The motions have been fully briefed, and the Court held a very lengthy discovery hearing on the motions on August 29, 2016. The motions are now ripe for review.

Plaintiffs, Stacey Blake and all others similarly situated, including Karla Sotomayor, (“Plaintiffs”) filed a Third Amended Complaint[1] [DE 173] on July 11, 2016. The Third Amended Complaint alleges one count for recovery of overtime compensation against the husband and wife defendants James and Marta Batmasian, individually and d/b/a Investments Limited. Despite the fact that the Third Amended Complaint alleges merely one count seeking recovery of overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), Plaintiffs' counsel, Chris Kleppin, has repeatedly attempted to interject irrelevant, scandalous and impertinent matters into this litigation. Such conduct has invaded both the pleadings and the discovery process.

As to the pleadings, on June 13, 2016, the Court entered an Order on Motion to Strike [DE 137] in which the Court struck numerous allegations from the Corrected Second Amended Complaint [DE 28], such as: (1) the allegation that Defendants defaulted on a $105,000,000 loan; (2) hearsay commentary that Defendants are “extremely wealthy, powerful and feared individual[s]”; (3) allegations that Defendant James Batmasian failed to pay taxes, including withholding or federal payroll taxes, and previously went to prison for failure to pay payroll taxes[2]; and (4) the allegations of prurient and vulgar behavior on the part of Mr. Batmasian contained in paragraphs 18 through 23 of the Corrected Second Amended Complaint with the exception of the massage vouchers (minus the happy ending allegations).

*2 The material stricken from paragraphs 18 through 23 included allegations that James Batmasian discusses sexual desires with employees in and around the office, that he routinely discusses his sexual desires regarding women and younger female employees, that he gifts employees vouchers for happy ending massages, that he sends pornographic text messages, that he views and forwards pornographic materials, that he uses extremely vulgar language when referring to women as sex objects, and that he texts obscene and profane material to his senior management, sometimes including his wife. [DE 28, ¶¶ 18-22], The stricken material included a reference to a media article in which James Batmasian allegedly falsely denied his “deviant sexual nature”; also stricken were allegations that opt-in plaintiff Sotomayor filed a lawsuit against Defendant for sexual harassment and that James Batmasian attempted to enlist Blake to assist in the defense of the Sotomayor lawsuit, but Blake refused since James Batmasian uttered crude and vulgar comments against women and harassed them. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 23. The Court struck all such allegations as being immaterial, impertinent and scandalous [DE 137].[3]

As to discovery, the parties have filed a plethora of discovery motions, responses, replies, and notices which are too numerous to count. In an effort to resolve these continuous and contentious discovery disputes, the Court has previously held three lengthy discovery hearings in this case—on January 8th, March 3rd, and June 21st, 2016 [DE 57, 71, 148]—and has entered numerous discovery-related Orders [DEs 58, 72, 96, 110, 121, 138, 151, 152, 153, 154, 167, 168, 174, and 180], Despite all of this, eleven discovery motions have been filed since July 15, 2016 [DEs 175, 183, 189, 192, 202, 204, 205, 206, 247, 258, and 271].[4] The Court therefore scheduled yet another lengthy discovery hearing for August 29, 2016, after having moved the hearing date twice in part to accommodate the vacation and trial schedule of Plaintiffs' counsel.

Defendants have recently filed numerous motions for protective order, to terminate depositions and to limit the scope of inquiry by Plaintiffs' counsel at the depositions of Defendant James Batmasian [DE 175], Defendant Marta Batmasian [DEs 175, 183], non-party Jacqui Wyatt [DE 189], non-party Jason Lazar [DE 202], non-party Paul Bedoyan [DE 204], non-party Michael Daszkal [DE 205], and non-party Nancy Tyson [DE 271], Plaintiffs have filed responses to each of these motions, and Defendants have filed replies. Further, Plaintiffs have filed a motion to compel deposition testimony of James Batmasian, Marta Batmasian, Jason Lazar, Daron Tersakyan, Jacqui Wyatt, Paul Bedoyan and Nancy Tyson, and to extend the depositions of James Batmasian, Marta Batmasian and Daron Tersakyan by two hours beyond the seven hours that Plaintiffs' counsel has already utilized for each of those depositions. See DE 258. The Court's discussion and ruling on each of these depositions and the motions related thereto are contained below in Part III of this Order.

A separate discovery dispute has arisen regarding a subpoena duces tecum issued by Defendants to non-party James Baker. See DE 206. The Court's discussion and ruling on that matter is contained below in Part IV of this Order.

It is clear to the Court that the opposing parties and their counsel dislike each other. This obvious mutual animus has made the discovery process unnecessarily combative, excessively litigious, and wasteful of the Court's limited judicial resources. Rather than work together cooperatively and professionally, opposing counsel have instead raised virtually every available obstacle and roadblock throughout the discovery process. This lengthy Order is yet another example of counsel's inability to cooperate professionally with one another in the discovery process.

*3 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), which governs the scope of discovery,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26 state that “[p]roportional discovery relevant to any party's claim or defense suffices.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment. The proportionality requirement of Rule 26 is important, and mandatory. In discussing the recent amendments to Rule 26, the Honorable John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, stated:

Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, as amended on December 1, 2015, has been expanded to direct that the Federal Rules “should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. This Rule makes crystal clear the obligation of judges—and lawyers—to cooperate and control the expense of litigation. This Court takes the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seriously and demands that counsel also take them seriously.

Under Rule 26(c)(1), “[a] party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order ... to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). The party seeking a protective order must demonstrate “ ‘good cause’ for the protection sought.” Wrangen v. Pennsylvania Lumbermans Mut. Ins. Co., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1277 (S.D. Fla. 2008). “ ‘Good cause’ has been defined as a ‘sound basis or legitimate need to take judicial action.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig.,820 F.2d 352, 356 (11th Cir. 1987)).

The parties are fighting over the depositions of eight individuals, to wit: 1) Defendant James Batmasian, 2) Defendant Marta Batmasian, and non-parties 3) Daron Tersakyan, 4) Jacqui Wyatt, 5) Jason Lazar, 6) Paul Bedoyan, 7) Michael Daszkal, and 8) Nancy Tyson. The deposition issues as to each of these eight individuals are discussed separately below. Defendants have filed motions for protective orders and to limit each deposition (with the exception of Daron Tersakyan), while Plaintiffs have filed a motion to compel or extend each deposition.

*4 Defendant James Batmasian has filed a Motion for Protective Order and to Limit Scope of Inquiry during Depositions [DE 175]. Defendant James Batmasian explains that his deposition was taken on July 11, 2016. Id. at p.1. He asserts that Plaintiffs' counsel should be prevented from inquiring into areas which are designed only to harass, embarrass or burden Defendant. Id. at p. 2. Specifically, Defendant seeks to prevent inquiry into (1) matters related to those allegations which were previously stricken by the court as immaterial, impertinent and scandalous pursuant to the Court's June 13, 2016 Order [DE 137]; (2) improper financial discovery; and (3) confidential cell phone information. Id. Moreover, Defendant seeks a determination that his deposition should be deemed completed as Plaintiffs' counsel used his allotted seven hours of deposition time at the July 11th deposition. Id. A deposition excerpt is attached to Defendant's motion. [DE 175-1].

Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs' counsel made improper inquiry into racial commentary and sexual innuendo and began questioning Defendant about scandalous text messages that he purportedly sent. [DE 175, p. 3]. Defendant maintains that defense counsel objected to such areas of inquiry since certain allegations regarding these matters were previously stricken from the pleadings by the court, and, further, since such areas of inquiry are not relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in this case. [DE 175, p. 3].

Defendant also asserts that Plaintiffs' counsel improperly questioned Defendant about certain financial documents which are the subject of an entirely unrelated and separate state court lawsuit brought by non-party James Baker for an alleged violation of the Florida whistleblower statute. [DE 175, p. 3], Defendant contends that Plaintiffs' counsel, Chris Kleppin, also represents James Baker in the separate whistleblower lawsuit and additionally represents Baker's wife, Karla Sotomayor, in this lawsuit and in her state court lawsuit against the Batmasians. Id. at pp. 3-4. According to Defendant, Plaintiffs' counsel blurred the lines between the various lawsuits and tried to question Defendant about financial documents wholly unrelated to the instant matter. Id. at p. 4. Next, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs' counsel tried to justify this line of inquiry as relevant to “enterprise coverage” under the FLSA, but Defendants have already stipulated that they meet the annual sales volume threshold required under the FLSA. Id.

Further, Defendant notes that the Court previously entered an Order [DE 154] which limited financial discovery solely to now-dismissed Defendant LSA Management and the then-alleged “joint employer” relationship between LSA and the Batmasians. [DE 175, p.4]. Defendant argues that it is improper for Plaintiffs' counsel to inquire about salaries and compensation paid to any non-party deponents other than to Plaintiff Blake and any opt-in plaintiffs, as this Court has limited the potential group of individuals that could join this collective action to only those who worked as commercial leasing agents from June 23, 2013, to the present. Id.Defendant claims that any tangential relevance is not proportional to the needs of the case under Rule 26. Id. at p. 5. Defendant alleges that this type of discovery is being made in bad faith and designed solely to harass Defendants and the non-parties. Id.

Defendant also objects to Plaintiffs' counsel's attempt during the deposition of Defendant to make an inquiry regarding Defendant's cell phones after Plaintiffs' counsel noted that Defendant had two cell phones with him. [DE 175, p. 5]. Such inquiry, according to Defendant, was irrelevant and undertaken by Plaintiffs' counsel solely to harass Defendant. Id. Finally, Defendant requests that this Court deem the deposition of Mr. Batmasian completed as Plaintiffs' counsel used his allotted seven hours of deposition time permitted under our Local Rules and has no good cause to extend the time period. Id.

*5 In their Response, Plaintiffs state that none of the Defendants' assertions have merit and that Defendants are covering up for defense counsel's interference at the depositions. [DE 185, p.1]. Plaintiffs argue that “there were no questions based on sex”, but rather their counsel's question was, “why did you send racist images over text messages when your own policies of your company say that that's forbidden?” Id. at p. 2. Plaintiffs contend this question was relevant to show that Mr. Batmasian exercised operational control over the company. Id. at pp. 2-3.

As to the objected-to financial discovery, Plaintiffs claim that the financial discovery at issue in the deposition involved a memorandum in which Mr. Batmasian ordered his controller, James Baker, to change revenue numbers on Defendants' financial statements for the purpose of defrauding a lender. [DE 185, p. 3], According to Plaintiffs, this shows Mr. Batmasian's “operational control” and shows that he is an employer. Id. at pp. 3-4. Plaintiffs also argue that this is “important Rule 608(b) evidence, and fraud with respect to tax returns and other financial statements is freely admissible as Rule 608(B) evidence in discovery” and is potentially impeachment evidence “to the extent that Mr. Batmasian denies he ordered Baker to change financials to commit fraud.” Id. at 4.

Regarding the two cell phones that Mr. Batmasian allegedly had at his deposition, Plaintiffs argue they would show that Mr. Batmasian routinely texted and phoned employees before and after work hours. [DE 185, p. 4], Plaintiffs claim that the cell phone numbers of those two cell phones present at the deposition are “critical and a precursor to the actual records, which will show routine after-hours phone calls.” Id. at p. 5.

Finally, Plaintiffs assert that their counsel is in the process of filing a motion to compel the witness to answer the questions, and, therefore, they object to the Court ruling on the completion of the depositions “at this juncture.” [DE 185, p. 5]. Plaintiffs want two additional hours of deposition time. Id.

Defendant filed a Reply in which he argues that his objections to the deposition questions were not just based on relevance, “but that such areas of inquiry are so far afield from the claims and defenses in this case that it is in bad faith and abusive and warrants limitation by the court, and that the sole purpose of such questioning is to harass and oppress the Defendants.” [DE 188, p. 2], Under such circumstances, Rule 30(d)(3) allowed Defendant to object and move for a protective order. Id.

Defendant argues that the racial questions were part of the same scandalous and prejudicial theme that the Court previously struck from the Corrected Second Amended Complaint. [DE 188, p. 3]. Further, Defendant states that Mr. Batmasian does not dispute that he has operational control over his companies, so Plaintiffs' counsel's purported after-the-fact justification for this line of questioning is “simply bizarre.” Id. As to the financial document questions, Defendant notes that this Court previously entered an Order [DE 154] which limited the scope of financial discovery, and that such inquiry cannot be justified under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b). Id. at p. 4. Further, Defendant argues that such questions lack any relevancy in this wage and hour dispute. Id. Defendant maintains that the cell phones present at Mr. Batmasian's deposition were personal cell phones not used for business purposes and that the intent of the questions was to harass and intimidate the deponent. Id. at pp. 4-5,[6] Defendant argues that Plaintiffs already have Mr. Batmasian's cell phone number and have not sought his cell phone records in discovery while this case has been pending, and the discovery period is now closed. Id. Defendant also objects to any extension of the time for Plaintiffs' counsel to conduct the deposition beyond the seven hours already utilized and points out that no good cause for such request has been shown by Plaintiffs. Id. at p. 5.

*6 On August 19, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel [DE 258] directed to seven deponents, including Mr. Batmasian. According to Plaintiffs, while Mr. Batmasian's deposition went on for seven hours, the deposition needs to be extended by two hours so that he can be questioned on areas that he refused to answer or in areas where objections were lodged by defense counsel. [DE 258, p. 1], Plaintiffs want to question Mr. Batmasian on “financial fraud”, since such would be “arguably relevant under Rules 404and 608 and 609.” Id. Plaintiffs assert that the “financial fraud” questions are permissible because Defendants listed Baker as a witness for the subject area “false allegations of financial fraud” in their Initial Disclosures. Id. at p. 2. Plaintiffs maintain that Mr. Batmasian “would not even answer questions about his cell phone number, and grabbed them off the conference room table denying that he had them.” Id. They claim that Mr. Batmasian should be compelled to provide his phone numbers because he used the phones for “business related things on weekends.” Id. Plaintiffs then complain about defense counsel's tactics at the depositions and argue that defense counsel had no right to object or instruct the witness not to answer any questions. Id. at pp. 3-5.

Defendants filed a Response to the Plaintiffs' motion to compel [DE 265], and Plaintiffs filed a Reply [DE 269], both of which have been carefully considered.

Court's Ruling as to the James Batmasian Deposition: The Court finds that Defendant's Motion for Protective Order and to Limit Scope of Inquiry During Depositions [DE 175] should be GRANTED to the extent that the motion pertains to the deposition of James Batmasian, and Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony and Extend the Depositions [DE 258] to the extent that it pertains to the deposition of James Batmasian should be DENIED. The reasons for this ruling follow below.

First, in regards to Mr. Batmasian's deposition (and in regards to virtually all the depositions at issue in this case), Plaintiffs' counsel, Chris Kleppin, has repeatedly made the argument that virtually any line of inquiry he wishes to pursue in this case is fair game—regardless of whether or not it is relevant to the parties' claims or defenses under Rule 26(b)(1)—because he has the authority to do so under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 608(b). In effect, Plaintiffs' counsel argues that in discovery depositions he can query parties and non-parties alike on irrelevant issues because the information sought may, at some point, be admissible under Rule 404(b) or Rule 608(b). Plaintiffs' counsel uses this argument to attempt to justify his attempts to discover into, inter alia, alleged areas of “financial fraud”, the fabrication of loan documents or information submitted to lenders, racially charged text messages, personal or unrelated financial and real estate information, and the alleged changing of financial information or statements to commit fraud unrelated to the FLSA claim.

However, in the civil context, Rules 404(b) and 608 do not operate to emasculate the relevancy and proportionality requirements of Rule 26 as Plaintiffs' counsel attempts to argue. Rule 404(b) evidence can be admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. But, Rule 404(b) evidence can only be admitted if (1) the evidence is relevant to an issue in the litigation other than defendant's character; (2) the probative value is not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice; and (3) the Government or other party offers sufficient proof so that the jury could find that defendant committed the act. United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1267 (11th Cir. 2008). In Ellisor, the Eleventh Circuit noted the “striking similarity” between the prior bad act and the crime defendant was charged with at trial. Id. Plaintiffs' counsel's argument that he can freely engage in extensive, invasive, irrelevant and disproportionate discovery of purported financial fraud, racially charged texts messages, past failure to pay federal payroll taxes, and other areas under Rule 404(b) is frivolous.

As to Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness's conduct in order to attack or support the witness's character for truthfulness. But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness, or of another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined has testified about. Rule 608(b) does not give Plaintiffs' counsel carte blanche to engage in the irrelevant, immaterial, and disproportionate discovery he seeks. SeeFed. R. Ev. 608(b).

*7 To support his argument that he should be able to discover such information during depositions, Plaintiffs' counsel primarily relies upon the case of Rakip v. Paradise Awnings Corp., No. 10-20004-CIV, 2011 WL 6029981 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 2011), which was not a case involving a discovery dispute.[7] Rather, Rakip involved the plaintiffs' post-verdict motion to alter or amend a judgment based in part upon plaintiffs' argument that the trial court erred in allowing the improper admission of evidence of (i) plaintiff Jeronimo's use of his brother-in-law's social security number, (ii) his failure to pay taxes, (iii) his application for worker's compensation and unemployment benefits, and (iv) his inability to find another job after working for defendants. Id. at *3. In light of the fact that plaintiffs did not object to the admission of such evidence at trial, the Court rejected plaintiffs' argument. Id. Further, the Rakip court found that, even if plaintiffs had objected or stated a good reason for having not objected, its ruling allowing admission of the evidence was proper based on Rule 608(b). Id. The Rakipcourt noted that “if probative of untruthfulness, a party may inquire into special instances of conduct ‘on cross-examination of the witness...concerning the witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness', at the court's discretion”, pursuant Rule 608(b). Id. The Rakip court also noted that extrinsic evidence may be admitted where it is introduced to disprove a specific fact material to the defendant's case, citing United States v. Calle, 822 F.2d 1016, 1021 (11th Cir. 1987). Id. The Rakipcourt noted that defense counsel had asked questions of the plaintiff regarding the four areas noted above “but took his answers as they were given without introducing evidence to prove any specific instances of misconduct or to prove his character for untruthfulness.” Id. at *4. Further, the Rakip court noted that the plaintiff's tax returns and filings for worker's compensation and unemployment benefits were relevant to show that he listed his occupation as factory manager, which was relevant to whether or not he would be eligible for recovery under the FLSA. Id.

After a careful review, it is clear that Rakip merely stands for the wholly unremarkable proposition that the trial court has the discretion under Rule 608(b) to allow certain limited cross-examination of a plaintiff in an FLSA case if the areas of inquiry are probative of untruthfulness, and further, that relevant evidence is not rendered inadmissible merely because it includes references to specific bad acts of a witness. In the instant case, the information that Plaintiffs' counsel seeks to discover is not relevant to any material issue in this case. Further, the scope of any cross-examination which Plaintiffs' counsel may wish to engage in at trial will be determined by the Court on an in limine basis and/or at the time of trial. The Court rejects Plaintiffs' counsel's misguided effort to rely on Rakip to support his effort to engage in irrelevant, immaterial and disproportionate discovery. Allowing Plaintiff's counsel to engage in such disproportionate and irrelevant discovery under the guise of Rules 404(b) and 608(b) would “cause the parties to run down a rabbit hole chasing irrelevant information on collateral matters.” See O'Boyle v. Sweetapple, Case No. 14-81250-CIV-MARRA/MATTHEWMAN, 2016 WL492655 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2016). The Court will not allow this to occur in this case.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs' counsel's question at the deposition of Mr. Batmasian, “why did you send racist images over text messages when your own policies of your company say that that's forbidden?”, was an inflammatory, scandalous, impertinent question which was designed to harass, oppress and intimidate the deponent. Such area of inquiry has no relevance to this simple one-count FLSA case and is also not proportional to this case under Rule 26(b)(1). The Court previously struck from Plaintiffs' Corrected Second Amended Complaint allegations of “prurient and vulgar behavior on the part of Mr. Batmasian” as immaterial, impertinent and scandalous. [DE 137, p. 6]. The Court finds that any questions regarding racist text images are likewise immaterial, impertinent and scandalous in the context of this simple FLSA case.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs' counsel's attempt to demand Mr. Batmasian's two cell phone numbers for the phones that Mr. Batmasian had with him at his deposition also represented an attempt by Plaintiffs' counsel to delve improperly into irrelevant areas wholly disproportionate to this case. Such questions were improper and designed to harass, oppress and intimidate the deponent. The deposition of Mr. Batmasian was not a duces tecumdeposition, and Plaintiffs' counsel had no authority to demand the phone numbers. Further, Defendant's counsel represented that one of the two cell phones was Mr. Batmasian's personal cell phone and not involved in Mr. Batmasian's business endeavors. That personal cell phone has absolutely no relevance to this case. As to the second cell phone, that was a business cell phone, and, as noted by defense counsel, Plaintiffs' counsel already had the phone number of that phone. It is important to note that Plaintiffs never made any valid discovery request for the phone numbers of Defendant's cell phones nor did Plaintiffs ever attempt to obtain any of Defendant's cell phone records. If Plaintiffs wanted the information as to any of Defendant's cellphones, they should have issued a timely and proper interrogatory, request for production, or subpoena, and this Court would have timely decided any objections thereto. Plaintiffs' counsel's failure to properly and fully conduct discovery does not justify his cavalier, last minute demand for the cell phone numbers from Defendant at his deposition. Further, in light of the animosity between the opposing parties and counsel in this case, Defendant had a legitimate and justifiable reason to not provide his personal cell phone number to Plaintiffs' counsel at the deposition.

*8 The Court also finds that Plaintiffs' counsel's questions regarding alleged “financial fraud” were wholly irrelevant, immaterial and improper. Questions regarding Mr. Batmasian's alleged attempt to order Mr. Baker (a current client of Plaintiffs' counsel in a state case against the Batmasians) to change financial statements to commit fraud on a lender lacked relevance, were disproportionate to this case, and were designed to harass, oppress and intimidate the deponent. Whether or not Mr. Batmasian attempted to commit fraud on a lender is of no relevance in this simple one-count FLSA case. It is a wholly collateral matter. Plaintiffs' counsel's effort to justify this line of inquiry by claiming that it might constitute impeachment under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) “to the extent that Mr. Batmasian denies he ordered Baker to change financials to commit fraud” [DE 185, p. 4] is without merit. In addition to the Court's analysis of Rule 608(b) above, the argument presupposes that Plaintiffs' counsel would, in fact, be permitted to ask Mr. Batmasian at trial, “did you order Mr. Baker to change financials to commit financial fraud on a lender?”, when such area of inquiry into loan fraud and the related inquiry into default on loans simply have no relevance in this FLSA case. In fact, the Court previously struck from the Corrected Second Amended Complaint the allegation that the Batmasians defaulted on a $105,000.00 loan as immaterial and irrelevant. [DE 137, pp. 4-6]. Further, the Court struck from the Corrected Second Amended Complaint allegations of Mr. Batmasian's failure to pay federal payroll taxes as immaterial and irrelevant. Id. at pp. 5-6.

As to Plaintiffs' counsel's questions as to certain financial documents that are the subject of an unrelated state court lawsuit involving Mr. Baker and the Batmasians, the Court finds that those questions clearly sought immaterial and irrelevant information and were disproportionate to the issues in this case. Defendants have already stipulated that they meet the annual sales volume threshold under the FLSA and that Mr. Batmasian has operational control over his company. Further, back on June 24, 2016, the undersigned entered a detailed Order [DE 154] which allowed certain limited financial discovery by Plaintiffs from the Defendants. It is clear that Plaintiffs' counsel's “financial fraud” and financial document questions at the deposition were improper and beyond the scope of discovery. Those questions appear to be designed by Plaintiffs' counsel to gather information related to a separate lawsuit and to harass Defendant. Defendant's counsel properly objected to those questions. Defense counsel's objections were proper pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d)(3) because Plaintiffs' counsel was conducting the deposition in bad faith and in a manner that unreasonably annoyed, embarrassed, or oppressed the deponent.

In sum, Plaintiffs' counsel's effort to interject collateral, irrelevant, immaterial and scandalous matters into this simple FLSA case is rejected. The Court finds that the deposition of Mr. Batmasian is CONCLUDED. In light of the fact that Plaintiffs' counsel wasted a portion of his allotted seven hours of deposition time by asking irrelevant, immaterial, and improper questions on collateral matters, Plaintiffs are not entitled to further depose Mr. Batmasian.

Defendant Marta Batmasian joined her husband, James Batmasian, in an initial joint Motion for Protective Order and to Limit Scope of Inquiry during Depositions [DE 175], which has been discussed fully above. Further, Defendant Marta Batmasian filed a separate Motion for Protective Order and to Limit Scope of Inquiry During Depositions [DE 183] on her own behalf. In her separate motion, Defendant specifically objects to Plaintiffs' counsel's questions as to non-party James Baker's employment status from 2007 to 2013. [DE 183, pp. 3-5]. The crux of Defendant's motion is that questions regarding James Baker are totally irrelevant and immaterial to this FLSA litigation and relate instead to a separate lawsuit.

According to Defendant, James Baker is a client of Plaintiffs' counsel, and Mr. Baker “has a lengthy, contentious litigation history with the Batmasians and other players in this lawsuit.” [DE 183, p. 3]. Defendant argues that Mr. Baker, an accountant, was never employed as a commercial leasing agent by the Batmasians or by any company owned by them. Id. at p. 4. As such, Defendant argues that any questions regarding whether Mr. Baker was an independent contractor or employee or was or was not terminated by Defendants are irrelevant and immaterial. Id. at pp. 4-5. Defendant argues that such issues are relevant only to Mr. Baker's state court lawsuit and that his counsel, Mr. Kleppin, continues to try to blur the lines between the cases and ask improper discovery questions in this FLSA case solely to advance the separate lawsuit. Id. at p. 5. Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs' counsel's questions were harassing and constituted bad faith conduct. Id. at pp. 4-5. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs' counsel used his allotted seven hours of deposition time at the July 12, 2016 deposition of Mrs. Batmasian and, therefore, the deposition should be deemed concluded. Id. at pp. 5-6.

*9 Plaintiffs filed a Response [DE 195] which the Court finds in part confusing and non-responsive to Defendant Marta Batmasian's motion. As best as can be deciphered from Plaintiffs' Response, James Baker is “an important witness” who “was the Defendants' controller for approximately 6 years” and is a witness to overtime violations and “violation of payroll tax laws, and many other financial improprieties engaged in by the Batmasians.” Id. at pp. 2-3. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants “intend to depose Mr. Baker.” Id. at p. 3. Plaintiffs then go into a long discussion apparently to show that Mr. Baker was an employee and not an independent contractor of the Batmasians, and that he was a “management employee.” Id. at pp. 3-4. Next, Plaintiffs discuss their position that Mr. Baker was fired and did not quit as apparently claimed by the Defendants. Id. at p. 5. Finally, Plaintiffs' request an additional two hours to take Mrs. Batmasian's deposition, which would be in addition to the seven hours already utilized. Id. at p. 5.

Defendant filed a Reply [DE 209] stating that Plaintiffs' counsel's questions were irrelevant, in bad faith, and intended to harass and oppress the deponent. Defendant cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d)(3) as the basis for justifying defense counsel's objections and the refusal of the deponent to answer certain questions. Id. at p. 2. Defendant points out that the “financial fraud” claims were stricken from the Corrected Second Amended Complaint; therefore, Mr. Baker could not be an important witness as to financial fraud since it is not part of this case. Id. Defendant argues that whether Baker was an employee or independent contractor years ago, or a member of management, has nothing to do with this FLSA case or what amount, if any, is owed to Plaintiffs for overtime work. Id. at p. 3. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' counsel conducted the deposition for seven hours and Plaintiffs have not made any showing as to why he should be allowed an additional two hours deposition time. Id. at p. 5.

Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony from Marta Batmasian and Extend the Deposition of Marta Batmasian as part of a motion addressed to seven deponents. See DE 258. As to the questioning of Mrs. Batmasian regarding James Baker, Plaintiffs again argue Mr. Baker's importance on the “financial fraud” issues. Id. at p. 2. Plaintiffs also seem to contend that further inquiry into issues regarding Mr. Baker are justified by Federal Rules of Evidence 404, 608 and 609 and by Defendants' Initial Disclosures which stated that Baker had information as to false allegations of financial fraud. Id.

Defendants Marta and James Batmasian filed a Response [DE 265] to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel as to the seven deponents, which response incorporated the prior arguments contained in Defendants' motions for protective order. As to the questioning of Mrs. Batmasian regarding James Baker, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' are trying to “bootstrap non-party James Baker's ‘Whistleblower’ claims as part of this straight-forward FLSA overtime claim.” Id. at p. 2. Defendants also state that they have filed Amended Initial Disclosures [DE 257], Id. at p. 5. In effect, Defendants argue that the only reason they listed James Baker in their Initial Disclosures was because of the scandalous and impertinent allegations contained in the initial versions of Plaintiffs' complaint. Id. Since those allegations have now been stricken, Defendants do not necessarily intend to call Mr. Baker as a witness and they have amended their Initial Disclosures. Id.[8]

Plaintiffs filed a Reply [DE 269] in which they argue that Defendants did not file an Answer until late July and have challenged every part of Plaintiffs' prima facie case to prove an overtime violation, so many issues have had to be addressed at the depositions. Id. at pp. 1-2. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants “listed Baker and his testimony about allegations of financial fraud as being issues in this case. After business hours on the last day of discovery, Defendants' amended those disclosures, and deleted that subject area; thus, it was an appropriate subject area for the entire discovery period.” Id. at p. 2. Plaintiffs contend that financial fraud not relating to conviction is admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 404 and 608. Id.They argue that “[w]hat part of the Defendants' financial fraud makes it trial [sic] is up to the Court to determine later at the motion in limine stage.” Id. at p. 3. Finally, Plaintiffs maintain that defense counsel questioned Mr. Batmasian on cross-examination about James Baker, Baker's independent contractor status, and payroll tax issues, and then defense counsel ended the deposition so that Plaintiffs' counsel “could not complete re-direct on those issues, which constitutes outrageous deposition behavior by defense counsel.” Id. at p. 4.

*10 Court's Ruling on Deposition of Marta Batmasian: The Court finds that Plaintiffs' counsel's questioning of Mrs. Batmasian regarding James Baker sought, in part, irrelevant and immaterial information which is not proportional to the issues in this case under Rule 26(b)(1). Plaintiffs' counsel's argument that Defendants' Initial Disclosures somehow make the inquiry about Mr. Baker relevant is disingenuous at best. Defendants formulated their Initial Disclosures based upon Plaintiffs' Corrected Second Amended Complaint as it then existed when it contained scandalous, immaterial, irrelevant, and impertinent allegations which have been since been stricken by the Court. In light of the Court's Order striking such allegations, Defendants have filed Amended Initial Disclosures and represent they do not intend to call Baker as a witness in their case-in-chief. Plaintiffs' counsel simply refuses to accept defense counsel's representation and stubbornly ignores such representation in his flawed arguments to the Court.

The Court agrees with the defense argument that Plaintiffs' counsel is unnecessarily and vexatiously over-litigating this case, is blurring the lines between this simple FLSA case and other unrelated cases where Plaintiffs' counsel represents other individuals such as James Baker and his wife, and is attempting to interject irrelevant matters in this lawsuit. It appears clear to the Court that Plaintiffs' counsel is attempting to conduct his depositions for the benefit of Mr. Baker's state court whistleblower case against Defendants, rather than stick to the issues in this simple FLSA case. The Court will not allow Plaintiffs' counsel to engage in such conduct. For these reasons and the reasons listed above regarding Mr. Batmasian's deposition, the Court GRANTS Defendant Marta Batmasian's motions [DE's 175, 183] and DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony and Extend the Depositions [DE 258] to the extent that the motion pertains to the deposition of Marta Batmasian. The Court orders that the deposition of Mrs. Batmasian is CONCLUDED. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any additional deposition time beyond the seven hours already expended. Plaintiffs have had more than ample opportunity to conduct the deposition of Marta Batmasian.

Defendants filed a Motion for Protective Order and to Limit Scope of Inquiry During Deposition of Jacqui Wyatt and to Terminate Deposition of Wyatt [DE 189]. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs conducted a deposition of approximately five hours in length of Jacqui Wyatt on July 22, 2016, and improperly inquired into areas (i) wholly irrelevant to a claim for overtime owed to commercial leasing agents, and (ii) for the purpose of harassing or burdening Defendants and Ms. Wyatt, who works for one of Defendants' companies. Id. at p. 1. Specifically, Defendants seek to prevent inquiry into Ms. Wyatt's knowledge of Mr. Batmasian's personal cell phone and into Defendants' property/business financial documents which have not been produced in this case and were allegedly misappropriated from Defendants by non-party James Baker. Id. at p. 2. Defendants assert that those documents are the subject of unrelated state court litigation between Baker and the Batmasians, where Plaintiffs' counsel in this FLSA case also represents Baker. Id. at pp. 3-4. Defendants allege that Plaintiffs' counsel improperly attempted to inquire into Defendants' real property/financial documents and the CAM charges or adjusted CAM charges on Defendants' rental properties. Id. at pp. 4-5. Defendants again argue that Plaintiffs' counsel is conducting discovery in bad faith, to harass, and to gain information for use in an unrelated state case. Id. at pp. 5-6. Many of the arguments made by Defendants as to the deposition of Jacqui Wyatt are the same as those made in reference to the depositions of Mr. and Mrs. Batmasian and will not be repeated here.

*11 Plaintiffs filed a Response [DE 226], Many of Plaintiffs' arguments are identical to other responses filed in this case. Specifically as to Ms. Wyatt, Plaintiffs again assert that the questions asked at her deposition are relevant since they involve “allegations of financial fraud.” [DE 226, pp. 4-5]. Apparently, Plaintiffs' counsel wants to inquire into allegedly false net operating revenue numbers used to defraud lenders and a third set of books. Id. at p. 5. Plaintiffs' counsel attempted at Ms. Wyatt's deposition to inquire into emails between Ms. Wyatt and Mr. Baker and asked questions regarding the Trump campaign. Id. at p. 6. Plaintiffs argue that this information is relevant to the Initial Disclosures and “potentially admissible” under both Rules 404 and 608. Id. Plaintiffs' counsel also wants to inquire into James Baker's previous employment status. Id. at p. 7. Plaintiffs argue the deposition of Ms. Wyatt should not be deemed completed and that Plaintiffs' counsel should have a further opportunity to question her. Id. at p. 8.

Defendants' Reply [DE 245] restates many arguments contained in Defendants' other motions, responses or replies regarding the depositions in this case and requests that the Court grant their motion. Defendants also contend that “Plaintiff engages in a convoluted (and ultimately unpersuasive) argument as to how Ms. Wyatt's testimony may be admissible...” Id. at p. 5.

Court's Ruling as to Deposition of Jacqui Wyatt: The Court finds that Plaintiffs' counsel's questioning of Ms. Wyatt was, at various points, frivolous, harassing, and improperly sought irrelevant and immaterial information. The Court adopts its rationale from the earlier portion of this Order regarding the Batmasian Defendants. Certain of the questions to Ms. Wyatt focused on collateral and irrelevant matters and were disproportionate to the needs of this case under Rule 26(b)(1). The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Protective Order and to Limit Scope of Inquiry During Deposition of Jacqui Wyatt and to Terminate Deposition of Wyatt [DE 189] and DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony [DE 258] to the extent that the motion pertains to the deposition of Ms. Wyatt. Ms. Wyatt's deposition is CONCLUDED. Plaintiffs' counsel had more than sufficient time to question Ms. Wyatt as to issues relevant and proportional to this case.

Defendants filed a Motion for Protective Order and to Limit Scope of Inquiry During Deposition of Jason Lazar and to Terminate Deposition of Non-party Jason Lazar [DE 202]. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs conducted a lengthy deposition of Jason Lazar on July 21, 2016, and improperly inquired into areas (i) wholly irrelevant to a claim for overtime owed to commercial leasing agents, and (ii) for the purpose of harassing or burdening Defendants and Mr. Lazar, who works for one of Defendants' companies. Id.at p. 1. Specifically, Defendants seek to prevent inquiry into Mr. Lazar's knowledge of James Baker's attendance at Mr. Lazar's father's funeral and whether James Baker is a “good guy.” Id. at p. 2. Defendants assert that Mr. Lazar refused to answer harassing questions at a certain point during the deposition. Id. at p. 3. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not permitted to call Mr. Lazar on direct examination and then present extrinsic evidence to impeach Mr. Lazar “to somehow make Mr. Baker look better.” Id. at p. 4. Finally, they maintain that Plaintiffs' “claimed admissibility of such information under Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) is simply a back door attempt to get into all of the issues that Plaintiffs' counsel believes are relevant to prove Baker's whistleblower claim.” Id.

Plaintiffs filed a Response [DE 230]. Many of Plaintiffs' arguments are identical to those in other responses, motions or replies filed in this case, and a large portion of the Response is spent rehashing Defendants' “attacks on Baker.” It appears that Plaintiffs' counsel copied and pasted part of their Response regarding Ms. Wyatt's deposition into their Response regarding Mr. Lazar's deposition without even bothering to correct the names. [DE 230, pp. 5-6].

*12 Defendants' Reply [DE 256] restates many of its prior arguments regarding the depositions in this case and request that the Court grant their motion. Defendants contend that the line of questioning Plaintiffs' counsel attempted to elicit from Mr. Lazar was “solely for the purpose of harassing the witness with this emotionally charged, wholly irrelevant, line of inquiry into his family life that is not related to any issue in this litigation...including inadmissible evidence regarding Baker's reputation.” Id. at p. 2. Defendants also claim that Plaintiffs' counsel's objective behind the harassing questioning is to “get information for use in Baker's Whistleblower case and/or attempts to improperly bolster Baker's reputation.” Id.

Court's Ruling as to Deposition of Jason Lazar: The Court finds that Plaintiffs' counsel's questioning of Mr. Lazar was, in part, frivolous, harassing, and improperly sought irrelevant and immaterial information. The areas of inquiry objected to by Defendants are irrelevant and immaterial in this FLSA case. Plaintiffs clearly had sufficient opportunity to question Mr. Lazar. The Court, therefore, GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Protective Order and to Limit Scope of Inquiry During Deposition of Jason Lazar and to Terminate Deposition [DE 202] and DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony [DE 258] to the extent that the motion pertains to the deposition of Mr. Lazar. The deposition of Mr. Lazar is CONCLUDED.

Defendants filed a Motion for Protective Order and to Limit Scope of Inquiry During Deposition of Paul Bedoyan and to Terminate Deposition of Bedoyan [DE 204]. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs conducted a lengthy deposition of Paul Bedoyan on July 26, 2016, and improperly inquired into areas (i) wholly irrelevant to a claim for overtime owed to commercial leasing agents, and (ii) for the purpose of harassing or burdening Defendants and Mr. Bedoyan, who works for one of Defendants' companies. Id. at p. 1. Specifically, Defendants seek to prevent inquiry into “(i) whether Mr. Bedoyan told Defendants that Mr. Baker was doing anything ‘illegal’ during Mr. Baker's tenure as Comptroller and CFO services of Investment Limited, and/or whether Mr. Bedoyan ever witnessed the Batmasians doing anything illegal...; [and] (ii) inquiry into whether Mr. Bedoyan ever received cash payments from the Batmasians and/or properly reported his income to the IRS.” Id. at pp. 1-2.

Defendants assert that, at the deposition, Plaintiffs' counsel asked Mr. Bedoyan three to four hours' worth of relevant questions and then began asking harassing, embarrassing and irrelevant questions as to Mr. Bedoyan's background and whether he had a visa when he began working for Investments Limited. [DE 204, p. 3]. Defendants again argue that Plaintiffs' counsel is trying to litigate Baker's whistleblower claim. Id. at p. 4. They also contend that, while Defendants may impeach Baker with admissible evidence, Plaintiffs are not permitted to call Bedoyan on direct examination and present extrinsic evidence to impeach Bedoyan to indirectly make Baker look better under the guise of Rule 608. Id. Next, Defendants maintain that Bedoyan is not a potential class member so his manner of compensation is not relevant and that there have been no allegations that any plaintiff or potential class member was compensated with cash. Id. At the August 29, 2016 hearing, defense counsel stated that Mr. Bedoyan previously worked as a controller for Defendants under Mr. Baker, and that they are not calling Mr. Bedoyan as a witness in their case-in-chief.

Plaintiffs filed a Response [DE 234]. Many of Plaintiffs' arguments are identical to those in other responses filed in this case. Plaintiffs argue that their counsel's questions to Bedoyan were “designed to rebut Defendants' claim that Baker's knowledge of allegations of financial fraud are false, by demonstrating through witnesses that the allegations of financial fraud are true.” [DE 234, p. 5]. Plaintiffs further argue that “[w]hether the Batmasians did anything illegal is central to this case” pursuant to Rule 404 because “the failure to pay overtime is a failure to also pay the payroll taxes associated with such payments, and thus cash payments are directly relevant to this case.” Id. Plaintiffs contend that the testimony sought is admissible under both Rules 404 and 608. Id. at p. 6.

*13 Defendants' Reply [DE 255] restates many arguments contained in its other motions and replies regarding the depositions in this case. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs are intentionally abusing the discovery process by subpoenaing Mr. Bedoyan for deposition “for no other reason than to get information for use in Baker's case.” Id. at p. 2. They argue that Bedoyan has no personal knowledge of material facts related to the claims and defense in Plaintiffs' overtime wage lawsuit. Id. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not made any real argument as to admissibility of Bedoyan's testimony under Rule 608 and that Plaintiffs' argument as to Rule 404(b) is “convoluted and unclear.” Id. at p. 4. Defendants maintain that the testimony that Plaintiffs' counsel tried to elicit from Bedoyan would not be admissible in this action under Rule 404(b). Id.

Court's Ruling as to Deposition of Paul Bedoyan: The Court finds that Plaintiffs' counsel's questioning of Mr. Bedoyan was, in part, frivolous, harassing, and improperly sought irrelevant and immaterial information. The areas of inquiry objected to by Defendants are irrelevant and immaterial in this FLSA case. Plaintiffs' counsel had sufficient time to question Mr. Bedoyan. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Protective Order and to Limit Scope of Inquiry During Deposition of Paul Bedoyan and to Terminate Deposition of Bedoyan [DE 204] and DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony [DE 258] to the extent that the motion pertains to the deposition of Mr. Bedoyan. Mr. Bedoyan's deposition is CONCLUDED.

The Batmasian Defendants filed a Motion for Protective Order and to Limit Scope of Inquiry During Deposition of Michael Daszkal [DE 205]. Defendants are seeking to prospectively limit the examination of Mr. Daszkal, a CPA and managing partner of the accounting firm, Daszkal Bolton, LLP, who is Investments Limited's outside accounting services provider, “strictly to Defendants' overtime pay policies and records of any overtime pay issues as to which Mr. Daszkal may have knowledge.” Id. at p. 2. Defendants also want to specifically preclude Plaintiffs' counsel's inquiry into Mr. Daszkal's knowledge of (1) Defendants' property/business/financial documents, (2) Baker's former employment status with Defendants, (3) whether Baker was actually terminated by Defendants, and (4) “other areas of inquiry which are wholly unrelated to the lawsuit at issue here.” Id.Defendants point out that Mr. Daszkal is not their potential witness and that Plaintiffs added him to their Amended Initial Disclosures on March 18, 2016, with no relevant subject matters about which he is expected to testify listed. Id. at p. 3. Defendants emphasize that Mr. Daszkal has little knowledge of Defendants' payroll and any overtime issues, but he is a material witness regarding issues in Baker's unrelated whistleblower case. Id. at pp. 4-5. Finally, they argue any examination regarding Defendants' financial documents and/or tax returns should be limited by the Court the same way that similar written discovery sought by Plaintiffs in this action was limited. Id. at p. 5.

Plaintiffs filed a Response [DE 240]. Many of Plaintiffs' arguments are identical to those in other responses filed in this case. Plaintiffs argue Defendants should not be able to limit a deposition before it is even taken and that Mr. Daszkal should have to hire his own attorney to litigate these issues. [DE 240, p. 1]. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants' property/business/financial records are relevant, were disclosed on Plaintiffs' Initial Disclosures many months ago, were subsequently produced, and were not timely objected to by Defendants. Id. at p. 3. Plaintiffs explain that, in the past, Mr. Daszkal accused Baker of making a threat against the Batmasians when Baker asked Marta Batmasian and Mr. Daszkal to go to the IRS to determine whether Baker was an employee or not and to determine whether Defendants had committed payroll tax evasion. Id. at pp. 4-5. Defendants also claim that the testimony they plan on eliciting is admissible under Rules 404 and 608. Id. at pp. 5-6.

*14 Defendants' Reply [DE 255] first states that the Federal Rules permit a party or a deponent to move for a protective order on a preventative basis when the moving party has confirmed with opposing counsel as to which areas of inquiry he will be delving into. Defendants point out that Plaintiffs have not made a substantive argument regarding the applicability of Rule 608 and emphasize that Mr. Daszkal does not have personal knowledge of material facts relating to the claims and defenses in this lawsuit. Id. at pp. 3-4. Defendants state that “[r]equiring Mr. Daszkal to sit through potentially seven (7) hours of deposition testimony largely unrelated to this action...and then subject him to repetitive deposition examination in Baker's case...is the definition of harassment.” Id. at p. 4.

Court's Ruling as to Deposition of Michael Daszkal: The Court notes that Mr. Daszkal is a CPA who provided outside accounting services to Investments Limited. Defendants do not intend to call Mr. Dazskal as a witness in their case-in-chief. The Court finds that, in light of Plaintiffs' counsel's prior improper discovery conduct in this case, it is necessary and appropriate to place limitations upon Plaintiffs' questioning of Mr. Daszkal. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Protective Order and to Limit Scope of Inquiry During Deposition of Michael Daszkal [DE 205], as follows.

The deposition of Mr. Daszkal shall proceed forthwith on a date, time and location convenient to Mr. Daszkal.[9] Counsel for the parties shall communicate and cooperate in setting this deposition. Plaintiffs' counsel shall be permitted to inquire into areas which are relevant to the claims and defenses in this FLSA case. Relevant and proportional areas of inquiry include, but are not limited to, Defendants' overtime pay policies, records of any overtime pay issues of which the deponent may have knowledge, pay policies and overtime practices, and related areas. Questions related to documents and records produced by Defendants per the Court's prior Order [DE 154] are also permitted. Plaintiffs' counsel shall additionally be permitted to inquire into alleged threats made by Mr. Baker against the Batmasians and any emails related thereto, as well as into any other emails between Mr. Dazskal and Mr. Baker which are relevant and proportional to the claims and defenses in this FLSA case. Plaintiffs' counsel shall follow the guidance provided by this Court in the entirety of this Order and its prior Orders entered in this case as to areas which are or are not relevant. Plaintiffs' counsel shall not inquire into areas of financial fraud, fraud on lenders, past allegations of failure to pay payroll taxes, sexual misconduct allegations, racially charged text messages, the CAM system or revised CAM system, the Yardi property management software, or any areas of inquiry specifically disallowed for other deponents in this Order or other Orders in this case. The deposition shall be limited to no more than four hours. Counsel for both Plaintiffs and Defendants shall conduct themselves properly and professionally at this deposition. The Court shall impose sanctions on any counsel who violates the letter or spirit of this Order.

*15 Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony from several individuals, including Nancy Tyson [DE 258]. In their motion, Plaintiffs do not specifically lay out what deposition testimony they are moving to compel from Nancy Tyson, and Plaintiffs' counsel was not able to give any specifics at the discovery hearing.

Defendants then filed a Motion for Protective Order and to Limit Scope of Inquiry During Deposition of Nancy Tyson and to Terminate Deposition of Tyson [DE 271]. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs conducted a lengthy deposition of Ms. Tyson on August 2, 2016, and improperly inquired into areas (i) wholly irrelevant to a claim for overtime owed to commercial leasing agents, and (ii) for the purpose of harassing or burdening Defendants and Ms. Tyson, who works for one of Defendants' companies. Id. at pp. 1-2. Specifically, Defendants seek to prevent inquiry into whether “the property management software, Yardi Systems's Inc., utilized by Defendants' business prior [to] 2008, contained multiple databases within the Yardi system.” Id. at p. 2. According to Defendants, “[t]hese allegations have been taken directly from non-party James Baker's unrelated state court case against the Batmasians.” Id. Many of the arguments in Defendants' motion are the same as have been asserted in other discovery motions in this case.

While Plaintiffs did not have the opportunity to file a written response to Defendants' motion, Plaintiffs' counsel had a full opportunity to argue his position at the August 29, 2016 hearing. Plaintiffs' counsel stated at the discovery hearing that he was not seeking information about the Yardi system.

Court's Ruling as to Deposition of Nancy Tyson: The Court finds that Plaintiffs' counsel's questioning of Ms. Tyson regarding the property management system known as Yardi was improper and sought irrelevant information in this FLSA case. The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Protective Order and to Limit Scope of Inquiry During Deposition of Nancy Tyson and to Terminate Deposition of Tyson [DE 271] and DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony [DE 258] to the extent that the motion pertains to the deposition of Ms. Tyson. The deposition of Ms. Tyson is deemed CONCLUDED. Plaintiffs' counsel had more than sufficient opportunity to question Ms. Tyson on issues relevant to this case.

Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony from several individuals, including Daron Tersakyan, and to Extend the Deposition of Daron Tersakyan [DE 258]. They seek to extend Mr. Tersakyan's deposition by two hours. Id. at p. 1. Plaintiffs allege that Tersakyan “refused to answer questions about receiving cash from the Batmasians and being misclassified as an independent contractor for 7 years in his current position (even though he and others all testified that since being reclassified to an employee after Baker filed his whistleblower suit in 2014 his duties have not changed at all).” Id. at 2. Plaintiffs claim that any payroll tax evasion perpetuated by Defendants would potentially be admissible as Rule 404evidence as to Defendants and as Rule 608(b) and Rule 609 evidence for the witness. Id.

In response, Defendants explain that defense counsel did not instruct Tersakyan to not answer any question, that Defendants did not seek a protective order for him, and that Plaintiffs misrepresent his testimony. [DE 265, p. 3].[10] Defendants argue that, after Tersakyan answered Plaintiffs' counsel's questions about Tersakyan's independent contractor status, Plaintiffs' counsel did not like the answers he received and “began badgering the witness about the amounts and terms of his compensation, which is personal information that is in no way relevant or proportional to the needs of this FLSA case.” Id. Defendants maintain that the only areas of inquiry left at issue are the amounts and terms of Tersakyan's compensation, including whether he received any cash payments. Id.Defendants claim that this line of inquiry has nothing to do with this FLSA action, has everything to do with Baker's unrelated whistleblower action, and is irrelevant. Id.

*16 In reply, Plaintiffs state that Tersakyan was Plaintiffs' supervisor and a key witness in this case. [DE 269, p. 3]. They allege that Tersakyan was engaged in payroll tax and overtime fraud and that Plaintiffs are “entitled to discovery information to potentially impeach on those areas at trial.” Id.

Court's Ruling as to Deposition of Daron Tersakyan: The Court first notes that the parties agree that Mr. Tersakyan is a key witness in this case and will be called by Defendants in their case-in-chief. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established good cause to take a further limited deposition of Mr. Tersakyan in order to question him on the following specific areas: whether he received cash payments from the Batmasians, whether he included those cash payments on his income tax returns, and the terms of his compensation. The Court finds these specific areas of inquiry to be relevant because, if Mr. Tersakyan, a key witness for Defendants, received cash payments from Defendants and failed to report such payments on his federal tax returns as income, it could be argued that such payments bias Mr. Tersakyan in favor of Defendants. That is, the receipt and reporting of such alleged cash payments may ultimately go to the issue of Mr. Tersakyan's bias or credibility. However, if Mr. Tersakyan denies receipt of any cash payments from Defendants, the inquiry into cash payments shall end. Further, if Mr. Tersakyan admits the receipt of cash payments and states that he properly reported such payments on his federal tax returns, the inquiry into cash payments shall end.

The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony from Daron Tersakyan and to Extend the Deposition of Daron Tersakyan [DE 258] to those limited areas stated and any relevant and proper follow-up questions. Mr. Tersakyan shall answer all such questions unless, of course, he invokes his privilege against self-incrimination pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The deposition shall be limited to 90 minutes.

Defendants filed a Motion to Compel Non-party James Baker to Produce Documents Responsive to Defendants' Subpoena Duces Tecum with Deposition [DE 206]. They explain that they issued the subpoena on June 21, 2016, requesting documents in Baker's possession that pertain to this lawsuit. Id. at p. 2. On June 29, 2016, Plaintiffs' counsel served objections as Plaintiff Blake and James Baker objected to every one of the 32 categories of documents. Id. While Baker has produced a large volume of documents (approximately 65,000 pages), Defendants allege that the documents are not responsive to the duces tecum and that they are documents that Baker stole from Defendants. Id. Next, after Defendants revised their duces tecum, Blake and Baker abandoned their substantive objections and they objected to performing any search of Baker's own records for responsive documents. Id. at p. 3. Defendants revised their duces tecum a second time, and Blake and Baker told Defendants that the duces tecum was sufficiently narrow, but that their objection is to actually searching Blake's records. Id. However, Defendants do not want Plaintiffs to interject the tens of thousands of files allegedly stolen by Baker into this action. Id.

*17 Defendants argue that they issued a valid subpoena to Baker which is narrow and specific and only seeks relevant documents that pertain to this lawsuit [DE 206, p. 4]. They also point out that Plaintiffs have injected Baker into this litigation. Id. Defendants contend that Baker has the burden of reviewing the documents in his possession for relevant documents that Plaintiffs intend to present in this action. Id. They argue that “[f]or Plaintiffs to now, on the eve of the close of discovery, refuse to prove the specific responsive documents regarding overtime that Plaintiffs intend to have Baker testify to at trial is a bad faith violation of discovery rules.” Id. at p. 5.

In response, Plaintiffs accuse Defendants of making misrepresentations to the Court. [DE 242, p. 1]. They claim that Defendants injected Baker into this litigation by listing them in their Initial Disclosures. Id. Plaintiffs argue that “Defendants' claim that Baker stole the documents is false, as the parties had an agreement that does not prohibit Baker from using any documents that he worked on or used at work, and the documents at issue are those.” Id. at p. 2. Plaintiffs contend that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(c) only requires production of documents as they are kept in the usual course of business, which Rule Baker has complied with, but Defendants improperly seek counsel's mental impressions of the documents. Id. Finally, Plaintiffs point out that all of the documents sought in the most recent duces tecum have been produced already. Id.

In reply, Defendants explain that Baker was listed as a potential witness in their Initial Disclosures based on the then-operative pleading, which contained a multitude of improper allegations that were later stricken and/or removed. [DE 260, p.1]. Defendants argue that, if Plaintiffs intend to have Baker testify at trial as to this overtime action, “and to testify as to certain relevant documents in support of those claims, such documents would need to be clearly and distinctly identified on a pre-trial exhibit list...so as to give Defendants notice of what documents Plaintiff intends to use at trial.” Id. at p. 2. Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs' and Baker's argument that a search of Baker's records would invade the work-product privilege is without merit since Baker is a non-party witness (and distinct from Plaintiffs) and any of Baker's documents that Plaintiffs intend to use at trial “must be disclosed in advance of trial.” Id. at pp. 3-4. Defendants also claim that Plaintiffs' argument about the documents being kept in the normal course of business is without merit because Blake may have produced the documents as kept in the normal course of business, but he also actually produced documents that are not relevant to the subpoena. Id. at p. 5.

In sum, this is a tempest in a teapot. The final revision of Defendants' subpoena to non-party Baker requested, “[a]ny and all documents in Baker's possession, custody or control that Plaintiffs intend to have Mr. Baker testify about and/or introduce into evidence.” [DE 206-6], Defendants argue that in response to that subpoena duces tecum that Baker produced (through his attorney, Mr. Kleppin) too many documents—on a thumb drive—and many of these documents are irrelevant to this case. Defendants want this Court to require non-party Baker to go through the documents and segregate out and produce only documents about which Plaintiffs intend to have Baker testify about at trial and/or which Plaintiffs intend to introduce into evidence. Of course, Plaintiffs' counsel objects and states that the documents produced on the thumb drive were responsive.

*18 The Court notes that the discovery period has been briefly extended until September 30, 2016, in order for Defendants to take Mr. Baker's deposition. See DE 227. Accordingly, the Court will DENY Defendants' motion to compel as to non-party Baker [DE 206]. Mr. Baker is a non-party, and the Court will not require him to go through tens of thousands of documents and determine which are responsive to the most recent version of Defendants' subpoena or make a determination as to which documents Plaintiffs will rely on at trial.

However, at the upcoming deposition of Mr. Baker, defense counsel shall be permitted to ask questions of Mr. Baker and then shall be permitted to follow up and ask Mr. Baker to specify and identify precisely which specific documents support his answer. At that time, Mr. Baker shall have the obligation of stating which specific documents support his answers, and he shall not be permitted to fulfill this obligation by referring to “all of the documents”, “most of them”, or “some of them”; rather, he shall specifically state which documents, if any, support his answer. Again, the deposition shall be conducted by counsel on both sides in a professional and courteous manner, and sanctions shall be imposed on any attorney who behaves unprofessionally or improperly at the deposition.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

*19 DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida, this 2nd day of September, 2016.