GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE CO., GEICO INDEMNITY CO., GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY and GEICO CASUALTY CO., Plaintiffs, v. CLEAR VISION WINDSHIELD REPAIR, LLC, MY CLEAR VIEW WINDSHIELD REPAIR, INC., DOUGLAS STROH, CENTRAL FLORIDA WINDSHIELD REPAIR, LLC, LIZZETTE LABELL, TRAVIS LABELL, J.C. WINDSHIELD REPAIR, LLC, JEAN CAROUSSO, GDB INDUSTRIES, LLC, GREGORY A. BECHTOLD and JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10, Defendants Case No: 6:16-cv-2077-Orl-28TBS United States District Court, M.D. Florida Filed March 20, 2017 Counsel Barry I. Levy, Max Gershenoff, Steven Henesy, Rivkin Radler, LLP, Uniondale, NY, John Patrick Marino, Lindsey R. Trowell, Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Jacksonville, FL, Lance Thomas Davies, Bogin, Munns & Munns, PA, Orlando, FL, for Plaintiffs. Andrew A. Bergman, Jay Kurtis Gray, Bergmangray, LLP, Dallas, TX, Erica Ann Diangelo, Bergman, Gray & Diangelo, Tampa, FL, for Defendants. Smith, Thomas B., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 Pending before the Court is Defendants Clear Vision Windshield Repair, LLC and My Clear View Windshield Repair, Inc.’s Rule 26(c) Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 51). Plaintiffs have filed a response (Doc. 55) and the Court has directed and considered a reply (Doc. 57). Now, the motion is due to be granted in part. Background On August 5, 2016, Plaintiffs (collectively “GEICO”) filed a complaint which alleges that Defendants are operating an ongoing fraudulent windshield repair/replacement insurance billing scheme (Doc. 1). Asserting claims of civil RICO violations, common law fraud, violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, violation of the Florida Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices Act, and unjust enrichment, Plaintiffs seek damages they allegedly suffered due to “fraudulent claims” submitted by Defendants (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 129, et seq.) as well as a declaratory judgment with respect to pending claims (Id.). Defendants dispute GEICO’s characterization of their business practices, deny any wrongdoing, and contend that they are entitled to collect on their outstanding invoices ((See Docs. 18-20), and the instant motion.)[1] Defendant Clear Vision asserts that it has been bringing lawsuits in state court against GEICO to collect the unpaid balance on its invoices with some success, and GEICO brought this federal “reverse-class action type suit” because it was “apparently dissatisfied with the rulings it was receiving in the Florida state court litigation” (Doc. 51 at 2-3). Plaintiffs have caused to be issued and have served subpoenas directed to multiple non-parties. Specifically, Plaintiffs have served a subpoena on JP Morgan Chase Bank (Defendants Clear Vision and My Clear View’s bank) seeking these Defendants’ financial records (“financial records subpoena”), and subpoenas directed to Defendants Clear Vision and My Clear View’s attorneys that have or are currently representing these Defendants in the on-going state court litigation against GEICO (“attorney subpoenas”). Claiming these subpoenas are abusive and seek irrelevant and/or privileged information, Clear Vision and My Clear View now seek a protective order forbidding (or limiting) the discovery and for an award of motion costs. Discussion Standards of Law Defendant has standing to move for a protective order if the proposed subpoenas seek irrelevant information. Armor Screen Corp. v. Storm Catcher, Inc., No. 07-81091-CIV, 2008 WL 5049277, at * 3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2008). Relevant evidence is evidence having “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” FED. R. EVID. 401. The scope of discovery is broad. Unless the court orders otherwise, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). The broad scope of discovery reflects the intent of the rules that trials in federal courts should be a search for the truth that is not “carried on in the dark.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). Still, the court “must limit the frequency or extent of discovery” if it determines that the information sought “is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)-(III). *2 “[C]ourts employ a liberal discovery standard ‘in keeping with the spirit and purpose of the discovery rules.’ ” Townsend v. Hosp. Bd. of Directors of Lee Cty., No. 2:10-cv-59-FtM-29, 2010 WL 3702546, at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2010), quoting Tate v. U.S. Postal Service, 2007 WL 521848, *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb.14, 2007). “When discovery appears relevant on its face, the party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish facts justifying its objections by demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within the scope of relevance as defined under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by the discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.” Wagner v. Viacost.com, No. 06-81113-CIV-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47211 (S.D. Fla. 2007). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides for protective orders to limit or eliminate discovery to “protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” upon a showing of “good cause” by the movant. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). On a motion for the entry of a protective order the moving party carries the burden to show good cause. In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 605 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Good cause requires a specific demonstration of facts to support the motion; conclusory statements about need and harm are not sufficient. Baratta v. Homeland Housewares, LLC, 242 F.R.D. 641, 642 (S.D. Fla. 2007); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Worldwide Ins. Mngm’t Corp., 147 F.R.D. 125, 127 (N.D. Tex. 1992); Blum v. Schlegel, 150 F.R.D. 38, 41 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). “If a sufficient showing of good cause is made, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show why relief should still not be granted, either because of undue prejudice or the importance of the discovery at issue.” New World Network, Ltd. v. M/V Norwegian Sea, No. 05-22916-CIV-JORDAN/TORRES, 2007 U.S. dist. LEXIS 25731, at * 3 (S.D. Fla. April 6, 2007). Although good cause is the standard under Rule 26(c), courts in the Eleventh Circuit “have superimposed a somewhat more demanding balancing of interests approach to the Rule.” Farnsworth v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985); Cf. Ekokotu v. Fed. Express Corp., 408 F. App’x 331, 336 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing McCarthy v. Barnett Bank of Polk Cnty., 876 F.2d 89, 91 (11th Cir. 1989)). This requires the court to balance Plaintiff’s interest in obtaining the discovery against movants’ interest that the discovery not be had. Analysis Movants claim that the subpoenas are impermissibly overbroad and seek irrelevant and, at times, privileged information. Plaintiffs oppose the motion on the merits and on the grounds that these Defendants did not comply with Local Rule 3.01(g). Upon careful review, I find that a full good faith conference as required by the Court’s local rules did not occur here; however, I also find that the subpoenas are overbroad on their face and, as drafted, are unenforceable. The financial records subpoena The financial records subpoena seeks from the bank the production of the following documents: (1) Monthly account transaction statements. (2) All withdrawn and deposited checks. (3) Account formation and governance documents, including but not limited to account application, signature cards, powers of attorney and corporate resolutions. (4) All documents reflecting or relating to all joint account holders. (5) All documents reflecting or relating to cash withdrawals, electronic fund transfers and/or wire transfers. *3 (6) All correspondence between the bank and the account holder identified above. (7) All documents evincing the account numbers and the name of the account holders for any JP Morgan Chase Bank accounts that made or received electronic transfers of fund to and/or from the above-referenced account(s). (8) All documents evincing the account numbers for any non-Morgan Chase Bank accounts that made or received electronic transfers of fund to and/or from the above-referenced account(s). (9) Any and all documentation related to any reporting or filing of any Currency Transaction Report (CTR), Monetary Instrument Log (MIL) or Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) within the bank, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network or with any other bureau of the government. Movants argue that the subpoena seeks unlimited information regarding allfinancial matters, without any showing of relevancy. Plaintiffs respond that the bank records are relevant to show a pattern of racketeering activity and to demonstrate the payments from Defendants to co-Defendants and car dealerships. Movants have the better argument. The financial records subpoena seeks carte blanche access to every transaction, and every document relating to any aspect of every account, no matter how tangential to the matters at bar. There is no showing that the subpoena seeks only transactions between Plaintiffs and Defendants or these Defendants and other Defendants, and no showing that the issues here require such unlimited access.[2] Plaintiffs do not need this information to show damages arising from any payments. They already know the details of who, what and when they made payment on these claims, and have alleged many of them in their complaint. To the extent Plaintiffs need to establish the structure of the enterprise, they can first ask Defendants to produce all records showing the transfer of funds between themselves, then ask for bank records if still needed.[3] Likewise, Plaintiffs can get records of payments to car dealerships from the car dealerships themselves. Balancing the interests of the parties as required, I find the financial records subpoena to be impermissibly overbroad. The attorney subpoenas Plaintiffs have issued 21 subpoenas directed at attorneys or law firms which have represented Clear Vision and My Clear View in state court collection litigation. The attorney subpoenas command the production of the following information: 1. Documents and electronically stored information relating to all financial transactions between You and the Stroh[4] Entities, or any entities in which You have an interest and the Stroh Entities, that are associated with or related to a Collection Action. This request should be deemed to include but not be limited to any agreements, correspondence, emails and assignments, as well as all checks, electronic fund transfers and/or other forms of payments between You and the Stroh Entities. *4 2. Documents and electronically stored information relating to payments made by You to the Stroh Entities as a result of the settlement and/or successful prosecution of a Collection Action. This request should be deemed to include but not be limited to all checks, electronic fund transfers and/or other forms of payment made by You to the Stroh Entities. 3. Agreements between You and the Stroh Entities regarding the provision of legal services in relation to a Collection Action. 4. Documents demonstrating legal fees that have been awarded to You by any court in connection with a Collection Action. Movants contend that the request for all financial transactions between the attorneys and clients is overly broad and seeks information not relevant to any claim or defense here, especially as the attorneys are non-parties and not alleged to be participants in the repairs or billing for same. Movants also object that the breadth of the attorney subpoenas impermissibly call for privileged information. Absent any proper purpose, they claim that the attorney subpoenas are designed solely to harass. Plaintiffs argue that the subpoenaed attorney records are relevant to demonstrate the pattern requirement of a civil RICO action, which is alleged to be a continuing enterprise, and assert that “Defendants intentionally billed GEICO for more than they would bill a private pay customer solely to create an opportunity for their collection lawyers to collect attorneys’ fees in gross disproportion from actual amounts in dispute in the underlying collection lawsuits.” (Doc. 55 at 15). I am not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ contentions. The attorney subpoenas are overbroad on their face. To the extent they seek information regarding fees awarded by a court in a collection action against Plaintiffs or other information filed by any of these attorneys in any action against Plaintiffs, these are public records that Plaintiffs – as the state court defendants- should already have. As for the contention that attorneys’ fees recovered in the state court litigation far exceed the amounts claimed in the collection lawsuits, this is not unusual in litigation against insurers in Florida. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Palma, 555 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1990), quashed in part on other grounds, 629 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1993). As such, Plaintiff’s argument that it is reasonable to conclude that Defendants reached an agreement with their attorneys whereby Defendants hold a residual interest in fee claims or somehow sold the rights to fraudulent insurance claims to their attorneys is not supported by evidence.[5] *5 Plaintiffs are correct in observing that attorney’s fee agreements and billing records are not ordinarily privileged, and presumably the information contained in the billing records and fee agreement is disclosed in every case where fees are sought and awarded. But the lack of privilege does not equate with relevancy. As movants note, none of these attorneys are named as defendants, nor do Plaintiffs point to any allegation that the attorneys actively participated in the scheme alleged.[6] Consequently, the attorney subpoenas are overbroad and unenforceable. Rule 3.01(g) By local rule, parties are required to confer in good faith prior to the filing of most motions, including motions for a protective order. Here, it appears that defense counsel began an appropriate overture and Plaintiffs’ counsel advised that, while his clients were not willing to withdraw the subpoenas, “we are happy to engage in a conferral process to discuss potential compromises.” (Doc. 57-4). This conferral process did not occur. As this Court has previously noted: “[c]ounsel who merely ‘attempt’ to confer have not ‘conferred.’ ” Maronda Homes, Inc. of Florida v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 2014 WL 6610932, at *5 (M.D. Fla. 2014). Defense counsel are admonished that full compliance with the letter and the spirit of Local Rule 3.01(g) is required and the Court will deny any future motion that does not reflect actual compliance. In addition, because counsel for movants failed to comply with Local Rule 3.01(g), movants’ request for attorney’s fees and costs in connection with their motion for protective order is foreclosed. Conclusion The motion for protective order is GRANTED to the extent that the subpoenaed parties are excused from compliance with the subpoenas, as framed. Should Plaintiffs be unsuccessful in obtaining relevant information from other, more appropriate sources, the Court may revisit the matter, upon proper motion and a showing of necessity. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED. DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on March 20, 2017. Footnotes [1] As motions to dismiss are pending, Defendants have not filed an Answer yet. [2] Indeed, the request for production of Suspicious Activity Reports runs counter to regulations prohibiting such disclosure. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 21.11(k); 208.62(j), 353.3(g). [3] This assumes that Plaintiffs can show that the amounts of the payments matter in the first place, if Defendants admit their relationships to each other and the car dealerships. [4] Defendant Stroh is alleged to be the owner/operator of Clear Vision and My Clear View (Doc. 1,¶5. [5] GEICO cites three cases as support for its conclusion that “the subpoenaed attorney records—which include records relating to financial relationships between the attorneys and the Defendants—are relevant not only to fully define the scope and contours of the Defendants’ past and continuing racketeering activity, but to demonstrate the extent to which the Defendants have profited—and continue to profit—from their fraudulent scheme.” (Doc. 55 at 16, citing Halcome v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 778 F.2d 606, 609 (11th Cir. 1985); Meyers v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 801 F. Supp. 709, 716 (N.D. Ga. 1992); and Airmont Homes Inc et al. v. Nalitt, 1995 WL 313147, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 12, 1995). None of these cases involved production of records from a defendant’s attorney in connection with pursuit of a collection matter. [6] Even if the privilege applied, Plaintiffs have not shown that they are entitled to invoke the crime-fraud exception. There is no showing that the attorney records are sufficiently related to the alleged fraudulent activity described in the Complaint. The “fraud” alleged is the invoicing of the charges; not the institution of an after-the-fact collection action.