Myriam FEJZULAI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SAM'S WEST, INC., et al., Defendants Civil Action No.: 6:14-3601-BHH United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Greenville Division Signed September 20, 2016 Counsel William D. Herlong, Herlong Law Firm, Greenville, SC, Christopher James Moore, Terry Edward Richardson, Jr., Richardson Patrick Westbrook and Brickman, Barnwell, SC, Dennis Charles Dukes, II, Thomas Christopher Tuck, Richardson Patrick Westbrook and Brickman, Mt. Pleasant, SC, for Plaintiffs. Alana Odom Williams, Benjamin Rush Smith, III, Donna Ojetta Tillis, Sarah B. Nielsen, Nelson Mullins Riley and Scarborough, Columbia, SC, Robert J. Herrington, Greenberg Traurig, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants. Hendricks, Bruce Howe, United States District Judge Order *1 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel (ECF No. 51). For the reasons set forth in this Order, Plaintiffs' Motion is granted in part and denied in part. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs filed this putative class action on September 10, 2014, alleging a breach of contract claim founded on certain terms and conditions of the Sam's Club Membership Agreement (“Membership Agreement”). (ECF No. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have, on divers occasions, breached the “200% Freshness Guarantee” (“Guarantee”) found in the Membership Agreement by failing to refund 200% of the purchase price of any returned item subject to the Guarantee (or alternatively refund 100% of the purchase price and replace the item, as provided in the Guarantee). (Id. ¶¶ 28-31.) The operative pleading in this case is now Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, which includes the original breach of contract claim, as well as claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and violation of SCUTPA,[1] all premised on the same putative failures to honor the Guarantee. (ECF No. 41 ¶¶ 33-42, 48-57.) Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel certain discovery on January 21, 2016. (ECF No. 51.) Defendants responded on February 8, 2016 (ECF No. 54), and Plaintiffs replied on February 19, 2016 (ECF No. 60). Given the delay in the Court's ruling on the discovery issues, on September 2, 2016 the Court directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing explaining, from their relative viewpoints, what portions of the discovery disputes itemized in the Motion to Compel remain outstanding. (ECF No. 76.) The parties filed their supplemental briefs, as directed, on September 9, 2016. (ECF Nos. 78; 80.) In addition, Defendants filed, with Plaintiffs' consent, their Response to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel (ECF No. 83), explaining their position on a particular discovery issue which they believed was already resolved when they filed their supplemental brief. After careful consideration of the relevant filings and standards of law, the Court now issues the following ruling. LEGAL STANDARD Parties to civil litigation may obtain discovery regarding “any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense,” including any information that “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Courts are to construe broadly rules enabling discovery. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 983 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)). However, while the parties' ability to obtain information through civil discovery is broad, it is not without limits. See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (“[D]iscovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries.”). “The scope and conduct of discovery are within the sound discretion of the district court.” Columbus-Am. Discovery Grp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 56 F.3d 556, 568 n.16 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Erdmann v. Preferred Research, Inc. of Ga., 852 F.2d 788, 792 (4th Cir. 1988)); see also Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Courts have broad discretion in [their] resolution of discovery problems arising in cases before [them].” (alterations in original and internal quotation marks omitted)). DISCUSSION *2 The parties' supplemental briefing narrowed the outstanding discovery disputes to five remaining issues. The Court will address each issue in turn.[2] A. ESI In their Motion to Compel, Plaintiffs stated that Defendants had produced only an extremely small amount of ESI and had failed to identify the persons whose computers and files they were searching. (ECF No. 51 at 1.) Defendants responded that they had been gathering ESI from custodians since late summer of 2015 and had been producing responsive documents on a rolling basis. (ECF No. 54 at 4-5.) More recently, Plaintiffs state that since the motion to compel was filed nearly eight months ago, Defendants have produced only a very small number of emails (less than 50). They assert that Defendants should be ordered to complete their review of the (approximately) 45 identified custodians and produce all responsive documents. (ECF No. 78 at 2.) Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants should be required to produce the relevant ESI in native format, rather than TIFF images only. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiffs represent that if the email evidence is not produced in native format they will have to procure expensive litigation support software (such as Summation or Concordance), which they apparently do not have, just to view the evidence, and that their review will be significantly more expensive and time consuming because of putative difficulties dealing with TIFF images rather than Microsoft “Outlook” compatible files. (Id. at 3.) Defendants respond that they believed the ESI issue was already resolved because: (1) they had produced ESI; (2) the form of the production comported with industry standard for producing ESI in litigation (i.e. TIFF images and a load file); (3) the form of the production comported with a Standing Order regarding ESI production that applies in Chikosi,[3] a parallel case pending in California; and (4) the parties' counsel, which are common between the two cases, have been working together to conform discovery and production as much as possible in order to prevent duplicative efforts, and the parties agreed to production without native format in Chikosi. (ECF No. 80 at 3.) Defendants argue that the format of ESI production is not properly before the Court because Plaintiffs' sole complaint regarding ESI in the Motion to Compel was that a limited number of emails had been produced, and the request for native format files was only raised in their Reply. (Id. at 5.) Defendants further assert that they have already produced documents to Plaintiffs in a manner that is both consistent with industry standard and in the form that Plaintiffs originally requested. (Id.) *3 The Court would quickly dispose of the notion that Plaintiffs' request for the native email files was newly raised in their Reply. As the Court recalls, this was a topic of rather extensive discussion at the November 20, 2015 hearing, prior to the filing of the Motion to Compel. (See generally, Hr'g Tr., ECF No. 52.) Additionally, as a reflection of that discussion, Plaintiffs state in their Motion, “The only ESI that has been produced since the hearing is a ‘re-production’ of prior discovery in ‘native’ format. That amounts to only a handful of documents.” (ECF No. 51 at 1 (emphasis added).) Needless to say, Plaintiffs' current request for native format email files is properly before the Court. At the hearing, when confronted with arguments on this issue the Court stated, “let's not split hairs over it. Let's just give [Plaintiffs] native format.” (ECF No. 52, p. 48, ll. 15-16.) Here, the Court would take a moment to confess astonishment that the parties have been unable to reach an amicable resolution on this issue given the fact that the entire universe of the email production in question is apparently in the vicinity of 50 files. (See ECF No. 78 at 2.) The Court finds both sides' arguments about putative delay, expense, risk, and inconvenience unpersuasive. Defendants cite an email sent by Plaintiffs' counsel on March 9, 2015, entitled “Sam's—document production format,” for the proposition that Plaintiffs' own request sought the emails in TIFF format for compatibility with Concordance. (See ECF No. 80-4 at 2 (stating that Plaintiffs needed the documents produced in “Concordance format” including “[i]mages scanned in single page tif format, 300 dpi, organized by document using bates number range and provided in a Concordance .OPT load file”).) But the fact is, in the same email Plaintiffs' counsel also requests, “Data fields including beginning and ending bates number provided in Concordance .DAT format including hyperlink field to Native files,” and “Native files provided separately and identified in .DAT file.” (See ECF No. 80-4 at 2 (emphasis added).) The Court is at a loss to understand why this request was not simply honored from the beginning of the case. The Court recognizes that Mr. Herlong (who wrote the email) is counsel for Plaintiffs both here and in Chikosi, and the request for Concordance compatible file formats may have been to accommodate the software capabilities of his co-counsel in the California case. But that is neither here nor there. In the instant proceeding Plaintiffs make a rather melodramatic plea: If only TIFFs are produced (even if a ‘load’ file is produced), plaintiffs will have to spend tens of thousands of dollars to purchase one of the traditional (and now antiquated and unnecessary when it comes to email) litigation support programs such as Summation or Concordance, to hire consultants to import the TIFF files into the program, and to hire paralegals or clerks to review and index or categorize the files (i.e., to physical [sic] look at each email and physically type into the litigation support program the “sender,” “recipient,” “subject,” [sic] send date/time,” [sic] receive date/time,” etc. This is [sic] expense and delay is completely unnecessary. (ECF No. 78 at 3.) The Court would remind Plaintiffs that they are referring to a grand total of 50 emails. Nevertheless, there is really no reason why Defendants would not produce the emails in native format along with the TIFF images they have already produced. Producing the native files in conjunction with the imaged documents is literally a matter of a few clicks of a mouse. Defendants cite various cases, putative consensus among subject matter experts, and precepts from the Sedona Conference to support their position that PDF or TIFF images are industry standard for email production and Plaintiffs are not entitled to anything more. (See ECF No. 80 at 6-7.) In their supplemental brief Defendants state: *4 In contrast, producing ESI in Microsoft “Outlook”—a living, working platform—as Plaintiffs now demand, is inconsistent with industry standards. Among other things, production in “Outlook” format is more costly and time-consuming for defendants (thus slowing down the discovery process), is not readily searchable across the entire production, cannot be “locked down” and thus allows the receiving party to manipulate and potentially change the ESI (and associated metadata) from its original format, does not allow for bates numbering or branding documents as confidential, and presents significant authentication problems. (ECF No. 80 at 7 (citing John K. Rabiej, Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, in 7 Moore's Federal Practice ch. 37A.43[1] (2015); Sedona Conference Best Practices at 62 cmt. 12.b.).) All of that may very well be true, and would make an excellent set of arguments as to why it is a bad idea to produce emails solely in native format. It does not follow that producing email files, which have already been identified, collected, and imaged, in both TIFF and native format somehow presents substantial risk, expense, or inconvenience to Defendants. In the end, the entire dispute about the format of ESI production in this case appears to be much ado about nothing. The Court claims no special expertise in electronic discovery matters, but it would appear that Defendants have already produced the emails in the format that Plaintiffs so adamantly request. Defendants explain that their practice has been to produce emails in an electronic folder containing four subfolders. (ECF No. 80 at 6.) The third subfolder, apparently entitled “NATIVES,” includes all of the emails in “.msg” format (see id.), which, the Court takes judicial notice, is the default format for emails generated in Microsoft Outlook. Plaintiffs' main contention is that they want to be able to review and organize the emails conveniently without purchasing expensive litigation support software. (ECF No. 78 at 3.) The Motion to Compel production of the email evidence in this case in a “native format” viewable in Microsoft Outlook is hereby granted. However, if Defendants' representations about their previous email productions are accurate, they appear to already have satisfied this burden (by producing the . msg files). Finally, any emails introduced into the record will be the TIFF image version containing bates numbering. This eliminates any residual risk that an “altered” version of a native format email would make its way in front of the fact finder. Insofar as the Motion to Compel is still ripe regarding the completion of the relevant ESI searches, which the Court doubts, the Motion is also granted. Defendants are ordered to complete the relevant searches of the (approximately) 45 custodians' computer records, using the parties' agreed upon search terms, and produce the resultant ESI within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Order. B. Interrogatory No. 4 Interrogatory No. 4 states: Identify the twenty Members in each state with the largest difference between (a) 200% of the total amounts paid by each Member for Fresh Goods that the Member returned to Sam's within the Statute of Limitations for the state of the Member's Home Club and (b) the total value of the refunds given by Sam's to the Member for such returned Fresh Goods (treating each replacement item as having the same value as the item that it was provided to replace and that value as having been “refunded” to the Member). (ECF No. 51-1 at 2.) In their Motion to Compel, Plaintiffs stated that Defendants had: (1) produced a spreadsheet showing all returns of “Fresh Goods” in the limitations period in South Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee; (2) represented that this constituted an indication of the 20 largest “returners” of Fresh Goods; and, (3) contended that they are unable to know how much each returner received in refunds. (ECF No. 51 at 2.) Plaintiffs asserted that they: (1) need the actual identification of each such Sam's Club member (including name, address, telephone, and email), in order to contact them as potential witnesses to Defendants' alleged noncompliance with the Guarantee; and, (2) need this information for all 50 states, not just the three that they received. (Id.) Defendants responded that the “top twenty returners” information Plaintiffs sought was contained within the spreadsheets already produced, and that all Plaintiffs needed to do was sort the data. (ECF No. 54 at 5.) Nevertheless, Defendants agreed to sort the data for Plaintiffs after first establishing exactly what Plaintiffs meant by “top twenty” (e.g. largest by dollar amount, largest by number of products, etc.). (Id.) Defendants also asserted privacy and other objections to the portion of Plaintiffs request that sought club members' names, addresses, telephone numbers, and email addresses. (Id. at 11-17.) As such, Defendants believed the Interrogatory No. 4 dispute to be moot at that time, subject to ongoing clarification and collaboration of the parties. (Id. at 8.) *5 More recently, Plaintiffs assert that this issue was “argued in full” at the November 20, 2015 hearing, and that the Court essentially directed that the requested information be supplied (ECF No. 78 at 5): THE COURT: Well, at this point—at this point the Court thinks it's necessary, and it's necessary for them to be able to build their case, and I think it is necessary. I'm not necessarily, you know, making a formal ruling right this second, but, you know, upon motion, that is likely the way it would go. (Hr'g Tr., ECF No. 52, p. 39, ll. 8-13.) Defendants respond that the reason Plaintiffs initially gave as to why they need customers' personal information is now inapposite, and such personal identifying information for putative class members is improper given that no class has been certified and disclosure would violate Sam's Club's Privacy Policy. (ECF No. 80 at 9.) Plaintiffs initially stated that they needed customer names and contact information for the top twenty returners in each state because “Plaintiffs need to contact them to confirm widespread non-compliance, as alleged, and are entitled to do so.” (ECF No. 51 at 2.) On March 4, 2016, the parties filed a Consent Motion to hold the remaining deadlines of the scheduling order in abeyance pending resolution of the discovery disputes itemized in the Motion to Compel. (ECF No. 62 at 1.) While a large number of discovery issues itemized in the Consent Motion were described as “resolved” or “continuing to confer—possibility of resolution,” the Interrogatory No. 4 dispute was described as “unresolvable—court intercession necessary.” (Id. at 2.) The Court granted the parties' request and suspended the remaining scheduling deadlines. (ECF No. 63.) Nonetheless, as Defendants point out, “Plaintiffs ... served their expert report and filed their Motion for Class Certification on June 8, 2016, without waiting for the Court to rule on the Motion to Compel, and when there was no deadline for either of those pleadings given that the Court had suspended the schedule.” (ECF No. 80 at 10 (emphasis in original).) Accordingly, Defendants aver, Plaintiffs have conceded, through their filings, that the customer information sought in the Motion to Compel is unnecessary at this stage and the “member numbers” that Defendants have provided as identifiers corresponding to each returner are sufficient. (Id.) The Court is sensitive to the privacy concerns raised by Defendants and their concern regarding the form and content of communications made to Sam's Club members outside the direct supervision of the Court. However, the Court believes that names and limited contact information for the top twenty returners in the three states for whom the de-personalized information has already been provided (SC, GA, and TN) is relevant and necessary at this stage. As the Defendants acknowledge in their Opposition (ECF No. 54 at 14), “Whether to permit discovery of contact information for putative class members prior to conditional certification of a case lies within the discretion of the district court.” Velasquez-Monterrosa v. Mi Casita Restaurants, No. 5:14-CV-448-BO, 2015 WL 1964400, at *6 (E.D.N.C. May 1, 2015) (citing Hoffman–La Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169–70 (1989) (acknowledging the discretionary authority possessed by the district court to oversee discovery issues, including the issuance of a court-approved notice to potential plaintiffs)). Courts have come down on either side of this issue depending on the specific circumstances of the case. See, e.g., id. at *8 (denying pre-certification production of employees' identifying information in FLSA putative class action); Tomassi v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 08-1851 DSF SSX, 2008 WL 4722393, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2008) (ordering pre-certification disclosure of names and addresses in FLSA case); Crawford v. Dothan City Bd. of Educ., 214 F.R.D. 694, 695 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (declining to compel production of employees' names and addresses until after conditional certification); Acevedo v. Ace Coffee Bar, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 550, 555-56 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (ordering pre-certification production of names and contract information for employees in plaintiff's work location, but denying production as to all other workers, reasoning that “[p]laintiffs have not ... yet demonstrated a reasonable factual basis for suspecting that all hourly employees have been subject to the same pay practice”). *6 In the case sub judice, Defendants have highlighted what they believe to be an important problem with ascertaining who, among those members that returned Fresh Goods, received the benefit of the Guarantee. Defendants' counsel explained it this way at the hearing: With regard to the interrogatory on the members in each state, the question is not the—the question posed was not give us all your member information. The question posed was to identify the members with the largest difference between 200 percent of the total amount paid by each member for the fresh goods, and the total of the value of the refunds that was given. And essentially, what they're asking for is one of the issues in the case, and that's why there's a huge ascertainability issue in the case. What they're asking for is tell us who of your members who returned fresh items received the 200 percent freshness guarantee. The way the process works is when you return an item, that return transaction happens at a cash register, just like it does in any other retail venue that any of us would go to. And you get 100 percent back at the register. And all that can be seen in that transaction. With the freshness guarantee, however, when a member returns an item because it's not fresh, that does not happen at the register. That money comes from the accounting department. Somebody comes down, they process that manually, they manually write onto, in many stores, what's a carbon copy, I hadn't seen one of those in a long time, and had an opportunity to literally see a carbon copy piece of paper where they write in a name, it's not a member number, and the name is for who the recipient is. In some instances the recipient may be the store manager, because they're the ones going back and forth, so it may be the actual manager or assistant manager's name. They write that in, write the amount, and then it says description. There's no requirement or anything that—and all the testimony says this—that the descriptions say freshness guarantee at all. And so in many instances what they write down is member sat, or mem sat, because that's the big account that all of this comes from, is the member satisfaction account. And so it could be a myriad of things that fall within that account. So what we gave them, which is what we have, is all of the members, all of the fresh returns of members in three states over the course of several years. And it shows the member, what they returned, how much they received, a description of the product, because that's what we have on the computer in the system. The second part, which is really what the question asked, and we respond indicating that the defendants cannot provide you with the 20 members who returned the most products as set forth in the documents—Excuse me, I apologize, I misspoke. What we say is the defendants can provide you the 20 members who returned the products, which we have done, we've given them all of that, but we're unable to determine the complete refund provided to these members. And that's because that second step does not occur by computerized method at the register. That second step is a manual record that's written in. At the end of the day or the end of every few days, there is someone in the accounting department who will go in and try to type in what they can discern from the handwritten records. And the whole purpose of that is just to make sure that the drawer's balanced out. It's not to keep an account of necessarily everything that people are doing, he just wants to make sure nobody is stealing the money. *7 (ECF No. 52, p. 35, l. 21–p. 38, l. 2.) The Court anticipates an additional problem with ascertaining which members, among those who returned Fresh Goods, were properly denied the benefits of the Guarantee because they returned the goods in question for some reason other than a failure on the part of Sam's Club to maintain the goods' freshness (e.g. a customer returning a package of pork chops because he accidentally purchased too many). It obviously cannot be the case that return of a Fresh Good for any reason qualifies a member for 200% reimbursement. Such a system would invite improper claims and could potentially be very financially injurious to Sam's Club. In light of this context, the undersigned believes that disclosure of a certain limited subset of customers' personal information will facilitate an understanding of the true contours of this case, is proportional to the issues at hand, and is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel the identification of the top twenty returners in each state is granted in part. Specifically, Defendants' counsel will provide to Plaintiffs' counsel the names and addresses (only) of the top twenty returners in South Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee within fourteen (14) days of the issuance of this Order. This information is obviously subject to the Confidentiality Order agreed upon by the parties and entered by the Court, and will be marked “Confidential—Attorneys' Eyes Only” as Defendants deem appropriate. (See ECF No. 32.) Plaintiffs' counsel will make initial communication with these returners by written correspondence only, and only after having disclosed the contents of that written correspondence to Defendants' counsel.[4] Plaintiffs' counsel will give a brief explanation of the case and may invite the returners to contact their law firm(s) via letter, telephone, or email, as the returners see fit, in order to schedule an interview. Within ten (10) days of receiving any response from a returner, Plaintiffs' counsel will identify the specific returner and the general nature of their communication to Defendants' counsel. These notifications, for example, need not spell out the substance of any interview that occurs, but only the occurrence of the interview itself. At all times, Defendants' counsel will have equal access to those members contacted by Plaintiffs' counsel. Defendants' counsel will similarly notify their opponents regarding the general nature of any communication with a returner, including the name of the specific member, within ten (10) days of that communication. These protocols for contacting the top twenty returners in each of the three states for which returner data has already been provided are intended to facilitate the discovery of admissible evidence while mitigating the risk that disclosure of members' personal information will be used by Plaintiffs' counsel simply to dredge up new potential clients. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981) (“Because of the potential for abuse, a district court has both the duty and the broad authority to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties.”); see also Dziennik v. Sealift, Inc., No. 05-CV-4659 (DLI)(MDG), 2006 WL 1455464, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006) (noting that requests for disclosure of class members' identities at the pre-certification stage have often been denied “out of concern that plaintiffs' attorneys may be seeking such information to identify potential new clients, rather than to establish the appropriateness of certification”); Flanigan v. Am. Fin. Sys. of Georgia, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 563, 563 (M.D. Ga. 1976) (“Rule 23 should not be used as a device to enable client solicitation.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). C. Request for Production No. 20, subsections 2 and 3 *8 Request for Production No. 20, subsections 2 and 3 state: Data Files—Re-Production (Note—this request applies to all stores in all states, as per the complaint, but it will be sufficient for now to limit it to South Carolina): 2. CFT File a. Identify the member number for each recipient who is or was a member. Alternatively, produce a complete copy of your member file with all identifying information for each member. b. Include any variables that were left out of the datasets originally provided including those related to transaction numbers and/or transaction times[.] c. Include Category codes for each item. 3. Gift Card a. For each member recipient, identify the member by name, address, telephone number and all other identifying information. b. Include any variables that were left out of the datasets originally provided including those related to transaction numbers and/or transaction times[.] c. Include Category codes for each item. (ECF No. 51-2 at 3.) To the best of the Court's understanding, the CFT File request is aimed at matching manually entered/handwritten entries located in a petty-cash type file (CFT), maintained at each Sam's Club location, to recipients' corresponding member numbers in order to see if particular members that returned Fresh Goods at a register for the full purchase price also received their “second 100%” in “member satisfaction” funds from the CFT account. (See ECF No. 52, p. 28, l. 22–p. 30, l. 2.) Apparently, the difficulty is that in order to conduct this matching one would have to look at actual handwritten names in the CFT File for each store and then go into the Sam's Club membership database and find the corresponding member, potentially having to deconflict names that are common to multiple members/former members (e.g. “John Smith”). (Id.) In their Motion to Compel and their Supplemental Brief, Plaintiffs state that Defendants have taken the position that they can both refuse to provide the member numbers that correspond to handwritten CFT recipient entries, and refuse to provide the information from which Plaintiffs could try and conduct the matching themselves, namely the master member file that contains all identifying information on each member. (ECF Nos. 51 at 3; 78 at 6.) Defendants do not squarely respond to the initial portion of Plaintiffs' request, which is that the relevant member numbers be produced (“Identify the member number for each recipient who is or was a member.”). Instead, Defendants argue that the request seeks members' personal information which is inappropriate for disclosure prior to certification of a class and which violates the corporate privacy policy. (See ECF Nos. 54 at 11-12; 80 at 9.) They further argue that the information is no longer necessary because Plaintiffs have filed their Motion for Class Certification. (Id.) The Court finds that disclosure of the member numbers corresponding to CFT File entries itemized in the “member satisfaction” category (only)[5] is relevant and necessary at this stage of the litigation, is proportionate to issues of central importance in the case, and is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The request for the master member file including sensitive personal information was only made in the alternative, given the contingency, which turned out to exist, that Defendants were unwilling to do the work of matching the handwritten entries with corresponding names in the member file. (See Req. for Produc. 20(2)(a.), ECF No. 51-2 at 3.) For the time being, as expressly stated in Request for Production No. 20, Defendants need only conduct this analysis with respect to the CFT Files at their South Carolina locations (and for the relevant three-year time period). Plaintiffs have already conceded that the efforts to match handwritten entries with names in a putatively massive computer database will likely not yield 100 percent accuracy in the matching results. (ECF No. 52, p.29, ll. 10-15.) Reasonably diligent efforts at matching CFT entries to member numbers will be deemed to comply with this Order. Accordingly, the Motion to Compel member numbers for relevant recipients in the CFT File is granted to the extent outlined above. *9 Similar to the CFT File request, the Gift Card request is aimed at matching gift cards issued out of the CFT File to the relevant member number and to returns specifically made for Fresh Goods. (See ECF No. 52, p. 30, ll. 11-20.) At the hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel represented that Sam's gift cards have member numbers associated with them, so matching gift cards to members who returned Fresh Goods should not be a problem. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiffs concede that if a gift card is issued as reimbursement for the return of items other than Fresh Goods, than it is not relevant to the material issues in the case. (Id.) The Court understands Plaintiffs to essentially be asking Defendants to identify which gift cards were issued as reimbursement for “member satisfaction” returns in an attempt to isolate those gift cards that are associated with Fresh Goods and determine whether the Guarantee was honored in each case. (See id.; ECF Nos. 51 at 4; 78 at 7.) Again, Defendants' responsive arguments are not directly on point but rather focus on putative privacy concerns with disclosing members' personal information and lack of necessity for the information given Plaintiffs' filing of their Motion for Class Certification. (See ECF Nos. 54 at 11-12; 80 at 9.) The Court finds that the gift card category code information is relevant, proportional, and necessary, but only to the extent that it can be narrowed to gift cards issued for “member satisfaction” returns.[6] There is no need to disclose any sensitive personal information in order to communicate this limited subset of relevant information to Plaintiffs. As the Court understands Plaintiffs' request, they believe the gift cards in question were largely issued as part of reimbursements itemized in the CFT File. (See ECF No. 52, p. 30, ll. 11-14.) Thus, the Court anticipates a large degree of crossover between production of the gift card category code information and production of the member number information from the CFT File, because it will involve analysis of the same documents (the CFT Logs). However, it goes without saying that the Court cannot order Defendants to produce information that does not exist. In their Response to Plaintiffs' Fourth Set of Requests for Documents, Defendants state regarding the Gift Card request: [T]he Defendants note that the term “Gift Card,” as used in the context of these requests is vague and ambiguous in that no “Gift Card” accounts have been identified, nor are Defendants aware of anything that would qualify as a “Gift Card” account in this context. Accordingly, the Defendants state that they are unaware of any documents responsive to parts 3(a) to (c) [of Request for Production No. 20]. (ECF No. 54-2 at 7.) Additionally, in a letter to Plaintiffs' counsel regarding discovery issues, counsel for Defendants states: “ ‘Gift Card’—At the outset, we note that we are not aware of any ‘gift card’ file, account, or log that was previously produced, nor is our client aware of any ‘gift card’ file, account or log that exists and is responsive and/or relevant to this matter.” (ECF No. 54-1 at 4.) Accordingly, the Court hereby orders Defendants to produce information showing which gift cards, if any, were issued as reimbursement for “member satisfaction” returns, as reflected in the CFT Files at their South Carolina store locations[7] during the relevant limitations period. The Motion to Compel is therefore granted in this limited respect. This information will be produced within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Order. D. Request for Production No. 29 Request for Production No. 29 states: All policies, procedures, manuals, training materials and other documents relating to the CFT account(s) and gift card account[t](s) for your stores, including preparation and tracking of disbursements from such account(s), documentation for disbursements, authorization for disbursements, maintenance of account ledgers, balancing of such accounts, auditing of such accounts, audit trails for transa[c]tions in such accounts, and/or the use of such accounts generally. *10 (ECF No. 51-2 at 4.) In their Motion to Compel, their Reply, and their Supplemental Brief, Plaintiffs state that “Defendants have produced a small smattering of documents regarding these issues,” but they insist that this “cannot be complete since there appears to be nothing on [each of the topics specifically itemized in the request].” (ECF Nos. 51 at 6; 60 at 6; 78 at 9.) Plaintiffs argue, “It is not credible that a company of the size, breadth, and sophistication of [D]efendants would have nothing on these topics.” (See ECF Nos. 51 at 6; 60 at 6.) Defendants respond that the Court should deny the Motion to Compel as it relates to Request for Production No. 29 because it is cumulative and duplicative of discovery previously served and completed. (ECF No. 84 at 1.) Defendants comprehensively outline the documents and interrogatory responses they have already produced that are responsive to this request, and assert that there are simply no further responsive materials to produce. (Id. at 1-3.) Moreover, Defendants represent that during the parties' recent September 7, 2016 conferral, a meeting specifically delineated to identify what discovery issues were still outstanding, Plaintiffs' counsel did not raise Request for Production No. 29 as an issue in dispute, leading to a continued belief on the part of Defendants that the request had been satisfied. (Id. at 3.) Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not set forth any substantive grounds for compelling Defendants to produce additional, unidentified documents, but rather rely on an unsupported contention that, in essence, “there must be more.” (Id.) The Court agrees with Defendants and hereby denies the Motion to Compel with respect to Request for Production No. 29. As already indicated above, the Court cannot compel a party to produce items that do not exist. Neither will the Court second guess Defendants' counsels' good-faith representation that they have made a diligent search of all potential repositories for responsive documents and produced all non-privileged information. Plaintiffs' arguments in support of this Request amount to nothing more than speculation that the previous productions are incomplete. Accordingly, the Motion to Compel is denied in this respect. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel (ECF No. 51) is granted in part and denied in part. IT IS SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] By way of its September 7, 2016 Order, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' SCUTPA claim to the extent it was brought in a representative capacity. (See ECF No. 77.) However, the individual Plaintiffs' SCUTPA claims remain viable. (Id.) [2] For the sake of efficiency, the Court says only what is necessary to address those issues that the parties have affirmatively indicated are still outstanding. The Court declines to make a specific ruling where Plaintiffs indicate that a particular issue is “probably resolved” (see ECF No. 78 at 6); however, Plaintiffs have effectively reserved the right to re-raise that issue in the event it turns out not to be resolved. The Court's rulings regarding Request for Production No. 20, subsection 2 and subsection 3 will be addressed together, since they implicate virtually identical factual issues and matters of dispute. [3] Chikosi v. Sam's West, et al., 8:15-cv-1675 (C.D. Cal.). [4] The parties are encouraged to make every effort to resolve any putative disagreements about the contents of this correspondence without the Court's intervention. However, should the parties reach a true impasse, they may request the Court's intervention via a telephone discovery conference. [5] The Court makes this limitation to eliminate unnecessary and irrelevant work, and because it has been led to believe that virtually all CFT reimbursements related to the Guarantee were itemized in the “member satisfaction” category. However, this limitation should not be construed in an unreasonably strict manner. Obviously, if there are CFT File entries that specifically indicate reimbursements related to Fresh Goods or the Guarantee, but which are not categorized as “member satisfaction,” those entries should be analyzed for member-number matching. The limitation that the Court has imposed should be sufficient to allay Defendants' concern that it would be “unduly burdensome” to manually enter the names listed on the CFT Logs into the member database, generate a list of individuals with those names, match the individuals with the club where the return was made, and, in instances where there are common names, “speculate as to which ‘recipient’ corresponds with which member number.” (See Defs. Resp. to 4th Req. for Produc., ECF No. 54-2 at 6-7.) Defendants objection to this task was that it was aimed at “each recipient” in the CFT Logs. (Id.) Now the task is narrowed to recipients of “member satisfaction” funds. [6] As more explicitly set forth in note 5 supra, this limitation should not be construed in an unduly strict fashion. [7] Plaintiffs have effectively preserved the right to seek this information on a nationwide basis, but have limited their current request to Sam's Club locations in South Carolina. (See ECF No. 51-2 at 2.)