At the heart of this case is whether Anand, in forming Prevoty and its application security engine, misappropriated intellectual property and other propriety information rightfully owned by Agora and Agora's other cofounders, Hullinger and de Bont. (See Third Am. & Supp'l Compl. (“TAC”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 283.) A host of discovery disputes have arisen both before this Court and before Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm. (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 30, 57, 69, 76, 93, 100, 121, 123-124, 127, 153, 307.) Prevoty Defendants now seek to have this Court overturn two adverse discovery-related rulings by Judge Mumm.

On August 19, 2016, Judge Mumm issued an order on Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions (“Sanctions Order”), after (1) holding an evidentiary hearing on June 1, 2016 regarding plaintiffs' request for sanctions for defendants' alleged disobedience of three discovery-related orders; and (2) receiving received written summations by the parties regarding their respective positions. (See Sanctions Order, ECF No. 289.) Three issues are relevant for the purpose of this Order: (1) whether Judge Mumm correctly found Prevoty violated a January 25, 2016 Order Granting Motion to Compel Answer to Interrogatory No. 2 (“Interrogatory Order”); (2) whether Judge Mumm correctly found Prevoty Defendants violated a March 16, 2016 Order Granting Motion to Compel Production of Documents Pursuant to Response to Document Requests (“Metadata Order”); and (3) whether Judge Mumm properly sanctioned Prevoty Defendants for these violations.

Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 2 asked Prevoty to “[p]rovide the name, contact information and precise ownership interest (including the number of shares and percentage of total) for each individual or entity holding any type of shares or other equity stake in Prevoty, Inc.” (See Decl. Guy Ruttenberg in Supp. Mot. to Compel Prevoty to Answer Interrog. No. 2 (“Ruttenberg Interrog. Decl.”), Ex. 7 (“Interrog. No. 2”) at 1, ECF No. 71 [emphasis added].) The “Instructions” in the interrogatories provided that “[a]ll requests contained in the interrogatories to identify a person, whether a natural person or organization, are to be answered by providing sufficient information to enable the undersigned to contact the person by telephone, by mail and to serve legal documents on the person including the person's full name, title (if any), address and telephone number.” (See Interrog. No. 2 at 5-6 [emphasis added].)

*2 Prevoty responded to Interrogatory No. 2 on November 20, 2015 with a series of objections. (See Ruttenberg Interrog. Decl., Ex. 9 (“Resp. to Interrog. No. 2.”).) Not satisfied with this response, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Defendant Prevoty to Answer Interrogatory No. 2 (“Motion to Compel Answer to Interrog. No. 2”). (See Motion to Compel Answer to Interrog. No. 2, ECF No. 69.) Prevoty provided a supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 2 on December 21, 2015, identifying Prevoty's publicly known shareholders and noting these shareholders could be contacted through counsel of record, Stephen Scott of the law firm Hayes, Scott, Bonino, Ellingson & McLay LLP, but not identifying the “additional shareholders” unless and until a protective order was entered. (Joint Stip. to Mot. to Compel Answer to Interrog. No. 2 13-14, ECF No. 70.) Plaintiffs, through a supplemental memorandum, argued the supplemental response was deficient. (Pls.' Suppl. Mem. In Supp. Mot. to Compel Answer to Interrog No. 2, ECF No. 84.)

In the Interrogatory Order, Judge Mumm ordered Prevoty “to provide the information responsive to [Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 2] within 10 days of the date of this order.” (Interrog. Order, ECF No. 90 [emphasis added].) The Court also ordered that “[t]o the extent plaintiffs seek to pursue claims against anyone identified in the answer, plaintiffs are not precluded from identifying the individual(s) (or entities) in an amended pleading along with such allegations as are necessary to state a claim, which may or may not require the disclosure of further facts included in the interrogatory answer.” (Interrog. Order 2 [emphasis added].)

Prevoty thereafter served its second supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 2 on February 4, 2016, listing “c/o Stephen Scott” as the address for every investor except for Anand and Bellanger. (See Mot. to Enforce the Court's January 25, 2016 Order (“Mot. to Enforce”), Ex. A (“Second Supp'l Resp. to Interrog. No. 2”), ECF No. 113.) Plaintiffs aver they contacted Mr. Scott, who confirmed he was not authorized to accept service of a summons and Complaint on behalf of any of the investors, and noted he does not represent all of the investors. (Mot. to Enforce at 3.) On February 12, 2016, after Plaintiffs informed Prevoty Defendants of these shortcomings, Prevoty served a third supplemental response. (Mot. to Enforce, Ex. B (“Third Supp'l Resp. to Interrog. No. 2”).) For twelve investors, Prevoty still listed “c/o Stephen Scott” as the contact information, and for two others, provided a mailbox drop or a P.O. box in London. (See Third Supp'l Resp. to Interrog. No. 2.)

The saga was destined to continue. On March 8, 2016, Plaintiffs explained in open court that they sought discovery and possibly desired to add Prevoty's investors as defendants and pointed out Prevoty's deficient responses. (Tr. of 3/8/2016 Proceedings 12:8-13:8, ECF No. 149.) Judge Mumm invited a motion to enforce via letter briefs. (Tr. of 3/8/2016 Proceedings 43:17-24.)

Plaintiffs filed their first Motion to Enforce on March 29, 2016, seeking “contact information sufficient to enable service of process on [Prevoty's] shareholders.” (Mot. to Enforce 1.) On March 30, 2016, Judge Mumm issued a minute order requiring Prevoty to show cause why its Third Supplemental Response should not be stricken for failure to comply with the Court's January 25, 2016 Order. (Order to Show Cause (“OSC”), ECF No. 118.) In its April 8, 2016 response to the OSC and later in open court, Prevoty Defendants and their counsel swore that “Prevoty has provided the best and most current address information available to it regarding the contact information of these shareholders.” (Decl. Julien Bellanger in Supp. Resp. to OSC ¶¶ 7, 17, ECF No. 123; Tr. of 5/10/2016 Proceedings 18:3-13.) Moreover, at a hearing held on March 10, 2016, Prevoty Defendants' counsel submitted there was

(Tr. of 5/10/2016 Proceedings 18:9-16.) Judge Mumm thereafter ordered an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual dispute, observing “the response to [the OSC] was that the [Prevoty] Defendants said they gave you all the information they had—that they didn't have any further information.” (Tr. of 5/10/2016 Proceedings 14:12-18.)

At the June 1, 2016 hearing, Plaintiffs (1) pointed to Prevoty's Second and Third Supplemental Responses; (2) noted that after receiving the Second Supplemental Response, they spoke with Mr. Scott, who informed them he cannot accept service of process and did not represent all of the investors; and (3) told Judge Mumm they informed Prevoty Defendants' counsel of the deficiencies with the Second Supplemental Response, but that the Third Supplemental Response was nevertheless deficient. (See Tr. of 6/1/2016 Proceedings 135-137, ECF No. 242.) Plaintiffs showed Bellanger has ongoing e-mail communications with all the investors, and thus could have easily obtained their current contact information. (Tr. of 6/1/2016 Proceedings 141:4-21.) Plaintiffs further demonstrated Prevoty keeps an up-to-date list of its shareholders and their addresses, and affirmatively redacted contact information for some investors in the documents Prevoty produced, even after Judge Mumm issued his January 25, 2016 Order. (Tr. of 6/1/2016 Proceedings 124:22-125:10, 141:24-144:15.)

In response, Prevoty Defendants' counsel agreed that “at least as to some, if not all, of those individual shareholders where Mr. Scott's information is provided, we were provided with, as outside counsel, whatever address of record the company had,” but that they nevertheless chose not to provide that information to Plaintiffs. (Tr. of 6/1/2016 Proceedings 155:10-25.) Prevoty Defendants submitted, however, that they “believed and still believe that, for represented parties, for a host of reasons ..., it's appropriate to identify those individuals' or entities' counsel as the point of contact.” (Tr. of 6/1/2016 Proceedings 154:16-20.)

As early as February 16, 2016, Plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Ma, brought to Judge Mumm's attention readability issues with several of Prevoty Defendants' productions. (See Decl. Dennis Ma in Supp. Mot. to Compel Documents (“Ma Compel Decl.”) ¶ 22, ECF No. 102.) Mr. Ma averred he sent a letter to Prevoty Defendants' counsel regarding these issues on January 7, 2016, requesting a meet-and-confer. (Ma Compel Decl. ¶ 23.) Mr. Ma further averred he met and conferred with Prevoty Defendants' counsel, Mr. Rips, who “conceded that the production was unacceptable and agreed to a corrected production,” explaining Prevoty Defendants had issues with their litigation support vendor.” (Ma Compel Decl. ¶ 24.) According to Mr. Ma, however, Prevoty Defendants had not corrected the production problems, nor had they provided any timetable for reproducing the documents, despite two additional emails from Plaintiffs' counsel on January 22, 2016 and February 1, 2016. (Ma Compel Decl. ¶¶ 24-27.)

*4 Plaintiffs thereafter moved to compel, in part, the production of documents in a “usable form [ ] in compliance with the rules.” (See Mot. to Compel Production, ECF No. 100; Joint Stip. to Mot. to Compel Production 154-55, ECF No. 101.) In particular, Plaintiffs sought:

(Joint Stip. to Mot. to Compel Production 160-61.) Prevoty Defendants did not argue with this request except to state that only a few documents were affected and that they should not be required to produce all 8,200 pages of documents a second time. (Joint Stip. to Mot. to Compel Production 161.) Prevoty Defendants acknowledged, however, at least a “small percentage” of documents were produced in an unreadable format, and agreed to reproduce those documents by February 19, 2016. (Joint Stip. to Mot. to Compel Production 158.) In light of the representations contained in the parties' joint stipulation, Judge Mumm ordered a joint status report by March 1, 2016. (Order re Pl.'s Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 104.)

On March 1, 2016, the parties filed a joint status report, and Plaintiffs informed Judge Mumm, in relevant part, that Prevoty Defendants' production of metadata and ESI was incomplete. (Joint Status Report 1-4, ECF No. 107.) In particular, Plaintiffs argued:

(Joint Status Report 5.) Plaintiffs further submitted they attempted to engage with Prevoty Defendants regarding the subject of ESI on February 25, 2016, only to be told they would follow up at a later date. (Joint Status Report 4.)

Judge Mumm held a hearing on the subject of document productions on March 8, 2016, during which Prevoty Defendants represented they sought “reciprocity” regarding the production of metadata and ESI, and believed they could provide natives of all documents. (Tr. of 3/8/2016 Proceedings 36:25-37:6.) Judge Mumm granted Plaintiffs' motion to compel on March 16, 2016, ordering Prevoty Defendants to “provide the metadata and other formatting information that plaintiffs seek” and to meet and confer within 10 days of the issuance of the order to discuss and agree on the protocol for the production of metadata and formatting information. (Metadata Order 2, ECF No. 112 [emphasis added].) Judge Mumm further ordered that “[a]ll statements and documents required by this order must be served on [P]laintiffs within 20 days of the date hereof.” (Metadata Order 2.)

*5 The parties thereafter agreed to a detailed protocol for ESI production, under which load files and metadata fields would be collected and provided, including custodian and various date fields. (See Sanctions Order 19 [comparing PX 35 and PX 38].)

Plaintiffs on April 26, 2016 informed Judge Mumm they believed Prevoty Defendants failed to abide by the protocol, alleging (1) no custodian information had been produced for more than 90% of the documents; (2) many documents had no information in the “date” fields; (3) no metadata had been produced for documents relating to Jamie McNiel and Kang Lam; and (4) the load files for Prevoty Defendants' first to volumes were “unusable” because the natives and extracted OCR were not linked to Bates numbers. (Reply in Supp. Mot. to Enforce Court's March 14, 2016 Order at 5, ECF No. 134.) On May 24, 2016, Judge Mumm ordered an evidentiary hearing to receive evidence regarding Prevoty Defendants' efforts to comply with the Court's March 16, 2016 Order. (Minute Order re Issues to be Addressed at June 1, 2016 Hr'g, ECF No. 161.)

At the June 1, 2016 hearing, the Court heard testimony from Plaintiffs' litigation support vendor, Ms. Quatinetz, who corroborated Plaintiffs' allegations listed above. (See Tr. of 6/1/2016 Proceeding at 36:13-17, 41:18-24, 47:9-19, 67:8-68:16, 71:14-72:10, 74:16-77:11, 89:13-19, 92:11-18.) Prevoty Defendants presented their own litigation vendor, Mr. Marciano, who did not dispute any of Ms. Quatinetz's testimony, but instead (1) agreed populating custodian fields is customary, and was largely not done in this case; (2) agreed date metadata should have been created, but was not provided; and (3) testified he had never seen the ESI protocol before the evidentiary hearing, and offered no explanation for the missing custodian information. (Tr. of 6/1/2016 Proceeding at 119:21-122:23.) Prevoty Defendants also placed Bellanger on the stand, who testified he “gave everything that our counsel asked for [,]” provided “full access to all our emails and hard drives and repositories [,]” and affirmatively stated that “[n]o one removed anything, [or he] would know of it.” (Tr. of 6/1/2016 Proceeding at 162:9-17.)

After ruling on evidentiary objections and entertaining the parties' written summations, Judge Mumm issued the Sanctions Order on August 19, 2016, finding Prevoty Defendants violated both the Interrogatory Order and the Metadata Order. (See generally Sanctions Order.)

As to Interrogatory No. 2, Judge Mumm found the following: (1) Prevoty keeps an up-to-date list of its investors and their physical address to make sure the corporate records are up to date and for securities law purposes; (2) Prevoty redacted contact information for several investors from documents it produced to Plaintiffs on February 4, 2016, which was after Judge Mumm granted Plaintiffs' motion to compel a full and complete answer to Interrogatory No. 2; (3) Prevoty's CEO, Bellanger, routinely communicated with the investors and was not averse to asking for address information from investors when he wanted to; and (4) one investor asked Bellanger to provide “legal” with its address to give to Plaintiffs, to no avail. (Sanctions Order 11-12.) Judge Mumm further clarified the Interrogatory Order “impliedly rejected the viability of” Prevoty Defendants' interpretation of the term “contact information” by “specifically referencing [P]laintiffs' intent to use the contact information in adding some fo the investors as defendants.” (Sanctions Order 24-25.) Judge Mumm further found “the words ‘contact information’ for an investor mean sufficient information to actually contact the investor, not the investor's attorney.” (Sanctions Order 27-28.)

*6 As to the issue of metadata, Judge Mumm found the following: (1) Plaintiffs demonstrated that out of 2,785 documents produced by Prevoty Defendants, 2,322 contained no custodian information and 681 had no intelligible date information across several fields; (2) every electronically created document should have had a “created date” associated with the document, with the exception of emails, which would have had a “date sent” or “date received” identifier; and (3) Prevoty Defendants neither accepted Plaintiffs' offer to have the e-discovery vendors work out any incompatibilities nor took any action to come into compliance with the Metadata Order. (Sanctions Order 16, 22-23.) Judge Mumm expressly disagreed with Prevoty Defendants' arguments that they were under no obligation to provide custodian information in their productions and that they were not obligated to provide metadata for documents produced before the Metadata Order. (Sanctions Order 17-22.)

In determining the appropriate sanction for Prevoty Defendants' violations of the Interrogatory and Metadata Orders, Judge Mumm noted Prevoty Defendants had “shown absolutely no interest in cooperating with [P]laintiffs in discovery,” but instead “tried every tactic at their disposal to delay and impede [P]laintiffs' discovery efforts.” (Sanctions Order 28.) Judge Mumm in particular highlighted Prevoty Defendants' failure to permit the e-discovery vendors to meet to figure out why certain load file date fields were garbled. (Sanctions Order 28.) Judge Mumm accordingly found Prevoty Defendants' failure to comply with the Interrogatory and Metadata Orders was without substantial justification, and awarded Plaintiffs the fees and expenses incurred in trying to enforce these two orders, as well as those resulting from Prevoty Defendants' inadequate responses, such as vendor fees. (Sanctions Order 29-30.) The Court also required Prevoty Defendants to comply with the Interrogatory and Metadata Orders within twenty (20) days of the issuance of the Sanctions Order. (Sanctions Order 29.)

Prevoty Defendants argue Judge Mumm clearly erred in finding they violated the Interrogatory and Metadata Orders, arguing Judge Mumm “for the first time” clarified or revised critical aspects of these orders in the Sanctions Order. (See generally Mot., ECF No. 303.) Indeed, Prevoty Defendants contend both the Interrogatory and Metadata Orders “were silent or ambiguous as to certain details.” (Mot. 5.) Prevoty Defendants also argue the Sanctions Order is contrary to law in holding that sanctions are warranted “for purported violations of Court Orders that were modified only after the purported violations took place.” (Mot. 2.) The Court disagrees.

Prevoty Defendants, as the parties challenging a magistrate judge's nondispositive pretrial order, must demonstrate that the Order “is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. Macey Banrk. Law, P.C., No. 2:13-CV-8620-ODW, 2013 WL 6859269, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2013) (“[A] Magistrate Judge's decision will be upheld unless it was clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”).

The clearly erroneous standard “is significantly deferential, requiring a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that the clearly erroneous standard requires the magistrate judge's decision to be “dead wrong,” for the standard aims to “protect both [the] court and parties against the burdens of repeated reargument by indefatigable diehards.” Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1060 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The “contrary to law” standard, by contrast, permits “independent, plenary review of purely legal determinations by the Magistrate Judge.” Jadwin v. Cty. of Kern, No. CV-F-07-026 OWW/TAG, 2008 WL 4217742, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2008). An order is “contrary to law” when it “fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Id.

*7 Prevoty Defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating Judge Mumm “clearly erred” in finding Prevoty failed to comply with the Interrogatory Order.

As an initial matter, Interrogatory No. 2 asked Prevoty to “[p]rovide the name, contact information and precise ownership interest (including the number of shares and percentage of total) for each individual or entity holding any type of shares or other equity stake in Prevoty, Inc.” (See Interrog. No. 2 at 1 [emphasis added].) Moreover, the “Instructions” in the interrogatory provided that “[a]ll requests contained in the interrogatories to identify a person, whether a natural person or organization, are to be answered by providing sufficient information to enable the undersigned to contact the person by telephone, by mail and to serve legal documents on the person including the person's full name, title (if any), address and telephone number.” (See Interrog. No. 2 at 5-6 [emphasis added].) Interrogatory No. 2 thus on its face requests the contact information of individuals and entities holding shares or an equity stake in Prevoty—which Prevoty Defendants do not dispute they had or easily could have had in their possession—rather than the contact information of their respective attorneys. This “contact information” must be sufficient to enable Plaintiffs to not only contact the person or organization by telephone and by mail, but also sufficient to serve legal documents on the person or organization by including their address and telephone number. Contrary to Prevoty Defendants' contention, there is nothing “unclear” about what information Plaintiffs sought through Interrogatory No. 2. (Cf. Mot. 12.)

To the extent a reasonable person might have interpreted Interrogatory No. 2 as being “unclear” with respect to whose “contact information” was permissible, the parties' subsequent filings and the Interrogatory Order itself should have settled any confusion as to this issue. Plaintiffs have from the outset of this litigation made clear their intention to add some or all of Prevoty's investors as defendants, which would require the physical mailing addresses of such investors. (See Compl. ¶ 212, ECF No. 1.) Moreover, as early as December 29, 2015—before the issuance of the Interrogatory Order—Plaintiffs informed Judge Mumm of Prevoty's failure “to provide the contact information for any stakeholder (i.e., where they can be served),” noting Prevoty instead “only provide[d] contact information for their lawyer.” (Pls.' Suppl. Mem. In Supp. Mot. to Compel Answer to Interrog. No. 2 at 2 [emphasis added].) In addition, Judge Mumm in the Sanctions Order correctly noted that in neither their Joint Stipulation accompanying the motion to compel nor in the Supplemental Memorandum did Prevoty Defendants make any contention with respect to the meaning or scope of “contact information” or address Plaintiffs' complaint that Prevoty only identified the contact information for the investors' lawyers. (Sanctions Mot. 24.)

In the Interrogatory Order itself, issued after this supplemental brief was filed, Judge Mumm stated Plaintiff had “demonstrated the relevance of the information sought” and emphasized that “[t]o the extent [P]laintiffs seek to pursue claims against anyone identified in the answer, [they] are not precluded from identifying the individual(s) (or entities) in an amended pleading ...” (Interrogatory Answer 1-2.) The Interrogatory Order thus contemplates the disclosure of Prevoty's investors' contact information in a manner sufficient to enable service of process upon them. Attorneys are not necessarily authorized to accept service of process on behalf of their clients, rendering Prevoty Defendants' contention that listing the contact information for the investors' lawyers should have been sufficient unsatisfactory.

*8 Prevoty Defendants' argument that Prevoty was not required to provide contact information for the individual investors because Judge Mumm “did not purport to define the form of ‘contact information’ that was required” and because “the underlying motion to compel also never provided any such definition” misses the mark. The phrase “contact information ... for each individual or entity [investor]” alone calls for such disclosure. Any ambiguity in this phrase should have been clarified by the “Instructions” section of interrogatory. Plaintiffs' stated desire in their Supplemental Memorandum for the “contact information for any stakeholder (i.e., where they can be served)” provides additional context that makes the scope of the Interrogatory Order unmistakable. That this request was not expressly included in the initial motion to compel is beside the point, and Prevoty Defendants point to no authority suggesting otherwise.

In sum, the Court is not left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” with respect to Judge Mumm's findings that Prevoty violated the Interrogatory Order, and DENIES Prevoty Defendants' Motion as to this issue. LegalZoom.com, 2013 WL 6859269 at *1.

Prevoty Defendants argue Judge Mumm erred in finding they failed to comply with the Metadata Order, contending the Metadata Order (1) lacks “any clear text” regarding what type of metadata required to be contained in the parties' productions; and (2) is, on its face, forward-looking. (See Mot. 13-14.) These arguments cannot withstand scrutiny.

The Metadata Order issued after (1) Plaintiffs moved to compel the production of documents in a “usable form,” including “basic document metadata” such as “custodian” and “date,” (Joint Stip. to Mot. to Compel Production 160-61); (2) Prevoty Defendants did not argue with this request, except to the extent they would be required to re-produce 8,200 of documents, (id. at 161); (3) Plaintiffs, in a joint status report, informed Judge Mumm that Prevoty Defendants' “productions still d[id] not include any of the metadata requested by Plaintiffs and discussed in the pending motion to compel,” pointing specifically to Prevoty Defendants' failure “to identify basic information such as the date of the document, the custodian or the directory it was collected from, and basic header information for emails....,” (Joint Status Report 5); and (4) Judge Mumm held a hearing during which Plaintiffs explained why they needed certain custodian and date metadata that Prevoty Defendants had not provided, (Tr. of 3/8/2016 Proceedings at 16:7-17:9).

Against this backdrop, the Metadata Order required Prevoty Defendants to provide the “metadata and other formatting information that [P]laintiffs seek,” impliedly but unmistakably referring to the information identified in the parties Joint Stipulation and status report. (Metadata Order 2.) The Court rejects Prevoty Defendants' legally unsupported argument that because the Metadata Order does not expressly refer to custodian or date metadata, the production of such information was not clearly contemplated by both the court and the parties. Indeed, that the Metadata Order obligated the parties to meet “to discuss and agree on the protocol for the production of metadata and formatting information,” (Metadata Order 2), indicates only the process for the production of such metadata was left to be determined.

The Metadata Order also provides that “[b]oth sides thereafter will be expected to comply with the agreed protocol in producing documents.” (Metadata Order 2.) The Court agrees with Judge Mumm that this directive was meant to clarify the reciprocal nature of the parties' discovery obligations under the to-be-agreed-upon protocol—an issue raised by Prevoty Defendants during the March 8, 2016 hearing—rather than a starting point for the parties' discovery obligations, as Prevoty Defendants advocate. Indeed, Prevoty Defendants' interpretation of this sentence is untenable in light of the Metadata Order's directive that Prevoty Defendants “provide the metadata and other formatting information that plaintiffs seek,” (Metadata Order 2 [emphasis added] ), which includes metadata for documents previously produced.[2]

*9 Turning to the merits of Judge Mumm's factual findings, the Court is not left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” LegalZoom.com, 2013 WL 6859269 at *1. Prevoty Defendants contend Judge Mumm clearly erred in finding that “[i]t is undisputed that defendants did not provide custodian information,” pointing out that hundreds of documents had the desired custodian metadata. (Mot. 14-15 [citing Sanctions Order 22].) Prevoty Defendants do not dispute, however, Ms. Quatinetz's testimony that of the 2,785 documents produced by Prevoty Defendants, 2,322 documents “had no value populated for the custodian field.” (Tr. of 6/1/2016 Proceeding 36:13-17.) Nor do they dispute Judge Mumm's statement that “[c]ustodian information should always be available, because presumably the party producing the document knows from where it was obtained.” (Sanctions Order 20.) Thus, Judge Mumm correctly found that Prevoty Defendants did not provide custodian metadata for the majority of the documents produced despite being previously ordering them provide this metadata.[3]

Prevoty Defendants next argue Judge Mumm clearly erred in finding they failed to provide date-related metadata such that they violated the Metadata Order. (Mot. 16-18.) Plaintiff's custodian, Ms. Quatinetz, testified that 681 of the 2,785 documents produced by Prevoty Defendants lacked any intelligible date information, and further testified that several of these documents, such as PowerPoint presentations and Excel spreadsheets, should have had such information. (Tr. of 6/1/2016 Proceeding 47:4-19, 66:19-67:17, 68:1-16, 69:8-21.) Prevoty Defendants' own custodian testified that he agreed with Ms. Quatinetz that electronically created documents such as PowerPoints and Excel files should have a date created file. (Tr. of 6/1/2016 Proceeding 123:10-13.)

Prevoty Defendants nevertheless contend Judge Mumm erred in finding a violation of the metadata Order, arguing Judge Mumm “ignored” Ms. Quatinetz's testimony on cross-examination wherein she “admitted that many of these documents had a different form of date metadata because they were e-mail messages.” (Mot. 17 (citing Tr. of 6/1/2016 Proceeding 89:8-19, 91:8-23).) This testimony does not create a dispute whether some of Prevoty Defendants' non-email productions lacked date metadata required to be produced under the Metadata Order. Nothing in the Sanctions Order indicates Judge Mumm failed to consider this testimony, and the Court does not find he committed clear error.

Finally, Prevoty Defendants do not argue Judge Mumm erred in finding they acted unreasonably in not allowing the e-discovery vendors to meet and figure out why certain load file date fields were “garbled.” (See generally Mot.) This failure constituted an independent—and unchallenged—ground for Judge Mumm's finding that Prevoty Defendants violated the Metadata Order, sufficient to support the Sanctions Order.

In sum, the record supports Judge Mumm's findings that Prevoty Defendants violated the Metadata Order, and DENIES Prevoty Defendants' Motion as to this issue.

Rule 37(b)(2)(A) authorizes a court to “issue further just orders” where “a party or a party's officer, director, or managing agent ... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a)....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). Examples of such orders include striking pleadings, staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, and dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vii). Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provides that “[i]nstead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added).

*10 Prevoty Defendants argue Judge Mumm's award of sanctions was “contrary to law” because he “entered what amounts to a new order, for the first time clarifying or modifying certain aspects of the Court's prior orders.” (Mot. 18-19.) Contrary to Prevoty Defendants' insistence, there was nothing “ambiguous” about the Interrogatory or Metadata Orders, and their two cases in their Motion are therefore inapposite. The Court cannot say, on this voluminous record, that Prevoty Defendants' failure to comply with the Interrogatory and Metadata Orders was “substantially justified,” and therefore sanctions are appropriate pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(C). The Court therefore DENIES Prevoty Defendants' Motion on this basis.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants Kunal Anand, Julien Bellanger, and Prevoty, Inc.'s Motion to Review Magistrate Judge Mumm's August 19, 2016 Order. This matter is remanded to Magistrate Judge Mumm for further proceedings.

The Court finds occasion to express its agreement with the following statements: (1) “[t]he word contentious barely describes the manner in which discovery has proceeded in this action[;]” (2) Prevoty Defendants “have shown absolutely no interest in cooperating with [P]laintiffs in discovery[;]” and (3) Prevoty Defendants have wasted not only Plaintiffs' and Judge Mumm's time “by taking incorrect and unreasonable interpretations of the Court's orders,” but have now taken the additional step of wasting this Court's time. (See Sanctions Order 2, 28.) Continued litigation abuse on the part of Prevoty Defendants will be addressed accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The hearing date on the instant Motion was continued from September 26, 2016 to October 11, 2016 pursuant to the parties' stipulation. (See Order Continuing Hr'g Date on Mot., ECF No. 318.)

Here, as before Judge Mumm, Prevoty Defendants “make no attempt to explain why they should be given a pass on their obligation to provide metadata precisely for the ESI comprising the subject matter of the motion even though the motion was granted.” (Sanctions Order 21.)

The Court disagrees with Prevoty Defendants' position that “[t]he fact that the metadata did not fully meet the aspects of the [Metadata] Order that the Magistrate Judge finds to be implied in a later Order cannot be the basis of a finding that the [Metadata] Order was violated,” (Mot. 15), in light of its earlier conclusion that the requirement to produce custodian and data metadata was clearly communicated through the Metadata Order. The Court also finds Prevoty Defendants' arguments regarding Plaintiffs' purported noncompliance with the Metadata Order irrelevant for the purpose of ruling on this Motion.