City of Colton v. Am. Promotional Events, Inc.
City of Colton v. Am. Promotional Events, Inc.
2011 WL 13223881 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
December 12, 2011
Gutierrez, Philip S., United States District Judge
Summary
The Court found that the Magistrate's Order requiring the United States to produce ESI in response to requests for production of documents was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. The Court found that the parties must comply with both the Case Management Order Number 1 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, and that the United States must produce ESI as it is kept in the usual course of business or must organize and label the ESI to correspond to the categories in the requests for production.
Additional Decisions
CITY OF COLTON
v.
AMERICAN PROMOTIONAL EVENTS, INC., et al
v.
AMERICAN PROMOTIONAL EVENTS, INC., et al
Case No. EDCV 09–1864 PSG (SSx)
United States District Court, C.D. California
Filed December 12, 2011
Counsel
Danielle Gerber Sakai, Best Best and Krieger LLP, Riverside, CA, John H. Holloway, Best Best and Krieger LLP, Walnut Creek, CA, for City of Colton.Daniel J. Coyle, Delfino Madden O'Malley Coyle & Koewler, LLP, Olivia M. Wright, Steven H. Goldberg, Downey Brand LLP, Jennifer Hartman King, King Williams and Gleason LLP, Sacramento, CA, Marc A. Shapp, Hunsucker Goodstein & Nelson PC, Lafayette, CA, Francis Norman Scollan, Emily L. Murray, John Anthony Lawrence, Richard Alan Dongell, Matthew Clark Bures, Dongell Lawrence Finney LLP, Allan Edward Ceran, Burke Williams & Sorensen LLP, William W. Funderburk, Jr., Anna Louise Le May, Castellon and Funderburk LLP, Sarah E. Johnston, Barnes and Thornburg LLP, Beth Marie Weinstein, Steven Edward Soule, Beth Marie Weinstein, C. Robert Boldt, Kirkland and Ellis LLP, David S. Poole, Poole and Shaffery LLP, Mark Riera, Akerman LLP, Andrew Zachary Edelstein, Mayer Brown LLP, Jeffrey A. Rosenfeld, DLA Piper LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Stephen C. Lewis, Robert Morgan Gilhuly, Barg Coffin Lewis and Trapp LLP, San Francisco, CA, Keith Alan Kelly, Law Office of Keith A. Kelly, Douglas C. Smith, Smith Law Offices LLP, Amy E. Hoyt, Burke Williams & Sorensen LLP, Riverside, CA, John E. Van Vlear, Newmeyer & Dillion LLP, Daniel S. Kippen, Voss Cook and Thel LLP, Newport Beach, CA, Christine A. Renshaw, Steven Joseph Renshaw, Renshaw and Associates APLC, Ventura, CA, Christopher T. Johnson, Wolfe & Wyman LLP, Jad T. Davis, Kutak Rock LLP, Irvine, CA, Elizabeth Boucher Dawson, US Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Brian Edward Koegle, Poole & Shaffery LLP, Valencia, CA, Brian A. Rawers, Katherine T. Weadock, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith LLP, San Diego, CA, Matthew C. Sostrin, Richard F. Bulger, Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago, IL, for American Promotional Events, Inc., et al.
Gutierrez, Philip S., United States District Judge
Order DENYING Motion for Review and Reconsideration of Magistrate's Order
*1 Before the Court is Plaintiff United States' (“United States”) objections to and motion for review and reconsideration of the Magistrate's Memorandum and Order of October 13, 2011. Dkt. #1051. The Court finds the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7–15. After considering the moving and opposing papers, the Court DENIES the motion.
I. Background
The latest dispute to reach the Court's attention in this matter concerns the United States' production of electronically stored information (“ESI”) in response to requests for production of documents propounded by Defendants Goodrich Corporation (“Goodrich”) and Pyro Spectaculars, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”). On August 1, 2011, the Special Master issued a Report granting Defendants' motion to compel the United States to produce documents in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. SeeDkt. #877. The United States then sought review of the Special Master's ruling by Magistrate Judge Segal. Magistrate Segal affirmed the report of the Special Master and ordered the United States to label all future ESI productions to correspond to the categories in the request or to produce the ESI in native format with metadata intact. See Dkt. #1021, Memorandum and Order Denying Plaintiff United States of America's Motion for Review of Special Master's August 1, 2011 Report Re ESI Production (“Magistrate's Order”) 20:4–8. The United States now seeks this Court's review of the Magistrate's Order.
II. Legal Standard
A magistrate judge has authority to hear matters that are not dispositive of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (“When a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party's claim or defense is referred to a magistrate judge to hear and decide, the magistrate judge must promptly conduct the required proceedings and, when appropriate, issue a written order stating the decision.”). These include discovery motions. Green v. Baca, 219 F.R.D. 485, 489 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Normally, a magistrate judge's order can be reversed by the district court only if it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1414 (9th Cir. 1991) (a “magistrate's decision on a nondispositive issue will be reviewed by the district court under the clearly erroneous standard” while “[d]ecisions on dispositive issues will be reviewed de novo”). “[T]he clearly erroneous standard applies to factual findings and discretionary decisions made in connection with nondispositive pretrial discovery matters.” Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting F.D.I.C. v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, 196 F.R.D. 375, 378 (S.D. Cal. 2000)) (internal quotations and punctuation omitted).
The clearly erroneous standard, which applies to a magistrate judge's findings of fact, is “significantly deferential, requiring ‘a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993); Security Farms v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 124 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 1997). “In contrast, the ‘contrary to law’ standard permits independent review of purely legal determinations by the magistrate judge.” See Green, 219 F.R.D. at 489 (quoting Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, supra, 196 F.R.D. at 378) (internal quotations and punctuation omitted).
III. Discussion
*2 In the underlying motion to compel, Defendants contended that the United States failed to produce ESI in the manner prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2)(E)(i). Magistrate's Order 3:10–13. Defendants argued that the United States was required to either produce ESI as it is kept in the usual course of business or to organize and label the production to correspond to the production requests of Defendants. Id.3:13–17.
In its motion for review of the Magistrate's Order, the United States makes four principal contentions: (1) Magistrate Segal erred in requiring the United States to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as Case Management Order Number 1 (“CMO”); (2) Magistrate Segal misinterpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2)(E)(i) by applying it to ESI; (3) Magistrate Segal improperly required the United States to produce future documents in either their native format or with labels corresponding to the requests for production; and (4) Magistrate Segal erred in ruling that the production of ESI in TIFF or JPEG format was not a reasonably usable form of production. Mot. 2:2–3:3. The Court will address each of the United States' arguments in turn.
First, the United States argues that the CMO supplanted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 and exclusively controls the production of ESI in this case. Mot. 6:10–12. The United States further contends that interpretation of the CMO is controlled by the intent of the parties when drafting the CMO. Id. 7:8–11. Under the United States' view, paragraph 5(a) of the CMO is incompatible with the requirements of Rule 34. See Dkt. #601, CMO No. 1, ¶ 5(a) (“All documents produced in response to discovery requests shall be posted by the producing party to the common document repository maintained by Encore Legal Solutions, except as otherwise agreed by all parties or as ordered by the Court.”). The Court disagrees. As Magistrate Segal found, the CMO is not a private contract between the parties. It is an order signed by this Court. Thus, the parties' intent in drafting the CMO is not dispositive of the meaning of the CMO. Magistrate Segal was also correct in finding the CMO provides a method for production, but does not supplant the requirements of Rule 34. Thus, the United States, and other parties, are required to comply with both the CMO and Rule 34.
Second, the United States argues that Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(i) does not apply to ESI. Mot. 10:5–13. The United States contends that Rule 34 draws a distinction between “documents” and “electronically stored information” and that subsection (i) only applies to documents, while subsection (ii) only applies to ESI. Mot. 10:18–24. Magistrate Segal rejected this argument and her ruling is not contrary to law.
Rule 34(b)(2)(E) was amended in 2006 and now provides, in relevant part:
(i) A party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of business or must organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the request;
(ii) If a request does not specify a form for producing electronically stored information, a party must produce it in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonable usable form or forms;
The Advisory Committee Notes passed concurrently with the 2006 amendments explain that “[t]he production of electronically stored information should be subject to comparable requirements [as documents] to protect against deliberate or inadvertent production in ways that raise unnecessary obstacles for the requesting party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 34Advisory Committee's Note (2006 Amendment, subdivision (b)). As the Notes suggest, the production of ESI should meet the requirements of Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(i). The weight of the authority agrees with this interpretation. See, e.g., MGP Ingredients, Inc. v. Mars, Inc., 2007 WL 3010343, at *4 n.12 (D. Kan. 2007) (“The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2006 amendments to Rule 34 make it clear that the requirement that a party produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of business or organize and label them to correspond with the categories in the request applies equally to ESI.”); Quinstreet, Inc. v. Ferguson, 2009 WL1789433, at *5 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (ordering party under Rule 34(b) to produce emails in a reasonably usable form and label emails to indicate which emails respond to which request for production). Accordingly, the United States must produce ESI as it is kept in the usual course of business or must organize and label the ESI to correspond to the categories in the requests for production.
*3 In its third objection to the Magistrate's Order, the United States argues the “Magistrate erroneously interpreted Rule 34 to require inclusion of all metadata with ESI in order for records to be produced as kept in the usual course of business.” Mot. 19:5–7. The United States has misread the Magistrate's Order. The Order does not require the United States to produce the metadata for its ESI. Magistrate Segal held “the United States may, at its option, provide Defendants with a copy of ESI in native format in any future production in lieu of labeling the production.” Magistrate's Order19:2–4. The production of ESI with metadata is an alternative option the United States can choose rather than labeling its production to correspond with the production requests. The Magistrate gave the United States this option because it was part of a “compromise” offered by the Defendants. Magistrate's Order 18:20–25. The Magistrate did not hold that this “option” was required by Rule 34.
Lastly, the United States argues Magistrate Segal erred in ruling that the production of ESI in TIFF or JPEG format was not a reasonably usable form of production. Mot. 2:24–3:3. As explained, the Magistrate Order requires the United States to comply with Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(i). Whether the production of ESI in TIFF or JPEG format was a reasonably usable form of production has nothing to do with the provisions of Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(i). Therefore, Magistrate Segal could not have erred as the United States argues.
IV. Conclusion
Plaintiff United States' objections to and motion for review and reconsideration of the Magistrate's Order is DENIED.