James MORALES, Plaintiff, v. KAVULICH & ASSOCIATES, P.C., et al., Defendants 16-CV-2134 (ALC) (JLC) United States District Court, S.D. New York Signed June 15, 2017 Counsel Matthew Austin Schedler, Cambo Legal Services Inc., Ahmad Keshavarz, Ahmad Keshavarz, Law Offices, Brooklyn, NY, Melissa Koven, Camacho Mauro Mulholland, LLP, Nasoan Channa Sheftel-Gomes, Urban Justice Center, New York, NY, for Plaintiff. Mitchell L. Pashkin, Huntington, NY, for Defendants. Cott, James L., United States Magistrate Judge MEMORANDUM ORDER *1 By letter-motion dated May 25, 2017 (Dkt. No. 78), non-party New York City Marshal Stephen W. Biegel (the “Marshal”) has moved pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for reimbursement of 50 percent of the Marshal's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by him in responding to Plaintiff's subpoena dated March 8, 2017. Plaintiff filed a letter dated June 2, 2017 (Dkt. No. 79) opposing the motion. A brief review of the chronology relating to the subpoena at issue is necessary in order to consider the Marshal's motion. The relevant and undisputed facts are set forth not only in the letters presently before the Court, but also in prior correspondence (Dkt. Nos. 67 and 68). The March 8 subpoena was served on March 9 and made returnable on March 16 (as were two other subpoenas to two additional marshals).[1] On March 15, an employee of the Marshal first responded to the subpoena by contacting plaintiff's counsel. Communications continued for more than two weeks and on April 3, the Marshal's employee requested that plaintiff's counsel send her a flash drive for the documents to be produced. At that time, plaintiff's counsel offered to sort through the documents themselves in order to obviate the need for the Marshal's employee to do any additional work. On April 11, plaintiff's counsel contacted the Marshal's employee to check on the status of the production of the documents and was told the documents were ready to go pending sign off from the employee's attorney. Declaration of Ahmad Keshavarz dated April 26, 2017, ¶¶ 2-3 (Dkt. No. 67-4). According to plaintiff's counsel, this was the first time that there had been any mention of an attorney involved on the Marshal's end of things. It turned out that on April 10, plaintiff's co-counsel had received a letter from attorneys for the Marshal interposing several complaints about the subpoena, including overbreadth and burdensomeness. This contact from the Marshal's counsel triggered substantial back-and-forth negotiations culminating in a proceeding before the Court where the issues were ultimately resolved. The Court then gave the Marshal the opportunity to seek his attorneys' fees and he has made the pending application for 50 percent of his fees, or $3,567.53. As a threshold matter, as plaintiff's counsel points out, counsel for the Marshal has not provided the Court with a basis to justify the hourly rates that are being charged. No information is given regarding either counsel's year of admission to the bar, the extent of their respective experience in matters such as the dispute presented here, or related topics. However, the Court has taken judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Lipp was admitted to the bar in 2013 and Mr. Schriever was admitted to the bar in 1999, which is provided in the records of the New York State Unified Court System. See, e.g., Farmer v. Hyde Your Eyes Optical, Inc., No. 13-CV-6653 (GBD) (JLC), 2015 WL 2250592, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2015) (taking judicial notice of attorney admission date); Dunn v. Advanced Credit Recovery Inc., No. 11CV-4023 (PAE) (JLC), 2012 WL 676350, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012) (same), adopted, 2012 WL 1114335 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2012). See Attorney Directory-Attorney Search, http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/attorney/AttorneySearch (last visited on June 8, 2017). In this District, courts have found attorneys' fees ranging from $225 to $375 reasonable for civil litigators working in small firms. See, e.g., Margolies v. Cnty. of Putnam N.Y., No. 09-CV-2061 (RKE) (GAY), 2011 WL 721698, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2011) (collecting cases). Based on this range, Mr. Lipp's rate of $250 per hour and Mr. Schriever's rate of $440 per hour (for the three-plus hours he worked on this matter) are reasonable in light of their experience. *2 Irrespective of the reasonableness of counsel's rates, however, the overarching question presented is whether the March 8 subpoena imposed an undue burden on the Marshal. The Court concludes, on the record presented, that it did not. Indeed, even though the subpoena was returnable on March 16, the first notice plaintiff's counsel had that there might be an issue with the subpoena was not until almost a month after it had been served when they received correspondence from the Marshal's counsel. Up until that point, the point-of-contact for the Marshal had not lodged any complaint about the subpoena and contrariwise appeared to be on the cusp of responding to it. The only concern that had been raised was related to the mechanics of running the search terms identified in the subpoena. Moreover, two other marshals had been able to respond to the same subpoena with no problems. They did so presumably by searching for emails in the same manner that the Marshal could have done (and ultimately did do) in this case. The cost attendant to such production is plainly not exorbitant. Plaintiff's counsel offered to provide technical assistance as well, although this offer was apparently rejected. In addition, the protective order that plaintiff's counsel offered on April 19 and that was ultimately entered in this case addressed any privacy concerns that the Marshal's counsel had raised. The Court is mindful that cost shifting “is particularly appropriate in the context of subpoenas, since Rule 45directs courts to minimize the burden on non-parties.” US Bank Nat. Ass'n v. PHL Variable Ins, Co., No. 12-CV-6811 (CM) (JCF), 2012 WL 5395249, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2012). However, Rule 45(b)(1) requires a “sanction” only if the issuing party does not “take reasonable steps to avoid imposing an undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.” Here, however, plaintiff took reasonable steps to avoid imposing an undue burden and to assist with subpoena compliance. Accordingly, the Marshal's motion for reimbursement for 50 percent of his attorneys' fees and costs is denied. Finally, plaintiff has requested that the emails be produced in their native format, as the Marshal has apparently produced them only in a single PDF file. The Court does not have any response from the Marshal on this issue, so it will not rule on plaintiff's request at this time. Instead, the Court directs plaintiff and the Marshal to meet-and-confer to discuss resolution of this issue, and if it cannot be resolved, then the Marshal should submit a letter to the Court no later than June 22 explaining why production in native format cannot be made. The Clerk is directed to close Docket No. 78. SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] Plaintiff reported that one of the marshals had no responsive documents and the other produced documents without issue.