Powers opposes Chevron's motion on several grounds which the Court does not find compelling. A leading case explaining Title 28 U.S.C. § 1782 is Intel Corp v. Advance Micro Devices, Inc. 542 U.S. 241 (2004) which holds: “Section 1782 (a) does not impose a foreign-discoverability requirement. Although section 1782 (a) expressly shields from discovery matters protected by legally applicable privileges, nothing [in the statute] limits a district court's production-order authority to material discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction located there.... the Court also rejects Intel's suggestion that a § 1782 (a) applicant must show that the United States law would allow discovery in domestic litigation analogous to the foreign proceeding. Section 1782 is a provision for assistance to tribunals abroad and does not direct United States courts to engage in comparative analysis to determine whether analogous proceedings exist here.” Id. at 243-244. Here, Powers admitted he deleted many responsive e-mails and documents. At his deposition he testified he did not “keep e-mails beyond 4 to 6 months.” He also testified he “keep[s only] the e-mails that I consider important.” (Docket (“Dkt”) 94, pg. A, lines 9-12.)[1].

Chevron contends Powers “threw out a computer hard drive just days before Chevron initiated this proceeding and after Chevron had initiated a related proceeding against Stratus Consulting, Inc., for which Powers conducted his work.”[2]. That statement was not refuted. Powers should have considered the deleted e-mails and documents pertaining to his work as important and should have preserved them in light of the proceeding against Stratus Consulting. In any event, Chevron has the right to recover the emails and to determine whether the emails shed light on Power's role in the preparation of the report submitted by Cabrera to the Ecuadorian tribunal which appointed Cabrera to be that tribunal's independent neutral expert. The emails and metadata may also shed light on whether Powers' own work product was used improperly in the Lago Agrio litigation.

*2 There is nothing in the proposed discovery that would cause this Court to conclude such discovery is “unduly intrusive or burdensome.” Id. at 265. Furthermore, as set forth below, Chevron will bear the cost of imaging Powers' hard drive. The discovery sought is entirely proper under the Federal Rules Civil Procedure. “Once discovery is authorized under § 1782, the federal discovery rules ... contain the relevant practices and procedures for the taking of testimony and the production of documents.” In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324, 1336 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly allow the discovery and use of electronically stored information. See F.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(B). Indeed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a)(1)(A) expressly provides a procedure by which a party can obtain “electronically stored information ... in a reasonably usable form....” Likewise, Rule 45 allows discovery of such information from non-party witnesses. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(1). Both statutes allow discovery of electronically stored information that may involve an undue burden or cost on the producing party if the requesting party can demonstrate “good cause.” See F.R.Civ.P. 45(d)(1)(D).

Here, the Court does not find any true burden to Powers or to the Ecuadorian Plaintiffs. Moreover, the benefits of allowing this limited discovery outweighs any burden on Powers and the Ecuadorian Plaintiffs. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 60 F.Supp. 1050, 1053-54 (S.D. Cal. 1999). Good cause exists to obtain information relevant to a determination of (a) the actual role of Powers and (b) the integrity of Cabrera's work product. Such information will undoubtedly be of great importance to the Ecuadorian Tribunal.

Powers relies upon Mintel International Group, LTD v. Neeghn, 2009WL249227 (N.D. Ill., 2009).[3]However, this case is distinguishable from Mintel. Mintel involved the request by the plaintiff to obtain a mirror image of all the computer hard drives of a non-party who was also one of plaintiff's competitors. Mintel's request involved possible exposure of a third party competitor's trade secret information. In addition, Mintel's request was excessively aggressive and, as demonstrated by the court's opinion, unnecessary. Furthermore, the information Mintel wanted could be obtained by less intrusive means. Lastly, “[Mintel's] request is based solely on speculation and not on evidence suggesting that discoverable materials may be found on Datamonitor's computers. Unfettered access to a third-party Datamonitor's computers will be denied.” Id. at 6. The instant case does not involve the possible invasion of a competitor's trade secret information. Although Powers is not a party to the Lago Agrio action, he is nonetheless deeply involved in that his work product was apparently adopted in whole cloth by the allegedly neutral expert Cabrera. Furthermore, Chevron is only seeking a mirror image of Powers' personal computer from which emails and metadata were deleted. Finally, there is abundant evidence the allegedly neutral expert Cabrera used Powers' work product in such a manner as to potentially defraud the Ecuadorian tribunal and compromise the integrity of that judicial proceeding. The information Chevron seeks is clearly relevant to the Lago Agrio litigation.

Forensic examination of Powers hard drive will not involve an undue burden or cost on Powers or the Ecuadorian plaintiffs because Chevron will pay the cost of the forensic examination. The information sought is clearly relevant to the issues and claims raised in the Lago Agrio litigation. The information goes directly to the credibility of Powers and, therefore, the credibility of the alleged neutral expert Richard Stalin Cabrera (“Cabrera”) and the integrity of Cabrera's report to the Ecuadorian Court. Moreover, because Powers admittedly deleted potentially relevant emails and metadata from his computer, the information Chevron seeks can not be obtained by any means other than a forensic examination of Powers' hard drive. Therefore, the Court issues the following Order:

*3 a. The parties shall select a neutral forensic expert on or before February 22, 2011.

b. If the parties cannot agree on a neutral forensic expert, the Court will select one.

c. The forensic expert must promptly make three (3) identical images of Powers' hard drive but may not search the computer until further order of the Court.

d. Chevron will pay the reasonable costs for such an expert who will produce a written protocol he/she will employ, including specific search terms and time parameters for later use. The protocol will be reviewed by counsel who will meet and confer in an effort to achieve agreement on the protocol. The protocol must be approved by the Court before the forensic expert searches the hard drive.

e. The parties shall prepare an appropriate protocol, which shall include the requirement that the neutral forensic expert will make three (3) additional and identical images of Powers' hard drive. One image shall be delivered to the Court and filed under seal until further order of the Court. The forensic expert will retain the other copies for later use by the parties. Use of the image shall be subject to an appropriate protective order and only after proper protocols have been established.

f. Upon completion the expert will prepare a written report of his/her findings. A copy of the report shall be filed under seal with the Court and each party shall be given a complete copy of the report. The report shall be subject to an appropriate protective order.

g. Powers must submit to deposition with regard to information discovered as a result of the forensic examination of his hard drive. The scope of the deposition shall include, but not be limited to, the reason and timing of the deletion of the emails and metadata from the hard drive and all non-privileged communications regarding the emails and the deletion thereof.

IT IS SO ORDERED.