Erik Kuselius v. Holly Neiderkohr Docket Number:CV175039209S Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven File Date: October 09, 2018 Wilson, Robin L., Superior Court Judge RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (#115) UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. *1 On December 1, 2017, the defendant filed a motion for protective order (#115) relating to the plaintiff's interrogatories, requests for production and admissions that were served upon her. Pursuant to a status conference held on February 15, 2018, and on that same date, the court issued an order deferring ruling on all discovery motions and defendant's motion to seal, pending the court's ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss (#133). On July 6, 2018, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss as to counts one through ten, and granted the motion as to count eleven which contained allegations of libel and slander (#106.30). Subsequent to the court's ruling on the motion to dismiss, on August 29, 2018, the court denied the defendant's motion for protective order on grounds that the defendant had failed to attach a copy of the interrogatories, requests for production and admissions so that the court could make a determination of whether or not good cause existed. On September 10, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to reargue (#148) the court's August 29, 2018 ruling on grounds that she did in fact file the requisite documentation in support of the motion for protective order, and that said documentation was filed under seal with the court pending the court's ruling on her motion to seal (#122). The motion to reargue appeared on the court's September 24, 2018 short calendar for oral argument and the court heard oral argument on the motion on said date. After reviewing the motion to reargue and hearing the parties' argument, the court granted the defendant's motion to reargue and vacated its prior order denying the motion for protective order (#148.10). The court ruled that it would review the documents lodged under seal which the court did not have at the time the court denied the motion for protective order and would issue an order in lieu of the prior order once the court had an opportunity to review the documents. See Docket Entry #148.10. In ruling on the defendant's motion for protective order, the court has carefully reviewed the plaintiff's interrogatories, requests for production and admissions that were lodged under seal with the court pending ruling on defendant's motion to seal (#122). The court has also carefully reviewed the plaintiff's amended complaint (#109) dated October 31, 2017, and the allegations contained therein to support each of the causes of action alleged against the defendant. Having carefully reviewed 70 interrogatories, 55 requests for production and 195 requests for admissions, the court finds it necessary to remind the plaintiff of the elements of each of his causes of action and the relevant factual allegations necessary to establish those causes of action, since much of what the plaintiff seeks through discovery is totally irrelevant and unnecessarily imposes upon the privacy interests of the defendant. The court must also remind the parties and counsel, first, this action is not in family court, and second, while the rules of discovery are to be liberally construed, they are not to be used for retaliation, annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or to unnecessarily impose upon the privacy interests of the parties. The court also points out that it is not ruling on the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims. However, because of the numerous irrelevant discovery requests submitted by the plaintiff, the court found it necessary to set forth each element for each cause of action claimed, in order to fairly weed out of the plaintiff's discovery requests, that which the court found to be unnecessary, irrelevant, oppressive, embarrassing, retaliatory and wholly invasive of the defendant's privacy interests, and to make a fair ruling on each request based on the causes of action and allegations as they are presently set forth in the plaintiff's amended complaint. I COUNT ONE—BATTERY *2 A person is liable for the tort of battery if “(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alteiri v. Colasso, 168 Conn. 329, 334, n.3, 362 A.2d 798 (1975), quoting 1 Restatement (Second), Torts § 13 (1965). “The intent required for a battery ... must be an intentional and unpermitted contact with the body of the plaintiff. Courts have also described the required intent as being unlawful ... where unlawful means either intentional, wanton or negligent conduct in the application of force ... [t]he contact complained of must be harmful or offensive to the plaintiff's person.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tyson v. Franco-Camacho, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-05-5001078-S (March 23, 2012, Wilson, J.). Courts have previously found that when the plaintiff has not alleged a physical contact, the plaintiff has not alleged the essential elements of battery. Doe v. Pahl, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-10-5014881 (June 8, 2011, Pittman, J.). The plaintiff in the present case alleges that during the period of 2015, 2016 and 2017, including incidents in Milford, Hamden and Stamford, Connecticut the defendant physically attacked the plaintiff by “punching, kicking, scratching, biting, and bashing the plaintiff's face with heavy objects.” II COUNT TWO—ASSAULT The tort of assault is “the intentional causing of imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact in another.” DeWitt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 5 Conn.App. 590, 594, 501 A.2d 768 (1985), quoting 1 Restatement (Second), Torts § 21 (1965). “Assault has also been defined as any attempt with force or violence to do corporeal offense to another, coupled with the present apparent ability to complete the act ... Thus actual, physical contact ... is not necessary to prove civil assault.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Engle v. Bosco, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-05-4006996-S (September 14, 2006, Robinson, J.). In count two, the plaintiff alleges a litany of allegations regarding alleged adulterous conduct by the defendant during the plaintiff's and defendant's marriage, most of which are totally irrelevant to the stated cause of action of assault. After carefully weeding through all of these allegations, the court found in one paragraph an allegation which is possibly relevant to establishing the claim of assault against the defendant. The plaintiff alleges that in 2017, the defendant and Darren Clark, a coworker of the defendant, threatened the plaintiff with professional injury and bodily harm. See count 2, paragraph 29. III COUNT THREE—BREACH OF CONTRACT “The elements of a breach of contract action are the formation of an agreement, performance by one party, breach of the agreement by the other party and damages.” (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) Keller v. Beckenstein, 117 Conn.App. 550, 558, 979 A.2d 1055 (2009). The plaintiff alleges in this count that he and the defendant entered into an agreement in 2016 which plaintiff claims was unilaterally breached by the defendant resulting in harm to him. IV COUNT FOUR—TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONS “A claim for intentional interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to establish: (1) the existence of a contractual or beneficial relationship; (2) the defendant's knowledge of that relationship; (3) the defendant's intent to interfere with the relationship; (4) that the interference was tortious; and (5) a loss suffered by the plaintiff that was caused by the defendant's tortious conduct.” Rioux v. Barry, 283 Conn. 338, 351, 927 A.2d 304 (2007). “This court has long recognized a cause of action for tortious interference with contract rights or other business relations ... [We have held, however, that] not every act that disturbs a contract or business expectancy is actionable ... [F]or a plaintiff successfully to prosecute such an action it must prove that the defendant's conduct was in fact tortious. This element may be satisfied by proof that the defendant was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation or molestation ... or that the defendant acted maliciously ... [A]n action for intentional interference with business relations ... requires the plaintiff to plead and prove at least some improper motive or improper means ... The plaintiff in a tortious interference claim must demonstrate malice on the part of the defendant, not in the sense of ill will, but 'intentional interference without justification.' ... In other words, the [plaintiff] bears the burden of alleging and proving 'lack of justification' on the part of the actor.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Daley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766, 805-06, 734 A.2d 112 (1999). *3 The Appellate Court has recognized that an individual has undertaken a tortious act when, acting with an improper motive, they urge one party to cancel its contract with another. Reyes v. Chetta, 143 Conn.App. 758, 766, 71 A.3d 1255 (2013). In Reyes v. Chetta, the defendant sold his landscaping business to another individual. Id., at 760-61. In turn, that individual sold the landscaping business, along with its accounts, to the plaintiff. Id., at 761. When the defendant discovered the subsequent sale, he began contacting his former customers, asking them to cancel their accounts with the plaintiff and to rehire the defendant. Id. In so doing, he managed to take roughly 70% of his former customers from the plaintiff. Id.Thereafter, the plaintiff successfully sued on a theory of tortious interference with business expectancies. Id., at 762-63. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment. Reyes v. Chetta, supra, 143 Conn.App. at 766. In particular, the court noted that it was proper to ignore the defendant's claimed justification for his conduct—that the individual to whom he had first sold the landscaping business was in default on that contract—because (a) the defendant had legal remedies available on that contract and (b) the defendant made statements indicating simply that he wanted the business back for himself. Id. In the absence of any justification or proper motive for his actions, there was ample evidence on the record to support a finding of tortious conduct. The plaintiff in count four alleges that the “defendant's conduct, including her tortious and persistent course of conduct has prevented the plaintiff from earning his living and obtaining jobs to which he was qualified” and that the plaintiff and defendant had a business relationship, which the defendant intentionally and willfully sabotaged. V COUNT FIVE—HARASSMENT/EXTORTION General Statutes § 53a-119 provides in relevant part: “A person commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner. Larceny includes, but is not limited to: (5) Extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: (A) Cause physical injury to some person in the future; or (B) cause damage to property; or (C) engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or (D) accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against him; or (E) expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule ... (G) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or ... (I) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the actor.” “ 'There is no case law that provides a civil remedy for attempted extortion in violation of General Statute § 53a-119(5)(D). Therefore, there is an absence of any genuine issue of material fact as to whether ... [the] complaint states a legally cognizable cause of action.' Carnemolla v. Walsh, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 990155192.” Hanssler v. New Country Motor Cars of Greenwich, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV020192755S (October 19, 2005, Wilson, J.). The plaintiff alleges in count five that on or before April 2017, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the defendant took a picture of him while he was naked changing his clothes. Thereafter, the defendant threatened to expose said picture to the plaintiff's detriment and to the detriment of his minor children unless the plaintiff submitted to the defendant's demands. The plaintiff further alleges that in 2016, the plaintiff was involved in two separate Connecticut litigations to which the defendant was a material witness. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant threatened that unless the plaintiff submitted to her demands she would testify falsely against the plaintiff; withhold testimony or information with respect to the plaintiff's legitimate claims; provide false information to parties associated with the litigation; and make false statements that would harm the plaintiff and his minor children. VI COUNT SIX—STALKING/HARASSMENT *4 General Statutes § 53a-181d provides: “(a) For the purposes of this section, 'course of conduct' means two or more acts, including, but not limited to, acts in which a person directly, indirectly or through a third party, by any action, method, device or means, including, but not limited to, electronic or social media, (1) follows, lies in wait for, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, harasses, communicates with or sends unwanted gifts to, a person, or (2) interferes with a person's property, and 'emotional distress' means significant mental or psychological suffering or distress that may or may not require medical or other professional treatment or counseling. (b) A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when: (1) Such person knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to (A) fear for such person's physical safety or the physical safety of a third person, or (B) suffer emotional distress; or (2) Such person intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear that such person's employment, business or career is threatened, where (A) such conduct consists of the actor telephoning to, appearing at or initiating communication or contact at such other person's place of employment or business, provided the actor was previously and clearly informed to cease such conduct, and (B) such conduct does not consist of constitutionally protected activity.” The plaintiff alleges that in 2016 and in May and June 2017, he was being stalked by the defendant in a number of ways as set forth in count six of the complaint. VII COUNT SEVEN—CIVIL CONVERSION “The tort of [c]onversion occurs when one, without authorization, assumes and exercises ownership over property belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner's rights ... Thus, [c]onversion is some unauthorized act which deprives another of his property permanently or for an indefinite time; some unauthorized assumption and exercise of the powers of the owner to his harm. The essence of the wrong is that the property rights of the plaintiff have been dealt with in a manner adverse to him, inconsistent with his right of dominion and to his harm.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Deming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 745, 770, 905 A.2d 623 (2006). A plaintiff must allege “that (1) the material at issue belonged to the plaintiff, (2) that [the defendant] deprived the plaintiff of that material for an indefinite period of time, (3) that [the defendant's] conduct was unauthorized, and (4) that [the defendant's] conduct harmed the plaintiff.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coster v. Duquette, 119 Conn.App. 827, 832, 990 A.2d 362 (2010). The plaintiff alleges that on or about September 1, 2017, the defendant intentionally stole money belonging to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant took more than $413,000 from an account that was set up by the plaintiff while he was in Connecticut and contained his name. VIII COUNT EIGHT—FRAUD/MISREPRESENTATION “The essential elements of an action in common-law fraud ... are that: (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and (4) the other party did so act upon that false representation to his injury ... Under a fraud claim of this type, the party to whom the false representation was made claims to have relied on that representation and to have suffered harm as a result of the reliance ... In contrast to a negligent representation, [a] fraudulent representation ... is one that is knowingly untrue, or made without belief in its truth, or recklessly made and for the purpose of inducing action upon it ... This is so because fraudulent misrepresentation is an intentional tort.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 142, 2 A.3d 859 (2010). The plaintiff alleges that on or around 2016 the defendant contacted the plaintiff's ex-wife. The defendant offered to help plaintiff's ex-wife and hurt the plaintiff's relationship with his children in part so that the defendant could spend more time alone with the plaintiff and less time with the plaintiff and his children. The plaintiff alleges that he was unaware of the communication between the defendant and his ex-wife and that for two years the defendant and the plaintiff's ex-wife communicated daily in an attempt by the defendant to harm the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges that many of the communications were in writing. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant would lie to the plaintiff and deny she was communicating with the plaintiff's ex-wife and that the defendant's deceptions were done to induce the plaintiff to take action against his interests, resulting in harm to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant knew her misrepresentations were false and detrimental when made and that the defendant made these false statements to get the plaintiff and others to rely on them; which in fact occurred to the plaintiff's detriment. The plaintiff makes further allegations relating to the communications between the defendant and the plaintiff's ex-wife occurring in 2017 wherein the defendant suggested to plaintiff's ex-wife that they make claims that the plaintiff was abusing his two minor children. IX - X COUNTS NINE AND TEN—INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS *5 There are four elements which the plaintiff must plead and prove to prevail on his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. “It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). “Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind ... [I]t is the intent to cause injury that is the gravamen of the tort ...” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tracy v. New Milford Public Schools, 101 Conn.App. 560, 569, 922 A.2d 280, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 910, 931 A.2d 935 (2007). “[I]n assessing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court performs a gatekeeping function. In this capacity, the role of the court is to determine whether the allegations of a complaint ... set forth behaviors that a reasonable fact finder could find to be extreme or outrageous. In exercising this responsibility, the court is not fact finding, but rather it is making an assessment whether, as a matter of law, the alleged behavior fits the criteria required to establish a claim premised on intentional infliction of emotional distress.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism District Commission, 92 Conn.App. 835, 847, 888 A.2d 104 (2006). “Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous! ... Conduct on the part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 443, 815 A.2d 119 (2003). The plaintiff alleges that the defendant knew or should have known that her conduct as alleged in the previous counts would likely cause emotional distress to the plaintiff and that said conduct was the cause of the distress suffered by the plaintiff. “To prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must plead and prove the following: (1) the defendant's conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's distress was foreseeable; (3) the emotional distress was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm; and (4) the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stancuna v. Schaffer, 122 Conn.App. 484, 490, 998 A.2d 1221 (2010). “The foreseeability requirement in a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is more specific than the standard negligence requirement ... [F]or negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must plead that the actor should have foreseen that her behavior would likely cause harm of a specific nature, i.e., emotional distress likely to lead to illness or bodily harm.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “[E]ssentially, [the foreseeability element] requires that the fear or distress experienced by the plaintiffs be reasonable in light of the conduct of the defendants. If such a fear were reasonable in light of the defendants' conduct, the defendants should have realized that their conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing distress, and they, therefore, properly would be held liable. Conversely, if the fear were unreasonable in light of the defendants' conduct, the defendants would not have recognized that their conduct could cause this distress and, therefore, they would not be liable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 447, 815 A.2d 119 (2003). *6 The plaintiff realleges all previous paragraphs and claims that the defendant's conduct as alleged therein caused an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress to the plaintiff which defendant knew or should have known; that the distress was foreseeable; that the distress was severe enough to cause the plaintiff to suffer illness for which he was treated; and that the defendant's actions were the specific cause of this distress. Based upon all of the above legal elements as they apply to each cause of action alleged by the plaintiff, the court rules as follows on the defendant's motion for protective order. The trial court has the inherent authority to moderate the discovery process by imposing protective orders under appropriate circumstances. See Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 276 Conn. 168, 221-22 n.59, 884 A.2d 981 (2005). “Our Supreme Court has noted: '[The] rules of discovery are designed to make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wexler v. DeMaio, 280 Conn. 168, 188-89, 905 A.2d 1196 (2006) quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682, 78 S.Ct. 983, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958).” Travelers Property & Casualty Co. v. Christie, 99 Conn.App. 747, 759, 916 A.2d 114 (2007). Our Supreme Court has also long. recognized that the granting or denial of a discovery request rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. See Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 280 Conn. 1, 16-17, 905 A.2d 55 (2006). “The court's discretion applies to decisions concerning whether the information is material, privileged, substantially more available to the disclosing party, or within the disclosing party's knowledge, possession or power ... A complete denial of discovery, however, is seldom within the court's discretion unless the court finds that one or more of the limitations on discovery expressed above applies.” (Citations omitted.) Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 59-60, 459 A.2d 503 (1983). In relevant part, Practice Book § 13-5 provides, “for good cause shown, the judicial authority may make any order which justice requires to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: ... (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters ...” (Emphasis added.) Under Practice Book § 13-5 the party seeking the protective order is required to show good cause. The courts have defined good cause as “a sound basis or legitimate need to take judicial action.” Welch v. Welch, 48 Conn.Sup. 19, 20, 828 A.2d 707 [34 Conn. L. Rptr. 171] (2003) “Good cause must be based upon a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Id. “Whether or not 'good cause' exists for entry of a protective order must depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.” Carrier Corp. v. Home Insurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 88352383 S (February 11, 1992, Schaller, J.) [6 Conn. L. Rptr. 3]. “To determine whether good cause exists, courts balance 'the need for information against the injury that might result if uncontrolled disclosure is compelled.' “ In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F.Sup.2d 385, 413-16 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1994)). INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION *7 Ruling on the defendant's motion for protective as follows. Where the court has granted the motion for protective order, the defendant does not have to respond as the court finds good cause to limit the discovery. Where the court has denied same, the defendant shall respond in accordance with the court's ruling. 1. A) The motion is DENIED. Disclosure is limited to defendant's address in 2015, 2016, 2017 and present address. B) DENIED. Limited to the dates stated above. C) GRANTED D) GRANTED E) GRANTED 2. A) The motion is DENIED. Limited to aliases the defendant used during the period of 2016 and 2017 relating to specific allegations in count six. B) GRANTED C) GRANTED 3. GRANTED. Irrelevant. 4. GRANTED. Irrelevant. 5. DENIED. Limited to the period of 2016 to present as alleged in count three, relating to the alleged agreement entered into by the parties in 2016. A) DENIED. Limited to the period of 2016 to present as alleged in count three. B) DENIED. Limited to the period of 2016 to present as alleged in count three. 6. DENIED. The sources of goods, services, income, revenue or benefits, including but not limited to endorsements, trade, services, gifts, promotional events, loans and paid appearances, limited to the allegations contained in count three. A) DENIED B) DENIED C) DENIED D) DENIED E) GRANTED. Irrelevant to claims alleged. F) GRANTED. Irrelevant to claims alleged. 7. GRANTED 8. GRANTED 9. GRANTED 10. A-H) GRANTED as to all items since plaintiff's complaint does not allege that the defendant took all of his items. However, defendant shall disclose such information as specifically alleged to have been taken in count 7 of the complaint. 11. A-G) DENIED. Limited to the period of September 2017 as specifically alleged in count seven and relating to the specific account as alleged therein. 12. A-I) DENIED. Limited to the period of September 2017 as alleged in count 7 and the account alleged in count 7. 13. A-D) DENIED. Limited to September 2017, the period of time alleged in count 7 and to the account alleged in count 7. 14. A-F) DENIED. Limited to September 2017, the period of time alleged in count 7 and to the account alleged in count 7. 15. A-F) DENIED. Limited to the period of September 2017 as alleged in count 7. 16. A-G) GRANTED. Irrelevant to the period of time as alleged in the conversion count. 17. A-G) GRANTED. Irrelevant. 18. A-F) GRANTED. Irrelevant as plaintiff claims of assault and battery are as to him. 19. A-F) GRANTED as to anyone. DENIED as to the plaintiff and limited to the specific time period of 2015, 2016 and 2017. 20. GRANTED. Overbroad, not limited in time and scope and irrelevant to the allegations contained in the complaint. 21. GRANTED. Irrelevant. 22. GRANTED. Irrelevant. 23. A-F) GRANTED as to “have you ever.” DENIED as to specific time period 2015, 2016 and 2017, and limited to domestic violence and anger issues as alleged in count 1, par. 17. 24. GRANTED. Irrelevant. 25. GRANTED. Irrelevant. 26. GRANTED. Irrelevant. The issue for trial is whether the defendant by a fair preponderance of the evidence committed an assault and battery on the plaintiff. 27. GRANTED. Irrelevant. 28. GRANTED. Irrelevant. 29. GRANTED. Irrelevant. 30. GRANTED. Irrelevant. 31. GRANTED. Irrelevant. 32. GRANTED. Irrelevant. 33. GRANTED. Irrelevant. Slander and Libel counts have been dismissed. *8 34. GRANTED. Irrelevant as to anyone since libel and slander counts have been dismissed. DENIED as to plaintiff's employer during the period plaintiff claims defendant breached the contract they had and tortiously interfered with plaintiff's business relations, limited to the period of January 2016 to present. See counts 3 and 4. 35. GRANTED as to Clarke and Marino as there is no allegation in the complaint of communications to them relating to the plaintiff's children. DENIED as to Karen Kuselius, limited to the period 2016 to the present. 37. GRANTED 38. GRANTED 39. GRANTED 40. GRANTED as to “anyone else.” DENIED as to the specific photograph alleged in count 7 to have been taken of the plaintiff on or before April 2017. GRANTED. DENIED as to the specific photograph alleged in count 7 to have been taken of the plaintiff on or before April 2017. 42. GRANTED 43. GRANTED 44. GRANTED 45. GRANTED 46. GRANTED 47. GRANTED 48. GRANTED as to all medications. DENIED as to medications prescribed pursuant to therapy sought by the defendant as alleged in count 1, paragraph 17, relating specifically to therapy sought for domestic violence and anger issues. Limited to the period of time such treatment was sought. 49. GRANTED as to all email addresses since 2014. DENIED as to all email addresses since 2016 and 2017. See count 6 paragraph 88. 50. GRANTED as to all email addresses since 2014. DENIED as to email accounts since 2016 and 2017 which is the relevant time period alleged in count 6. 51. GRANTED. There is no allegation in the complaint regarding defendant's use of social media accounts as it relates to any of the alleged causes of action. Count 6 specifically relates to an email account and a cell phone. 52. GRANTED. Irrelevant. 53. GRANTED as to “any person.” DENIED as to the plaintiff but limited to the period 2016 and 2017 as alleged in count 6 and limited to the language in statute “lies in wait for, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, harasses, communicates with or sends unwanted gifts to.” Defendant shall describe the manner used. 54. GRANTED as to “any person.” DENIED as to the plaintiff, limited to the incidents for the periods 2015, 2016 and 2017 as alleged in counts one and two. 55. GRANTED. Irrelevant. Count 8 alleges communications between the defendant and the plaintiff's ex-wife. 56. GRANTED. Irrelevant. 57. GRANTED. Irrelevant as to “anyone.” Moreover, the threat alleged in count 6 specifically relates to a photograph. There is no allegation that defendant threatened to report or took affirmative steps to report plaintiff to IRS as a basis for the claim of extortion or harassment. 58. a. GRANTED. Irrelevant. b. GRANTED. Irrelevant. c. DENIED. See count 7. Limited to the time period 2017 as alleged in count 7. 59. GRANTED. The court is not clear how this is relevant to the causes of action alleged by the plaintiff. 60. GRANTED. The causes of action and allegations contained therein do not relate to any and all of the plaintiff's family members. 61. DENIED. Limited to the period of 2016 and 2017 as alleged in count 8. 62. GRANTED. Irrelevant to the causes of action as alleged and the elements required to establish said causes of action. 63. GRANTED. Irrelevant. 64. GRANTED 65. GRANTED. Irrelevant to the causes of action alleged and the elements to required to establish said causes of action. *9 66. GRANTED 67. GRANTED 68. GRANTED 69. GRANTED 70. GRANTED REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION Ruling on the defendant's motion for protective as follows. Where the court has granted the motion for protective order, the defendant does not have to respond as the court finds good cause to limit the discovery. Where the court has denied same, the defendant shall respond in accordance with the court's ruling. 1. GRANTED 2. GRANTED 3. DENIED. Limited to the time period of September 2017 as alleged in count 7 and to the account containing funds that plaintiff alleges defendant took and converted. 4. GRANTED 5. GRANTED as to 2014-2015. DENIED as to 2016 and 2017. See counts 3 and 7. 6. DENIED as to 2016 and 2017. 7. GRANTED as to “any and all.” DENIED as to account alleged in count 7 and limited to the time period of September 2017 as alleged in count 7. 8. GRANTED as to “any and all.” DENIED as to account alleged in count 7 and limited to the time period of September 2017 as alleged in count 7. 9. GRANTED 10. GRANTED 11. GRANTED 12. GRANTED 13. GRANTED 14. GRANTED 15. GRANTED as to all cell phone information for period January 2013. DENIED as to cell phone information covering the period 2016 and 2017. See count 6, paragraphs 91-94. 16. GRANTED as to all communications, evidence, information, etc. DENIED as to same for the period 2016 and 2017. See count 6. 17. GRANTED 18. GRANTED as to any and all. DENIED but limited to specific allegations in count 6, for period 2016 and 2017. 19. GRANTED 20. GRANTED as to any. DENIED as to documents relating to the photograph alleged in count 5 for the period 2017, as alleged therein, and the account alleged in count 7 for the period September 2017. 21. GRANTED 22. GRANTED 23. GRANTED 24. GRANTED as to all. DENIED as to communications to plaintiff's employer/s and/or business associates/co-workers for the period 2016 and 2017. See counts 3 and 4. 25. GRANTED 26. GRANTED. DENIED as to Kristen Kuselius only and limited to 2016 and 2017. See count 8. 27. GRANTED 28. GRANTED 29. GRANTED 30. GRANTED 31. GRANTED 32. GRANTED 33. GRANTED 34.GRANTED 35. GRANTED as to any and all. DENIED as to the specific photograph alleged in count 5 and limited specifically to the plaintiff as alleged in count 5. 36. GRANTED 37. GRANTED as to any and all. DENIED as to the specific photograph alleged in count 5 limited specifically to the plaintiff as alleged in count 5. 38. GRANTED 39. GRANTED 40. GRANTED 41. GRANTED 42. GRANTED 43. GRANTED 44. GRANTED 45. GRANTED as to any and all. DENIED as to the period defendant sought professional help relating to domestic violence and anger issues as alleged in count 1, par. 17 of the complaint. 46. GRANTED 47. DENIED. Limited to 2015, 2016 and 2017 as alleged in count 1 and limited to “domestic violence and anger issues” as alleged in count 1. 48. GRANTED 49. GRANTED 50. GRANTED 51. GRANTED 52. GRANTED as to any person. DENIED as to the plaintiff and limited to the incidents alleged in count 1 and limited to the period 2015, 2016, 2017 as alleged in count 1. 53. GRANTED as to any and all. DENIED as to threats conveyed as alleged in count 2 pars. 29-31 and limited to the period of time of 2017. *10 54. GRANTED 55. GRANTED REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS Ruling on defendant's motion for protective order is as follows. Where the court has granted the motion, the defendant does not have to respond as the court finds good cause to grant defendant's motion as to those specific requests for admission. Where the court has denied the motion, the defendant shall respond in accordance with Practice Book § 13-23(a). 1. GRANTED 2. GRANTED 3. DENIED 4. DENIED 5. GRANTED 6. GRANTED 7. GRANTED 8. GRANTED as to any document DENIED as to the account alleged to have been converted in count 7. 9. See court's ruling on request #8. 10. GRANTED 11. DENIED 12. DENIED 13. DENIED 14. DENIED 15. DENIED 16. DENIED 17. DENIED 18. DENIED 19. DENIED 20. DENIED 21. DENIED 22. GRANTED 23. GRANTED 24. DENIED but limited to the period of 2015, 2016, and 2017 as alleged in count 1. 25. DENIED but limited to the period of 2015, 2016 and 2017. 26. GRANTED 27. GRANTED 28. GRANTED 29. GRANTED 30. GRANTED 31. GRANTED 32. DENIED but limited to period of 2015, 2016 and 2017. 33. GRANTED 34. GRANTED 35. GRANTED 36. DENIED but limited to period of 2015, 2016 and 2017 as alleged in count 1 par. 17. 37. DENIED but limited to the therapy sought for domestic violence and anger issues for period 2015, 2016 and 2017. 38. GRANTED 39. GRANTED 40. GRANTED 41. GRANTED 42. GRANTED 43. GRANTED 44. GRANTED 45. GRANTED 46. GRANTED 47. GRANTED. 48. GRANTED 49. GRANTED 50. GRANTED 51. GRANTED 52. GRANTED 53. GRANTED 54. GRANTED 55. GRANTED 56. GRANTED 57. GRANTED 58. GRANTED 59. GRANTED 60. DENIED 61. DENIED 62. GRANTED 63. GRANTED 64. GRANTED 65. GRANTED 66. GRANTED 67. GRANTED 68. GRANTED 69. GRANTED 70. GRANTED 71. GRANTED 72. GRANTED 73. GRANTED 74. GRANTED 75. GRANTED 76. GRANTED 77. GRANTED 78. GRANTED 79. GRANTED 80. GRANTED 81. GRANTED 82. GRANTED 83. GRANTED 84. GRANTED 85. GRANTED 86. GRANTED 87. GRANTED 88. GRANTED 89. GRANTED 90. GRANTED 91. GRANTED 92. GRANTED 93. GRANTED 94. GRANTED 95. GRANTED 96. GRANTED 97. GRANTED 98. GRANTED 99. GRANTED 100. GRANTED 101. GRANTED 102. GRANTED 103. GRANTED 104. GRANTED 105. GRANTED 106. GRANTED 107. GRANTED 108. GRANTED 109. GRANTED 110. GRANTED 111. GRANTED 112. GRANTED 113. GRANTED 114. GRANTED 115. GRANTED 116. GRANTED 117. GRANTED 118. GRANTED 119. GRANTED 120. GRANTED 121. GRANTED 122. GRANTED 123. GRANTED 124. DENIED. Limited to period of 2017 as alleged in count 5, par., 68. 125. DENIED. See court's ruling in #124. 126. DENIED 127. DENIED 128. GRANTED as the use of the word “track.” DENIED as to the language in statute “lies in wait for, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, harasses, communicates with or sends unwanted gifts to” and limited to period June 2017. 129. GRANTED 130. GRANTED as to use of the word “tracked.” DENIED as to the language in statute “lies in wait for, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, harasses, communicates with or sends unwanted gifts to” and limited to period June 2017. 131. DENIED. Limited to period June 2017. 132. DENIED 133. GRANTED. Irrelevant to the claim alleged in count 6. 134. DENIED 135. GRANTED 136. GRANTED 137. GRANTED 138. GRANTED 139. GRANTED 140. GRANTED *11 141. DENIED. See count 6, par. 88 142. DENIED. See court's ruling on #141. 143. DENIED 144. GRANTED 145. GRANTED. Plaintiff does not allege in either counts 6 or 7 the defendant's use of his social security number. 146. GRANTED. This is not an allegation which serves as a basis to any of the causes of claimed. 147. DENIED. See count 6, par. 88. 148. DENIED 149. DENIED 150. DENIED. See count 6, par. 89. 151. DENIED 152. DENIED. See count 6, par. 91. 153. DENIED 154. DENIED. See count 6. 155. DENIED 156. DENIED 157. GRANTED. Plaintiff does not state a period of time relevant to the allegations contained in count 6. 158. GRANTED 159. GRANTED 160. GRANTED 161. GRANTED 162. GRANTED 163. GRANTED. Plaintiff does not identify the relevant time period as it relates specifically the allegation set forth in count 8. 164. GRANTED. See court's ruling on #163. 165. DENIED. Limited to 2017 as alleged in count 8, par. 132. 166. DENIED. See court's ruling on #165. 167. DENIED. Limited to 2017. 168. GRANTED 169. GRANTED 170. GRANTED 171. GRANTED 172. GRANTED 173. GRANTED 174. DENIED 175. GRANTED 176. GRANTED 177. GRANTED. Irrelevant to the claims of assault, battery, breach of contract, tortious interference; harassment/extortion; stalking/harassment; civil conversion; fraud/misrepresentation; IIED and NIED. 178. DENIED. See count 5 par. 74. 179. DENIED 180. DENIED 181. DENIED 182. DENIED 183. DENIED 184. DENIED 185. GRANTED 186. GRANTED 187. GRANTED 188. GRANTED 189. GRANTED 190. GRANTED 191. GRANTED 192. DENIED. See count 2, par. 30. 193. DENIED. See count 2, par. 30. 194. DENIED. See court's ruling on #192 and #193. 195. GRANTED Compliance is ordered on or before 11/13/2018. If the moving party does not receive compliance by that date, the moving party may file a Motion for Judgment of Default referring to this order. Absent proof of compliance on file before the motion appears on this short calendar, the motion will be granted by the Court and judgment will enter. As the motion is a discretionary motion, oral argument on the motion is not necessary and therefore the parties' request for same is denied. It is so ordered.