (“Samsung”). The technology at issue involves imaging lens products that are used in mobile phone cameras. Currently pending before the Court is the parties' joint motion for determination of discovery dispute regarding discovery requests Largan served on Samsung (“Joint Motion”). (Dkt. No. 49.)[1] On May 16, 2014, Largan served on Samsung its First Set of Requests for Production of Documents and Things (“Document Requests”). (Dkt. No. 49-2 at 9.) Samsung served its objections and responses to those Document Requests on June 18, 2014. (Dkt. No. 49-4 at 19.) On July 2, 2014, Largan served on Samsung its First Set of Interrogatories (“Interrogatories”). (Dkt. No. 49-5 at 8.) Samsung served its objections and responses to those Interrogatories on August 4, 2014 and served a supplement on September 19, 2014. (Dkt. No. 56-1 at 9; Dkt. No. 56-2 at 19.) The parties met and conferred yet could not resolve certain disputes, so they filed their Joint Motion on November 12, 2014. (Dkt. No. 49.)

The parties disagree about the applicability of the ESI Order to Largan's requests, Largan's right to certain documents and information that exist on Samsung's shared systems, and the timeliness of the Joint Motion. But the heart of the dispute is whether Largan is entitled to discovery relating more broadly to Samsung's electronic devices that contain the allegedly infringing imaging lenses and camera modules, or whether Largan should be limited to discovery targeted at the accused components.

The purpose of discovery is to “remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” U.S. ex rel. O'Connell v. Chapman University, 245 F.R.D. 646, 648 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (internal quotation omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) offers guidance as to the scope of discovery permitted in an action:

“Relevance for purposes of discovery is defined very broadly.” Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 1998). However, “[t]he party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1). Thereafter, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying, explaining or supporting its objections.” Bryant v. Ochoa, 2009 WL 1390794, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2009) (internal citation omitted). District courts have broad discretion when determining relevancy for discovery purposes. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). However, this discretion should be balanced with the obligation to interpret the Rules in order to secure a “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. This Court has the power to restrict discovery when it is necessary to prevent “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Likewise, the Court will consider whether “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).

*2 The Court must first consider the timeliness of the Joint Motion, which was filed on November 12, 2014. (Dkt. No. 49.) According to the Court's Case Management Conference Order Regulating Discovery and Other Pretrial Proceedings in a Patent Case (the “Scheduling Order”), counsel must file a joint discovery motion within 45 days of “the date upon which the event giving rise to the dispute occurred.” (Dkt. No. 35 at 12.) For written discovery, “the event giving rise to the discovery dispute is the service of the initial response.” (Id.) The Joint Motion includes a dispute regarding certain Document Requests and Interrogatory No. 2, which were answered on different dates, and therefore have different deadlines for timeliness under the Scheduling Order.

Samsung argues that the 45-day clock began to run on Largan's Document Requests on June 18, 2014, when Samsung served its objections and responses. (Dkt. No. 49 at 11; Dkt. No. 49-4 at 19.) Samsung claims that it has “clearly and consistently told Largan it will not provide discovery on Galaxy products—apart from the allegedly infringing modules—as irrelevant, overbroad, and unduly burdensome.” (Dkt. No. 49 at 5.) Therefore, Samsung believes that Largan has “waived its belated challenges.” (Id. at 12.) Largan, on the other hand, asserts that the Joint Motion is timely because “Samsung appeared to agree to produce documents in response to all of Largan's requests....” (Dkt. No. 49 at 4; see also id. at 10.) More specifically, Largan states that “[g]iven Samsung's written agreement to produce documents, and the generic nature and ambiguity of Samsung's objections, there was no way for Largan to know that an actual dispute existed over relevance, or the scope of the dispute, until Samsung first made its position clear on September 30, 2014.” (Id. at 10-11.)

The Court disagrees with Largan. A review of Largan's Document Requests and Interrogatory No. 2, and Samsung's objections and responses to the same, reveals the broad scope of Largan's requests and Samsung's consistent objections. Through the expansive definitions of “implicated imaging lenses,” “implicated camera modules,” “implicated electronic devices,” and “implicated products”, Largan clearly sought documents not only relating to the allegedly infringing imaging lenses and camera modules, but also non-accused imaging lenses and camera modules, and Samsung's products themselves (both those that contain allegedly infringing components and those that do not). (Dkt. No. 49-2 at 4.) For example, in RFP No. 8, Largan sought “[d]ocuments showing the sales volume, revenue, costs, profit, and customers, on a product-by-product and sale-by-sale basis, of implicated products since August 28, 2007 ....” (Id. at 7.) Through the definition of “implicated products”—which itself encompasses the definitions of “implicated imaging lenses,” “implicated camera modules,” and “implicated electronic devices”—Largan's RFP No. 8 can reasonably be read to seek financial documents on any Samsung electronic device that incorporates any three or five lens element.

The Court rejects Largan's claim that “Samsung appeared to agree to produce documents in response to all of Largan's requests.” (Dkt. No. 49 at 4.) Largan suggests that Samsung made a “broad, ambiguous” objection in its General Objection No. 7, and that “there is nothing in Samsung's objections or responses that says that Samsung refuses to produce documents related to the accused smartphones.” (Id. at 10-11 n. 10.) Not so. In addition to providing a general objection to the above definitions,[2] Samsung objected to each Document Request that included such a term “to the extent [the Document Request] seeks information on products other than the lens systems or camera modules used in the Samsung Galaxy S II, S III, S4, S4 mini, Note, Note II, or Gear products.” (See, e.g., Document Request Nos. 5-10, Dkt. No. 49-4 at 9-14.) Samsung further stated that “[s]ubject to these specific objections and without waiving its General Objections” it would produce “non-privileged, non-ESI documents within the unobjectionable scope of the request and that are in Samsung's possession, custody, or control to the extent they can be identified after a reasonable search.” (Id.) The Court finds that these objections clearly put Largan on notice—by June 18, 2014—that Samsung would produce only documents related to the allegedly infringing lens systems and camera modules within the specific accused products. Almost five months had passed by the time the Joint Motion was filed. Therefore, to the extent the Joint Motion involves a dispute about Document Requests Largan served on May 16, 2014 and Samsung responded to on June 18, 2014, the Court finds that Largan waived its challenge to Samsung's objections.

*3 Additionally, although Samsung does not specifically assert that Largan has waived its right to challenge Samsung's objections and response to Interrogatory No. 2, Largan also has a timeliness issue here. To summarize Interrogatory No. 2, Largan asked Samsung to identify and state the location of any category of documents stored solely or primarily on a shared system that related to the “design, development, manufacture, assembly, sale, offer for sale, or importation of the Implicated Product.” (Dkt. No. 49-5 at 6; Dkt. No. 49 at 17.) Among other objections, Samsung again objected “to the extent [the Interrogatory] seeks the identification of documents unrelated to the patented technology and the design of the accused lenses.” (Dkt. No. 56-1 at 7; Dkt. No. 49 at 17.) Samsung stood on its objections, refusing to identify any responsive category of documents. (Id.) When Samsung supplemented its response to Interrogatory No. 2 on September 19, 2014, it stated that it was “not presently aware of any categories of documents primarily or solely on shared storage that are directed to the design, development, manufacture, sale, or importation of the accused lens assemblies independent of Samsung phones which contain those assemblies.” (Dkt. No. 56-2 at 15; Dkt. No. 49 at 17 (emphasis added).) And it did not identify any categories of documents that were responsive to the broader part of Largan's request, i.e., not limited to the accused lens assemblies. Clearly, by this time, Largan should have been aware of Samsung's position as to Interrogatory No. 2. Yet it did not file its Joint Motion until November 12, 2014. (Dkt. No. 49 at 24.) Even if the Court determines that the “event giving rise to the dispute” regarding Interrogatory No. 2 is Samsung's service of its supplemental response on September 19, 2014, the Joint Motion was still filed more than 45 days later, and is thus untimely.

It appears to be Largan's position that the clock should begin running only after the parties realize that the dispute cannot be solved through the meet and confer process. (See Dkt. No. 49 at 11 n. 11.) However, the Scheduling Order very clearly states that the “event giving rise to the discovery dispute is the service of the initial response.” (Dkt. No. 35 at 12). Additionally, the undersigned judge's Civil Case Procedures even more explicitly state that the event giving rise to the discovery dispute is “not the date on which counsel reach an impasse in meet and confer efforts.”[3] This requirement safeguards the efficient management of the Court's docket and the Court's ability to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Accordingly, the Court would be well within its rights to deny relief to Largan on timeliness grounds alone. Nonetheless, because the Court understands that the parties are seeking guidance on the appropriate scope of discovery in this case, the Court will undertake a substantive analysis of the issues raised in the Joint Motion. Still, the result is similar—denial of most of the relief Largan seeks. As explained below, because the Court finds that Largan has not established the relevance of its broad-ranging discovery requests, nor has it established the ESI Order's required showing of “good cause and distinct need” for certain discovery, the Court will only compel the production of a limited amount of information responsive to Interrogatory No. 2.

Under the ESI Order, “[t]he Court will consider ... requests for searches of servers, databases or other systems not maintained by a single person, upon showing of good cause and distinct need based on the size, complexity, and issues of this specific case.”[4] (Dkt. No. 32 at 3-4.) Summarizing the parties' arguments, Largan believes that Samsung's 30(b)(6) witness identified three categories of relevant information on shared systems (bills of materials, customs information, and financial and sales information), such information is responsive to Document Request Nos. 3, 6, 8, and 9, and there is “good cause and distinct need” for the Court to order its production. (Dkt. No. 49 at 7-8.) Samsung argues that the requested bills of materials, customs information, and financial and sales information are irrelevant and that such discovery—as well as all discovery not limited to the allegedly infringing components—is overbroad and unduly burdensome. (Id. at 11.) Samsung also argues that Largan has not established “good cause and distinct need” because Samsung has offered to provide certain requested information (though not necessarily the source documents that Largan seeks) and Largan has failed to pursue third party discovery. (Id. at 13-14.) The Court will examine each category of requested information.

*4 Bills of materials (“BOMs”) apparently “specify all the components in a particular model of smartphone or tablet, including their model numbers, part numbers, and manufacturers.” Additionally, they “also likely specify the price of the components and confirm that an imaging lens is used in conjunction with an image sensor (as some asserted claims require).” (Dkt. No. 49 at 7.) Largan argues that “[i]dentification of the components inside the accused products is necessary to gauge infringement, whether third party discovery is necessary, and from whom.” (Id. at 8.) Samsung counters that Largan's request for BOMs “is directed to Samsung's smartphone products, not lens assemblies,” and further, that it has produced the information Largan claims to need from the BOMs to the extent it is relevant and limited to the accused lens module and camera modules. (Id. at 12-13.) Specifically, Samsung states that it has provided Largan with the part number of each accused lens module and the camera modules containing them and also “has agreed to provide its costs to buy the camera modules containing an accused lens module and any information obtained from its vendors on their costs.” (Id. at 13.) The Court cannot conceive why any further information from the BOMs is relevant, and Largan's cursory statement that such documents will help it “gauge infringement” is far from helpful. (See id. at 8.) The only information that is relevant on its face—the information limited to the accused lens module and the camera modules containing them—has been or will be produced by Samsung.[5]

In addition, Largan has not established “good cause and distinct need” for such information. Largan's only stated reason for needing the BOMs is to “gauge infringement.” (See id.) Yet, according to Samsung, Largan has acknowledged that only lens design files are needed to determine if a lens module embodies Largan's asserted claims, and such files have been produced. (Dkt. No. 49 at 13.) Largan does not argue otherwise. Therefore, even if Largan had established the relevance of the BOMs, it is not clear that it could have satisfied the heightened “good cause and distinct need” standard set forth in the ESI Order.

Next, Largan seeks customs information that Samsung maintains in a shared database—specifically, information regarding country of origin of products imported into the United States, the entity responsible for the importation, and the declared value of the goods. (Dkt. No. 49 at 7.) To explain the relevance of such information, Largan states only that “[i]mportation is one form of infringing activity under the patent statutes.” (Id. at 8.) This is woefully insufficient for establishing relevance or “good cause and distinct need” to conduct expansive discovery into Samsung's shared systems. It is not the Court's job to establish relevance. See Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Prima Bella Produce, Inc., 2011 WL 2518948, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 23, 2011) (denying motion to compel where party “has abdicated its responsibility as the moving party and has left the Court to advocate in its absence.”). Samsung has offered to stipulate to the importing party and to provide “a table identifying the relevant units imported on a per-month and per-year basis.” (Dkt. No. 49 at 13-14.) Thus, it appears that Largan will have discovery sufficient to show how many products with allegedly infringing components were imported into the United States. The Court cannot understand why Largan wants or needs to know the countries of origin for Samsung's smartphones, as Largan is silent on this topic.[6] Lastly, while Largan seeks the declared value of imported products, it fails to explain either the relevance or the “good cause and distinct need” for such information.

*5 Largan's request for financial and sales information relating to “implicated products”—seemingly contained within Document Request No. 8 (Dkt. No. 49-2 at 7; Dkt. No. 49 at 7)—forms the core of its present dispute with Samsung. Largan asserts that it is entitled to financial and sales information regarding Samsung's smartphones, not just the camera components contained within them, because its complaint and infringement contentions “clearly accuse Samsung's smartphones of infringement.” (Dkt. No. 49 at 9.) Largan further argues that “a party's finances are expressly relevant to damages under the Georgia-Pacific analysis” and that courts regularly grant motions to compel the production of sales and financial documents relating more broadly to the accused product, or even similar non-accused products, not merely documents targeted at the allegedly infringing components. (Dkt. No. 49 at 8, 9-10 (citing Audatex N. Am. Inc. v. Mitchell Int'l, Inc., 2014 WL 4961437, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2014), Clare v. Chrysler Group, 2014 WL 2514563, at **16-18 (E.D. Mich. June 4, 2014), and Positive Techs., Inc. v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 2013 WL 707914, at **3-6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2013)).)

Samsung, on the other hand, argues that while Largan is seeking to compel discovery “on the entirety of Galaxy products containing an accused module [,]” Largan “has admitted that its asserted patents only relate to lenses.” (Dkt. No. 49 at 12 (quoting Dkt. No. 44 at 2 (“The Patents-in-Suit all relate to what is known as an ‘imaging lens.’ ”)).) Samsung further contends that in multicomponent product cases like this one, “the relevant ‘product’ for damages purposes is the ‘smallest salable patent-practicing unit,’ ” in this case, the lens modules. (Dkt. No. 49 at 14 (quoting VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1326-29 (Fed. Cir. 2014) and citing LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 964 F.3d 51, 60 n. 2, 66-67 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).) Lastly, to oppose any claim of “distinct need,” Samsung states that it has provided or will provide the following: “U.S. unit sales of the relevant Galaxy products”; “any information it has on the sales of the accused lens modules or camera modules containing them”; “its camera module costs”; and cost information it has requested and received from its third-party vendors. (Dkt. No. 49 at 14-15.)

The Court concludes that, based on the showing made in the Joint Motion, Largan is not entitled to financial documents and discovery as to Samsung's electronic devices as a whole. First, although Largan does allege that Samsung has infringed its patents through the “making, using, sale, offer to sell, and/or importation of its products,” (see, e.g., Dkt. No. 21 at ¶¶ 21, 27, 33), the only allegedly infringing components in the products are the imaging lenses within the camera modules. This fact is best demonstrated by Largan's infringement contentions, in which Largan only identifies the “[t]he imaging lens and camera module” as the “[a]ccused [p]roduct” in each and every claim. (Dkt. No. 49-3 at 4-6.)

Second, Largan simply has not established the relevance of the broader discovery it seeks. Merely asserting that “a party's finances are expressly relevant to damages under the Georgia-Pacific analysis” is as vague and insufficient a statement as the Court can imagine. (See Dkt. No. 49 at 8.) The Court is similarly underwhelmed by Largan's assertion that the “smallest saleable unit damages model is not the only damages model that is available for patent infringement” because Largan failed to actually identify the alternate model it is considering and the types of information it needs under that model. (See id. at 10.)

Moreover, the cases Largan cites are distinguishable. In Audatex N. Am. Inc. v. Mitchell Int'l, Inc., the court compelled discovery of defendant's financial information and sales data for the broader product (the WorkCenter product suite) because the plaintiff's infringement contentions specifically accused the WorkCenter product—rather than the narrower Total Loss module—of infringement. 2014 WL 4961437, at *8. Additionally, the plaintiff specifically explained under what damages theory the information was relevant. Id. at *7 n. 9. Similarly, in Clare v. Chrysler Group, LLC, the court granted plaintiff's motion to compel the production of revenue and cost information for the pick-up truck itself, not just the accused “RamBox” storage system within the truck, because Plaintiff identified the Georgia-Pacific factor to which the requested information was relevant and also explained how “comparing Ram-Box trucks to non-RamBox trucks might reveal relevant information relating to RamBox pricing.” 2014 WL 2514563, at *16. Lastly, when the court in Positive Techs., Inc. v. Sony Elecs., Inc. granted discovery of sales and revenue information for content and accessories sold on or with the accused e-readers, it did so only after the plaintiff explained how the requested discovery was probative of certain Georgia-Pacific factors. 2013 WL 707914, at *4.

*6 Largan also cites Positive Techs., Inc. for its analysis of LaserDynamics, Inc.—which held that in cases where the entire market value rule (“EMVR”) does not apply,[7] it would be error to admit into evidence sales and revenue information pertaining to the value of an entire multicomponent product, rather than the smallest patent-practicing unit in the product. Id. at *5. The court noted that LaserDynamics, Inc. “limits admissibility, not discoverability[,]” and therefore refused to bar discovery on that basis. Id. at *6. While this Court agrees that there may be some circumstances in which financial discovery into the broader multicomponent product containing an accused component may be appropriate, unlike the plaintiff in Positive Techs., Inc., Largan did not make “a preliminary showing of relevance for discovery purposes pursuant to the Georgia-Pacific factors.” Id. As a result, Largan is not entitled to the breadth of discovery it seeks. See Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (“District courts need not condone the use of discovery to engage in ‘fishing expeditions.’ ”). However, Samsung must produce the sales and financial documents it describes in pages 13 to 14 of the Joint Motion, as well as any other responsive sales and financial documents targeted at the allegedly infringing components.

In full, Interrogatory No. 2 states as follows:

(Dkt. No. 49-5 at 6; Dkt. No. 49 at 17.) Largan states that it served Interrogatory No. 2 so that it could determine whether any additional requests for ESI searches are necessary. (Dkt. No. 49 at 19.) Without this information, Largan argues, the ESI Order “transforms into an untenable Catch-22: a party must move the Court to obtain relevant information contained in a shared system, but cannot learn of shared systems containing relevant information.” (Id. at 20.) Samsung asserts that “[t]o the extent its interrogatory is properly limited to accused lens assemblies, Samsung has responded based on the information identified to date.” (Id.) Samsung further states that “it is not presently aware of any categories of documents primarily or solely on shared storage that are directed to the design, development, manufacture, sale, or importation of the accused lens modules (or camera modules containing them) independent of the Samsung products containing those modules.” (Id. at 21 (emphasis in original).) Lastly, Samsung claims that “an investigation to determine the answer to Interrogatory No. 2—even properly limited to accused lens modules or camera modules containing them—would require the types of searching prohibited under the ESI Order absent good cause and distinct need.” (Id. at 21-22.)

To the extent that Interrogatory No. 2 is not limited to accused lens assemblies, the Court finds that Largan has not established the relevance of the requested information, as described above in Section III B. However, Samsung's response as to the information limited to accused lens assemblies—information that is facially relevant—is less than satisfactory. First, Samsung inaccurately characterizes Interrogatory No. 2 in its supplemental response when it says that it is “not presently aware of any categories of documents primarily or solely on shared storage ...independent of the Samsung phones which contain those assemblies.” (Dkt. No. 56-2 at 15; Dkt. No. 49 at 17 (emphasis added).) This response adds a qualifer that Largan did not include in its interrogatory. Therefore, if removing this qualifier will change Samsung's response, Samsung must again supplement its response to Interrogatory No. 2 within 30 days of the date of this Order.

*7 Second, based on the Joint Motion, the Court understands that Samsung has answered as to the responsive shared systems of which it is currently aware (and which are limited to accused lens assemblies), though it has not made an independent investigation. (Dkt. No. 49 at 20-21.) Samsung claims that it will be “complex and burdensome” to answer Interrogatory No. 2 because Samsung “is a huge company with thousands of employees working on various aspects of Galaxy products.” (Id. at 22.) To undercut any showing of “distinct need” Samsung also points out that Largan has not taken discovery from the “eight employees who interact with its third-party module vendors in a technical or procurement capacity.” (Id.)

The Court finds that a compromise is necessary here because neither Largan nor Samsung is in the right. The Court agrees with Samsung that the ESI Order limits the scope of discovery that might otherwise be “relevant” under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to encourage proportionality and avoid unnecessary costs. (See Dkt. No. 49 at 21.) The Court further agrees that Largan's failure to conduct certain targeted discovery calls into question Largan's “distinct need” for the requested information.[8] Moreover, the Court understands that for a company as large as Samsung, even answering Interrogatory No. 2 may be burdensome.

However, as the party opposing relevant discovery, Samsung has “the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975)). Samsung does not provide any details to satisfy this “heavy burden.” Blankenship, 519 F.2d at 429. For example, Samsung does not estimate the time, expense, or process involved in answering Interrogatory No. 2. This information would have better enabled the Court to assess Samsung's claimed burden. Additionally, the Court questions whether Largan needs to make a showing of “good cause and distinct need” at this point since Interrogatory No. 2 is asking for the identification of shared systems, rather than seeking to compel the production of information on those shared systems under the ESI Order. If Samsung identifies any category of responsive documents (i.e., limited to the design, development, manufacture, sale, offer for sale, or importation of the accused lens modules or camera modules containing them) stored solely on primarily on shared storage, Largan will still need to make a showing of “good cause and distinct need” to the Court to compel their production.

Given the reasonable opposing arguments, the Court hereby ORDERS Samsung to interview the eight employees who interact with its third-party module vendors in a technical or procurement capacity for the purpose of answering Interrogatory No. 2 consistent with the limitations described in this Order. This solution takes into account Largan's interest in identifying potential electronic sources of responsive documents and Samsung's concern regarding the burden and expense of answering Interrogatory No. 2 and its interest in ensuring that the discovery is appropriately tailored to the accused lens modules and camera modules containing them. Samsung has 30 days from the date of this Order to supplement its answer to Interrogatory No. 2 based on those interviews.

*8 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Unless the Court specifically needs to cite to the sealed version of the Joint Motion (Dkt. No. 53), it will cite to the unsealed version at Dkt. No. 49. The Court will also cite to the unsealed versions of the Exhibits to the Joint Motion. The Court has been careful not to specifically reference any confidential information in this Order.

In General Objection No. 7, Samsung objected to the definitions of “implicated imaging lenses,” “implicated camera modules,” “implicated electronic devices,” and “implicated products” and noted that “[t]hese definitions and each request relying on one or more of them improperly seek information on lens systems unrelated to the accused products or a patent-in-suit or the accused lens systems in the Samsung Galaxy S II, S III, S4, S4 mini, Note, Note II, or Gear products.” (Dkt. No. 49-4 at 5.)

Available at https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/Rules/SitePages/Home.aspx

The Court disagrees that the ESI Order should be interpreted as saying that “[t]he Court will consider contested requests... for searches of servers, databases or other systems not maintained by a single person.” A close reading of the relevant language shows that the Court will consider “contested requests for additional custodians per producing party, or requests for searches of servers, databases or other systems not maintained by a single person.” (emphasis added). If the parties agree to produce relevant, responsive documents from shared systems without the Court's involvement, they may choose to do so. However, under the ESI Order, they need not do so.

Samsung is vague on this point. Samsung says that it “has agreed to provide” certain financial information, not that it has already done so. (See Dkt. No. 49 at 13.) The Court notes that per the Scheduling Order, the vast majority of documents must be produced by February 23, 2015, and discovery closes on April 23, 2015. (Dkt. No. 35.) The Court will not entertain last-minute motion practice on these documents and therefore urges Samsung to provide “its costs to buy the camera modules containing an accused lens module and any information obtained from its vendors on their costs” by February 23, 2015. (See Dkt. No. 49 at 13.)

Moreover, as Samsung points out, Largan already knows the countries of origin for Samsung's smartphones. (Dkt. No. 51 at 14.)

The EMVR applies only if “the patented feature creates the ‘basis for customer demand’ or ‘substantially create[s] the value of the component parts.’ ” Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).) It appears that Largan and Samsung agree that the EMVR does not apply in this case.

For example, the Court is not aware of Largan seeking email or non-email ESI from the eight Samsung employees who interact with third-party module vendors in a technical or procurement capacity, nor is the Court aware of any depositions or written discovery directed at those individuals.