*1 This is an action by Plaintiff Nat Palaniappan against Norton Sound Health Corporation (“NSHC”) and various pseudonymously named parties arising out of NSHC's termination of Plaintiff's employment.[1] The Parties have filed several motions seeking the Court's assistance with various discovery disputes.[2] For the reasons set forth below, NSHC's motion to compel is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, NSHC's motion for sanctions in connection with Plaintiff's deposition is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's motion seeking the Court's review and consideration is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

Plaintiff alleges that he began working as NSHC's CFO in 2006.[3] He alleges that NSHC, through the former CEO Dennis Tiepelman, guaranteed him employment for a minimum of two years with six months' severance pay in the event he was terminated without good cause before the expiration of the two year period.[4] Plaintiff contends that NSHC terminated Tiepelman and that his successor, Trevor Colby, “set about engaging in ... a pattern of unethical and illegal conduct” that Plaintiff objected to.[5] He claims that NSHC terminated him after 18 months without the promised severance.[6] He asserts claims for breach of contract, breach of the “warranty of good faith and good dealing,” promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, wrongful discharge, and violation of the Alaska Whistleblower Act.[7]

On May 20, 2011, the Court issued an order denying Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim under the Alaska Whistleblower Act.[8] On the same date, the Court also issued an order denying without prejudice Plaintiff's motion to compel NSHC to respond to his discovery requests and compel Defendant's attorney, James Juliussen, to cooperate with him.[9] In the order, the Court observed that the Parties had not conferred before Plaintiff filed the motion, that Plaintiff had not included a Good Faith Certificate, that it is customary for Parties to negotiate over discovery requests and responses, that Mr. Juliussen is not required to personally handle every interaction with Plaintiff, that NSHC's objections and responses appeared to be appropriate given that Plaintiff's requests “are not in a customary format and are, at times, difficult to follow,” and that Plaintiff could refile his motions after conferring with NSHC and reviewing the applicable discovery rules.

The Parties subsequently filed a number of additional discovery motions.[10]On September 27, 2011, the Court held a status conference with the Parties to discuss the motions.[11] Among other things, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion to compel without prejudice due to his failure to comply with the Local Rules. The Court also denied NSHC's motion to compel Plaintiff to provide discovery responses as premature, but granted NSHC's requests to compel Plaintiff to appear for his deposition in Anchorage and to provide contact information for Tiepelman. The Court also warned both Parties that it would seriously consider awarding attorney's fees in connection with future motions to compel.

*2 The Court indicated that it would extend the discovery deadlines and ordered the Parties to confer and submit proposed deadlines. The Parties subsequently submitted proposed deadlines providing that written discovery would be completed by January 31, 2012, depositions would be completed by February 20, 2012, and dispositive motions would be filed by April 27, 2012.[12] The Court subsequently approved the deadlines.[13] The Parties then filed the motions that are now pending before the Court.[14]

Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the conduct of disclosure and discovery in civil cases. Discovery is intended to narrow the issues and provide the parties with full knowledge of the facts, thereby reducing the risk of surprise at trial.[15] “[W]ide access to relevant facts serves the integrity and fairness of the judicial process by promoting the search for the truth.”[16] The Rules broadly[17] permit discovery into “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense” and that discoverable information “need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence.”[18] Parties have a duty to cooperate in discovery[19] and should not abuse the rules by improperly refusing discovery.[20]

Nonetheless, there are some limits to discovery. A court generally must limit otherwise permissible discovery where it “is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive ....”[21] Similarly, the court should limit discovery where “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.”[22] On a showing of good cause, the court may also grant a motion seeking a protective order to protect a person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.[23] Among other things, the court may forbid unduly burdensome or expensive discovery or provide that confidential information need not be revealed.[24]

Rule 37 provides a number of remedies for an aggrieved party where the opposing party fails to fulfill its disclosure or discovery obligations.[25] Rule 37(a)(3) provides that a party may file a motion to compel a response to a discovery request and for appropriate sanctions. For the purposes of the rule, an “evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response” is “treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.”[26] The court may also enter a protective order if the motion is denied at all or in part.[27] District courts “have wide latitude” in managing all aspects of discovery.[28]

*3 NSHC seeks an order compelling Plaintiff to respond to its document requests and interrogatories regarding: (1) his mitigation efforts; (2) damages; and (3) recordings.[29] In its most recent motion for sanctions, which it asked the Court to consider on shortened time,[30] NSHC also seeks an order compelling Plaintiff to return to Anchorage for the continuation of his deposition.[31] In response, Plaintiff opposes NSHC's requests and asks the Court to: (1) “approve [his] request to [the] Scottsdale Police Department to re-create” certain recordings; (2) enter a “case by case” protective order instead of the blanket protective order proposed by NSHC; and (3) compel NSHC to comply with his “scaled down” discovery requests.[32] NSHC also seeks an award of its reasonable costs, including attorney's fees, in connection with its motions.[33]

NSHC seeks an order compelling Plaintiff to provide responses to its interrogatories and document requests seeking information concerning Plaintiff's employment and income since leaving NSHC.[34] NSHC contends that this information is relevant to its defense that Plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages.[35] In response to these requests, Plaintiff occasionally provided some information, but generally objected arguing that the information is “privileged and confidential,” that the information is not relevant “to the complaint,” that the requests are overbroad, or that NSHC already is aware of, or has access to, the information sought because he reported it in connection with submitting unemployment claims.[36] In his opposition, Plaintiff reiterates many of these objections.[37]

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, information is discoverable if it is not privileged and relevant to the claims or defenses in a case.[38]Furthermore, under Alaska law, failure to mitigate damages is a valid defense to a wrongful discharge claim.[39] Consequently, in this case, information concerning Plaintiff's efforts to mitigate his damages is generally discoverable unless it is privileged, unduly burdensome or expensive, is cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from another source in a less burdensome or expensive manner.[40]

As a matter of public policy, discovery of tax returns and other sensitive financial information is disfavored.[41] Nonetheless, there is no absolute privilege against such discovery, and it may be permitted where the materials are relevant to the claims or defenses and the information is not available from another source.[42] Additionally, absent a motion for a protective order, confidentiality is not a valid objection to discovery requests.[43]

*4 Plaintiffs' discovery responses here are plainly inadequate. As noted above, Plaintiff's relevance objections are unfounded and confidentiality is not a valid objection for a complete refusal to provide discovery responses. Even where Plaintiff does provide some substantive responses, they are insufficient. For example, in response to NSHC's Interrogatory No. 6 seeking information about each period of time that Plaintiff did not seek employment since September 26, 2008, he responded:

Even if accurate, Plaintiff's answer is not responsive to the question posed. It appears that Plaintiff is asserting that there have not been any periods of time that he did not seek employment since September 26, 2008, but that is not clear from his response. Plaintiff must provide a full and accurate response to that question and the remainder of Interrogatory Nos. 3 through 8. Moreover, to the extent that this information is available from other sources, it does not appear to be so burdensome for Plaintiff to provide that he should be excused from responding.

The Court will, however, impose some limits on these requests. In response to Interrogatory No. 4, Plaintiff will not be required to “identify all documents that reflect” his income given the sensitive nature of the financial information sought. Similarly, given Plaintiff's privacy interest in his employment records, the obvious potential for annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, and the lack of any specific showing of need by NSHC, the Court will not require Plaintiff to execute the “Authorization for Release of Employment Records” as purportedly required by that same Interrogatory.

Plaintiff's objections to NSHC's document requests contain similarly flawed objections based on lack of relevance and confidentiality. NSHC is entitled to complete responses to these requests. Many of the requests seeking financial information, however, are overbroad, particularly given the sensitive nature of the information sought. Consequently, in lieu of responding to Requests for Production Nos. 4, 6, 7, and 8, Plaintiff shall produce documents sufficient to disclose all compensation that he has received, regardless of the source, from September 26, 2008, to the present.

NSHC also seeks information concerning Plaintiff's alleged damages.[45] In response to these requests, Plaintiff referred to a “Demand Letter” sent by his former attorney.[46] The Demand Letter sets forth sums for several categories of damages.[47] For some categories, the Letter provides an explanation for the computation (e.g., “Six-months severance pay [$136,000[48]/2] = $68,000”), and in some cases, it simply sets forth a lump sum (i.e., “Emotional Distress = $250,000”).[49] Plaintiff also objected to a document request seeking “all documents” concerning “any loss” he allegedly suffered as a result of NSHC's actions as overbroad.[50]

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) requires that each party, as part of their initial disclosures, to provide the other parties in an action with “a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party.” The Rule further provides that each party “must also make available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary material unless privileged or protected from disclosure, on which each computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered.”[51] The purposes of these requirements are to “accelerate the flow of basic information between the litigants,” “assist the parties in focusing and prioritizing their organization of discovery,” “enable the parties to assess their risk and undertake an informed settlement analysis,” and “facilitate[ ] the efficient administration of a case and help [ ] the litigants prepare for trial.”[52]

*5 In order to satisfy the “computation” requirement, a plaintiff must provide a defendant with an estimate of the claimed damages including a “specific dollar figure” and the methodology used to arrive at that figure.[53] The description of the methodology must include “at least ‘some analysis' of how the relevant facts lead to that dollar figure.”[54] It must “provide sufficient detail to enable the defendants to understand the contours of their potential exposure and make informed decisions regarding settlement and discovery.”[55] Moreover, “[t]he plaintiff cannot shift to defendant the burden of attempting to determine the amount of claimed damages from documents that are produced without any explanation of plaintiff's claimed damages.”[56]

From his responses, it is clear that Plaintiff intends to rely on the amounts set forth in the Demand Letter. However, to the extent that a further explanation exists for the amounts set forth in that letter, Plaintiff must provide it. If there is no further explanation or support for the figures other than what is set forth in the letter, Plaintiff must acknowledge that and accept the consequences of doing so. The Court notes that explanations such as “Read the Demand Letter and apply reasonable, equitable fair and common sense to arrive at the damage”[57] are wholly inadequate and do not provide NSHC with the certainty it is entitled to (and, indeed, was entitled to at the outset of this case). Plaintiff must provide NSHC with a full and accurate explanation of the damages he seeks.[58]

Plaintiff is correct, however, to the extent that he suggests that Request for Production No. 10 is overbroad[59] in that it seeks “all” documents referring to “any loss.” Consequently, the Court will only compel Plaintiff to provide documents sufficient to disclose all loses that he allegedly suffered as a result of any alleged wrongful acts of NSHC in response to that request.

NSHC asks the Court to order Plaintiff to disclose recordings of conversations that Plaintiff had with NSHC's senior management or to preclude Plaintiff from using the recordings at trial.[60] Plaintiff has refused to produce the recordings because he claims that they are “very expensive” to copy and some of the recordings were “sabotaged” and erased by a law firm he provided them to in Scottsdale.[61] In his opposition, Plaintiff suggests that NSHC was somehow responsible for erasing the recordings.[62] NSHC notes that Plaintiff has not clearly identified what is on the recordings, provided it with a quote for copying them, or allowed it to review the recordings to determine whether they are worth copying.[63]

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 provides that a party may request another party “to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample” documents or electronically stored information, including sound recordings, “in the responding party's possession, custody, or control.”[64] NSHC is entitled to review the recordings under the Rules. The Court finds Plaintiff's suggestions that NSHC may use the opportunity to intentionally erase the recordings to be unreasonable and unfounded. However, to guard against the potential of accidental destruction, the Court will allow Plaintiff to play the recordings for NSHC's counsel and provide NSHC with a quote for copying the recordings, rather than providing the original recordings to NSHC for review. If Plaintiff wishes to avail himself of this option, however, Plaintiff must play the recordings for NSHC's counsel in Anchorage.[65]

*6 In its most recent motion, NSHC seeks an order compelling Plaintiff to return to Anchorage for the continuation of his deposition.[66] Plaintiff's deposition commenced in Anchorage on February 19, 2011, shortly after 9:00 a.m.[67] NSHC contends that Plaintiff insisted on taking a two hour break at approximately 11:30 a.m., and only then informed NSHC's counsel that his flight was at 5:30 p.m.[68] NSHC's counsel states that she then asked Plaintiff to change his flight since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a discovering party to depose an individual for seven hours, but that Plaintiff refused and insisted that NSHC was only entitled to depose him for four hours.[69] She indicates that she attempted to show Plaintiff Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d) but that he refused to review it.[70] She also contends that Plaintiff refused to answer further questions at approximately 4:01 p.m.,[71] and that the videographer's records show that the deposition recordings total 4 hours and 22 minutes.[72] Plaintiff also apparently refused to answer some questions while contending that he would disclose the information at trial.[73]

In response, Plaintiff argues that NSHC delayed the scheduling of his deposition, did not request to schedule his deposition until the first week of February, and at that point, asked to schedule the deposition for the last available day.[74] He further contends that he spoke to an attorney in Arizona who informed him that depositions are limited to four hours.[75] He also observes that NSHC's deposition notice did not indicate a time for the conclusion of the deposition and that NSHC's counsel took frequent breaks during the deposition.[76]

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30 provides that a party may depose another party by oral examination.[77] Unless otherwise ordered or agreed, Rule 30 depositions are limited to one day of seven hours.[78] The Advisory Committee's notes indicate that “[t]his limitation contemplates that there will be reasonable breaks during the day for lunch and other reasons, and that the only time to be counted is the time occupied by the actual deposition.”[79] The notes further provide that the parties should “make reasonable accommodations” and that “[p]reoccupation with timing is to be avoided.”[80]Additionally, further examination may be justified where documents have been wrongfully withheld or a witness refuses to answer questions.[81]Regardless, the court should permit additional time where needed for a fair examination of the deponent or if the deponent impedes or delays the examination.[82]

Plaintiff's position here is unfounded. Depositions are limited to four hours under the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure;[83] however, those rules do not apply in this Court. The Federal Rules apply here, and they permit up to seven hours of actual examination time. Additionally, it is common practice for both parties to take breaks during depositions. Deposition notices do not typically include “conclusion” times because it is frequently unclear how much time it will take to conduct seven hours of examination, exclusive of breaks, or whether a full seven hours will be necessary. Although Plaintiff's contentions regarding the scheduling of his deposition may have been grounds for extending the deposition deadline, that is not what is at issue here. He agreed to appear for his deposition on February 19th and left before it was complete. Accordingly, the Court will grant NSHC's motion and order Plaintiff to return to Anchorage[84] for the continuation of his deposition.

*7 In addition to opposing NSHC's motion, Plaintiff also asks the Court to: (1) enter an order either requesting or requiring the Scottsdale Police Department to recreate the lost recordings; (2) enter a “case by case” protective order; and (3) order NSHC to comply with his revised discovery requests.[85]

Plaintiff asks the Court to “have” the Scottsdale Police Department recreate the erased recordings.[86] Plaintiff asserts that when the recordings were erased by the law firm in Scottsdale, he reported it to the Scottsdale Police Department, which then told him that “it needed a special request from a Judge to re-create [them] if it is a civil law suit.”[87] NSHC did not address this issue in its response.

The Court is not certain what, exactly, Plaintiff is asking it to do. Regardless, even if the Court understood Plaintiff's request, it is not clear whether this Court has the power to order the Scottsdale Police Department to recreate recordings for the purposes of a civil lawsuit. The Scottsdale Police Department is not a party and is not within the subpoena power of this Court.[88] If Plaintiff believes that he has claims against the law firm that he alleges erased the recordings, he can pursue them in Arizona. If Plaintiff wishes to recreate the recordings for the purposes of this litigation, he can retain an expert to do so. The Court will not, however, enter an order compelling the Scottsdale Police Department to do that work for him.

Plaintiff asks the Court to “consider [a] case by case Protective order instead of a Blanket Order proposed by the Defense Counsel.”[89] He states that he rejected NSHC's proposed blanket protective order “due to the nature of [his] complaints.”[90] Plaintiff did not submit an alternative proposal to NSHC or the Court other than his general request for a “case by case” order. NSHC indicates that it sent Plaintiff a proposed blanket “Qualified Protective Order”[91] to address his confidentiality concerns, but now contends that it is not requesting that the Court enter its proposed protective order “and is not aware of any protective order proposed by the plaintiff.”[92]

District courts have broad discretion to fashion appropriate protective orders.[93] Here, there is good cause for entering a protective order as some relevant documents may contain sensitive financial information, employment information, or confidential commercial information. Plaintiff, however, has not proposed any specific language for a “case by case” protective order.

*8 In contrast, NSHC's proposed protective order generally appears sufficient to protect the confidentiality and privacy interests at issue with the caveat that “Confidential Information” should include personal financial and employment information. Additionally, any requests to seal documents marked “Confidential” pursuant to the order must comply with Local Rule 5.4 and the Court's CM/ECF procedures. Although NSHC is not requesting the Court to enter its proposed protective order at this time, in light of the nature of some of the information the Court is requiring the Parties to disclose in this Order, a protective order is appropriate. Accordingly, with the qualifications noted above, the Court approves NSHC's proposed Qualified Protective Order.

Plaintiff requests that the Court order NSHC to comply with his “scaled down” discovery requests, embodied in emails attached to his motion.[94]Plaintiff argues that he has significantly reduced the scope of his requests and implies that NSHC improperly deleted information from its servers after receiving a request to preserve documents from his former counsel in June of 2010.[95] He contends that “[w]e usually preserve information for 5-7 years.”[96] In response, NSHC states that it has already produced over 3,000 pages of documents in response to Plaintiff's requests, provides affidavits from several employees explaining that some of the information Plaintiff seeks was purged prior to NSHC's receipt of Plaintiff's preservation request, argues that Plaintiff seeks irrelevant information, and argues that his requests are overbroad.[97] NSHC also acknowledges that it made some privilege and confidentiality redactions.[98] In reply, Plaintiff argues that the produced information is “useless,” some of it is repetitive, and that NSHC “truncated” or “redacted” various documents in the production.[99] He also takes issue with statements in the affidavits, claiming that “e-mails of Senior Management” were preserved in a file folder.[100]

The Court initially observes that Plaintiff's motion is technically deficient as he has failed to comply with the Local Rules requiring a moving party to attach a Good Faith Certificate and the actual discovery requests, responses, and correspondence that he relies on.[101] More significantly, however, a party moving to compel production bears the burden of informing the court which discovery requests are the subject of its motion to compel, which responses are disputed, why it believes the responses are deficient, why the objections are not justified, and why the information it seeks is relevant to the prosecution or defense of the action.[102] Other than attaching two emails that list the general outlines of his “scaled down” requests, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden.

From the limited available information, the Court can determine that Plaintiff is entitled to some additional discovery. Plaintiff's claims, particularly his claim under the Alaska Whistleblower Act, appear to be premised on his allegations that he was wrongfully terminated after reporting “illegal and unethical conduct” by CEO Trevor Colby to NSHC's Board of Directors.[103]Consequently, Colby's employment contract, job description as a grant accountant, and proposed audit journal entries from April through July 2008 are discoverable. Additionally, as the Court has accepted NSHC's proposed Qualified Protective Order, NSHC should provide unredacted copies of any documents that it withheld or redacted on the basis of confidentiality. If it has not already done so, NSHC should also provide Plaintiff with a privilege log describing any documents that it has withheld or redactions made on the basis of privilege in compliance with Rule 26(b)(5)(A). The Court will also require NSHC to check for the file folder of senior management email that Plaintiff contends exists.

*9 Otherwise, however, Plaintiff has not established that he is entitled to the relief he seeks. Apart from the limited exceptions noted above, the Court can only speculate as to the significance of persons identified in the emails and the possible relevance of the requested materials to this litigation. Because Plaintiff has failed to properly support his motion, the Court cannot assess whether his requests are valid. This Court has repeatedly advised Plaintiff that he must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's Local Rules. He has failed to do so once again and the consequence of his failure is that he will not receive the bulk of the discovery he seeks.

In any event, many of Plaintiff's requests (such as those for grant information) appear to be overbroad on their face. Moreover, as Plaintiff has requested batches of email from various time periods, he should not be surprised that the production includes some “useless” and duplicative documents. Additionally, the Court has reviewed NSHC's affidavits and does not consider them to be contradictory. It is entirely plausible that NSHC adopted document preservation policies that are different than Plaintiff's experience and the Court has no reason to disbelieve the sworn statements of NSHC's employees.[104]

NSHC also asks the Court to impose sanctions on Plaintiff in connection with its motions. Specifically, NSHC seeks its reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in connection with making its motions and the additional expenses that it will incur by having a videographer and court reporter attend the continuation of Plaintiff's deposition.[105]

Under Rule 37(a)(5), a successful movant on a motion to compel is presumptively entitled to attorney's fees, and the court may also award attorney's fees to a successful nonmovant, or apportion expenses between the parties if the motion is granted in part or denied in part. Additionally, the Court may sanction a party who fails to attend his or her deposition or provide discovery by requiring the party to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure or precluding the party from introducing the withheld information in evidence.[106] This Court's Local Rules further provide that:

As the Court is granting, in part, and denying, in part, NSHC's motion to compel, it will not award NSHC costs. NSHC's motion for sanctions, however, is another matter. The Court has found that NSHC's position was meritorious. Additionally, the factors under the Local Rules support an award of reasonable costs as Plaintiff's position was legally baseless, NSHC has suffered prejudice in the delay of completing discovery, Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to comply with the relevant Local and Federal Rules despite the Court's admonishments, the Court has previously warned the Parties that it would seriously consider awarding costs in connection with future discovery motions, and the costs have been directly caused by Plaintiff's improper curtailment of his deposition. The Court further notes that it has advised Plaintiff, personally, to review the applicable rules.[108]Instead, Plaintiff chose to rely on mistaken information from an attorney that is not participating in this case and refused to even review the correct rule when NSHC's counsel attempted to show it to him.

*10 Accordingly, the Court will require Plaintiff to pay the expenses NSHC will incur by having the videographer and court reporter attend the additional day of Plaintiff's deposition. That, along with the cost of returning to Anchorage, is a sufficient sanction to deter future violations at this time. Although the Court will not require Plaintiff to pay NSHC's attorney's fees in connection with filing its motion for sanctions, Plaintiff is advised that the Court will seriously consider awarding attorney's fees if he continues to violate the applicable rules.

The Court will also not, at this time, preclude Plaintiff from using introducing any information into evidence. Indeed, courts are often reluctant to order preclusion where a less harsh alternative penalty will remedy any prejudice.[109] The Court does observe, however, that it has now advised Plaintiff that objections based on confidentiality are unavailing, particularly given that Plaintiff may now designate documents or portions of his deposition as “Confidential” under the Qualified Protective Order. To the extent that Plaintiff persists in his refusal to answer questions based on confidentiality concerns at the continuation of his deposition, he does so at the risk of the Court entering an order of preclusion against him.

For the foregoing reasons, the NSHC's motion to compel (Docket No. 63) is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, NSHC's motion for sanctions (Docket No. 77) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's motion (Docket No. 67) is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff shall produce the following information to NSHC no later than March 24, 2012:

a. Full and accurate responses to NSHC's Interrogatory Nos. 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9;

b. A full and accurate response to the first clause of the first sentence in NSHC's Interrogatory No. 4, requesting Plaintiff to “identify separately by employer and/or other source all income (including wages, salaries, benefits, commissions, bonuses, tips, cash payments, payments in kind and other income) you have earned or received since September 26, 2008”;

c. All documents responsive to NSHC's Requests for Production Nos. 1, 2, 5, and 9;

d. Documents sufficient to disclose all compensation that Plaintiff has received, regardless of the source, from September 26, 2008, to the present; and

e. Documents sufficient to disclose all loses that Plaintiff allegedly suffered as a result of any alleged wrongful acts of NSHC;

2. Plaintiff shall either lend a copy of the recordings he indentified in response to NSHC's Request for Production No. 3 to NSHC or play these recordings for NSHC's counsel and provide NSHC with a quote for copying the recordings at a mutually agreeable date in Anchorage no later than April 2, 2012;

3. Plaintiff shall return to Anchorage for the continuation of his deposition, not to exceed three additional hours of actual examination time, at a mutually agreeable date no later than April 2, 2012;

4. NSHC shall produce the following information to Plaintiff no later than March 24, 2012:

a. Trevor Colby's employment contract, job description as a grant accountant, and proposed audit journal entries from April through July 2008;

b. Unredacted copies of any documents that NSHC has withheld or redacted on the basis of confidentiality; and

*11 c. A privilege log describing any documents that NSHC has withheld or redactions made on the basis of privilege in compliance with Rule 26(b)(5)(A);

5. NSHC shall review its files and determine whether it can locate the “file folder” containing senior management email referred to in Plaintiff's motion papers and file an affidavit from a knowledgeable individual discussing its efforts to locate the file no later than March 24, 2012;

6. NSHC's proposed Qualified Protective Order (Docket No. 64-3) is hereby APPROVED subject to the following caveats: (1) the definition of “Confidential Information” shall include personal financial and employment information; and (2) any requests to seal documents marked “Confidential” pursuant to the Qualified Protective Order must comply with Local Rule 5.4 and the Court's CM/ECF procedures;

7. Plaintiff is ordered to reimburse NSHC for any additional expenses NSHC incurs by having a videographer and court reporter attend the continuation of his deposition. NSHC shall submit an affidavit detailing and supporting its expenses no later than April 10, 2012. The Parties shall otherwise bear their own costs in connection with this motion practice;

8. The Parties should request a status conference if any disagreements arise over their efforts to comply with this Order; and

9. NSHC's counsel is directed to email a copy of this Order to Plaintiff upon receipt.

Dated at Anchorage, Alaska, this 7th day of March, 2012.

See Dkt. 1.

Dkt. 63; Dkt. 67; Dkt. 77.

Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 13-14.

Id. ¶ 16.

Id. ¶¶ 17-18.

Id. ¶¶ 21-22.

Id. ¶¶ 26-66.

Dkt. 35.

Dkt. 36.

See Dkts. 37, 38, 43, 50.

Dkt. 59.

Dkt. 60.

Dkt. 61.

Dkt. 63; Dkt. 67.

See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 507 (1947).

Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1993).

See id. (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Evid. 401 (defining “relevant evidence” as evidence that “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” where “the fact is of consequence in determining the action”).

See Pac. Sun Publ'g Co. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., No. C 75-1845 RPA, 1981 WL 380710, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 1981); see alsoFed. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee notes (noting that parties have an “affirmative duty to engage in pretrial discovery in a responsible manner”).

See Exigen, Ltd. v. Aliant Telecom, Inc., No. C 04-1203 TEH (JL), 2005 WL 608283, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2005).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(G).

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).

Arizona v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 528 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2008). Accord Blackburn v. United States, 100 F.3d 1426, 1436 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The district court has wide discretion in controlling discovery.”); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Doe, No. C 08-1193, 2008 WL 4104214, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008) (noting that “the district courts wield broad discretion ... when managing any aspect of discovery”); Bromgard v. Montana, No. CV-05-32-BLG-RFC-CSO, 2007 WL 2710387, at *1 (D. Mont. Sept. 13, 2007) (indicating that courts have “ ‘very broad discretion’ ... in fashioning discovery remedies”).

Dkt. 63.

See Dkts. 79-80.

Dkt. 77.

Dkt. 67.

See Dkt. 63; Dkt. 77.

Dkt. 63 at 4-5.

Dkt. 64-1.

Dkt. 67 at 3-5.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

See, e.g., City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1111 (Alaska 2000) (“In the case of wrongful discharge, ... generally ... the employee ‘is entitled to the total amount of the agreed upon salary for the unexpired term of his employment, less what he could earn by making diligent efforts to obtain similar employment.” (citations omitted)); Wien Air Alaska v. Bubbel, 723 P.2d 627, 632 (Alaska 1986) (“The rule is that ‘where an employee's wrongful discharge frees him to take another job he could not have held had he been retained, the employee can recover as damages only the difference between his actual earnings and the amount he would have earned in his old job.’ ” (citation and alteration marks omitted)).

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), (b)(2)(C).

6 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 26.41[8][b] (3d ed. 2011) (citing, inter alia, Premium Serv. Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir. 1975)). Thus, NSHC's assertions that “Plaintiff's tax records are not entitled to any confidentiality” and that “[n]one of the information requested by NSHC's discovery requests is confidential or privileged” are incorrect. See Dkt. 68 at 3, 5.

See Moore's Federal Practice §§ 26.41[8][b], 26.52[6][a].

Walt Disney Co. v. DeFabiis, 168 F.R.D. 281, 283 (C.D. Cal. 1996); see also Fowler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 07-00071 SPK-KSC, 2008 WL 4907865, at *2 (D. Hawaii Nov. 14, 2008) (noting that it is the court, not a party responding to a discovery request, who may enter a protective order restricting the use of documents in a case).

Dkt. 64-1 at 10.

Dkt. 63 at 5-6.

See Dkt. 64-1 at 12, 16.

Id. at 22.

The Court understands that this amount represented Plaintiff's annual salary at NSHC. See id. at 20.

Id. at 16.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii).

OHC Liquidation Trust v. Credit Suisse First Bos., 340 B.R. 510, 538 (D. Del. 2006).

Id. at 541-42.

Id. at 541.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Nassiri, No. 2:08-cv-00369-JCM-GWF, 2011 WL 2977127, at *4 (D. Nev. July 21, 2011).

Id. (citation omitted); see also Villagomes v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1129 (D. Nev. 2011) (finding that plaintiff who did not provide a computation of damages but provided calendar entries regarding work, tax documents, tip logs, and time sheets did not satisfy the rule).

Dkt. 64-1 at 16.

The Court observes that the type of new factual information Plaintiff provides about his damages in his opposition is the type of information that should have been included in his Interrogatory response. Compare Dkt. 67 at 6 with Dkt. 64-1 at 12-13.

Dkt. 64-1 at 16.

Dkt. 63 at 6.

Dkt. 67 at 5; Dkt. 64-1 at 13.

Dkt. 67 at 5.

Dkt. 63 at 6.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A).

See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 883 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that although a court may order a requesting party to inspect materials at the responding party's location, it was within the trial court's discretion to require the responding party to produce the materials at a location convenient to the requesting party where the responding party had only belatedly made its offer to permit inspection at the sites where the documents were located), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Ins. Co. of Ireland Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982)

Dkt. 77.

See Dkt. 78-3 at 1.

Dkt. 78 ¶¶ 7-8; Dkt. 77.

Dkt. 78 ¶¶ 9-11.

Id. ¶¶ 9-10.

Id. ¶ 14. The transcript shows that Plaintiff asked whether it was 4:00, and after hearing that it was 4:01, stated “I'm not going to answer any of your questions.” Dkt. 78-3 at 7.

Dkt. 78 ¶ 15.

See Dkt. 78-3 at 6.

Dkt. __at 4.

Id. at 5.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d) advisory committee's note (emphasis added).

See 7 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 30.45 (3d ed. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d) advisory committee's note and Laplante v. Estano, 226 F.R.D. 439, 440 (D. Conn. 2005)).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1).

Ariz. R. Civ. P. 30(d).

Generally, a plaintiff must make him or herself available for deposition in the district where he or she brought the suit. See, e.g., Clinton v. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, No. CIV S-05-1600-LKK-CMK-P, 2009 WL 210459, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing 8A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2112).

Dkt. 67. In his motion, Plaintiff also argues that NSHC delayed Tiepelman's deposition. Id. at 8-9. The Court understands that the deposition has taken place since Plaintiff filed his submission; accordingly, the issue is moot. See Dkt. 75 at 2.

Dkt. 67 at 5-6, 8; Dkt. 67-2.

Dkt. 67 at 7.

“A Court ordinarily does not have power to issue an order against a person who is not a party and over whom it has not acquired in personam jurisdiction.” Arntsen v. Clark, No. C07-1967-JCC-MAT, 2008 WL 183649, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2008) (quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2856).

Dkt. 67 at 10.

Id. at 6.

Dkt. 64 ¶¶ 7-8; Dkt. 64-3.

Dkt. 68 at 5.

See Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing, inter alia, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)).

See Dkt. 67 at 9-10; Dkt. 67-1 at 7-9.

Dkt. 67 at 9-10.

Id. at 10.

Dkt. 69; Dkts. 71-73.

Dkt. 69 at 5.

Dkt. 75 at 4.

Dkt. 75 at 5.

D.Ak. L.R. 37.1(a) (requiring a Good Faith Certificate); D.Ak. L.R. 7.1(a) (requiring parties to include legible copies of all exhibits upon which they rely).

See Smith v. Tallerico, No. 1:08–CV–01817–DLB PC, 2011 WL 5826038, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2011) (citations omitted).

See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 17, 20.

The Court observes that Plaintiff could have taken these individuals' depositions, but apparently chose not to do so.

Dkt. 63 at 7; Dkt. 77 at 8.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(3), (b)(2)(A)(ii).

D. Ak. L.R. 37.1(b).

See Dkt. 36 at 3 n.12.

See, e.g., Atkins v. Cnty. of Orange, 372 F. Supp. 2d 377, 395-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that preclusion is “discretionary” and “is not generally ordered”), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Bellotto v. Cnty. of Orange, 248 Fed. App'x 232 (2d Cir. 2007).