Lemuel BLAND, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PNC BANK, N.A., Defendant. Marat Gokhberg, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., et al., Defendants 15cv104215cv1700 United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania Signed December 30, 2016 Counsel Diana J. Nobile, Gregory K. McGillivary, Molly A. Elkin, Woodley & McGillivary LLP, Washington, DC, Justin L. Swidler, Joshua Boyette, Swartz Swidler LLC, Cherry Hill, NJ, Marc A. Silverman, Frank, Weinberg, Black, P.L., Robert D. Soloff, Robert D. Soloff, P.A., Plantation, FL, for Plaintiffs. Richard L. Etter, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Gretchen Woodruff Root, Catherine S. Ryan, Reed Smith LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendant. Schwab, Arthur J., United States District Judge MEMORANDUM ORDER RE: RULINGS ON OBJECTIONS TO EXHIBITS *1 Before the Court are objections provided to certain exhibits for use at trial on January 17, 2017, as indicated in the Joint Exhibit List submitted by the parties, as well as the response of the party proponent of those exhibits indicated therein. (Doc. 322). The Court has considered the objections and responses thereto, including the arguments in support and against the objections to Plaintiffs' exhibits as indicated in Defendants' brief in support of omnibus motion in limine (Doc. No. 328), and Plaintiffs' response thereto, (Doc. No. 339), and now makes the following rulings. Objections Plaintiffs object to each of Defendants' Exhibits, which are Exhibits D-1 through D-6. Defendants object to Plaintiffs' Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-3, P-36, P-39, P-42, P-45, P-48, P-51, P-53, P-56, P-58, P-61, P-64, P-65, P-66, P-67, P-68, P-69, P-71, P-72, P-74, and P-75. Defendants additionally indicated objection to Plaintiffs' Exhibits P-40, P-41, P-46, P-47, P-52, P-57, P-62, P-63, P-76, but Plaintiffs have indicated in response (Doc. No. 322) that they will withdraw those exhibits thereby mooting Defendants' objections to Plaintiffs' Exhibits P-40, P-41, P-46, P-47, P-52, P-57, P-62, P-63, P-76. I. Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants Exhibits 1 through 6 Plaintiff objects to each of Defendants' Exhibits, D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5, and D-6, on relevance grounds. Exhibits D-1, D-2, D-3 and D-4, respectively are PNC's written overtime policy, hours of work policy, recording and correcting time policy, and resolution of Complaints Policy. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, “[e]vidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. The Court notes first that the jury instructions not objected to by Plaintiffs provides: “PNC denies Plaintiffs' claim and contends that it had well-established policies that required mortgage loan officers to obtain pre-authorization from their manager before working overtime, required mortgage loan officers to accurately record all hours worked, and required that mortgage loan officers be paid for all hours recorded.” (Doc. No. 317). The Court finds that each of these documents would be probative (ie. have a tendency to make a fact more or less probable) as to whether PNC had a policy that caused mortgage loan officers to work off-the-clock. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' relevance objections to Defendants Exhibits 1 to 4 are OVERRULED. Plaintiff also objects to Exhibits D-5 and D-6 on relevancy grounds and on the additional grounds of authenticity and asserting that D-5 and D-6 are a “false summation” and that they are more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Exhibits D-5 and D-6 are summaries of overtime hours and overtime earnings for the Mortgage Loan Officers and Opt-in Plaintiffs (Exhibit D-5) and the number of weeks worked and numbers of weeks worked where hours over 40 were recorded by named Plaintiffs (Exhibit D-6). *2 D-5 and D-6 are exhibits contemplated by Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 Summaries to Prove Content, which provides: The proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court. The proponent must make the originals or duplicates available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place. And the court may order the proponent to produce them in court. The authenticity objection to Exhibits D-5 and D-6 is not well taken as all Rule 1006 exhibits are not “authentic” exhibits in the sense that they are created for use at trial “to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court.” FED. R. EVID. 1006. Defendants have indicated that the underlying documents are from its electronic payroll and timekeeping system and were produced in discovery as required. The authenticity objection to Defendants' Exhibits 5 and 6 is OVERRULED. Plaintiffs also object to Exhibits D-5 and D-6 as a false summation, misleading or incomplete and more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 403. Rule 403 provides: The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Plaintiffs do not provide how D-5 and D-6 are false summations. Defendants argue that the summaries accurately provide the overtime hours actually recorded by all the Mortgage Loan Officers and specifically the opt-in plaintiffs (D-5) and paid by PNC and the number of weeks in which overtime hours actually were recorded by the named plaintiffs (D-6), makes it less likely that any unwritten policy or practice exists or that such unwritten policy or practice caused Mortgage Loan Officers (“MLOs”) to not record their hours worked. As to any argument of either party that certain summaries are inaccurate, a party may cross examine the preparer of any summary to establish any inaccuracies, and/or offer rebuttal testimony thereon. The Court agrees with Defendants that the evidence is relevant and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice, and therefore, the remaining objections to Exhibits D-5 and D-6 are OVERRULED. II. Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-3, P-36, P-39, P-42, P-45, P-48, P-51, P-53, P-56, P-58, P-61, P-64, P-65, P-66, P-67, P-68, P-69, P-71, P-72, P-74, and P-75 A. Offer Letters Exhibits P-1, P-36, P-42, P-48, P-53 and P-58 Defendants object to Exhibits P-36, P-42, P-48, P-53 and P-58, which respectively are the individual offer letters to Surekha Bassi, Marc Franchi, Marat Gokhberg, Yury Gokhberg, and David Jaffe, on relevance grounds, as well as on the basis that the probative value of these offer letters is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay and wasting time. Defendants likewise object to Exhibit P-1, which is a composite of offer letters to certain other additionally listed individuals, on the same basis and on the additional basis of lack of personal knowledge. Plaintiffs argues that many of the plaintiffs who were provided these offer letters will testify and have personal knowledge and also point out because these are business records they are admissible without personal knowledge. Regardless, the documents provide information on salary, draw and the bps structure, and such is not relevant to the single issue for trial on January 17, 2017, which does not involve either damages or the claims regarding pay structure, would confuse the issues and mislead the jury, and also simply would waste time. Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS the objections to Exhibits P-1, P-36, P-42, P-48, P-53 and P-58 on the grounds of relevance, confusing the issues, misleading the jury and waste of time. B. Commissions Earning Statements P-2, P-39, P-45, P-51, P-56, P-61 *3 Defendants object to Exhibits P-39, P-45, P-51, P-56, and P-61, which respectively are the commissions earning statements for Surekha Bassi, Marc Franchi, Marat Gokhberg, Yury Gokhberg, and David Jaffe, on relevance grounds, as well as on the basis that the probative value of these commissions earning statements is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay and wasting time. Defendants likewise object to Exhibit P-2, which is a composite of commissions earning statements for certain other additionally listed individuals, on the same basis and on the additional basis of lack of personal knowledge. Regardless, the documents provide the MLO's commissions and draw, and such is not relevant to the single issue for trial, which does not involve either damages or the claims regarding pay structure, bps, or draw, it would confuse the issues and mislead the jury, and also simply would waste time. Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS the objections Exhibits P-2, P-39, P-45, P-51, P-56, and P-61 on the grounds of relevance, confusing the issues, misleading the jury and waste of time. C. Plaintiffs' Performance Evaluations P-3 Defendants object to Exhibit P-3, which is a composite of the performance evaluations of certain of the Plaintiffs. Defendants object on relevance grounds, as well as on the basis that the probative value of these performance evaluations is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay and wasting time. Plaintiffs argue that the MLO performance evaluations set expectations for performance that could not be performed without overtime and provides details regarding the amount of work required to perform the MLO position, and thus is relevant and probative. Plaintiffs also point out that the evaluations are business records of Defendant and are admissible without personal knowledge, but that many plaintiffs who were provided evaluations will testify and have personal knowledge. Defendants' objections to Exhibit P-3 are OVERRULED except that to the extent there are performance evaluations in composite exhibit P-3 for non-testifying plaintiffs, the objection is SUSTAINED on the grounds of confusion or misleading the jury and wasting time. D. MLO Overtime Guidelines P-64 Defendants object to Exhibit P-64, which is PNC's Overtime Guidelines for Mortgage Loan Officers. Defendants object on relevance grounds, as well as on the basis that the probative value of the Overtime Guidelines is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, and lack of personal knowledge. Plaintiffs respond that the document is highly probative regarding PNC's policies which restricted overtime reporting by significantly limiting the amount of overtime recorded by MLOs. Further, Plaintiffs provide that the guideline is a business record so that no personal knowledge is required and also that numerous witnesses may testify as to knowledge of the document. PNC's own written policies and guidelines regarding overtime work of MLO's is relevant to the single issue for trial and its probative value as such is not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice. On review of the exhibit, it does not appear to the Court to contain matters that will either confuse the issue for trial or mislead the jury on same. Accordingly, Defendants' objection to Exhibit P-64 is OVERRULED. E. FLSA PowerPoint Slides P-65 Defendants object to Exhibit P-65, which are FLSA power point slides used by PNC regarding its time and attendance training, on relevance grounds, as well as on the basis that the probative value of the time training slides is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time and lack of personal knowledge. Plaintiffs respond that the slides are highly probative regarding PNC's policies which restricted overtime reporting and recording by MLOs, and that it is a business record of PNC so that no personal knowledge is required and also that numerous witnesses may testify as to the knowledge of the document. *4 PNC's training regarding MLOs' overtime work and recording of hours is relevant to the single issue for trial. On review of the exhibit, however, certain of the slides purport to provide a statement or summary of federal or state law, and such information shall be redacted by Plaintiffs. Accordingly and subject to this redaction, Defendants' objection to Exhibit P-65 is OVERRULED. F. Discipline MLO Time Reporting P-66 Defendant objects to P-66, which appears to be a record of discipline of MLOs for time reporting issues, on relevance grounds, as well as on the basis that the probative value of the exhibit is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, subsequent remedial measures under Rule 407, and hearsay. Plaintiffs respond that the exhibit shows that PNC only disciplined 2 employees for working off-the clock, that the 2 employees were disciplined post filing of the lawsuit, and thus the document shows retaliation by PNC for an MLO raising concerns of OTC work, the doctrine of subsequent remedial measures does not apply as this is not a tort case, and the document is not hearsay as it was authenticated by designee of PNC as a business record. Federal Rule of Evidence 407 provides that: When measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove: • negligence; • culpable conduct; • a defect in a product or its design; or • a need for a warning or instruction. But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as impeachment or—if disputed—proving ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures. Fed. R. Evid. 407. Under Plaintiffs' theory, Exhibit P-66 is not offered to show a subsequent remedial measure within the meaning of Rule 407, rather it is to show enforcement and non-enforcement of PNC's written policies regarding overtime and recording of hours. The document is probative regarding enforcement and non-enforcement of PNC's written policies in determining what PNC's policies actually were. PNC's record of discipline of MLOs for violating its time recording policies or working unapproved overtime is relevant to the single issue for trial, and is not more prejudicial than probative. As to these matters the statements contained within are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather the knowledge of it and response to it by PNC and are required to show context. Thus, for this purpose the evidence is not hearsay within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c)(2). To the extent, however, Plaintiffs offer this evidence for the truth of the matters asserted by the MLO contained therein, ie. that the MLO was not able to perform the work in a forty hour workweek, it would be hearsay. Accordingly, Defendants may request and propose a cautionary instruction regarding the hearsay. Defendants' objection to Exhibit P-66 is OVERULED. G. Email Retention Policy P-67 Defendants object to Exhibit P-67, which is PNC's email retention policy, on relevance grounds, as well as on the basis that the probative value of the email retention policy is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay and wasting time. Plaintiffs argue that PNC's failure to preserve emails is relevant because the emails would demonstrate their off-the-clock work. The Court finds that Exhibit P-67 is not relevant to the single issue for trial and would be wasting time. Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Defendants' objection to Exhibit P-67. H. Mortgage Sales Organization Chart P-68 *5 Defendant objects to Exhibit P-68, which is PNC's Mortgage Sales Executive Organization Chart, on relevance grounds, as well as on the basis that the probative value of the chart is substantially outweighed by misleading the jury, wasting time and needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Plaintiff responds that it is relevant to explain who the key witnesses are in the case. The Court find the organization chart as a whole is irrelevant and the exhibit would be both wasting time and needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. The Court SUSTAINS Defendants' objection to Exhibit P-68. I. PNC MLO Compensation Plan P-69 Defendant objects to Exhibit P-69, which is a document regarding PNC's MLO Compensation Plan, on relevance grounds, as well as on the basis that the probative value of the exhibit is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time and needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Plaintiffs respond that the document details disincentives to MLO's for reporting overtime by reducing commissions as a consequence of overtime. The Court finds that much of the plan is not relevant to the single issue for trial and will confuse the issues and mislead the jury, and waste time. Portions of the plan, however, do relate to the reporting of overtime, namely provision at page 9 “Overtime: Mortgage Origination Loan Officers are classified as Non-Exempt Employees and are eligible for OT paid for hours worked and documented,” the Bullet points provided under the “Example;” provision at page 18 question nos. 19, 20, 25; provision at page 19 no. 31. The remaining portions of the document shall be redacted as irrelevant, confusing the issues, and wasting time. Subject to the indicated redaction, the Court OVERRULES Defendants' objection to Exhibit P-69. J. Plaintiffs' 30(b)(6) Deposition Notices P-71 and P-72 Defendants object to Exhibits P-71 and P72, which are the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) Notices of Deposition, on relevance grounds, as well as on the basis that the probative value of these notices are substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay and wasting time. Plaintiffs contend the notices are necessary for cross-examination of certain witnesses who testified as designees and who are listed on Defendants' witness list. The “notices” authored by Plaintiffs' counsel are not relevant to the single issue for trial, contain mention of matters relevant to claims and issues not now being tried, contain mention of various items regarding which the Court has sustained objection to related exhibits, contain statements that could mislead and confuse the jury, and would waste time. Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS objection to Exhibits P-71 and 72. K. Map of Plaintiffs' Interrogatory Answer Locations P-74 Defendants object to Exhibit P-74, which is a map created by Plaintiffs' counsel depicting the location of opt-in Plaintiffs, on relevance grounds, as well as on the basis that the probative value of the map is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, and as hearsay under Rule 801 and hearsay within hearsay under Rule 805. Plaintiffs argue that the map is relevant to show the representative nature of the discovery taken from the opt-in plaintiffs and that it is not hearsay because the information used to comprise the map came from sworn testimony of witnesses who are more than 100 miles from the Courthouse and it is necessary to rebut Defendants' designations of representative discovery, which Plaintiffs claim Defendants “cherry-picked” to paint a false picture of the responses, and to support summary witness testimony. The Court notes that on review of Exhibit P-74, “pin 91” appears to be located in Allegheny County and “pin 71” also appears South of Erie, and thus, the map would not depict only individuals more than 100 miles from the Courthouse, to the extent the 100 mile marker is relevant and/or determinative. The map also is not relevant to this single issue trial, would confuse the issues, and is at a minimum hearsay (whether or not it is hearsay upon hearsay). Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Defendants' objection to Exhibit P-74. L. Plaintiffs' Interrogatory Answers P-75 *6 Defendants object to Exhibit P-75, which is a composite of answers to interrogatories propounded by Defendants on certain opt-in plaintiffs, on relevance grounds, as well as on the basis that the probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, and as hearsay and “hearsay within hearsay.” Plaintiffs responds that the answers are relevant to show the representative nature of the discovery taken from the opt-in plaintiffs, are not hearsay because the responses are the sworn testimony of witnesses who are more than 100 miles from the Courthouse, are necessary to rebut Defendants' designations of representative discovery, which is “cherry-picked” to paint a false picture of the reality of the responses, and is submitted to support summary witness testimony. On review of the Exhibit, naturally much of it contains the objections and argument of counsel as opposed to responses of the opt-in plaintiffs, which is not relevant, and would be confusing and misleading to the jury. Certain of the Interrogatories and Responses do, however, appear relevant in that they relate to the job duties of the MLO (Rog. 1), indicate instruction by management not to record overtime, (Rog 2), indicate overtime worked but not recorded (Rog 7), indicating MLO communicated to management that MLO worked overtime but did not record it (Rog 8), indicating typical hours worked (Rog 12). Regarding the hearsay objection, Plaintiff asserts that the responses to interrogatories of opt-in plaintiffs who are more than 100 miles from the Courthouse are not hearsay is inaccurate. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(c) provides that “An answer to an interrogatory may be used to the extent allowed by the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(c). Rule 33(c) is distinguished from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(4)governing the use of depositions in court proceedings where the witness is unavailable, which provides an additional exception to the hearsay rule regarding deposition testimony, not applicable to interrogatories, as follows: (4) Unavailable Witness. A party may use for any purpose the deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, if the court finds: (A) that the witness is dead; (B) that the witness is more than 100 miles from the place of hearing or trial or is outside the United States, unless it appears that the witness's absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; (C) that the witness cannot attend or testify because of age, illness, infirmity, or imprisonment; (D) that the party offering the deposition could not procure the witness's attendance by subpoena; or (E) on motion and notice, that exceptional circumstances make it desirable—in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of live testimony in open court—to permit the deposition to be used. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4) (emphasis added). Due to 1970 and 1975 revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the use of deposition testimony at trial was separated from the use of Responses to Interrogatories, which previously had been equated under former rule 33. See 1970 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 33 (“The use of answers to interrogatories at trial is made subject to the rules of evidence. The provisions governing use of depositions ... are not entirely apposite to answers to interrogatories, since deposition practice contemplates that all parties will ordinarily participate through cross-examination.”) (citing 4 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 33.29[1] (2d Ed.)); seeTreharne v. Callahan, 426 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1970)(interpreting former rule), abrogated as recognized by Botkin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 907 A.2d 641, 646 (Pa. Super. 2006). Federal Rule of Evidence 804, regarding exceptions to hearsay when the declarant is unavailable, provides: *7 (a) Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant: (1) is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant's statement because the court rules that a privilege applies; (2) refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so; (3) testifies to not remembering the subject matter; (4) cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness; or (5) is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement's proponent has not been able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure: (A) the declarant's attendance, in the case of a hearsay exception under Rule 804(b)(1) or (6); or (B) the declarant's attendance or testimony, in the case of a hearsay exception under Rule 804(b)(2), (3), or (4). But this subdivision (a) does not apply if the statement's proponent procured or wrongfully caused the declarant's unavailability as a witness in order to prevent the declarant from attending or testifying. (b) The Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: (1) Former Testimony. Testimony that: (A) was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether given during the current proceeding or a different one; and (B) is now offered against a party who had—or, in a civil case, whose predecessor in interest had—an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination. (2) Statement Under the Belief of Imminent Death. In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil case, a statement that the declarant, while believing the declarant's death to be imminent, made about its cause or circumstances. (3) Statement Against Interest. A statement that: (A) a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to invalidate the declarant's claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability; and (B) is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability. (4) Statement of Personal or Family History. A statement about: (A) the declarant's own birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history, even though the declarant had no way of acquiring personal knowledge about that fact; or (B) another person concerning any of these facts, as well as death, if the declarant was related to the person by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the person's family that the declarant's information is likely to be accurate. (5) [Other Exceptions.] [Transferred to Rule 807.] (6) Statement Offered Against a Party That Wrongfully Caused the Declarant's Unavailability. A statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant's unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result. *8 Fed. R. Evid. 804. As Plaintiffs are proponents of the opt-in plaintiffs' own interrogatory responses, none of the exceptions of Rule 804(b)(1) to (6) applies. Even if an exception did apply, Plaintiffs have made no effort to show that the declarants, opt-in plaintiffs, will be absent from the trial or hearing and the plaintiffs have not been able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure attendance. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not shown any applicable exception to the rule excluding hearsay, and Defendants' objection on this basis will be sustained. Nevertheless, as separately discussed regarding the parties' motions in limine, to be addressed by separate order, to the extent Defendants will be permitted to offer portions of an individual opt-in Plaintiffs' Responses to Interrogatories, admission will be permitted of additional portions of same or other writings or recorded statements that the Court determines in fairness ought to be considered at the same time as required by the rule of completeness codified at Federal Rule of Evidence 106, Beech v. Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 171 n. 14 (1988) (“We take this to be a reaffirmation of the obvious: that when one party has made use of a portion of a document, such that misunderstanding or distortion can be averted only through presentation of another portion, the material required for completeness is ipso facto relevant therefore admissible.”); Saltzburg, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual § 106.01 [1] at 106-4 (11th Ed. 2015) (“The rule does not mean than an entire writing or recording is automatically admissible whenever part of it is introduced.”). Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS Defendants' objection to Exhibit P-75. III. CONCLUSION In sum, Plaintiffs' objection to Defendants' Exhibits D-1 to D-6 is OVERRULED; Defendants' objection to Plaintiffs' Exhibits P-64 and P-66 is OVERRULED; Defendants' objection to Plaintiffs' Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-36, P-39, P-42, P-45, P-48, P-51, P-53, P-56, P-58, P-61, P-67, P-68, P-71, P-72, P-74 and P-75 is SUSTAINED; subject to the indicated redaction, Defendants' objection to Plaintiffs' Exhibit P-65 and P-69 is OVERRULED; Defendants' objection to Plaintiffs' Exhibit P-3 is OVERRULED for testifying plaintiffs and SUSTAINED for non-testifying plaintiffs; Defendants' objection to Plaintiffs' Exhibit P-75 is SUSTAINED, subject, however, to the Court's subsequent decision applying Federal Rule of Evidence 106, and Exhibits P-40, P-41, P-46, P-47, P-52, P-57, P-62, P-63, P-76 have been withdrawn by Plaintiffs and objection thereto accordingly denied as moot. The Parties shall meet with the law clerk in the Jury Room following the Preliminary PreTrial Conference on Tuesday, January 3, 2017 at 9:30 a.m., to remove or redact any exhibits consistent with this Memorandum Order. SO ORDERED, this 30th day of December, 2016.