IN RE: ADLER, COLEMAN CLEARING CORP., Debtor. EDWIN B. MISHKIN, AS SIPA TRUSTEE FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF THE BUSINESS OF ADLER, COLEMAN CLEARING CORP., Plaintiff, v. PHILIP GURIAN, et al., Defendants. EDWIN B. MISHKIN, AS SIPA TRUSTEE FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF THE BUSINESS OF ADLER, COLEMAN CLEARING CORP., Plaintiff, v. JEANNINE GURIAN, Defendant. EDWIN B. MISHKIN, AS SIPA TRUSTEE FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF THE BUSINESS OF ADLER, COLEMAN CLEARING CORP., Plaintiff, v. JEANNINE GURIAN TRUST NUMBER ONE, RICHARD GURIAN and PHILIP GURIAN, Defendants. EDWIN B. MISHKIN, AS SIPA TRUSTEE FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF THE BUSINESS OF ADLER, COLEMAN CLEARING CORP., Plaintiff, v. PHILIP GURIAN, JEANNINE GURIAN, RHEAL COTE, BLUE GREEN T., LLC, BARRY ALTER, and HOWARD BREGMAN, Defendants Case No. 06-80157-CIV-RYSKAMP/ROSENBAUM United States District Court, S.D. Florida Entered on FLSD Docket July 31, 2008 Rosenbaum, Robin S., United States Magistrate Judge REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION *1 This matter comes before the Court upon Third Parties Barbara Knight and Lolly Lu, LLC’s Notice of Compliance with Production Requirements (“Third Parties’ Notice of Compliance”) [D.E. 316] and their Response to Plaintiff’s Response to Notice of Compliance and Request for Hearing (“Third Parties’ Response”) [D.E. 321], pursuant to the Order of Reference from the Honorable Kenneth Ryskamp, dated March 28, 2008, for report and recommendation or disposition [D.E. 336], and the Order of Recusal dated April 2, 2008, assigning the undersigned as Magistrate Judge [D.E. 337]. I have carefully reviewed Third Parties’ Notice of Compliance, Plaintiff’s Response to Third Parties’ Notice of Compliance (“Plaintiff’s First Response”) [D.E. 317], Third Parties’ Response, all filings in support thereof and in opposition thereto, and the case file. Additionally, a hearing was held in this matter on April 24, 2008. [D.E. 363]. Based on a thorough review of the filings and careful consideration of the evidence and argument presented at the hearing, I submit this Report and Recommendation. A. Background 1. Origins of the Case The origins of this case stem from efforts by Plaintiff, Edwin B. Mishkin, Trustee for Liquidation of the Business of Adler Coleman Clearing Corp., to satisfy a judgment that the Trustee obtained originally against Defendant Philip Gurian for $200 million in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. [D.E. 1]. The Southern District of New York appointed Mishkin as Trustee for the liquidation of Adler Coleman Clearing Corp., finding pursuant to the Securities Investors Protection Act of 1970 that Adler Coleman’s customers were in need of protection, as Defendant Gurian was found to have committed widespread securities fraud that led partially to the demise of the brokerage firm Adler Coleman. See Mishkin v. Gurian (In re Adler Coleman Clearing Corp.), 399 F. Supp. 2d 486 (S.D.N.Y. November 8, 2005). The collapse of Adler Coleman caused creditors and investors to lose more than $90 million dollars. The liquidation of Adler Coleman has proceeded in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code. Subsequent to the registration of the judgment, Plaintiff sought discovery in aid of execution against Defendant Gurian. Because, according to Plaintiff, Defendant Gurian did not adequately respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests regarding his assets, Plaintiff sought discovery from several non-parties, including Third Parties Barbara Knight and Lolly Lu, LLC (“Third Parties”).[1] In Plaintiff’s investigation into Defendant Gurian’s assets, Plaintiff discovered that Defendant Gurian was a managing member of the company Lolly Lu, LLC, from August 26, 2005, to March 14, 2006, along with Lolly Lu managing member Ms. Knight and Whitney Farber. D.E. 47, Ex. B, p. 53-54, 56-57; D.E. 85 at ¶ 3. *2 Accordingly, on May 12, 2006, Plaintiff served two separate subpoenas duces tecum in aid of execution (“Subpoenas”) on Third Parties. [D.E. 47, Ex. A, p. 9-27].[2] The Subpoenas commanded Third Parties to produce documents in aid of execution, consisting of 1. Any and all documents which evidence your receipt of any money or property, real or personal, from any of the following persons or companies since January 1, 1995: a. Philip Gurian[3] b. Jeannine Gurian a/k/a Jeannine Schnapik[4] c. Benil Finance Limited[5] d. Blue Green T, LLC[6] e. Rheal Cote[7] . . . . g. Jaime Villarroel [h]. Any other company for which Philip Gurian is a shareholder, officer, director, partner, member, employee, agent or is otherwise affiliated with in any manner. 2. The Member Agreement for Lolly Lu, LLC. 3. A list of all of the officers, directors, shareholders, members, employees, officers, and/or agents of Lolly Lu, LLC. 4. Any and all communications between you and any of the persons listed in Request Number One, above, from January 1, 1995[,] to the present. 5. Any and all documents evidencing any transfers of money or property, real or personal, from you to or for the benefit of Philip Gurian, from January 1, 1995[,] to the present. 6. Any and all documents evidencing any transfers of money or property, real or personal, from any of the persons listed in Request Number One, above, to or for your benefit, from January 1, 1995[,] to the present. 7. Any and all documents evidencing any transfers of money or property, real or personal, from any of the persons listed in Request Number One, above, to or for the benefit of Lolly Lu, LLC, from January 1, 1995[,] to the present. 8. Any and all documents not referenced above that are related to any of the persons listed in Request Number One, above, in any manner, from January 1, 1995[,] to the present. 9. Any and all documents, included but not limited to any communications between you and any person who maintains the web page for Lolly Lu, LLC, related to the removal of the picture of Phil Gurian from Lolly Lu’s web pages. 10. Any and all documents related to the resignation of Phil Gurian as a member, managing member, director, officer, agent, employee or otherwise from Lolly Lu, LLC. D.E. 47, Ex. A, p. 9-27. The Subpoenas imposed an original date of compliance of May 26, 2006. Id. 2. Procedural History *3 After various negotiations between Plaintiff and Third Parties (and Ms. Farber) regarding the date of compliance, including three extensions granted by Plaintiff, the responses were due on July 5, 2006. See D.E. 47. Accordingly, on July 5, 2006, Third Parties and Ms. Farber served their responses to the Subpoenas. [D.E. 47, p. 38-51; D.E. 106, Ex. A, C]. Soon thereafter, on July 25, 2006, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Compel Production of Documents from Barbara Knight, Whitney Farber, and Lolly Lu, LLC, and Motion for Sanctions. [D.E. 47]. Plaintiff complained that Third Parties, along with Ms. Farber, had provided only eight documents in response to the Subpoenas and that their responses failed to comply with the requests set forth in the Subpoenas. Id.; see also D.E. 106, Ex. A. For their part, Third Parties and Ms. Farber argued that they had “responded to the Subpoenas and produced the documents that were in their possession as they were kept in the usual course of business.” D.E. 49 at ¶ 9. They stated they were “taking additional steps to gather additional documents from their bank.” Id. According to Third Parties and Ms. Farber, “there ha[d] been no intentional violation of the Subpoenas, and, the Servees ha[d] attempted, in good faith, to timely comply therewith.” Id. Finally, Third Parties and Ms. Farber asserted that they were “continuing to work to get the material. . . .” Id. at p. 5. At about this same time, the judgment against Defendant Gurian in the Southern District of New York was vacated and remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. [D.E. 51, Ex. A; 53]. As a result of this development, Third Parties and Ms. Farber moved to quash their Subpoenas on August 24, 2006. [D.E. 51]. Because the Second Circuit vacated the Southern District of New York’s judgment, on November 16, 2006, this Court ordered a stay of all proceedings until a decision was reached by the Southern District of New York on the then-pending renewed motion for summary judgment. [D.E. 60]. The Southern District of New York issued a decision granting summary judgment and directed the clerk of the court to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Philip Gurian in the amount of $150 million dollars on January 8, 2007. [D.E. 61, Ex. 1]. On January 14, 2008, Plaintiff moved, along with other relief sought, to lift the stay on proceedings in this Court [D.E. 61], and on February 7, 2007, registered the final judgment of the revised summary judgment with this Court issued on January 19, 2008. [D.E. 63, Ex. 1]. On February 14, 2007, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the portion of the Court’s November 16 Order staying the proceedings in this case. [D.E. 64]. On March 8, 2007, Plaintiff moved the Court to render moot Third Parties’ and Ms. Farber’s Motion to Quash the Subpoenas [see D.E. 51] (which was based on the Second Circuit’s remand of the original decision awarding $200 million against Gurian), grant his Motion to Compel [see D.E. 47], and direct Third Parties and Ms. Farber to comply with the Subpoenas within seven days. [D.E. 65]. Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s request, the Court denied as moot Third Parties and Ms. Farber’s Motion to Quash on March 16, 2007. [D.E. 68]. On the same day, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel documents from Third Parties and Ms. Farber, and directed Third Parties and Ms. Farber to provide the requested documents by March 23, 2007 (“March 16th Order”). [D.E. 69]. Additionally, the Court directed Third Parties and Ms. Farber to pay Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs associated with the filing of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. Id. *4 On April 9, 2007, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Lolly Lu, LLC, Barbara Knight and Whitney Farber Should Not Be Held In Contempt For Failing to Comply with Plaintiff’s Subpoenas Duces Tecum As Well As The Court’s Order to Response to Subpoenas Duces Tecum, arguing that Third Parties and Ms. Farber continued to be non-compliant with their obligations under the Subpoenas and the Court’s March 16thOrder. [D.E. 85]. On the same day, the Honorable Kenneth L. Ryskamp referred Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Show Cause to the Honorable Ann E. Vitunac for disposition or report and recommendation [D.E. 86, 87, 88], and set a hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Show Cause for April 25, 2007. [D.E. 97, 100]. In accordance with Judge Ryskamp’s referral, Magistrate Judge Vitunac held a hearing on April 25, 2007, on Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Show Cause [D.E. 111; 114; 153; 123, Transcript for the April 25, 2007, Hearing (“4/25/07 Tr.”) ]. During the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel, Robert F. Reynolds, Esq., referred to Lolly Lu checks that had been produced by Third Parties, allegedly evidencing loans to Defendant Gurian for over $600,000 (referring to p. 2 of Plaintiff’s April 25, 2007, Hearing Exhibit 4; see D.E. 111), suggesting that Third Parties had failed to produce all documents relating to loans from Defendant Gurian to Third Parties, evidenced by certain checks Third Parties produced. In this regard, Plaintiff’s counsel stated the following: Also, attached, Judge, are certain checks and if you look at the memo lines on the checks that were written, it has all of kinds of information about loans; 10 percent of 57,000 at 3.5 percent of 268,000; 3.5 percent on 268,000 rent. There’s all kinds of notations here as to – These appear to be paybacks of loans as we have indicated in our motion. . . . .Mr. Gurian . . . filed responses to interrogatories in New York . . . .[8] Mr. Gurian answers on page 8 of those interrogatories, he is asked about relationships with Barbara Knight . . . . as to Barbara Knight. I helped her set up Lolly Lu and provided general business advice. I loaned Lolly Lu a bit of operating capital. I do not have details on the loan, but it has been paid back in full. The checks . . . don’t look like they paid any loans back in full. Not for $268,000 not for over $300,000 not for $67,000. So there’s something else out there, Judge. Candidly, I don’t think the loans have been paid. Of course, it’s in Mr. Gurian’s interest to indicate that they have been. So until we get some documents, Judge it’s our position they haven’t been paid back.. . . . 4/25/07 Tr. 57:4-13, 19-21, 25; 58:1-12. In response, Magistrate Judge Vitunac at one point directly questioned counsel for Third Parties and Ms. Farber, at the time, David Feingold, Esq., “Where are the loan documents?” 4/25/07 Tr. 61:4. Although Third Parties and Ms. Farber continued to claim that the checks at issue represented loan payments, Mr. Feingold responded that “[t]here are no loan documents.” 4/25/07 Tr. 61:5. Referring to the very precise numbers appearing on the checks in the memo sections, the Court expressed disbelief that Third Parties and Ms. Farber could have paid such specific amounts without the benefit of loan documents, a payment schedule, or any other assistance: THE COURT: Counselor, where does somebody come up with, okay, office rent 3.5 percent at 318,975? Did that figure come out of Barbara Knight’s head or does she have a piece of paper that has some figures written down where she could come up with 3.5 percent 318,975. I don’t believe for a second that there’s not a document underlying this figure. *5 And then we have another check in a memo. Interest on 57,500 for November, December 959.32. You don’t pull those numbers out of your head. 4/25/07 Tr. 63:7-16. As a result of the April 25th hearing, on June 22, 2007, Magistrate Judge Vitunac ordered Third Parties, along with Ms. Farber, to file by June 29, 2007, a written report on the status of compliance with the Subpoenas. [D.E. 143]. Accordingly, Third Parties and Ms. Farber filed their report on June 29, 2007 [D.E. 147], and Plaintiff filed a response [D.E. 148]. In an Order dated July 19, 2007, Magistrate Judge Vitunac compelled Third Parties and Ms. Farber to complete production of documents requested by the Subpoenas and all documents enumerated in Exhibits A and B of Third Parties and Ms. Farber’s June 29th response [see D.E. 147, Ex. A and B], by July 27, 2007, and reserved ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Show Cause [see D.E. 85] until such time that the Court could determine the complete status of compliance by Third Parties and Ms. Farber with their Subpoenas (“July 19th Order”). [D.E. 159]. The July 19th Order stated that “[i]mportantly, . . . [Third Parties and Ms. Farber] raised no objections, or reasons which prohibit or impair their ability to ‘assemble the remaining documents.’ ” [D.E. 159, p. 3]. Magistrate Judge Vitunac also ordered Plaintiff, Third Parties, and Ms. Farber to file a report with the Court by August 3, 2007, regarding the status of completion of the document production. Id. Finally, in light of Third Parties and Ms. Farber’s failure to cooperate in discovery and abide by the Court’s March 16th Order [seeD.E. 69], Magistrate Judge Vitunac sanctioned them and directed them to pay the attorney’s fees incurred by Plaintiff in the filing of Plaintiff’s June 29th response with the Court. [D.E. 159]. Plaintiff filed an Emergency Motion for an Order Directing Preservation of Electronically Stored Documents [D.E. 162], of various non-parties and Third Parties on July 24, 2007. On the same date, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion and directed Third Parties, along with other individuals and entities, to preserve and prohibit from destroying, transferring, or otherwise disposing of all electronically stored documents of Defendants Gurian, Ms. Gurian, and Mr. Cote, Third Parties Ms. Knight, and Lolly Lu, LLC, Ms. Farber, William Knight,[9] Vanessa Side, a/k/a Vanessa Wells,[10] Benil Finance, Ltd., Laditel Investments, Ltd., and Dinter Finance, Ltd[11] (“July 24th Order”). [D.E. 164]. In furtherance of this goal, the Order also required Third Parties and other individuals and entities to complete and return to Plaintiff’s counsel within three calendar days of the unsealing of the Court’s Order, a “Consent to Search” form attached to the Order. [D.E. 164, Ex. 1]. The “Consent to Search” form required the electronic document repository account holder to provide signed consent, in connection with a subpoena, to authorize counsel for Plaintiff, to receive, review, copy, and otherwise obtain access to all information relating to the account holder’s electronic document repository account and personal identification information connected therewith in order to verify the electronic document repository account holder’s account. See id. *6 In compliance with Magistrate Judge Vitunac’s July 19th Order [see D.E. 159] requiring a status report by August 3, 2007, Plaintiff filed a report regarding Third Parties and Ms. Farber’s compliance with the Subpoenas on August 1, 2007. [D.E. 168]. In his report, Plaintiff asserted that Third Parties and Ms. Farber remained in non-compliance, requested that Plaintiff’s Motion for an Order to Show Cause [see D.E. 85] be granted, and argued that Third Parties and Ms. Farber should be held in contempt for their failure to comply with the Court’s March 16th [see D.E. 69] and July 19th [see D.E. 159] Orders compelling compliance. Id. On August 6, 2007, Third Parties and Ms. Farber filed their own report regarding their compliance with the Subpoenas. [D.E. 172].[12] On August 22, 2007, Magistrate Judge Vitunac ordered Plaintiff, Third Parties, and Ms. Farber to file a joint status report regarding the status of compliance with the Subpoenas by September 12, 2007. [D.E. 190]. In accordance with Magistrate Judge Vitunac’s Order, Plaintiff, Third Parties, and Ms. Farber filed their joint status report on September 12, 2007. [D.E. 201]. In the meantime, on September 5, 2007, Judge Ryskamp issued an Omnibus Order regarding motions by Defendants and non-parties [see D.E. 171, 187, 195, 183, 195], relating to his July 24th Order. [D.E. 200]. In the Order, the Court directed, among other relief, that (a) the parties choose a copy service within two days of the date of the Order to receive the documents from each of the electronic repositories used by Defendants and non-parties, which was to Bates-stamp and deliver a copy of responsive documents to counsel for the appropriate Defendant or non-party, including Third Parties, to whom the e-mail account related; (b) the copy service keep an original production from the electronic repository until the Court ordered otherwise;[13] (c) within seven calendar days of receiving the stamped production from the copy service, counsel for Third Parties, and appropriate Defendants and non-parties, deliver to Plaintiff non-privileged documents and a privilege log; and (d) failure by Third Parties, the appropriate Defendant and non-parties to deliver non-privileged documents and privilege log within the time limits set forth in the Order would be deemed a waiver of privilege, and Plaintiff would receive access to the entire Bates-numbered file.[14] [D.E. 200, 3-4, ¶1-9]. Returning to the Joint Status Report filed on September 12th, because it failed to state with particularity each witness’s compliance with the various subpoenas [see D.E. 201], on September 18, 2007, Magistrate Judge Vitunac directed Plaintiff, Third Parties, and Ms. Farber to file a joint status report that specified with detail the status of compliance of each witness by October 2, 2007. [D.E. 204]. On October 1 and 9, 2007, Magistrate Judge Vitunac granted two separate extensions to the parties for the filing of the joint status report, with the final deadline set for October 11, 2007. [D.E. 214, 217]. Accordingly, Plaintiff, Third Parties, and Ms. Farber filed their Joint Status Report on October 11, 2007. [D.E. 222]. *7 Taking into account the parties’ October 11, 2007, Joint Status Report, on October 16, 2007, Magistrate Judge Vitunac issued a Report and Recommendation regarding Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Show Cause. [D.E. 226]. In the description of the April 25, 2007, evidentiary hearing contained in her October 16th Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Vitunac observed that “[t]he Court examined the documents that had been produced and noted that it was incongruous for . . . [Third Parties and Ms. Farber] to claim that they had produced all responsive documents when some of the documents they had produced made it crystal clear that other responsive documents must exist.” [D.E. 226, p. 3]. The Report and Recommendation incorporated by reference the October 11, 2007, Joint Status Report [see D.E. 222] “as an accurate description of the status of the . . . [Third Parties and Ms. Farber’s] compliance” [Id., p. 6; p. 12 at ¶ 5, 7], and found that as of the October 11, 2007, Joint Status Report, “clear and convincing evidence” existed that Ms. Knight’s “noncompliance with the May 2006 subpoena include[d] failures, timely or otherwise, to make full production of documents, at a minimum, as to Subpoena Requests No. 1[ ], No. 4[ ], No. 5[ ], No. 6[ ], and No. 8[ ]” [see D.E. 226, p. 12 at ¶ 5], and that Lolly Lu’s “noncompliance with the May 2006 subpoena include[d] failures, timely or otherwise, to make full production of documents, at a minimum, as to Subpoena Requests No. 1[ ], No. 4[ ], No. 5[ ], and No. 6[ ]” [see D.E. 226, p. 12 at ¶ 7]. Magistrate Judge Vitunac held that the Subpoenas were “valid and lawful,” “clear, definite and unambiguous,” and “compliance” by Third Parties, as well as Ms. Farber, “is possible and does not constitute an undue burden and that the records, and documents sought by Plaintiff are in the care, custody and control of the Witnesses. . . .” [D.E. 226, p. 13 at ¶ 8]. Accordingly, the Report and Recommendation recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Show Cause [D.E. 85] be granted, Third Parties and Ms. Farber be required to appear personally before the Court to show cause why they should not be held in contempt, and Third Parties and Ms. Farber be required to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs associated with noncompliance with Plaintiff’s Subpoenas. [D.E. 226]. Subsequently, on motion from a separate Defendant and non-parties [seeD.E. 202, 2053, 205], the Court modified the “Consent to Search” form that Third Parties and other individuals and entities were required to provide to Plaintiff by the Court’s July 24th Order [see D.E. 164, Ex. 1], with additional procedural requirements added by the Court’s September 9th Order [seeD.E. 200], on October 16, 2007. [D.E. 223] (hereinafter, the July 24th, September 9th, and October 16th Orders are referred to collectively as the “Preservation Orders”). In the October 16th Order, among other directives, the Court denied the defense request to require “specific[ ] identif[ication] [of] the documents that must be produced in lieu of requiring production of all documents by the electronic repository,” and held that it was the responsibility of counsel for Third Parties, other non-parties, and Defendants, “not the electronic repository’s [responsibility], to cull through the information and determine what was relevant.” [Id., p. 2].[15] At about the same time, on October 16, 2007, the Court granted a temporary stay of all case proceedings due to Defendant Gurian’s motion for stay in the related Southern District of New York case, in front of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. [D.E. 224]. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Compliance on October 18, 2007, which included, among other items, a request to lift the temporary stay on case proceedings because the Second Circuit had vacated the stay in the Southern District of New York case, as well as a request that the Court order parties and witnesses to complete the “Consent to Search” forms within three days of the Court’s order, pursuant to the Court’s October 17th Order [see D.E. 223; see also Preservation Orders], or, alternatively, to direct various repositories of e-mails of individuals subject to the Preservation Orders, to produce responsive information to Copy Scan, as directed, within five days of the Court’s order. [D.E. 227]. In an Endorsed Order dated October 19, 2007, the Court lifted the temporary stay and reserved ruling on Plaintiff’s requested relief regarding completion of the “Consent to Search” forms. [D.E. 228]. On November 1, 2007, Third Parties and Ms. Farber filed their Objections to Magistrate Judge Vitunac’s Report and Recommendation. [D.E. 232, 233]. On November 8, 2007, the Court adopted Magistrate Judge Vitunac’s October 18th Report and Recommendation [see D.E. 226] and granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Show Cause. [D.E. 238]. Thus, the Court ordered Third Parties and Ms. Farber to appear at a show cause hearing and to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiff associated with litigating the noncompliance, and stated that arrest warrants would be issued to secure Third Parties’ presence at the show cause hearing. [D.E. 238]. Accordingly, the Court issued an arrest warrant for Ms. Knight, as well as Ms. Farber, on the same day. [D.E. 318, 319]. The Order to Show Cause hearing was set for December 13, 2007. [D.E. 239, 241, 244, 246, 260]. *8 On November 16, 2007, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Compliance [D.E. 227] and directed Third Parties, along with other individuals referred to in the original Orders, to comply with the July 24th[D.E. 164] and October 17th [D.E. 223] Preservation Orders [see also D.E. 200], by providing completed “Consent to Search” forms to the appropriate electronic depositories within two days. [D.E. 245]. In response to a motion by Ms. Knight and Ms. Farber to cancel the bench warrants, the Court denied the motion on November 29, 2007. See D.E. 251. On December 10, 2007, however, in response to another motion by Ms. Knight requesting clarification of the Court’s previous Order and Re-notice of Hearing [D.E. 238, 260] and an emergency status conference [seeD.E. 262], the Court ordered that Ms. Knight’s warrant be canceled immediately upon her deposit of $10,000.00 into the registry of the Court, to stand as security for her appearance at the previously scheduled December 13th Order to Show Cause hearing, ordered Ms. Knight to appear at the hearing, and denied her request for status conference. [D.E. 264]. On December 11, 2007, Ms. Knight filed her notice of compliance by depositing $10,000 into the Court’s Registry. [D.E. 265]. On the same day, Ms. Knight and Lolly Lu, LLC, also filed a motion for substitution of counsel [D.E. 270, 273], which the Court approved on December 14, 2007 [D.E. 287].[16] 3. December 13th Hearing On December 13, 2007, Judge Ryskamp presided over the show cause hearing for Third Parties and Ms. Farber (“December 13th Hearing”). [D.E. 278; 299, Transcript for the December 13, 2007, Hearing, referred to hereafter as “12/13/07 Tr.”]. Along with Shawn T. Hayes, Esq., and Jason E. Slatkin, Esq., counsel for Plaintiff, Ms. Knight and Ms. Farber appeared with their newly hired attorneys, L. Louis Mrachek, Esq., for Third Parties, and David Roth, Esq.,[17] for Ms. Knight, and Sidney A. Stubbs, Esq., for Ms. Farber. 12/13/07 Tr. 1-3. Mr. Roth stated that Ms. Knight had turned over her passport to her attorney’s possession. 12/13/07 Tr. 3:6-10. At the start of the hearing, Judge Ryskamp informed counsel briefly of the history of this case and that Third Parties and Ms. Farber’s documents would assist in locating the assets of Defendant Gurian in order to restore money to victims of the original fraud. 12/13/07 Tr. 4:15-25; 5:1-7; 6:9-14, 16-20. Mr. Roth informed the Court that he and Third Parties’ other counsel were recently hired and would work diligently to comply with the Court’s orders, but requested ten to fifteen minutes to confer with Plaintiff. 12/13/07 Tr. 3:20-25, 4:1-11, 9:9-11. After a brief recess, Mr. Roth announced to the Court that Plaintiff and Third Parties had settled their differences, subject to the Court’s approval. 12/13/07 Tr. 9:17-20. Specifically, Mr. Roth stated, We have reached a global settlement on all issues which will be dictated in the record by counsel, Mr. Mrachek, subject to Plaintiff’s counsel’s approval. *9 My only part in the settlement is that it is agreed that if Your Honor approves the settlement, that the bond for Ms. Knight and the bond for Ms. Farber will be discharged. They will have no further obligation. 12/13/07 Tr. 9:23-25; 10:1-4. On behalf of Ms. Farber, Mr. Stubbs represented, “Your Honor, we are in agreement with the settlement as I understand it is going to be expressed.” 12/13/07 Tr. 10:9-10. In addition to the terms of the agreement Mr. Roth stated above, Mr. Mrachek then went on to explain to the Court the other terms of the settlement agreement, as follows: We have entered into a global settlement subject to the following terms. And the global settlement is on behalf of the three non-party witnesses that have been the subject of this hearing, Barbara Knight, Whitney Farber and Lolly Lu, Limited, plus William Louis Knight, who’s in the courtroom today. He is the husband of Barbara Knight. So he is included within the ambit of the settlement and as a party to the settlement. It will be the responsibility of the Knights and Lolly Lu to pay $600,000 by check or wire transfer in 45 days to the Plaintiff trustee. The Knight[s], Lolly Lu and Whitney Farber entity agree to produce all responsive non-privileged documents required by the initial subpoenas that were sent out and have been and are the subject of this hearing within 14 days of today. That production will include, if there are privileged documents, a privilege log. General releases will be exchanged between the trustee and the four parties on the other side. The settlement will be secured by a mortgage, or really two mortgages, one to be placed on the Knights’ personal residence in Boca Raton; one to placed on the loft office space owned by Lolly Lu, in Atlanta, Georgia. Those motions will be – those mortgages will be prepared and will be held in trust with – by Mr. Slatkin’s firm, and they will be released from the escrow if there is no payment as required by the terms of the settlement agreement of the $600,000. Additionally, Lolly Lu and the Knights will agree there will be no encumbrances or conveyances of any kind, . . . on those two properties until such times as the mortgages are destroyed and canceled and voided when the payment is made in accordance with the terms of the agreement. And the mortgages will be canceled and destroyed when the payment is made in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The obligation to make the payment of $600,00 will be joint and several among Lolly Lu, Barbara Knight and William Knight. Whitney Farber is not included in that joint and several liability. In other words, she will have no requirement to make the payment. Her only requirement will be, in connection with the payment, to execute the mortgage as one of the two managing members of Lolly Lu. . . . This entire settlement is, of course, subject to approval of the Bankruptcy Court I think of the Southern District of New York. 12/13/07 Tr. 10:15-25; 11:1-25; 12:1-8, 12-14. Mr. Hynes agreed with the settlement as articulated by Mr. Mrachek and Mr. Roth. 12/13/07 Tr. 12:15. Mr. Mrachek then continued to explain the terms of agreement to the Court: The Plaintiff will undertake immediately steps to cause that approval to be obtained. *10 If that approval, given the holiday season or the normal court calendar up there, is not obtained within the 45 days the payment is required, the payment requirement and any other deadlines attached to that requirement will be continued until and only if there is a bankruptcy court approval of the settlement. 12/13/07 Tr. 12:16-23. Next, Mr. Mrachek discussed what would happen if bankruptcy approval of the settlement agreement was not obtained: We have not talked about it, but I guess if there is no bankruptcy approval, and for some reason it’s rejected, I would presume that all parties will return to their status quo as of today, and will have all rights, or duties, or responsibilities, or obligations as they exist as of today, again, only if there’s no bankruptcy court approval. And as of now, we know of no reason why the bankruptcy court would not approv[e] the settlement. 12/13/07 Tr. 12:24-25; 13:1-6. Mr. Mrachek continued by addressing what would happen if Third Parties and Ms. Farber failed to comply with discovery requirements from the date of the hearing going forward: Finally, and I think it goes without saying, if there are any discovery violations or any other sanctions or issues between the parties that develop after today on a going-forward basis, all parties reserve their rights, and they can seek sanctions if we don’t do something right between now and then, but all past disputes are put behind us. And that would be the effect of the general releases, too. They would only release what has occurred prior to today but not what has occurred after today. I think that’s the agreement as I understand it. Mr. Roth wanted me to add that part of the effect of the general release, of course, will be that any monetary sanctions or claims or issues that have accrued to today are subject to the general release and are released. 12/13/07 Tr. 13:7-21. In response, Mr. Slatkin, on behalf of Plaintiff, agreed, stating “That’s correct.” 12/13/07 Tr. 13:22. Mr. Slatkin, then proceeded to note that he had “[j]ust two points to add.” 12/13/07 Tr. 14:2. He first pointed out that “there be a representation as to the equities” on the record regarding the properties at issue in the settlement agreement. 12/13/07 Tr. 14:2-4. Mr. Mrachek responded by representing the equity ranges of the Boca Raton property and the Lolly Lu property in Atlanta. 12/13/07 Tr. 14:5-13. Concerning his second point, Mr. Slatkin stated the following: . . . [T]he settlement that is subject to bankruptcy court approval does not encompass the discovery obligations that they’ve represented will be complied with within 14 days. I don’t believe that falls under the ambit of the bankruptcy settlement, and therefore it’s carved out from that approval process. . . . We can’t wait for the bankruptcy approval process to run . . . . for the 14 days to start running. The 14 days start from today to comply with the discovery. 12/13/07 Tr. 14:15-20, 22-23, 25; 15:1. Then, Mr. Slatkin represented to the Court that the parties would formalize the settlement agreement terms: . . .[S]ince we have to circulate this under Rule 9019 of the bankruptcy rules under motion, we’re going to reduce this to a formal agreement to be included with the motion in the bankruptcy court. 12/13/07 Tr. 15:2-5. In response to the representations by the parties of the settlement agreement, the following exchange took place between Judge Ryskamp and Mr. Slatkin: *11 THE COURT: I assume that you’ll all submit an order to me also, a stipulated order. Certainly, I will eliminate the requirement of a bond. I just don’t know about the timing on that, how you want the timing to work. But in any contempt situation a party can purge themselves by complying, and so I gather that your agreement contemplates that they have purged their contempt by this agreement; is that correct? MR. SLATKIN: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. . . . 12/13/07 Tr. 15:6-15. Finally, Mr. Roth requested to know whether he could return Ms. Knight’s passport to Ms. Knight, as bond has been discharged pursuant to the settlement agreement. 12/13/07 Tr. 15:23-25; 16:1-2, 11-14. Mr. Slatkin objected and Mr. Roth agreed to maintain Ms. Knight’s passport until further order of the Court. 12/13/07 Tr. 16:5-18. The Court ordered that Mr. Roth retain the passport until submission of a stipulated order by both sides regarding the passport, and the Court ended the hearing. 12/13/07 Tr. 16:19-25; 17:1-2. 4. Proceedings after the December 13th Hearing and Compliance by Third Parties After the hearing, on December 14, 2007, as agreed to pursuant to the settlement agreement, Plaintiff submitted the Stipulation regarding the release of the bonds for Ms. Knight and Ms. Farber, and the continued maintenance of Ms. Knight’s passport by Mr. Roth until further order by the Court. [D.E. 286]. The Court approved the cash bond of $10,000.00 for Ms. Knight on December 18, 2007 [D.E. 288], and on December 19, 2007, approved Plaintiff’s December 14, 2008, Stipulation. [D.E. 289]. Under the terms of the agreement, Third Parties’ and Ms. Farber’s document productions were due on December 27, 2008. Third Parties provided a supplemental response on that date with additional documents but indicated in their response that they “will continue to work diligently and quickly on any unfinished tasks.” [D.E. 316, Ex. A, p. 3]. On January 4, 2008, Third Parties provided their second supplemental response to Plaintiff with additional documents. Id., Ex. B. On January 21, 2008, Third Parties filed a Motion for Stay of the Settlement Agreement and Reconsideration of the Court’s denial of Defendants Gurian and Jeannine Gurian, and other nonparties’ Motion to Dismiss. [D.E. 302]. In Third Parties’ motion, among other relief, Third Parties requested that the Court certify the denial of the motion to dismiss to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and stay the formalized settlement agreement, as agreed to by Third Parties, Ms. Farber and Plaintiff at December 13th Hearing. Id.Attached to their motion, Third Parties included the formalized settlement agreement between Third Parties, Ms. Farber and Plaintiff. See id. at Ex. A. The formalized settlement agreement, titled “Stipulation of Settlement,” identifies the “Settling Parties” as Third Parties, along with Ms. Farber and Mr. Knight (“Settlement Agreement”). [D.E. 102, Ex. A, p. 1]. The written terms of the Settlement Agreement pertinent to the issue currently pending before the undersigned are as follows: 2. Production. Consistent with applicable controlling law, Farber, Barbara Knight and Lolly Lu shall produce all responsive, non-privileged documents in their care, custody or control within 14 calendar days of December 13, 2007, as requested in the Subpoenas Duces Tecum in Aid of Execution served on each of them, in this civil action in May, 2006, except as previously produced (the “Production Obligations”). If there are any documents withheld from production on account of privilege, a privilege log will be provided consistent with General Rule 26.1 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. *12 . . . . 6. No Waiver. Nothing in this Stipulation is intended to affect, nor does it in fact affect, any future obligations, claim for sanctions, fines or monetary compensation for the conduct of any party to this Stipulation in the above-captioned litigation or elsewhere. The intent of this Stipulation is to only resolve all such claims that the Plaintiff had against each of the Settling Parties prior to and including December 13, 2007, but not as to any claims against each of the Settling Parties that may arise after that date. . . . 7. Mutual General Releases. Plaintiff and the Settling Parties, for and in consideration of the agreement set forth herein and other valuable considerations, received from or on behalf of the other, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, except for that set forth in the preceding paragraph, hereby remise, release, acquit, satisfy, and forever discharge each other, of and from all manner of action and actions, cause and causes of action, suits, debts, dues, sums of money, accounts, reckonings, bonds, bills, specialities, covenants, contracts, controversies, agreements, promises, variances, trespasses, damages, judgment, executions, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which either party ever had, now has or may have . . . against the other party, for, upon or by reason or any matter, cause of thing whatsoever, from the beginning of the world to December 13, 2007, including but not limited to, notwithstanding the Production Obligations, all claims for sanctions and other penalties which have been previously sought by Plaintiff herein on account of the Plaintiff’s allegations that the Settling Parties have not complied with prior orders of Court and discovery obligations. 8. Bankruptcy Court Approval. This Stipulation, other than the Production Obligations, is subject to the approval of the Bankruptcy Court. . . . If the Bankruptcy Court Approval is not obtained within 45 days of December 13, 2007, then the Payment deadline shall be extended until the Bankruptcy Court Approval is obtained. If the Bankruptcy Court Approval is not obtained, or if the Bankruptcy Court Approval is subsequently vacated or set aside, then the Plaintiff and Settling Parties will return to their respective positions as of December 12, 2007, and as if they had not entered into this Stipulation, notwithstanding the Production Obligations referenced above. [D.E. 302, Ex. A, ¶¶ 2, 6, 7, 8]. On February 11, 2008, the Court denied Ms. Knight’s motion for release of her passport. [D.E. 314]. Shortly thereafter, on March 6, 2008, the Court also denied Third Parties’ motion for stay of the settlement agreement and reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss. [D.E. 320]. The issue now before the Court, Third Parties’ Notice of Compliance with Production Requirements [D.E. 316], was filed on February 21, 2008. In their Notice, Third Parties argued that they had no further documents in their possession that have not already been produced. Id. On February 26, 2008, Plaintiff filed his Response to Third Parties’ Notice of Compliance [D.E. 317], in which he asserted that Third Parties have failed to comply fully with production of documents. Third Parties filed their Response to Plaintiff’s Response to Notice of Compliance and a Request for Hearing [D.E. 321] on March 7, 2008, seeking a hearing and determination from the Court that they have complied with the Subpoenas. *13 In response, Judge Ryskamp issued an Order to Show Cause on March 11, 2008, directing Plaintiff to file a document by March 17, 2008, listing each area in which Third Parties’ production was deficient, and allowing Third Parties to reply by March 19, 2008. [D.E. 322]. The parties were also ordered to notify the Court jointly as to whether they still needed a hearing to determine compliance by March 20, 2008. Id. A hearing on Third Parties’ Notice of Compliance was set for March 28, 2008, in front of Judge Ryskamp. [D.E. 323, 325, 326]. Ms. Knight was directed to appear individually and in her capacity as corporate representative of Lolly Lu, LLC, at the March 28th hearing. [D.E. 328]. On March 17, 2008, Plaintiff filed his Response to the Order to Show Cause. [D.E. 327, 329]. Third Parties filed their Response to the Order to Show Cause on March 19, 2008. [D.E. 331]. Plaintiff filed his second Response to the Order to Show Cause on March 20, 2008. [D.E. 332]. Judge Ryskamp held a hearing on Third Parties’ Notice of Compliance on March 28, 2008. [D.E. 335; 355, Transcript for the March 28, 2008, Hearing, referred to hereafter as “3/28/08 Tr.”]. Both Plaintiff and Third Parties made brief arguments regarding their positions about Third Parties’ compliance with the Subpoenas, and Judge Ryskamp referred Third Parties’ Notice of Compliance to Magistrate Judge Vitunac. 3/28/08 Tr. 3-33. Accordingly, on March 28, 2008, Judge Ryskamp entered a Referral of Third Parties’ Notice of Compliance and their Response to Plaintiff’s Response to their Notice of Compliance to Magistrate Judge Vitunac. [D.E. 336]. Magistrate Judge Vitunac recused herself from the case on April 2, 2008, and the case was referred to me. [D.E. 337]. I issued an Order dated April 3, 2008, setting the matter for a hearing for April 24, 2008 [D.E. 338].[18] Additionally, on April 15, 2008, I ordered Plaintiff to file specific objections to Third Parties’ Notice of Compliance by April 21, 2008. [D.E. 353].[19] On April 21, 2008, Plaintiff filed his Response to the Court’s April 15, 2008, Order to Set Forth With Specificity His Objections to the Purported Compliance of Third Parties (“Plaintiff’s Specific Objections Response”). [D.E. 359, Ex. 1-37]. 5. April 24th Hearing On April 24, 2008, I held a hearing on Third Parties’ Notice of Compliance. [D.E. 363]. Present at the hearing were Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Slatkin and Mr. Hynes, Third Parties’ counsel, Mr. Mrachek and other members of his firm, and Ms. Farber’s counsel, Mr. Stubbs,[20] as well as Ms. Knight. Transcript of 4/24/08 hearing (hereinafter, “Tr.”), at 1-2.[21] *14 Plaintiff argued that Third Parties are deficient in their production obligations under the Subpoenas in nine areas: (1) the Octagon account (Canada);[22] (2) the Antigua account;[23] (3) the Gibraltar account (the Bahamas);[24] (4) the Bolivian accounts;[25] (5) investment accounts;[26] (6) the Joint Operation;[27] (7) obligations to Defendant Gurian for at least $644,000;[28] (8) Ms. Knight and Lolly Lu’s bank and credit card accounts;[29] and (9) e-mail accounts.[30] See D.E. 359. In response, Third Parties asserted that they had fully complied with each of the nine areas identified by Plaintiff. *15 At the hearing, the Court ordered that Ms. Knight testify under oath as to her efforts to comply with the Subpoenas. Additionally, the Court required Ms. Knight to submit to cross-examination regarding her compliance efforts, and directed Plaintiff and Third Parties to put forth any evidence the parties wanted the Court to consider regarding Third Parties’ compliance. Tr. 6:14-25; 7:1-9; 8:7-20. Pursuant to this procedure, Ms. Knight testified under oath and Plaintiff’s counsel cross-examined her. For consideration by the Court, Plaintiff submitted as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, Plaintiff’s exhibits from his Specific Objections Response [see D.E. 356, Ex. 1-26], and Third Parties’ submitted as Third Parties’ Hearing Exhibit 1, a PowerPoint booklet entitled, “Knight and Lolly Lu’s Compliance with Subpoenas,” dated April 24, 2008, and their Hearing Exhibit 2, consisting of three letters, including two from Third Parties’ counsel to Plaintiff dated December 17, and 20, 2007, and one from Plaintiff to Third Parties’ counsel dated December 18, 2008. See also D.E. 359, Ex. 6-7. Each party had an opportunity to inquire, cross-examine and put into evidence all materials deemed appropriate for consideration by the Court. During the course of the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to impeach Ms. Knight regarding her testimony about an April, 2007, purchase of plane tickets on behalf of Defendant Gurian, which Plaintiff asserted Ms. Knight did not disclose during her deposition. Tr. 151:6-25; 152:1. Because Plaintiff could not provide a deposition transcript citation regarding her specific response on this issue during Ms. Knight’s deposition, Third Parties requested that Plaintiff provide a citation after the hearing, and the Court directed Plaintiff to locate the deposition citation. Tr.152:4-17. Also during the hearing, Plaintiff requested that Ms. Knight be required to provide an affidavit regarding all of her efforts to comply with the Subpoenas.[31] The Court denied Plaintiff’s request, noting that Plaintiff could elicit testimony from Ms. Knight on these very issues, and, unlike with an affidavit, live testimony provided Plaintiff with an opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Knight regarding her statements. In accordance with Third Parties’ request, after the hearing, on April 29, 2008, Plaintiff filed his submission with respect to Ms. Knight’s deposition testimony. [D.E. 364]. Third Parties filed their response to Plaintiff’s submission on May 2, 2008 [D.E. 368], and Plaintiff filed his reply on May 6, 2008 [D.E. 370]. B. Analysis This matter arises in the context of a motion by Third Parties for the Court to hold a hearing and make a determination regarding Third Parties’ compliance with the production requirements set forth in the Subpoenas at issue.[32] Despite the history of litigation and alleged non-compliance in this case, Third Parties, who are represented by counsel other than those representing them before the December 13th hearing, contend that the Court should review their compliance from December 13, 2007, forward and should not take into consideration Third Parties’ conduct occurring prior to that date. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that Third Parties have an extensive history of non-compliance with the Subpoenas and multiple Court orders compelling compliance. Thus, Plaintiff urges, in evaluating Third Parties’ compliance under their Notice of Compliance, the Court must take into account Third Parties’ conduct since service of the original Subpoenas, including all of Third Parties’ pre-December 13, 2007, acts of non-compliance. To rebut Plaintiff’s position, Third Parties refer to the Settlement Agreement [D.E. 302, Ex. A] entered into by Plaintiff and Third Parties after the December 13, 2007, hearing. In the Settlement Agreement, the Parties executed mutual general releases in which Plaintiff relinquished “all claims for sanctions and other penalties which have been previously sought by Plaintiff . . . on account of the Plaintiff’s allegations that [Third Parties] have not complied with prior orders of Court and discovery obligations.” [D.E. 302, Ex. A at ¶ 7]. Although a separate paragraph of the Settlement Agreement requires Third Parties to produce the subpoenaed documents within fourteen days of December 13, 2007, no aspect of the Settlement Agreement expressly makes the general release contingent upon Third Parties’ compliance with their production responsibilities. *16 Third Parties point to the December 13, 2007, hearing for further support for their contention that the Court may not evaluate their pre-December 13th subpoena compliance efforts in the conteth of the pending Motion. In this regard, Third Parties note that although Plaintiff clarified the production of the subpoenaed documents by December 27, 2007, constituted an immediate obligation of Plaintiff under the terms of the settlement entered into orally on December 13, 2007, Plaintiff did not specify that his rights to seek contempt, sanctions, or other penalties for conduct occurring before December 13, 2007, would remain, should Third Parties fail to comply with their obligations under the oral settlement. Indeed, to the contrary, Plaintiff’s attorney announced, “That’s correct,” when counsel for Third Parties described the agreement as follows: “. . . I think it goes without saying, if there are any discovery violations or any other sanctions or issues between the parties that develop after today on a going-forward basis, all parties reserve their rights, and they can seek sanctions if we don’t do something right between now and then, but all past disputes are put behind us.” 12/13/07 Tr. 13:7-13. Similarly, the Court asked Plaintiff’s counsel, “[I]n any contempt situation a party can purge themselves by complying, and so I gather that your agreement contemplates that they have purged their contempt by this agreement; is that correct?” In response, Plaintiff’s counsel stated without qualification, “Yes, Your Honor.” 12/13/07 Tr. 15:10-14. Plaintiff, nonetheless, urges the Court to find that it must consider Third Parties’ pre-December 13th conduct when evaluating whether Third Parties are in compliance with their obligations under the Subpoenas. In support of this contention, Plaintiff asserts that the Settlement Agreement release is dependent upon Third Parties’ compliance with their responsibilities under the Settlement Agreement. Under Plaintiff’s theory, in the absence of Third Parties’ compliance, the release ceases to operate. Although Plaintiff’s argument has appeal on an equitable basis, the problem with the position rests in the lack of language within the Settlement Agreement supporting such an interpretation, as well as within Plaintiff’s counsel’s acceptance at the December 13 Hearing of Third Partieth s’ attorney’s characterization of the agreement, which explicitly stated that the parties reserved their rights to seek a remedy for “any discovery violations or any other sanctions or issues between the parties that develop after today,” but that “all past disputes are behind us.” (emphasis added). 12/13/07 Tr. 13:7-13. Nor can Plaintiff successfully argue that any pending issue over Third Parties’ compliance with the Subpoenas did not develop after December 13th, but instead, developed before December 13th, and, thus, is somehow immune from the release. Otherwise, the phrase “all past disputes are behind us” would have no meaning. As of the time immediately prior to the entry into the December 13th agreement, there were no “past disputes;” there were only pending disputes. Rather, the very purpose of the December 13th hearing consisted of determining whether Third Parties were in contempt of the Court’s prior orders. Thus, it was the December 13th settlement that rendered the issue of Third Parties’ alleged contempt and pre-December 13, 2007, compliance efforts a “past dispute.” Accordingly, the record reveals that the Parties agreed that the Court should evaluate Third Parties’ compliance efforts by looking to the record from the point of December 13, 2007, forward.[33] A subpoena places the recipient under a “duty to make in good faith all reasonable efforts to comply with it.”[34] United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 534 (1971). Through its opinion in United States v. Hayes, 722 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1984), the Eleventh Circuit has provided some guidance regarding the meaning of this phrase. In Hayes, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) served summonses on Hayes, seeking disclosure of information relating to tax shelters sold and managed by Hayes. Hayes invested trust assets gathered from American investors, in Panamanian partnerships formed to engage in commodity trading. For each partnership, Hayes named Thom, a Swiss resident, as the managing partner, but Hayes retained control over Thom pursuant to the partnership agreement. After the IRS obtained an order requiring Hayes to comply with the summonses, Hayes partially complied but failed to provide the foreign partnership agreements. In response to an order to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court, Hayes claimed that the records were in Switzerland and that Thom, because of concern over a separate tax investigation, would not release them. In this regard, Hayes testified that he had made two trips to Switzerland and had asked Thom for the records. The district court declined to find Hayes in contempt of court. *17 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the matter for further proceedings. In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Hayes had satisfied his “duty to make in good faith all reasonable efforts to comply” with the district court’s order requiring Hayes to provide documents responsive to the summonses. 722 F.2d at 725-26. The Eleventh Circuit found that he had not. As the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, Hayes had not explored other available avenues for obtaining the summonsed materials. More specifically, among other deficiencies, following Thom’s refusal, Hayes did not engage in any other steps to obtain the partnership agreements, although the Eleventh Circuit found that Hayes’s status as the principal or sole partner in the foreign partnerships endowed him with the ability to exercise substantial control over Thom, as well as some power to remove Thom as manager. Nor did Hayes ever advise Thom that he would take steps to see that the summonsed documents were released. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded, “[e]ven if the efforts [Hayes] did make were ‘substantial,’ ‘diligent’ or ‘in good faith,’ ” he “did not make ‘all reasonable efforts[.]’ ” Id. at 725 (quoting United States v. Rizzo, 539 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1976)).[35] Bearing in mind this understanding of what satisfactory subpoena compliance entails, the undersigned considers Third Parties’ compliance efforts with respect to each of the subpoena areas outlined by Plaintiff in his Court-Ordered Report on the [Third Parties’] Failure to Comply with Subpoenas and Court Orders Related Thereto [D.E. 327] and Plaintiff’s Specific Objections Response [D.E. 359]. 1. The Octagon Account (Canada) Blue Green T, LLC, has an account at Octagon Capital Corporation (“Octagon”), located in Canada. According to Plaintiff, Mr. Villarroel, Ms. Knight’s father, is the nominal owner of Blue Green T, LLC, and Ms. Knight directs Blue Green’s affairs as an “authorized officer.” [D.E. 359, p.13, n.7, Ex. 12]. Plaintiff reaches this conclusion based on his assertion that Ms. Knight has general power of attorney over all of Mr. Villarroel’s affairs. SeeD.E. 359, p.13, Ex. 11, “Durable Power of Attorney,” signed by Mr. Villarroel, dated December 26, 2003, and “Acceptance of Appointment,” signed by Ms. Knight, on December 23, 2006. As a result, Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Knight has power to produce all documents from the Octagon Account, but has failed to do so. D.E. 359, p. 13. According to Plaintiff, an e-mail by Third Parties’ counsel to Octagon dated December 28, 2007 [D.E. 359, Ex. 16], and a letter from Third Parties’ counsel to Octagon dated December 19, 2007 [D.E. 359, Ex. 8], detail Ms. Knight’s post-December 13, 2007, production obligations under the Subpoenas regarding the Octagon Account and demonstrate that Ms. Knight was aware of these production requirements. D.E. 359, p. 13-14. Plaintiff alleges that as of April 21, 2008, the date of Plaintiff’s Specific Objections Response, Ms. Knight had not produced the documents described in these letters. D.E. 359, p. 14. Thus, Plaintiff asserts that the letters demonstrate that Octagon has responsive documents that have not been produced, and that Ms. “Knight has not adequately demanded their production” in order to be able to provide them to Plaintiff. D.E. 359, p. 14. Further, Plaintiff urges that if Ms. Knight contends that Octagon “has wrongfully refused to produce to her copies of responsive documents, it is her obligation to compel their production; it is no answer to tell the Trustee to get her documents for her.” Id. Additionally, Plaintiff proffers that Ms. Knight did not indicate whether she has requested assistance from Mr. Villarroel regarding her outstanding production obligations regarding this account. Id., p. 19. Consequently, Plaintiff requests that Ms. Knight be directed to produce all unproduced Octagon Account documents pursuant to the Subpoenas. Id., p. 14. *18 Ms. Knight counters Plaintiff’s argument by asserting that she has engaged in all reasonable efforts to obtain the responsive documents and has provided all such documents obtained. In this regard, Ms. Knight first contends that she does not have any authority to compel production of information from her father’s accounts. She explained at the hearing that pursuant to a Bank of America consumer banking dual power of attorney, Ms. Knight had power of attorney over her father’s financial matters as of December 26, 2006. Tr. 45:1-7; D.E. 359, Ex. 11. On July 25, 2007, however, Mr. Villarroel revoked Ms. Knight’s power of attorney over his financial matters in a handwritten note, signed by Mr. Villarroel and produced to the Court. Tr. 33:24-25; 34:1-7; 35:2-13; D.E. 331, Ex. C (W 02551- W 02552). Thus, Ms. Knight could no longer, on behalf of her father, demand that Octagon produce responsive documents or seek legal recourse for any failure by Octagon to comply with a request to produce documents. Despite the fact that the power of attorney was revoked, Ms. Knight detailed her efforts to retrieve and produce responsive Octagon Account documents to Plaintiff. In this regard, Ms. Knight related that she requested from Octagon Corporation in person, in Canada, that it provide her with everything it had regarding her father’s account. Ms. Knight stated that Octagon advised her that it had given her everything. Tr. 36:9-25; 37:1. Indeed, Ms. Knight testified that she understood when she left Octagon’s office that “I had everything.” Tr. 50:2-4. According to Ms. Knight’s testimony, Ms. Knight’s father had also requested that Octagon provide her with the additional documents requested. Tr. 38:11-19. On August 2, 2007, Mr. Villarroel provided authorization to Octagon Corporation “to send all transactional records and all other related matters in reference to Blue Green T LLC account to Mrs. Barbara Knight . . . .” See Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 11 (W 02729); see also Tr. 47:21-25; 48:1-23. Ms. Knight understood this authorization to Octagon to provide all documents from the Blue Green T, LLC, account to Ms. Knight. Tr. 47:21-25; 48:1-23. Ms. Knight acknowledged, however, that the authorization from her father did not state “all records.” Tr. 49:14-18. Ms. Knight asserted that she communicated with her father about the documents she had to produce and asked him orally and in writing to help her in the process. Tr. 56:14-23. According to Ms. Knight, she had her father write the letter to Octagon because Octagon would not let her have the documents when she called directly. Tr. 50: 5-12. The letter dated December 19, 2007, from Ms. Knight’s counsel to Octagon contains a list of what were thought to be documents that were missing from the Octagon account. Tr. 54:17-21; see D.E. 359, Ex. 8 (W 04406- W 04409). Ms. Knight also sent a follow-up e-mail to Octagon on December 19, 2007, asking it to confirm that there are no other responsive documents available and/or to produce any missing documents. See Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 13 (W 04410- W 04411). Later, in a follow-up letter from Ms. Knight’s counsel to the compliance office of Octagon, Ms. Knight’s attorney requested additional documents that appeared to be in existence. In response, Octagon stated it required additional time to retrieve the documents because they were stored off-site or because Octagon was still searching for them. Tr. 37:2-25; 38:1-6; see also Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 14. In Third Parties’ Hearing Exhibit 1, p. 14, Ms. Knight further submitted details of the efforts by her counsel to retrieve the missing documents from Octagon via correspondence with Octagon and the failure of Octagon to respond to counsel’s requests, with the last request dated April 4, 2008. Id. As of the April 24th hearing, Octagon still had not made available to Ms. Knight some of the additional documents requested, but she stated that she intends to turn over to Plaintiff any other documents later provided by Octagon. Tr. 38:11-25; 39:1. Ms. Knight testified that she believes she has done everything within her power to obtain documents from this account, including going to Canada and personally trying to get the documents. Tr. 49: 19-23. Ms. Knight asserted that she had contacted her father through phone calls and via an e-mail dated April 13, 2008. Tr. 38:11-21; 56:14-12; Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 25. According to Ms. Knight, she urged her father in these communications to do everything he could to find or get the documents still outstanding from Octagon, Gibraltar and Global Bank. Id.; Tr. 69:2-8. *19 Additionally, Ms. Knight instructed her attorney to do what was necessary to comply with the Subpoenas, and she stated that she has not done anything to try to stop her counsel from attempting to procure the documents. Tr. 55:19-22. Indeed, Ms. Knight affirmatively denied asking anybody not to assist her counsel in getting the documents that counsel thought were necessary to comply with the Subpoenas. Tr. 56:24-25; 57:1-2. Based on Ms. Knight’s testimony and the evidence presented by Third Parties, the undersigned finds that Ms. Knight has made a good-faith effort to retrieve and produce responsive documents within her custody, control, or possession as of December 13, 2007, regarding the Octagon Account. While prior to the revocation of her father’s power of attorney in July, 2007, Ms. Knight may well not have exhausted all reasonable efforts to provide documents regarding the Octagon Account, any such delinquency is not in front of the Court today because of the parties’ December 13, 2007, Settlement Agreement. As for Ms. Knight’s post-December 13th efforts, I recommend a finding that Plaintiff’s efforth ts satisfy the standard set forth in Hayes, supra. Although Plaintiff urges the contrary result and suggests that Ms. Knight must file legal process in Canada to obtain the requested documents, I respectfully reject such a proposition. Unlike in Hayes, where the Eleventh Circuit found that Hayes’s status as the principal or sole partner in the foreign partnerships endowed him with the ability to exercise substantial control over Thom, as well as some power to remove Thom as manager, here, no evidence exists to demonstrate that Ms. Knight or Lolly Lu, LLC, had any legal status with respect to Blue Green T, LLC, or Ms. Knight’s father after December 13, 2007. Indeed, Ms. Knight’s prior ability to act on behalf of her father in his financial affairs expired a few months earlier, in July, 2007, when Mr. Villarroel retracted the grant of power of attorney to Ms. Knight. In the absence of this authority or evidence of Ms. Knight’s holding of any other position with respect to Blue Green T, LLC, Ms. Knight and Lolly Lu, LLC, appear to have lacked the standing required to effect any legal process in Canada to require Octagon to produce the subpoenaed documents. Despite this fact, Ms. Knight testified that she had requested that her father assist her with her obligations under the Subpoenas, but the Court notes that neither of the Subpoenas is addressed to Mr. Villarroel, and thus, Mr. Villarroel has no obligation to provide Ms. Knight or Plaintiff, in fact, with any of his documents pursuant to the Subpoenas currently under consideration.[36] Here, Ms. Knight has empowered her attorney to engage in all available avenues for obtaining the documents at issue, and no evidence suggests that he has not done so. Nor does any evidence indicate that Ms. Knight has attempted to interfere with her attorney’s efforts in this regard. Moreover, Ms. Knight has presented uncontroverted testimony that she has personally visited Octagon in Canada to obtain the subpoenaed documents, and she has further enlisted the help of her father. In the absence of Ms. Knight’s father’s power of attorney, I cannot conceive of any legal remedies available to Ms. Knight to procure the documents. In short, I recommend that Ms. Knight be found in compliance with respect to the request for Octagon documents, but that any responsive documents provided to Third Parties’ counsel by Octagon Capital Corporation, in response to their prior requests, be provided to Plaintiff within seven calendar days of receipt from Octagon. Additionally, to the extent that Third Parties contend that any newly obtained Octagon documents contain privileged information, I recommend that Third Parties be required to provide Plaintiff with an appropriate privilege log within seven calendar days of receipt of any such additional documents from Octagon regarding the Octagon Account. 2. The Antigua Account *20 Plaintiff also seeks documents relating to Blue Green T, LLC’s account at the Global Bank of Commerce, Ltd., located in Antigua. This account is controlled by Mr. Villarroel and allegedly Ms. Knight. See D.E. 85 at ¶ 18; 359, p.14-15, 16-17. According to Plaintiff, Ms. Knight has produced eight authorizations signed by her approving transfers for $1.7 million dollars [seeD.E. 359, Ex. 16 (W 7859, 7865, 7867, 7868, 7872, 7875, 7879, 7886) ] from this account to other accounts, but she has failed to provide similar signed authorizations for other executed transfers [see D.E. 359, p. 14; Ex. 16 (W 7883, 7884, 7887, 7888) ] from this account to other accounts, for transactions totaling $680,000, or account management documents that show authorization for Ms. Knight’s actions on this account. Id. Three of the four missing transactions are dated December 8, 2006, for $58,000 (W 07883), September 26, 3006, for $37,000 (W 7884), and December 27, 2006, for $57,678 (W 7887). The last missing transaction is dated October 8, 2007, for $480,533.91 (W 7888), closing the account at Global Bank. Plaintiff also notes that Blue Green T’s Octagon account, totaling $1.64 million, was liquidated into this Antigua account on November 15, 2005 [seeD.E. 359, Ex. 16 (W 07870) ], and that on October 8, 2007, the Global Bank account was closed and account proceeds were provided to an undisclosed Bolivian account. [D.E. 359, p.14-15]. According to Plaintiff, the Antigua Account, along with other accounts, has been used to “secrete and launder assets beneficially owned by Gurian.” [D.E. 359, p. 16-17]. Plaintiff urges that no doubt can exist that Ms. Knight has the ability to produce documents from this account, in view of a December 21, 2007, letter from the Global Bank of Commerce, addressed to “The Director,” but with “Attn: Mr. & Mrs. Knight,” regarding “Closed Account . . . Blue Green T LLC,” stating, “We hereby acknowledge receipt of your request to have documents provided to you on the subject of the closed account and advise that we will research and advise you further.” D.E. 359, p. 15, Ex. 18 (W 06737). Finally, Plaintiff concludes that despite evidence that these documents remain unproduced, Ms. Knight “announces that . . . [she] has no intention of producing the outstanding authorizations.” Id., p. 15, referring to D.E. 331, p. 8. Plaintiff requests that the Court compel production all “remaining Antigua documents . . . .” from Ms. Knight, and hold that Ms. Knight “has an obligation to compel production.” D.E. 356, p. 15. In contrast to Plaintiff’s arguments, Third Parties argue that all documents regarding this account have been produced. [D.E. 331, p. 8]. According to Third Parties, Plaintiff has received numerous documents relating to the Global Bank from Third Parties. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 17 (detailing Bates ranges). Moreover, they contend that they have made great efforts in attempting to retrieve the responsive documents from Global Bank. Id., p. 17-21; see also D.E. 331, p. 8-9. More specifically, Third Parties assert that they made multiple requests by e-mail and telephone, dated December 10, 11, and 18, 2007, to Global Bank for all records regarding Blue Green. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex 1, p. 17 (W 4403-4406). Likewise, Ms. Knight testified that her attorneys, in the letters to the bank dated December 10, 11, and 18, 2007, asked the bank to produce additional documents and the missing four documents. Tr. 57:9-12. Ms. Knight further represents that she directly requested documents on several occasions prior to December, 2007. Tr. 57:13-15. In response to these efforts, on December 20, 2007, Third Parties received a fax from Global Bank acknowledging the request for documents and instructing counsel to have the client contact the bank directly. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 17 (W 0446). Third Parties further state that they contacted the Antiguan Consulate Agent by telephone on December 17, 2007, in order to request a list of attorneys to assist them in procuring the documents, and Ms. Knight confirmed that her attorneys were also involved in such a request. Tr. 57:16-20; Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 18. Using this list, Third Parties contacted a law firm in Antigua on December 17 and 18, 2007, but state that they never received a response. Id. In light of the difficulty of obtaining Global Bank’s cooperation in producing documents, Ms. Knight and Third Parties state that Ms. Knight’s husband traveled to Antigua on December 20, 2007, to obtain documents. Id., p. 18 (W 06748- W06742); Tr. 57:21-24. Global Bank advised Mr. Knight that Global Bank did not keep any documents at the bank, as documents were maintained offsite, but Global Bank agreed to research the relevant account documents. Id.; Tr. 57:25, 58:1-10. Global Bank also provided a letter dated December 21, 2007, stating that it would research the records requests, and a signed bank statement, which Third Parties allege contains a cumulative list of all transfers into or out of the account from 2003 to 2006. Id. (W 06737- W 06739); see also D.E. 359, Ex. 18. *21 Third Parties assert that in March of 2008, Global Bank finally responded to Third Parties’ numerous document requests and provided documents, which Third Parties, including Ms. Knight, subsequently produced to Plaintiff. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 19 (W 07855- W 07888); D.E. 331, p. 8; Tr. 58:3. In this regard, Ms. Knight testified that she recalled that she produced in March, 2008, all account documents in her possession. Tr. 58:11-14; see also Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 19-21. (W 07855– W 07888). Only the records relating to the four transactions in question were missing, but she did not receive those documents from Global Bank through her subpoena compliance efforts, and she did not otherwise possess them. Id. Further, Third Parties represent that Ms. Knight never announced that she had no intention of producing the four outstanding authorizations. D.E. 331, p. 8; Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p.16. To the contrary, in their Order to Show Cause Response, Third Parties state that they “have produced all documents provided by Global Bank, and based on its response, are not expecting any additional documents from Global Bank. If, however, any further documents are produced by . . .[Global Bank], they will promptly be produced to Plaintiff.” D.E. 331, p. 8.[37] Ms. Knight similarly asserts that all documents from the Global Bank of Commerce in Antigua have been produced. Tr. 57:3-8. Thus, although Ms. Knight has indicated her intention to provide documents relating to the four missing transactions should they come into her possession, custody, or control, she has testified under oath that she simply does not have those documents at this time, despite her attempts to obtain them from Global Bank. Ms. Knight also stated that she has not interfered with any requests that her counsel has made to procure the documents. Tr. 55: 19-22. Indeed, Ms. Knight affirmatively denied that she has asked anybody not to assist her counsel in getting the documents that counsel thought were necessary to comply with the subpoena. Tr. 56:24-25, 57:1-2. In response to Plaintiff’s cross-examination regarding the four transactions that are allegedly missing the signed authorizations, Ms. Knight admitted that she believed she personally authorized the transaction of $35,000 from Global Bank of Commerce of Antigua to Lolly Lu, LLC, on September 26, 2006, as evidenced by written request to the Bank. Tr. 61:13-16, 23-25; 62:1-5; see also D.E. 359, Ex. 16 (W 07884). She said, however, that she could not remember whether she authorized a wire transfer in the amount of $57,678.00 from the Bank to Quepasa Corporation, as evidenced by an “Advice of Debit” receipt from the Bank dated December 27, 2006. Tr. 62:6-23 [see D.E. 359, Ex. 16 (W 07887) ]. Regarding Quepasa Corporation, Ms. Knight clarified that Quepasa Corporation is a stock that was involved with Blue Green T, LLC, and she vaguely remembers that Mr. Gurian advised her on this stock. Tr. 62:11-20, 24-25. Ms. Knight also believed she authorized a wire transfer in the amount of $480,533.91 on October 8, 2007, from Global Bank of Commerce of Antigua to Jaime Villarroel, that closed the account. Tr. 61:13-15, 62:6-7, 24-25; 63:9-11; see D.E. 359, Ex. 16 (W 07888). Earlier in her testimony, Ms. Knight recalled transferring funds to Las Vegas for Defendant Gurian from this Antigua account. Tr. 44:15-19. With regard to other accounts in the name of her father, Blue Green T, or her name, Ms. Knight was not sure or did not think Gurian provided trading instructions directly, but stated she had no personal knowledge. Tr. 43:9-14, 25; 44:1-7. *22 Plaintiff did not present any evidence indicating that Ms. Knight’s statements were untruthful. Nor did he provide evidence suggesting that she had misrepresented her efforts to retrieve documents from Global Bank. Rather, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Knight, as the one who authorized at least some, if not all, of the missing four transactions, should have the documents. Perhaps she should, but Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she does or that she did at any time from December 13, 2007, forward. In view of Third Parties’ efforts to obtain the Antigua Account documents, as detailed in their Response and Ms. Knight’s testimony, the undersigned recommends that Ms. Knight be found in compliance regarding documents from this Antigua Account located at Global Bank of Commerce. The evidence presented by Third Parties and Ms. Knight’s testimony indicates that Third Parties have undertaken all reasonable efforts to retrieve documents from Global Bank of Commerce, and to produce responsive documents to Plaintiff. While documents regarding the missing four transactions that should exist somewhere have not been produced, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence indicating that Ms. Knight has not tried to retrieve this information or that she has otherwise failed to meet her good-faith obligations in this regard. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, since December 13, 2007, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Ms. Knight has refused to produce any documents regarding this account. Indeed, Ms. Knight’s testimony acknowledged her involvement with this account and control, and admitted authorizing some of the very transactions at issue. Based on her sworn testimony, she has provided all the documents that Global Bank has provided to her, and thus, has nothing else to provide Plaintiff. Global Bank’s apparent inability to provide the documents Plaintiff seeks should not weigh against Ms. Knight where the record demonstrates her multiple efforts to retrieve these documents and no actual resistance on the part of Global Bank. Although the Bank has not produced the documents relating to the missing four transactions, this fact appears to arise from Global Bank’s offsite record maintenance procedures, a situation unlikely to be remedied by serving legal process in Antigua against Global Bank. Thus, the situation is unlike Hayes, where Thom had the documents but refused to produce them to Hayes – a circumstance that an appropriate court order could correct. Here, there is no indication that Global Bank even has the documents at issue anymore, at least in a place where they can be searched and accessed by the bank. For these reasons, I recommend a finding that Ms. Knight is in compliance with respect to the request for Antigua Documents, but that any responsive documents provided to Third Parties’ counsel by Global Bank of Commerce in response to prior requests, be provided to Plaintiff within seven calendar days of receipt from Global Bank of Commerce. Additionally, I recommend that Third Parties provide Plaintiff with a privilege log regarding any documents withheld on the basis of privilege, within seven calendar days of receipt of any additional documents from Global Bank regarding this Account. 3. The Gibraltar Account (the Bahamas) The Gibraltar Account (the Bahamas) is a brokerage account opened on behalf of Blue Green T, LLC, at Gibraltar Global Securities, a brokerage company located in the Bahamas. See D.E. 359, p.15-16. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gurian controlled the Gibraltar trading account of Blue Green T, LLC, owned by Mr. Villarroel and allegedly controlled by Ms. Knight. See D.E. 359, p. 15-16. With respect to the Gibraltar Account (the Bahamas), Plaintiff complains that even though Ms. Knight is an authorized agent for Blue Green T, LLC, on the Gibraltar Account, Ms. Knight has produced only seven pages regarding this account. D.E. 359, p.15; Ex. 19-21 (e-mails dated October 16 and 20, 2007, from Gibraltar to Ms. Knight as Blue Green’s “agent;” Ms. Knight’s statement that she is an “executor” of the Gibraltar Account; October 3, 2006, Corporate Resolution listing Ms. Knight as “authorized trader” for Blue Green). Because Plaintiff contends that the evidence reflects that more than sixty-five transactions, including a number of wire transfers, have occurred affecting this account, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Knight has failed to provide all documents from this account responsive to the Subpoenas. Id., p. 15; Ex. 19, Account records from Gibraltar (LL 2913-19). *23 Further, Plaintiff complains that according to the “Account Opening Documentary Checklist” for this Blue Green brokerage account, Third Parties have produced only three of the eight requested account-opening documents, without explanation of the deficiency. D.E. 359, p. 15; Ex. 22 (W 06753). Additionally, due to Ms. Knight’s demonstrated ability to act on behalf of Blue Green, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Knight should be able to produce additional documents such as “historical activity, including but not limited to, its funding source(s), withdrawals . . ., and who controls its trading activities.” D.E. 359, p. 15. Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Knight’s failure to provide an affidavit detailing her efforts to obtain documents from Gibraltar or Defendant Gurian, results in a “plausible inference” that these “additional documents” “may demonstrate that Gurian . . . has been compensated from – or has some other financial interest in, or controls – the Gibraltar Account.” Id., p.16. Plaintiff equates Ms. Knight’s failure to provide an affidavit regarding her efforts to retrieve these documents from Gibraltar and Defendant Gurian with a “refusal” by Ms. Knight to produce additional Gibraltar documents. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that documents from Defendant Gurian’s counsel demonstrate that Gurian’s legal bills have been paid from an account at Gibraltar [id., Ex. 23] and that Ms. Knight has “refused to produce all documents demonstrating whether such payments originated from the Gibraltar Account.” Id. Pursuant to these arguments, Plaintiff asks that the Court direct Ms. Knight to produce all remaining Gibraltar Account documents, including “all account statements, notes, memoranda, correspondence, evidence of deposits or withdrawals (by wire, check, stock transfer or otherwise),” and order Ms. Knight to compel production of the Gibraltar documents. Id. Third Parties, including Ms. Knight, deny that they have any outstanding document production obligations regarding this account. D.E. 331, p. 7. They argue that they “have requested each and every document related to the Gibraltar account documents[,] and have, in fact, produced to Plaintiff[,] each and every one of the documents they obtained.” Id.; see also Tr. 63:15-17, 24-25; 64:1. More specifically, Third Parties state they have produced documents in December of 2007 (W 06753- W 06758) from Gibraltar. Id. Regarding their efforts to retrieve documents, Third Parties represent that Ms. Knight caused Gibraltar to be called on December 17 and 18, 2007, and, in response, Ms. Knight received documents that she produced in December. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 24; Tr. 67:25; 68:1-4. To her knowledge, all the Gibraltar Securities account opening documents received were included in the production to her counsel. Tr. 64:2-5. Of the nine documents required to open an account at Gibraltar Securities, Ms. Knight represents that only seven were provided by Gibraltar Securities to her or her counsel. Tr. 64:6-23; 65:16-21. According to Ms. Knight, the two missing documents for opening a corporate account have been requested from Gibraltar Securities. Tr. 67:21-24. In order to ensure that Gibraltar had provided all responsive documents, counsel for Third Parties wrote a letter to Gibraltar on December 20, 2007, again requesting the complete file. D.E. 331, p. 7 (W 04420); Tr. 68:5-8. In response to the last request, no additional documents were provided to Third Parties. Id.; Tr. 68: 5-16. In sum, Ms. Knight testified that everything she or her attorneys have received from Gibraltar has been turned over to Plaintiff. Tr. 68:13-16. *24 Additionally, Ms. Knight stated that she has not interfered with any requests that her counsel has made in attempting to obtain the documents. Tr. 55: 19-22. She likewise affirmatively denied that she has asked anybody not to assist her counsel in getting the documents that counsel thought were necessary to comply with the Subpoenas. Tr. 56:24-25, 57:1-2. Ms. Knight further stated that she turned over to her counsel for production all documents she received. Tr. 66:18-20. As for indications in the documents produced that Ms. Knight has authority as an agent of Blue Green T, LLC, with respect to the Gibraltar Account, Ms. Knight conceded her ability to trade on the Gibraltar Account on behalf of Blue Green T, LLC. In this regard, the Court notes that in an e-mail dated October 16, 2006, to Gibraltar Securities regarding what appears to be a stock transfer, Ms. Knight described herself as the “executor on the account.” Tr. 72:8-23, See D.E. 359, Ex. 20 (LL 00030-32). Similarly, on a document titled “Corporate Resolution” for Blue Green T, LLC, dated October 3, 2006, Ms. Knight confirmed that she signed her signature with the title “Authorized Trader” next to her name. Tr. 72:24-25; 73:1, See 359, Ex. 21 (LL 00029). With respect to a document entitled, “Account Overview” for Blue Green T, LLC, dated January 1, 2006 - August 1, 2007, Ms. Knight stated this document constituted a complete transactional history for the Gibraltar account, with a total net value of $2,605,503.69, as of August 1, 2007. Tr. 73:2-24, See D.E. 359, Ex. 19 (LL 02914). Thus, it appears as though Ms. Knight could act on Blue Green’s behalf, at least with regard to the Gibraltar account. Nevertheless, Plaintiff did not counter any of Ms. Knight’s statements or evidence regarding her efforts and those of her attorneys to retrieve and produce documents regarding the Gibraltar account. Nor did Plaintiff attack Third Parties’ counsel’s December 20, 2007, written request to Gibraltar for documents as being too under-inclusive. Plaintiff similarly did not provide evidence tending contradict Ms. Knight’s position regarding the Account Overview document that it served as a complete transactional history for Blue Green T, LLC’s Gibraltar account, as of August 1, 2007. Thus, I recommend a finding that Ms. Knight is in compliance regarding the Gibraltar account. Ms. Knight provided documentary evidence and sworn testimony to verify her various efforts to provide all documents regarding the Gibraltar account. As acknowledged by Ms. Knight, there are missing documents from the Account Opening Checklist, but Third Parties have attempted to retrieve these missing documents from Gibraltar to no avail. Again, Plaintiff fails to provide evidence that counters Ms. Knight’s testimony and evidence of her efforts. While the Court could order Third Parties to file legal process against Gibraltar in the Bahamas, it does not appear to me that engaging in such an exercise would yield additional documents. Accordingly, for the same reasons Ms. Knight need not engage in legal process against Global, Ms. Knight has no obligation to attempt to compel production of the documents from Gibraltar. As with Global, there is no indication that Gibraltar has resisted Ms. Knight’s requests for documents. Rather, Gibraltar simply appears unable to collect the entirety of the documents requested. Under these circumstances, I recommend a finding that Ms. Knight is in compliance with respect to the request for Gibraltar documents, but that any responsive documents provided to Third Parties’ counsel by Gibraltar in response to their prior requests, be provided to Plaintiff within seven calendar days of receipt from Gibraltar. Additionally, with respect to any newly received Gibraltar documents for which Third Parties claim privilege, I recommend that Third Parties provide Plaintiff with a privilege log within seven calendar days of receipt of any additional documents from Gibraltar regarding this Account. 4. Bolivian Accounts *25 Ms. Knight’s father, Mr. Villarroel, has accounts located in Bolivia, the location of Mr. Villarroel’s current residence [D.E. 359, Ex. 16], which Plaintiff alleges have been used to “secrete and launder assets beneficially owned by [Defendant] Gurian . . . .” [D.E. 359, p. 16-17]. Plaintiff contends that the Octagon assets (totaling $1.64 million) were liquidated into the Antigua Account, and then the proceeds from that transaction were transferred on August 10, 2007, from the Antigua Account to an account located in Bolivia, which he asserts Ms. Knight controls. D.E. 359, p. 14-15, 16-17; Ex. 16, 25 (W 7856, 7888). Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Knight has “unfettered access” to these accounts, as a result of a November 25, 2003, handwritten note in Spanish from Mr. Villarroel. D.E. 359, Ex. 24 (W 01104). The handwritten note, translated into English, gives Ms. Knight “total control” of Mr. Villarroel’s “savings account at Banco Union and Cooperativa Fatima,” and identifies the account. Id. Because Plaintiff argues that Mr. Villarroel’s accounts contain the assets of Defendant Gurian, and Ms. Knight has complete access to such accounts, Plaintiff urges that Ms. Knight is required to produce responsive documents from the Bolivian Accounts. According to Plaintiff, Ms. Knight has managed her father’s accounts for more than four years, but has provided only one document regarding the Bolivian Accounts, the November 25, 2003, handwritten note from Mr. Villarroel. D.E. 359, p. 16. Plaintiff asserts that there is no evidence that Ms. Villarroel has rescinded the “total control” over the Bolivian Accounts he ceded to Ms. Knight. Id. According to Plaintiff, “[Ms.] Knight has refused to produce all documents related to transactions involving the Bolivian Accounts, including but not limited to[,] all documents related to the purported transfers from one of the Bolivian Accounts to Lolly Lu,” as evidenced by an affidavit signed by Mr. Villarroel dated December 26, 2007. Id.; Ex. 25 at ¶ 6 (W 06733). In the affidavit, Mr. Villarroel notes that he and Blue Green “loaned” Ms. Knight money for Lolly Lu, including transfers from his “personal account” to Lolly Lu in December of 2003, and June, August, and September of 2004. D.E. 359, Ex. 25.[38] Plaintiff requests that Ms. Knight be ordered to produce all documents regarding the Bolivian accounts. Id. Third Parties do not deny that they have received money and property from Mr. Villarroel, as testified to by Ms. Knight. Indeed, Ms. Knight confirmed that between 1995 and May of 2006, she received money and property from her father. Tr. 75:13-16. Third Parties contend, however, that they have produced what limited documents are within Ms. Knight’s control regarding Mr. Villarroel’s Bolivian accounts, including two letters from Mr. Villarroel and the December 26, 2007, affidavit of Mr. Villarroel. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 26 (W 01104-1105, W 02551 -52). First, Third Parties argue that Mr. Villarroel provided Ms. Knight with control of his accounts on November 25, 2003, just prior to undergoing a triple by-pass procedure, and submit a declaration from Ms. Knight’s brother, Michael Villarroel, dated January 30, 2008, to attest to this fact. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 27; D.E. 331, Ex. E. Ms. Knight also confirmed during her testimony that her father gave her the power of attorney when going into open heart surgery and she did not think he was going to survive. Tr. 79:8-12, 22-24. While Ms. Knight testified that she directed money from Antigua to a bank account number for her father, which she could not recall, but which was located at Banco Union in Bolivia [Tr. 81:10-16], Ms. Knight stated that she has not undertaken any other activities pursuant to this power of attorney. Tr. 81:4-9. In fact, Ms. Knight testified that she had forgotten this power of attorney existed [Tr. 82:1-2], and she did not recall where or how she located this power of attorney, either in a package her father sent her or among paperwork and boxes she searched in order to find responsive documents. Tr. 79:5-21. Furthermore, according to Ms. Knight, she had not provided any funds from an account in Bolivia for the benefit of Defendant Gurian. Tr. 44:20-22. *26 Second, despite Plaintiff’s contentions to the contrary, Third Parties affirmatively state that by note dated July 25, 2007, Mr. Villarroel rescinded the power of attorney and Ms. Knight no longer had access to his accounts. D.E. 331, Ex. C, Handwritten note from Mr. Villarroel (W 02551-52). Indeed, Ms. Knight testified that her father ended all of her powers over his accounts in August. Tr. 81:21-24. Third, Mr. Villarroel stated in his December 26, 2007, Affidavit that he “would not produce [his] . . . personal bank account statements or records” [D.E. 359, Ex. 25 at ¶ 9], limiting Ms. Knight’s power to provide documents regarding his accounts. While Ms. Knight stated that her father has been cooperative in providing her with certain records [Tr. 77:17-20], Ms. Knight confirmed that her father has not provided her with any statements from his personal bank accounts. Tr. 79:2-4. Fourth, even thought she lacks authority, Third Parties represent and Ms. Knight testified that she wrote a letter on March 27, 2008, to the bank referred to in Mr. Villarroel’s November 25, 2003, letter, Banco Union, and requested documents, but has received no response, as of the date of the April 24th Hearing. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 28; Tr. 77:10-16. She also stated that she provided Plaintiff with everything from her own bank records showing the money from her father coming to her or her companies, including Lolly Lu, Shop Lucy’s, and Just Gotta Have It. Tr. 75:13-25; 76:1-14. Finally, because Ms. Knight claims to have no control over Mr. Villarroel’s Bolivian accounts, despite her efforts without authority to request the documents, Ms. Knight suggests that she cannot produce documents regarding this account and, thus, is compliant under the Subpoenas. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 26-28. Additionally, Ms. Knight testified that she has not countermanded any requests that her counsel has made from herself or a third party to try to stop her counsel from obtaining the documents. Tr. 55:19-22. Ms. Knight also asserted that she communicated with her father about the documents she had to produce and asked him to help her in the process, orally and in writing. Tr. 56:14-23. She affirmatively denied that she has asked anybody not to assist her counsel in procuring the documents that counsel thought were necessary to comply with the Subpoenas. Tr. 56:24-25; 57:1-2. Plaintiff did not counter Ms. Knight’s testimony. He similarly did not challenge Ms. Knight’s evidence that her power of attorney over her father’s Bolivian Accounts had been rescinded. While Mr. Villarroel’s retraction from Ms. Knight of the power of attorney, as well as Mr. Villarroel’ refusal to provide records from his personal bank accounts, appears to provide a suspiciously convenient excuse for Third Parties’ failure to provide all responsive documents regarding the Bolivian Accounts, the fact remains that as a result of Mr. Villarroel’s July, 2007, rescission of Ms. Knight’s power of attorney and authority over Mr. Villarroel’s bank accounts, Third Parties no longer have any legal status with respect to these accounts. Therefore, I recommend a finding that, at least as of December 13, 2007, Ms. Knight lacked the ability to comply with this request, as she had no power, custody or control over her father’s Bolivian accounts. Consequently, compelling Ms. Knight to provide additional documents regarding this account would be futile. Unlike in Hayes, where Hayes had legal control over Thom and the entity at issue, Ms. Knight no longer has control over the Bolivian Accounts, and she has no legal basis to seek to compel anyone, including her father, to provide responsive documents. Based on the evidence presented and Ms. Knight’s testimony, I therefore recommend that Ms. Knight be found in compliance with respect to Plaintiff’s request for documents regarding Mr. Villarroel’s Bolivian Accounts. 5. Investment Accounts *27 Plaintiff argues that Third Parties have refused to produce documents related to investment accounts in which Third Parties had an interest or Third Parties administered, for which Defendant Gurian provided investment advice to Ms. Knight, Mr. Villarroel and Blue Green T, LLC, and for which Ms. Knight compensated Defendant Gurian for the investment advice (“Investment Documents”). See D.E. 359, p. 17. Third Parties retort that Plaintiff’s request for these Investment Documents falls outside the scope of the Subpoenas. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 29; D.E. 331, p. 11. Specifically, Third Parties argue that the Subpoenas do not require Third Parties to produce documents relating to investment accounts when Defendant Gurian gave Third Parties trading instructions or advice. See Tr. 83:1-12. In this regard, Ms. Knight testified that she understands the Subpoenas to seek only documents where she is in receipt of money or property. Tr. 83:6-12. Furthermore, Third Parties assert that Ms. Knight never compensated Defendant Gurian for any advice he gave to Ms. Knight. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 29. According to Ms. Knight’s testimony, Defendant Gurian provided Ms. Knight with advice about stocks and “things like that” via telephone. Tr. 83:22-24. She stated that she did not pay him for the advice. Tr. 83:25; 84:1. Instead, Ms. Knight testified that she compensated Defendant Gurian for his advice regarding securities transactions by taking him to lunch and to dinner. Tr. 89:1-2. Plaintiff contests Third Parties’ suggestion that the Investment Documents at issue do not come within the scope of the subpoenaed records. In support of this position, Plaintiff directs the Court to correspondence between Plaintiff and Third Parties’ counsel, which Third Parties submitted as Third Parties’ Hearing Exhibit 2. According to Plaintiff, these letters between counsel dated December 17, 18, and 20, 2007 [see also D.E. 359, Ex. 6-7], represent Third Parties’ agreement that the documents described in the letters, including those relating to the Investment Accounts, fall within the scope of the Subpoenas. D.E. 359, p. 7, n.4. More specifically, in response to a letter from Third Parties’ counsel dated December 17, 2007, where counsel purported to “set forth below with specificity the tasks we are undertaking to finish the production required by the subpoenas,” and further stated that “[i]f there are any more specific tasks that you believe we need to accomplish or documents we need to obtain, please let me know immediately . . . .” [Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 2, letter from Third Parties to Plaintiff’s counsel dated December 11, 2007], Plaintiff’s counsel advised Third Parties of what it viewed as Third Parties’ “outstanding production obligations pursuant to . . . [the] subpoenas . . .,” as of December 18, 2007. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 2, letter from Plaintiff to Third Parties’ Counsel, dated December 18, 2007. In this regard, Plaintiff, in his December 18, 2007, letter, identified the relevant document categories he alleged were outstanding under the Subpoenas. Based on the following paragraphs from Plaintiff’s December 18, 2007, letter, Plaintiff argues that he put Third Parties on notice that the Investment Accounts fall within the scope of the Subpoenas [D.E. 359, p. 17]: . . . . Third: All documents concerning or related to any of the individuals and entities listed in Subpoena Request. No. 1, including but not limited to, any persons or entities controlled by Gurian or who acted for his benefit (e.g., Laditel Investments) (collectively, the “Search Names”). *28 Fourth: All documents concerning or related to any accounts for which Barbara Knight served as an authorized officer, executor, trader, agent or in any other role, on behalf of or for the benefit of any of the Search Names, including but not limited to, Global Bank of Commerce, Gibraltar Global Securities, Octagon Capital Corporation, and Meyer Associates, L.P. Fifth: All documents concerning or related to any accounts in the name or for the benefit of any of the . . . [Third Parties], including but not limited to, bank, brokerage, credit card or lines of credit, that concern or relate to the transfer of benefits, funds, or assets to or from any of the . . . [Third Parties] (or for the benefit of any of them) and any of the Search Names (or for the benefit of any of them). Sixth: All documents concerning or related to any of the . . . [Third Parties’] dispatch or receipt of documents to, from or for the benefit of any of the Search Names. To the extent such responsive documents were sent or received by facsimile, any and all documents with the facsimile line indicating its origin or any subsequent transmissions should be produced. Seventh: All documents concerning or related to the transfer of benefits, assets or funds to or from any . . . of the . . . [Third Parties] (or for the benefit of any of them) and the Search Names (or for the benefit of any of them). .... Tenth: All documents concerning or related to Philip Gurian’s relationships, financial or otherwise, with any of the . . . [Third Parties]. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 2, letter from Plaintiff to Third Parties’ counsel, dated December 18, 2007; see also D.E. 359, Ex. 6. On December 20, 2007, in a letter to Plaintiff, Third Parties’ counsel then assented to Plaintiff’s statement of Third Parties’ outstanding document obligations under the Subpoenas, noting the following to each corresponding relevant paragraph of Plaintiff’s December 18, 2007, Letter, including the Investment Accounts documents at issue in this section of this Report and Recommendation:[39] .... 3. I think in the specific tasks we are undertaking we are doing everything we can to accomplish the phraseology that you used. 4. We know of no other accounts other than the four that you listed, Global Bank of Commerce, Gibraltar Global Securities, Octagon Capital Corporation and Meyers Associates, LP. If there are others that you think are relevant, let us know. 5. Okay. 6. In addition to producing evidence as to how faxes were transmitted, we will attempt to find every fax cover sheet that we can find. I know that a number already have been produced. 7. Okay. 8. Okay. .... 10. Okay. . . . . Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 2, letter from Third Parties to Plaintiff’s counsel, dated December 20, 2007. In short, Plaintiff argues that paragraphs 4, 3-7, and 10 of his December 18, 2007, letter and Third Parties’ December 20, 2007, letter, read together demonstrate that Third Parties have already agreed to produce the Investment Documents as falling within the scope of the Subpoenas. D.E. 359, p. 7, n. 4. *29 Consequently, Plaintiff contends that consistent with Subpoena Requests 1, 4, 5, 6, and 8, and paragraphs 4, 3-7, and 10 of his December 18, 2007, letter and Third Parties’ December 20, 2007, letter, Third Parties should be directed to produce “any and all documents related to any investment accounts in which . . . [Ms. Knight] has a beneficial interest, or for which she has acted in any capacity,” “about which Gurian gave trading instructions” or “documentation detailing how Gurian was compensated for his services.” D.E. 359, p. 17. As a threshold matter, the Court finds that the correspondence between Plaintiff and Third Parties’ counsel, which Third Parties submitted as Third Parties’ Hearing Exhibit 2, dated December 17, 18, and 20, 2007 [see alsoD.E. 359, Ex. 6-7], represents an agreement by Third Parties to comply with the document requests as set forth in those letters by Plaintiff, as documents responsive to Subpoena Requests 1, 4, 5, 6, and 8 [D.E. 359, p. 7, n.4], including Plaintiff’s request for information regarding the Investment Accounts. While the Court recognizes the vast breadth of the Plaintiff’s interpretation of these December, 2007, letters, the Court need not consider whether to require Third Parties to produce these documents, because Third Parties agreed to it, and, thus, waived all objections. Just as the Court holds Plaintiff to the December 13, 2007, settlement agreement, so must Third Parties abide by their agreement to produce the Investment Documents. Moreover, the Court finds reasonable Plaintiff’s interpretation of Ms. Knight’s Subpoena and Lolly Lu’s Subpoena[40] regarding the request for Investment Accounts records.[41] And, the mere fact that Third Parties continue to argue that they need not respond to this request because it falls outside the scope of the Subpoenas suggests that Third Parties have not made “all reasonable efforts” to comply with this aspect of the Subpoenas. Indeed, in this regard, Plaintiff complains that a September 23, 2001, e-mail from P. Gurian to B. Knight, produced by Third Parties in response to the Subpoenas, leads to the inescapable conclusion that Third Parties have failed to produce all documents relating to accounts for which Gurian gave investment advice and was compensated therefor. The e-mail at issue reads as follows: *30 . . . . I propose charging you 25% of profits until you get to 1//2 million than 30 %. We start at the number 250. if your 250 becomes 350 in the next yr. you pay me 25 grand. 25% is for 12 months no matter what the account is worth 12 months from now. we can negotiate the rates in person when I get back if you are unhappy with that. Let me know. pg D.E. 359, Ex. 26 (W 06995). Ms. Knight denies that this e-mail represents any consummated agreement to pay Defendant Gurian for his investment advice. In this regard, in response to Plaintiff’s specific inquiry about the September 23, 2001, e-mail between Gurian and Ms. Knight, Ms. Knight testified at the April 24thhearing that she “does not remember this.” Tr. 89:23-25; 90:1-2. Then she stated that “[n]othing materialized from this e-mail.” Tr. 90:17. In further testimony, Ms. Knight continued, describing this e-mail as “some type of proposal, but the proposals never happened.” Tr. 90:18-20. When Ms. Knight was asked to what account this “proposal” referred, she replied “with respect to no account.” Tr. 90:21-22. Finally, Ms. Knight explained that although Defendant Gurian made this proposal to her, she was “sure at that time he was saying, ‘Hey, you know, let’s trade together’ . . . but it just never happened.” Tr. 90:23-25; 91:1. In view of this e-mail and the fact that Ms. Knight admitted receiving and using investment advice from Defendant Gurian that resulted in significant gains to Ms. Knight, it seems unusual that Ms. Knight would not have compensated Defendant Gurian for his investment advice. Nevertheless, although the combination of the September 23rd e-mail and Ms. Knight’s admitted receipt of investment advice from Defendant Gurian certainly seem to imply that Ms. Knight must have compensated Defendant Gurian in some way for his investment advice, Plaintiff has produced no evidence showing this to be the case, and Ms. Knight has affirmatively denied the suggestion that it was. Under these circumstances, I will not recommend a finding that other documentation exists relating in some way to the September 23rd e-mail. With respect to records pertaining to those accounts where Defendant Gurian gave Ms. Knight money (as opposed to merely investment advice), Third Parties argued in their Response that Ms. “Knight has already provided documents concerning each and every investment account in which she had a beneficial interest and which are responsive to the Subpoena . . . .” See D.E. 331, p. 11. In this regard, Ms. Knight testified that she has provided all documents to Plaintiff relating to her personal accounts where Defendant Gurian gave her money. Tr. 83:13-18. She also asserted that she had authorized her counsel to produce any investment accounts that she personally held that would involve receipts of money that Ms. Knight received from Defendant Gurian, and to her knowledge, that had been done by her counsel. Tr. 84:6-12. She stated that she previously provided documents regarding her Shadow Trading account, an on-line account in which she trades. Tr. 83:19-21; 84:13-19. Ms. Knight stated that no money came into or out of this account from or to Defendant Gurian, Tr. 84:20-24; 85: 3-5, although she testified that Defendant Gurian did provide her with advice about how to trade on stocks, bonds, or money held in the Shadow Trading account. Tr. 84:25; 85:1-2; 91:10-15. *31 The scope of what Plaintiff and Third Parties agreed fell within the reach of the Subpoenas is not limited to only those Investment Accounts in which Defendant Gurian was compensated for his advice regarding trades or gave Ms. Knight money or property, but also touches on documents where Ms. Knight was provided a benefit from Gurian for his investment advice alone. See Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 2, letter from Plaintiff to Third Parties’ counsel, dated December 18, 2007, ¶ 10. Indeed, paragraph ten of Plaintiff’s December 18, 2007, letter includes “[a]ll documents concerning or related to Philip Gurian’s relationship, financial or otherwise, with any of the . . . [Third Parties].” Id. Ms. Knight has admitted she has received a benefit from Defendant Gurian by allowing him to direct her investment choices on trading accounts. Up and through the Court’s April 24th hearing, however, Ms. Knight has refused, as outside the scope of the Subpoenas, to provide documents from her personal accounts unless they actually evidenced receipt of property or money from or for Gurian. See D.E. 331, p. 11; Tr. 83:13-18. Ms. Knight did not testify that she provided all documents regarding Investments Accounts for which Gurian provided trade or investment advice, but stated that she searched only for documents regarding those accounts for which Defendant Gurian provided her money or property. While Ms. Knight testified that she had produced her Shadow Trading account information and that no money had come into or gone out of this account from Gurian [Tr. 84:20-24; 85:3-5], it does not appear that all possible responsive documents relating to accounts where Gurian provided trading advice have been produced, now that the scope of the Subpoena has been clarified. As Ms Knight has stated that she has received a benefit from Defendant Gurian through trading advice on investment accounts, any Investment Account on which Gurian gave her advice or provided her any type of benefit would be responsive under the Subpoenas, as reflective of or related to Ms. Knight’s or Lolly Lu’s relationship, financial or otherwise, with Gurian, regardless of whether Gurian was paid for his services. Consequently, I recommend that Third Parties be found out of compliance with the Subpoenas regarding the Investment Accounts. I further recommend that Third Parties be directed to produce “any and all documents related to any investment accounts in which . . . [Ms. Knight] has a beneficial interest, or for which [she] has acted in any capacity,” “about which Gurian gave trading instructions,” within seven calendar days of the issuance of an order by the Court. The undersigned further recommends that Third Parties be required to submit a privilege log regarding any Investment Account documents withheld on the basis of privilege, within seven calendar days of the issuance of an order by the Court. Once Third Parties have provided all Investment Account documents and a privilege log, I recommend a finding of compliance. 6. The Joint Operation According to Plaintiff, Ms. Knight has failed to provide documents in relation to an “operation” indicated in the following e-mail from Defendant Gurian to Ms. Knight, dated June 9, 2001: Hey sugar wassup . . . . I hope to go to Atlanta to see OUR operation sometime in the near future. Hope everything goes well your first week . . . . See D.E. 359, Ex. 28 (W 07064-65). Ms. Knight responded to Gurian’s e-mail by stating only, “WHAT IS GOOD MILK?” Id. Plaintiff asserts that this e-mail demonstrates the existence of a business venture with Defendant Gurian, but Third Parties have failed to produce any documents related to it. D.E. 359, p. 17. In addition, Ms. Knight failed to disclose this business venture with Defendant Gurian at her deposition, and the date of the e-mails pre-dates the existence of Lolly Lu, LLC, created in November of 2003. Thus, Plaintiff urges that the e-mail cannot refer to Lolly Lu, of which Defendant Gurian is known to have been a member at some point. D.E. 359, p. 17, Ex. 1 (Lolly Lu, LLC Annual Report, where Defendant Gurian listed as managing member); Ex. 29 (Lolly Lu, LLC Articles of Incorporation, dated November 25, 2003). Plaintiff requests that the Court compel all documents related to the Joint Operation referred to in this e-mail. D.E. 359, p. 18. *32 Third Parties deny that the e-mail demonstrates the existence of a “joint operation” and assert that no such “operation” exists. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 31. During her testimony, Ms. Knight verified that she produced this e-mail to Plaintiff and that the e-mail addresses belonged to herself and Defendant Gurian. Tr. 98:21-25; 99:1-8; 95:21-23. Ms. Knight explained that she believed the “operation” to which Gurian referred in this e-mail was the “grand opening for the Just Gotta Have It showroom,” which occurred during the same time period. Tr. 99:4-24; 96:3-8. As Ms. Knight testified, she was preparing to open the showroom in June of 2001 and finally opened it in July of 2001. Tr. 95:17-25; 96:1-10; 99:10-12, 19-24. Ms. Knight stated that there is no “joint operation” between Defendant Gurian and Ms. Knight, and there are no documents relating to a “joint operation.” Tr. 96:13-15, 20-22. Rather, Ms. Knight testified that she believed that Defendant Gurian was joking in this e-mail when referring to “our operation.” Tr. 96:16-19; 99:10-14. Regarding Just Gotta Have It, Ms. Knight said that neither Defendant Gurian nor any one associated with him provided her with funds for Just Gotta Have It. Tr. 99:15-18. She likewise stated that she has never given Defendant Gurian any benefit from Just Gotta Have It. Tr. 99:25; 100:1-2. As for her other business, Shop Lucy’s, Ms. Knight also insisted that Defendant Gurian has not been involved. Tr. 102:17-20. Plaintiff did not contest Ms. Knight’s testimony or provide any evidence to counter it. Nor did Plaintiff point to anything other than the June 9, 2001, e-mail as indicating the existence of some type of “joint operation.” In view of these circumstances, I recommend a finding that Plaintiff has not established evidence indicating the existence of a “joint operation,” as referred to in the June 9, 2001, e-mail between Ms. Knight and Defendant Gurian. Ms. Knight testified under oath that there are no documents in relation to the “operation” referred to in the e-mail and that no “operation” existed. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, Ms. Knight did not concede the existence of an “operation” with Defendant Gurian anywhere in her response to the e-mail or anywhere else (indeed, Ms. Knight’s response to the e-mail does not even appear responsive to the e-mail), nor did Plaintiff present any additional evidence indicating Ms. Knight’s confirmation of an “operation” with Gurian. As indicated by Plaintiff, the date of this e-mail from 2001, precedes the creation of Lolly Lu in 2003, so, as a matter of logic, it cannot relate to that business. Further, Ms. Knight testified that she did not provide Defendant Gurian with any benefit from the other businesses that she owned, Just Gotta Have It and Shop Lucy’s. As no “operation” has been shown to have existed, in contrast to Plaintiff’s assertions, there appears to have been nothing relating to this theoretical “operation” for Ms. Knight to disclose. Because there is no evidence of the existence of a “joint operation” in relation to this specific e-mail between Ms. Knight and Defendant Gurian, I recommend that Ms. Knight be found in compliance with Plaintiff’s request for documents regarding “The Joint Operation.” 7. Obligations to Defendant Gurian for at least $644,000 Plaintiff asserts that documents produced to date by Third Parties demonstrate that Third Parties have incurred obligations to Defendant Gurian of at least approximately $644,000.00, for which Third Parties have not provided related documentation or any other explanation. D.E. 356, p. 18-19. In support of this argument, Plaintiff points to certain checks from Lolly Lu to Defendant Gurian. See D.E. 359-4, p. 20-22 (WSB 00379, WSB 00385, WSB 00400). The first check, Check #1694, dated December 30, 2005, for $930.00, states in the memo section, “Office Rent 3.5% @ 318,975.” [D.E. 359-4, p. 20 (WSB 00379) ]. The second, Check #1697, dated January 1, 2006, is for $1,062.50,” and states in the memo section, “10% on $127,500 (balance owed on investment loan).” [D.E. 359-4, p. 21 (WSB 00385) ]. The third check at issue, Check #1496, dated July 25, 2005, is for $1,260.84 and states in the memo section, “monthly Interest 10% on $57,500 = 479.16[;] 3.5% on $268K = 781.67.” [D.E. 359, p. 22 (WSB 00400) ]. Totaling the $318,975, $127,500, $268,000, and $57,500 appearing in the memo sections of the Lolly Lu Checks, Plaintiff arrives at approximately $644,000.00 in what appears to be unexplained indebtedness of Lolly Lu to Defendant Gurian. Plaintiff further notes that Magistrate Judge Vitunac stated at the April 25, 2007, hearing that additional documents must exist with regard to the terms and liabilities that are represented by these Lolly Lu Checks. See D.E. 222, p. 24-25; 359, p. 18; 4/25/07 Transcript at 63:7-16. *33 While Plaintiff has not pointed to actual payments from Defendant Gurian to Third Parties in the amounts of $318,975, $127,500, $268,000, and $57,500, Plaintiff notes that other records provided by Third Parties reflect the actual payment by Defendant Gurian of more than $400,000 in money and property by Defendant Gurian to Third Parties directly and indirectly, thus supporting Plaintiff’s contention that Third Parties incurred significant obligations to Gurian. Specifically, Plaintiff refers to the April 5, 2005, wire transfer of $100,000.00 from Rheal Cote (Ms. Gurian’s alleged paramour) to the bank account of Ms. Knight and her husband, immediately following an e-mail from Ms. Knight to Defendant Gurian entitled, “Transfer info,” which provides the account and routing information for the bank accounts of Ms. Knight and Lolly Lu, and indicates in a handwritten note on the e-mail, “100000.” D.E. 168-2, p. 13 (JSG 000772); p. 14 (LL 00009); see also D.E. 331-2, Ex. A, p. 20, row 9. Additionally, Plaintiff directs the Court to the bank account records of Mr. Cote for the month of April, 2005, which, besides reflecting the $100,000.00 wire transfer discussed above, also show a wire transfer on the same day of $75,000.00 to the Lolly Lu account identified by Ms. Knight in the e-mail. D.E. 168-2, p. 15-17. (RC 000044, JSG 000774, RC 000102). Plaintiff also points to the May 4, 2005, purchase by Laditel Investment Limited, a company controlled by Defendant Gurian, of an Atlanta property for $218,000.00 for the benefit of Third Parties. D.E. 168-2, p. 95 (LL 00304); 222, p. 4-5, 9; D.E. 359, p. 18. Finally, Plaintiff notes that an April 12, 2005, check from the Knights’ personal account to Lolly Lu in the amount of $25,000.00 states in the memo section, “From Phil [Gurian] For Lolly Lu.” D.E. 222, p. 68, Ex. 3 (LL 03947); see also D.E. 331-2, Ex. A, p. 20, row 10. Hence, Plaintiff argues that the records obtained to date reflect at least $400,000 in actual payments from Defendant Gurian to Third Parties. Plaintiff further suggests that certain payments in money and services by Third Parties to Defendant Gurian similarly corroborate Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant Gurian loaned money to Third Parties. D.E. 359, p. 18. In support of this argument, Plaintiff states that Lolly Lu has provided evidence of repayment of 4%, or $28,847, of the $644,000 obligation to Defendant Gurian, from Lolly Lu checks to Gurian dated July 25, 2005, through January 3, 2006. See D.E. 222, p. 24, Ex. 13; 359, p. 18, Ex. 32 (the reimbursement checks). Additionally, Plaintiff directs the Court to wire transfers from Defendant Gurian and others allegedly acting on his behalf, such as Blue Green T, LLC (Mr. Villarroel’s company), to Third Parties and for their benefit. D.E. 359, p. 18. Yet, despite all of these apparent indications of the existence of loans or other types of obligations of Third Parties to Defendant Gurian, Plaintiff complains that Third Parties have produced absolutely no documents regarding any such loans. Id. To counter Plaintiff’s argument that unexplained payments to Defendant Gurian continue to exist, Third Parties submitted a chart that inventories all outgoing and incoming checks regarding individuals named in the Subpoenas, as well as an affidavit by Mr. Villarroel, which discusses his financial dealings with Defendant Gurian, Ms. Knight and Lolly Lu. Ms. Knight also testified at the April 24th hearing. D.E. 331-2, Ex. A, p. 20-23; see also Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 33-36 (same chart). For ease of reference, this Report and Recommendation addresses the alleged $644,000 in obligations to Defendant Gurian in parts. a. References on the Lolly Lu Checks to Loans for $57,500 and $127,500 With respect to the memo section references on the Lolly Lu checks to loans for $57,500 and $127,500, the Court begins its consideration of the evidence submitted by Third Parties with a review of the affidavit from Mr. Villarroel. D.E. 359, Ex. 25, (W 06732- 06736) (“Villarroel Affidavit”). Third Parties argue that the Villarroel Affidavit explains (1) certain payments from Blue Green T, LLC, to Third Parties, which Plaintiff has suggested constitute payments from Defendant Gurian to Third Parties, using Blue Green T, LLC, as a pass-through; and (2) portions of payments from Lolly Lu to Defendant Gurian, including notations appearing in the memo sections of the Lolly Lu checks. See D.E. 316-2, p. 13-17; 321, p. 8-9; see also D.E. 331-2, Ex. A, p. 20-23. Pertinent parts of Mr. Villarroel’s Affidavit, dated December 26, 2007, read as follows: *34 3. Philip Gurian (“Gurian”) and any affiliate corporations owned by him have never had any ownership or other interest in Blue Green. 5. . . . Blue Green and I loaned Barbara a total of approximately $373,831 for Lolly Lu, LLC (“Lolly Lu”), a company in which Barbara has an ownership interest. 6. Blue Green and I loaned Barbara the following amounts for Lolly Lu (the “Loans”): $30,000 from my personal account to Lolly Lu on 12/24/2003; $57,500 from my personal account to Lolly Lu on 6/4/2004; $29,175 from my personal account to Lolly Lu on 8/12/2004; $20,000 from my personal account to Lolly Lu on 9/23/2004; $200,078 from Blue Green to John David’s trust account (to purchase Lolly Lu office property from Laditel) on 4/11/2006; $37,078 from Blue Green to Lolly Lu on 9/29/06. 9. We did not execute any written documents, agreements, or other writings concerning the Loans listed above. 10. Because Barbara is my daughter and I trust her, we did not create any formal loan documents. There was likewise no formal repayment schedule, written or oral. 11. From time to time, I directed Barbara to make payments on the Loans to Gurian on my behalf 12. Gurian and I have had a 15-year business relationship. Because of our long-standing relationship, we regularly conduct business together without any written or other documentation. 13. Instead of making repayments directly to me on the Loans I made to Lolly Lu, I occasionally directed Barbara to have Lolly Lu make payments on my behalf to Gurian for money that I owed Gurian from other business dealings. 14. At my direction, Lolly Lu made the following payments to Gurian (or Laditel) on my behalf. On checks numbered 1496, 1529, 1560, and 1598, Lolly Lu apparently combined payments made on my behalf with payments on matters unrelated to me, and I have identified the portions of those payments made on my behalf: Check No. 1496 $1,260.84 Including $479.16 for 10% interest on $57,500 loan Check No. 1529 $1,261.33 Including $479.66 for 10% interest on $57,500 loan Check No. 1560 $1,261.33 Including $479.66 for 10% interest on $57,500 loan Check No. 1598 $1,261.33 Including $479.66 for 10% interest on $57,500 loan Check No. 1602 $30,000.00 Repayment made to Laditel on my behalf Check No. 1638 $959.32 Interest on $57,500 for November & December 2005 Check No. 1676 $525.00 3.5% interest on $60,000 of loans for 3 months Check No. 1697 $1,062.50 10% interest on $127,500 of loans Check No. 1698 $20,000.00 Repayment of loans on my behalf 15. There is no formal repayment schedule, written or oral, concerning the repayment of the remaining Loan amounts. I expect that Barbara will pay the Loans back when and if she is able. D.E. 359, Ex. 25. Thus, based on the Villarroel Affidavit, Third Parties argue that the notations in the memo sections of the Lolly Lu checks referring to a $57,500 loan, $60,000 loan,[42] and $127,500 loan, for a total of $234,000 in alleged loans, refer to Third Parties’ loans from Mr. Villarroel, not from Defendant Gurian, even though the checks on which the memos appear are made payable to Gurian. Additionally, Third Parties contend that paragraph 14 of the Villarroel Affidavit provides evidence that payments from the Lolly Lu checks to Defendant Gurian totaling $54,464.96 actually constitute payments to Mr. Villarroel, not to Defendant Gurian, for money Third Parties owe Mr. Villarroel. See D.E. 359, Ex. 24, ¶ 14 (totaling check amounts identified). Third Parties also assert that the $373,831 in payments from Mr. Villarroel and Blue Green T, LLC, to or on behalf of Third Parties, noted in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Villarroel Affidavit, are loans made by Mr. Villarroel to Third Parties, not loans from Defendant Gurian through Mr. Villarroel. See D.E. 359, Ex. 25, ¶ 5 & 6 (totaling amounts identified). Thus, Third Parties contend, these payments from Mr. Villarroel to or on behalf of Third Parties support Mr. Villarroel’s assertions that he loaned Third Parties money that Third Parties referred to in the memo sections of the Lolly Lu checks made payable to Defendant Gurian. *35 Further, Third Parties explain the lack of records substantiating the loans from Mr. Villarroel to Third Parties by referring to the fact that Mr. Villarroel is Ms. Knight’s father, and, as such, trusts Ms. Knight and does not require loan documents. See D.E. 359, Ex. 25, ¶ 9, 10, 15. Mr. Villarroel similarly asserts that he has no documents evidencing loans between himself and Defendant Gurian, which Mr. Villarroel uses as the basis for explaining why Ms. Knight makes payments for loans from Mr. Villarroel to Defendant Gurian, because Defendant Gurian is a trusted business associate with whom Mr. Villarroel has engaged in business for the last fifteen years. Id., ¶ 12, 15. Ms. Knight’s testimony at the April 24th hearing was both consistent and inconsistent with different aspects of Mr. Villarroel’s Affidavit. First, Ms. Knight confirmed that her father made loans of $57,500 and $127,500 to Third Parties. Tr. 142:8-11; 137:11-16; 131:18-25; 132:1-3. She further testified, consistent with paragraph 6 of the Villarroel Affidavit, that Mr. Villarroel made a number of “capital contributions” into Lolly Lu to assist Ms. Knight in starting up Lolly Lu. Tr. 142-143; see also D.E. 331-2, Ex. A, p. 20, rows 1, 4, and 6; 359, Ex. 25, ¶ 6. According to Ms. Knight’s testimony as well as the Transaction Summary Chart that identifies Mr. Villarroel’s capital contributions to Lolly Lu, Mr. Villarroel’s capital contributions total over $79,000. See id. In the absence of the capital contributions from Mr. Villarroel, Ms. Knight explained, she lacked sufficient funds to start up her company. Tr. 143:1-3. Ms. Knight further stated that all of the money her father has given her has been loans, and not gifts. Tr. 111:11-13. Nevertheless, Ms. Knight was unable to identify with any specificity the amount of money she has repaid Mr. Villarroel on the alleged loans, although she estimated that she had paid back approximately $10,000. Tr. 111:14-15; 161:1-25. Indeed, Ms. Knight stated that she does not keep “good records” of what her father has loaned her over time. Tr. 111:16-18; 150:20-25; 151:1-5. Despite her apparent lack of detailed recollection regarding claimed loans from Mr. Villarroel, Ms. Knight testified that she made a good-faith effort to find all the documents related to these financial transactions. Tr. 112:2-5. Ms. Knight explained the absence of any expected documentation relating to these transactions by stating, like Mr. Villarroel, that Mr. Villarroel has loaned her money without requiring her to sign any papers. Tr. 111:8-10. According to Ms. Knight, Mr. Villarroel has advised Ms. Knight that Ms. Knight may pay back Mr. Villarroel when she can, since Ms. Knight testified that she lacks the money to repay him now. Tr. 161:19-25. As for those payments Third Parties have allegedly made on the Villarroel loans, Ms. Knight testified that she paid Defendant Gurian on the Villarroel loans at Defendant Gurian’s or Mr. Villarroel’s direction. Tr. 162:1-15; 131:3-25; 134;5-25; 135:1-12, 25; 136:1-25; 137:1-16. Plaintiff argues that the Court should not consider the Villarroel Affidavit or these aspects of Ms. Knight’s testimony because the assertions contained therein are not credible, as a matter of common sense. According to Plaintiff, the Villarroel Affidavit suggests that Defendant “Gurian relinquished his rights to debts totaling over $600,000 owed by [Ms.] Knight and/or Lolly Lu.” D.E. 359, p. 18, Ex. 25. Plaintiff contends that Mr. Villarroel alleges that he “loaned” Ms. Knight over $130,000 from his personal account and another $238,000 from Blue Green T, LLC accounts [Id. at Ex. 25, ¶ 5-6], but, from evidence in the record, Ms. Knight has never made any repayments directly to Mr. Villarroel or Blue Green. And Ms. Knight, herself, can identify neither the total amount allegedly lent by Mr. Villarroel to Third Parties nor the amount repaid by Ms. Knight to Mr. Villarroel. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that according to the Villarroel Affidavit, Mr. Villarroel instructed Ms. Knight to make payments to Defendant Gurian purportedly related to un-described “other business dealings” with Mr. Villarroel, but no documents have been produced evidencing these “other business dealings.” Id., p. 19; Ex. 25, ¶ 11-15. In short, Plaintiff urges that the Villarroel Affidavit should not be credited, particularly in the absence of Plaintiff’s ability to cross-examine Mr. Villarroel. D.E. 359, p. 19. *36 Alternatively, even assuming, arguendo, that the Villarroel Affidavit could be credited, Plaintiff continues, the alleged repayments on the Villarroel loans to Third Parties total only about $55,000 of the alleged $600,000 owed. Id. at Ex. 25, ¶ 14 (totaling check amounts identified). Plaintiff argues that this demonstrates that Third Parties have failed to produce all documents demonstrating how or if Defendant Gurian was paid for loans totaling approximately $550,000 of the alleged $600,000 owed. D.E. 359, p. 19. Plaintiff, thus, urges the Court to direct Third Parties to produce all documents evidencing repayment of loan obligations to Defendant Gurian. Id. I find the Villarroel Affidavit and Ms. Knight’s testimony on these points to provide a somewhat suspicious explanation for approximately $185,000 ($127,500 + $57,500) in loans described in the memo sections of the three Lolly Lu checks relied upon by Plaintiff in asserting that Third Parties have incurred at least $644,000 in obligations to Defendant Gurian. Although the Villarroel Affidavit identifies a $57,500 transfer from Mr. Villarroel’s personal account to Lolly Lu’s account, none of the other transfers indicated in the Villarroel Affidavit are for $127,500, nor can the undersigned discern a way to add up the remaining numbers to arrive at the $127,500 figure appearing on the Lolly Lu check as a loan amount. Indeed, other than Ms. Knight’s testimony that Mr. Villarroel loaned Third Parties $185,000 ($127,500 + $57,500) and told Third Parties to repay the money to Defendant Gurian, [Tr. 134:5-25; 135:1-12, 18-19, 25; 136:1-25], Third Parties rely exclusively on Mr. Villarroel’s bald assertions and nine checks made payable to Defendant Gurian, not to Mr. Villarroel, to show that Mr. Villarroel loaned Third Parties $185,000. Moreover, Third Parties have presented no documentation regarding any loans between Third Parties and Mr. Villarroel, and Ms. Knight stated that even she does not know how much money her father supposedly loaned her nor how much money she has repaid. Third Parties have similarly failed to submit any records substantiating Mr. Villarroel’s averments that he directed Third Parties to repay loans to Mr. Villarroel by paying Gurian and his interests because of business obligations between Mr. Villarroel and Defendant Gurian. In short, the undersigned is deeply troubled by the evidence submitted by Third Parties on this point. Under these circumstances, the Court has two choices: it can accept Third Parties’ explanation as bolstered by the Villarroel Affidavit and Ms. Knight’s testimony, or it can discount Third Parties’ evidence because of the previously discussed deficiencies and find Third Parties not to be in compliance with respect to $185,000 of the loans referenced in the Lolly Lu checks relied upon by Plaintiff. If the assertions in the Villarroel Affidavit are true, in order to prove them, Third Parties must either present Mr. Villarroel to testify or submit documents that, in turn, must be provided by Mr. Villarroel, yet Third Parties do not have legal control over Mr. Villarroel and cannot compel his appearance before this Court (Mr. Villarroel is located outside the United States). On the other hand, the fact that Ms. Knight has no means of identifying the alleged total loans from Mr. Villarroel to Third Parties nor the amounts repaid by Third Parties to Mr. Villarroel, in addition to the other unusual aspects of Mr. Villarroel’s assertions and the occurrence of many of the alleged loan transactions themselves between Third Parties and Defendant Gurian or his entities, tends to detract from the credibility of Third Parties’ description of the transactions involved as loans between Mr. Villarroel and Third Parties. In light of the all of the evidence regarding these transactions, I cannot recommend a finding of compliance. Ms. Knight must either present additional evidence to demonstrate the veracity of her contentions with respect to these transactions, or, if her prior submissions did not accurately represent the nature of the transactions at issue, she must correct her testimony and provide any corroborating documents that exist. b. References on the Lolly Lu Checks to Loans for $318,975 and $268,000 I. The $318,975 Loan Notation *37 With respect to the $318,975 loan notation on the memo section of one of the Lolly Lu checks [D.E. 359, Ex. 31 (WSB 00379) ], Third Parties rely upon the testimony of Ms. Knight and certain documents to show that they have complied with their obligations under the Subpoenas. In this regard, Third Parties explain the $318,975 figure in the memo section of one of the Lolly Lu checks by asserting that it is actually composed of two figures: one for approximately $218,000, and the other for approximately $100,000. D.E. 222, p. 26. According to Ms. Knight, both of these amounts of money are associated with a condominium in Atlanta, which was purchased for Lolly Lu’s use. Id. More specifically, Ms. Knight stated she believes that Defendant Gurian or people related to Defendant Gurian caused or “facilitated” the giving of money to Lolly Lu for the purpose of enabling Lolly Lu to occupy a condominium in Atlanta. Tr. 98:4-14;106:1-20; 97:2-4, 13-21; 126:15-25. Ms. Knight confirmed that she spoke to Defendant Gurian in order to formulate the project. Tr. 126:20-25. Further explaining the transaction, Ms. Knight stated that she used the word “facilitate” “because the money never came from Philip Gurian” to Lolly Lu, but instead came from a company called Laditel.[43] Tr. 97:2-4, 13-21; 126:20-25. Ms. Knight stated that she was unsure who owned Laditel but believed Defendant Gurian had control over it, although Ms. Knight indicated that she thought Defendant Gurian’s mother, Ms. Gurian, was the principal. Tr. 97: 2-4, 13-21; 126:20-25; 127:2-4;. Further, Ms. Knight testified that in addition to dealing with Defendant Gurian, she may also have spoken to or corresponded with Defendant Gurian’s mother and Mr. Cote on behalf of Laditel. Tr. 127:2-4. With respect to Laditel’s role in the purchase of the condominium at issue, Ms. Knight testified that Laditel bought the condominium for her in May of 2005. Tr. 97:15-21; 106:1-22; 126:20-25. She further explained that the condominium was used for the benefit of Lolly Lu. Tr. 102:24-25; 103:2-4; 106:1-20. Ms. Knight testified that she believed that Laditel bought the condominium for $218,000. Tr. 104:17-21. In fact, Fulton County records confirm Ms. Knight’s recollection in this regard, documenting Laditel’s purchase on May 4, 2005. See D.E. 222, Ex. 2, p. 61. As for the $100,000 component of the $318,975 amount written in the memo section of the Lolly Lu check dated December 30, 2005, Ms. Knight testified that at the time of purchase, the condominium had to be gutted completely, and performing that work cost approximately $100,000. Tr. 104:20-25; 105:1-3; se also D.E. 233, ¶ 6 . Although Ms. Knight explained that Lolly Lu paid the $100,000 from money in her personal account, she further clarified, “We all had to pay. We wired money into my personal account. We used $100,000 to renovate the building.” Tr. 104:22-25; 105:1-3. A review of the documents produced also reflects a wire transfer of $100,000 from the account of Rheal Cote, Defendant Gurian’s mother’s alleged paramour, to the account of Ms. Knight in April, 2005, the month before Laditel purchased the condominium for Lolly Lu’s use. D.E. 168-2, Ex. 2; see also D.E. 222, p. 12, 26. Ms. Knight also explained that the notation on the check states, “Office Rent 3.5% @ 318,975” because payments on the $318,975 loan were considered Lolly Lu’s rental payments. Tr. 110:3-20; 130:2-25. Based on the notations appearing on the respective memo lines of the Lolly Lu checks at issue, then, according to Ms. Knight’s testimony, the rent amount was determined by taking 3.5% of the various loans made associated with the condominium as documented on each check. Ms. Knight testified that the rent changed over time as a result of an agreement she made with Defendant. Tr. 105:9-11; 103:17-23; 110:14-20. According to Ms. Knight, “if we were ever to sell [the condominium], we made an agreement that we would keep it up.” Tr. 103:5-8; 106:1-20. Ms. Knight further asserted that the agreement required Lolly Lu to “pay for all the taxes” and “maintenance,” and “at some future date hopefully make a profit and share the profit [with Defendant Gurian].” Tr. 103:9-11; 106:1-20. Ms. Knight stated that this was a verbal agreement with Defendant Gurian, and she has no documents regarding this verbal agreement with Defendant Gurian. Tr. 133:14-25. *38 As a result of this agreement, Ms. Knight indicated, the parties agreed to lower the rent payments that Third Parties had been making on the condominium. According to Ms. Knight, for example, in July of 2005, shortly after Laditel purchased the condominium, the monthly rent payment was $5,000.[44] Tr. 110:3-13. By December 20th of that year, however, as evidenced by Check 1637, the rent had decreased to $781.67. [Tr. 110:8-17; D.E. 331-2, Ex. A, p. 20-23]. Eventually, Ms. Knight testified, Lolly Lu stopped paying rent since Third Parties “bought [the condominium] back” from Laditel for $200,000 on May 22, 2006. Tr. 103:24-25; 104:1-5; D.E. 222, Ex. 2, p. 61. As for why Third Parties paid Defendant Gurian, as opposed to Laditel or anyone else, for the $318,000.00 obligation, Ms. Knight stated, “That is what I was told to do [by Defendant Gurian and Mr. Villarroel].” Tr. 129:19-25; 130:1-9; 131:6-12. ii. The $268,000 Loan Notation Next, the Court considers the memo notation, “3.5% on $268K = 781.67,” appearing on Check 1496, dated July 25, 2005. [D.E. 359, Ex. 31 (WSB 00400) ]. As is apparent from the date of Check 1496, Check 1496 was written approximately five months before Check 1694 (bearing the reference to $318,975) was issued (December 30, 2005). [D.E. 359, Ex. 31 (WSB 00379) ]. Additionally, Check 1496 was prepared after Laditel had purchased the condominium for Third Parties’ benefit for $218,000 in May, 2005. With respect to the reference on Check 1496 to $268,000, Ms. Knight testified, “I believe the 268 is again the office space before it was completely built out.” Tr. 133:6-8. When Plaintiff asked for the basis of her belief, in light of the fact that the office space was purchased for $218,000, Ms. Knight responded, “That’s correct, but this is 268, and I know we spent 100,000 to build it out. So you are right. I don’t know. I could be assuming.” Tr. 133:9-13. In the Joint Status Report filed by Plaintiff and Third Parties (as well as Ms. Farber) on October 11, 2007 [D.E. 222], however, Third Parties state that $50,000 of the $268,000 notation derives from a “$50,000 loan from Laditel which has been repaid.” Id. at p. 12. Later in the Joint Report, at p. 26, Third Parties state that $50,000 of the $268,000 notation comes from “$50,000 which was advanced to Lolly Lu by Rheal [Cote] and Lolly Lu has produced proof of repayment of said loan.” They further aver that the $318,975 notation refers to a “combination of the $100,000 from Rheal [Cote] to Knight for the tenant improvements and the $218,975 also paid by Laditel for the purchase of the Atlanta Property.” Id. Further, Third Parties assert that “100,000 [was] advanced by Rheal [Cote] to personal account, the owner of the Atlanta property at the time, to Lolly Lu, its tenant, for tenant improvements,” and that “75,000 [was] advanced by Rheal [Cote] as a start up loan to Lolly Lu, which amount remains outstanding.” Id., p. 12; see alsoD.E. 233, Third Parties’ Objections to Report and Recommendations, p. 2, ¶ 4(“75,000 still due and owing to Rheal [Cote]”); p. 3, ¶ 6. Thus, according to Third Parties’ argument, the memo notations to $268,000 and $318,975 appearing on the checks actually refer to a total of $368,975 in loans from Mr. Cote and Laditel to Third Parties: $218,975 relating to the purchase of the condominium; $50,000 regarding a loan for an unspecified purpose, and $100,000 for improvements to the condominium.[45] While some aspects of this explanation appear to be supported by the records, the timing of the first appearances of the loan notations on the checks is somewhat strange, and the transfer amounts from Mr. Cote and Laditel to Third Parties do not neatly match up. The records show that Mr. Cote transferred $100,000 to Ms. Knight and $75,000 to Lolly Lu on April 5, 2005, and that Laditel purchased the Laditel property for 218,00 on May 4, 2005, they demonstrate no further monetary transactions from Mr. Cote or Laditel to Third Parties. In other words, the records do not reveal a $50,000 transfer from Mr. Cote or Laditel. See Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 33-36; D.E. 168, Ex. 2. Yet, Third Parties have been clear in their assertion that the alleged $100,000, $75,000 and $50,000 transactions did not overlap and were instead separate transactions for separate purposes. Thus, it seems logical that a transaction involving a transfer of $50,000 (or more than one transaction of lesser amounts) from Mr. Cote or Laditel to Third Parties should appear in the records. No such entry, however, exists. See Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 33-36. *39 Moreover, although Mr. Cote transferred the $100,000 to Third Parties on April 5, 2005 and Laditel purchased the Atlanta property for Lolly Lu on May 4, 2005, the $318,975 loan memo notation first appears on a check dated close to nine months later – December 30, 2005. The $268,000 notation first arises on a check dated July 25, 2005. Although the memo notation on the December 30, 2005, check reflects a current loan at that time of $318,975 (as opposed to $368,975 for the $218,975, plus $100,000, plus $50,000), the alleged $50,000 loan appears to have been repaid through a check for $30,000 also dated December 30, 2005, and a check for $20,000 dated January 3, 2006 – after the outstanding loan figure appears to have already been decreased for the repayment of the very loan for which the January 3, 2006, check allegedly represented full repayment. Thus, the documents provided by Third Parties raise more questions than they answer. Indeed, a review of the chronology of Lolly Lu checks invites further questions. Turning to the payment amounts on the checks bearing the notations of $268,000 and $318,975 appearing in the memo sections, Ms. Knight testified that a review of Third Parties’ Transaction Summary Chart [see D.E. 331-2, Ex. A, p. 20-23; see also D.E. 359, Ex. 33; Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 33-36], demonstrates that on May 26, 2005, later in the same month that Laditel purchased the condominium for $218,000, Lolly Lu issued Check 1414 to Defendant Gurian for $653.83. This number, $653.83, equals 1/12 (a monthly payment) of $7,630, which, in turn, constitutes 3.5% of $218,000, the purchase price of the condominium. Additionally, Lolly Lu issued Check 1637, dated December 20, 2005, for $781.67, to Defendant Gurian. The number $781.67 equals 1/12 (a monthly payment) of $9,380, which, in turn, equals 3.5% of $268,000 ($218,000 purchase price of the condominium, plus another unaccounted for $50,000). While Third Parties in their Transaction Summary Chart describe the purpose of Check 1414 as “[r]ent on office/[i]nterest” and the purpose of Check 1637 as “[r]ent on office space,” the parties have not supplied the Court with copies of these checks, so the Court cannot determine whether these notations actually appear on faces of the checks at issue, or whether, instead, they constitute Third Parties’ after-the-fact recollections of the purposes of those payments, which could be faulty. Significantly, Checks 1433 (dated 6/13/05), 1469 (dated 7/1/05), 1498 (dated 7/25/05), 1530 (dated 9/6/05), 1561 (dated 9/27/05), and 1596 (dated 10/30/05), each for $5,000 and payable to Laditel, are described in Third Parties’ Transaction Summary Chart as made for “[r]ent on office space.”[46] During this same period of time, a review of the checks submitted by the parties reflects that Lolly Lu wrote the following relevant separate checks for what appears to be interest: (1) Check 1496 (dated 7/25/05), payable to Defendant Gurian for $1,260.84, bearing the notation, “Monthly Interest[;] 10% on $57,500 = 479.16[;] 3.5% on $268K = 781.67;”[47] (2) Check 1529 (dated 9/5/05), payable to Defendant Gurian for $1,261.33, bearing the notation, “10% on 57,500 = 419.66[;] 3.5% on 268K = 781.67;” (3) Check 1560 (dated 9/27/05), payable to Defendant Gurian for $1,261.33, bearing the notation, “$781.67 (3.5% on 268K) Sept.[;] 479.66 (10% Sept);” (4) Check 1598 (dated 10/30/05), payable to Defendant Gurian for $1,261.33, bearing the notation, “$479.66 (10% int on 57,5)[;] $781.67 (3.5% on 268K). See D.E. 222, Ex. 13; D.E. 331-2, Ex. A, p. 20-23. In light of these checks, which seem to constitute interest payments on $268,000 and $57,500 (discussed previously in this Report and Recommendation), it appears as though during this period of time of June, 2005, through October, 2005, and contrary to Ms. Knight’s recollection in this regard, see supra at p. 81, rent payments were separate from and independent of interest payments, and, thus, the amount of rent was not tethered to interest owed on the purported $268,000 loan.[48] *40 The last $5,000 payment alleged to have been made for rent occurred on October 30, 2005. See Check 1596. D.E. 331-2, Ex. A, p. 22, row 25. Following that payment, the next check that purports to have been for rent on office space was issued on December 20, 2005, and that check (1637) was payable for $781.67, or 1/12 (a monthly payment) of $9,380, which equals 3.5% of $268,000. Id., row 28. Thus, consistent with Ms. Knight’s testimony that the rent changed from $5,000 to $781.67, it appears that the rent payments as of December, 2005, became tied to the interest on the purported loan(s) at that time, in connection with an agreement allegedly entered into between Third Parties and Defendant Gurian through which Third Parties were to maintain the property, pay the taxes, and, upon reaping profits from the business, share those profits with Defendant Gurian, in exchange for paying the interest on the purported loan as office rent. In view of these circumstances, the next question the Court must consider involves the documentation one might fairly expect to exist regarding these transactions. Thus, for convenience, the Court reviews the various transactions described: (1) purchase of condominium by Laditel in May, 2005, for the benefit of Lolly Lu; (2) loan agreements for the $218,000, the $50,000, the $75,000, and the $100,000; (3) lease between Laditel and Lolly Lu for Lolly Lu’s occupancy of the condominium; (4) agreement between Lolly Lu and Laditel and/or Defendant Gurian altering the rent on the condominium from $5,000 monthly to a percentage of interest owed on loans, and requiring Lolly Lu to pay taxes, maintain the premises, and share profits; and (5) documents relating to Lolly Lu’s purchase of the condominium from Laditel. While Third Parties have provided documents relating to Lolly Lu’s purchase of the condominium from Laditel in 2006, see D.E. 316-2 at p. 3-4, I note that Third Parties have produced no agreements whatsoever between Lolly Lu or Ms. Knight, on the one hand, and Laditel, Rheal Cote, Defendant Gurian, or anyone else acting on his behalf, on the other, relating to any of the other agreements. This absence represents a gaping hole in Third Parties’ production obligations. While Third Parties assert that they have no such written agreements, like a lease for the condominium, loan agreements, or the profit-sharing agreement, I am troubled by this assertion. First of all, Third Parties have articulated no reason at all why they have no loan or other agreements with Mr. Cote or Laditel. I find it difficult to believe that Mr. Cote, who bears no relationship to Third Parties, would lend Third Parties approximately $444,000 without so much as demanding a promissory note in exchange. And, as for documents between Third Parties and Defendant Gurian, although Third Parties attribute the utter lack of any loan documents, lease agreements, or business contracts to the fact that Ms. Knight had romantic involvement with Defendant Gurian at one point and remains a “close friend” of his, Ms. Knight testified that the romantic relationship ended thirteen years ago, in 1995 – ten years before the first transaction at issue here even occurred. Tr. 85; 165 - 168. Moreover, Ms. Knight testified that at least as early as 1999, she knew that Defendant Gurian had been convicted of “something to do with trading” and had spent time in jail. Tr. 88. She further admitted knowing in the “late 90’s” that Defendant Gurian had been “officially barred” by a governmental agency. Tr. 89. Yet, despite these circumstances Ms. Knight insisted at the April 24th hearing, that regarding the detailed notations on checks made to Defendant Gurian, she knew what to put in the memo notations on these checks only because “[e]ither my father or [Defendant Gurian] would tell me and that’s exactly why there are no documents I dealt with. The only way to remember was to write it on the check. There was no agreement. . . . At that point in time that is what I was told to do.” Tr. 169:11-14, 16. *41 In light of the circumstances, Third Parties’ explanation for why they have none of these documents that one would expect them to have – that is, because no such documents ever existed in the first place – does not, as a matter of common sense, seem practical, credible, or even plausible. For the foregoing reasons, I recommend a finding that Third Parties are not in compliance with respect to providing documents regarding the documents described in this section. For Third Parties to come into compliance, I recommend that the Court require Third Parties either to present additional documentation relating to the loans, lease, and business agreements between Third Parties and Defendant Gurian (or anyone else allegedly acting on his behalf, including Mr. Cote), or if Third Parties’ prior submissions did not accurately represent the nature of the transactions at issue, to correct Ms. Knight’s testimony and provide any corroborating documents that exist. c. Third Parties’ Transaction Summary Chart Finally, in addressing Third Parties’ production efforts as they relate to the alleged obligations to Defendant Gurian and others, the Court notes that Third Parties also submitted their Transaction Summary Chart, which they contend “show[s] . . . all financial transactions going to or from any of the parties listed in the Subpoena[s]. . . .” [D.E. 331, p. 8, 14; 331-2, Ex. A, p. 21-24]. Third Parties assert that the “spreadsheet clearly shows each financial transaction, and . . . [they] have also produced all supporting documents related to those transactions and have corresponded to each and every one of those documents by bates number on the spreadsheet.” [D.E. 331, p. 9]. Ms. Knight testified that she tried to put all of the transactions with Laditel, Mr. Villarroel, Ms. Farber, Rheal Cote,[49] and Defendant Gurian in the Transaction Summary Chart. Tr. 110:21-25; 111:1. She stated that in order to find all the documents referred to in her Transaction Summary Chart, she requested bank statements multiple times, she ran reports out of her own Quick Book files, and she looked through her files. Tr. 111:2-7. Transactions in the Transaction Summary Chart relating to Jaime Villarroel, Blue Green T, LLC, and Rheal Cote have, except as reviewed below, already been addressed in Sections B.1 - 5 and B.7.a of this Report and Recommendation. As for the remaining transactions, which involve Third Parties and Defendant Gurian and Laditel, the discussion in Sections B.7.a and b addresses several of these. The Court now reviews the others. Row 11 of the Transaction Summary Chart refers to an April 11, 2006, wire for $200,078 from “Blue Green to J. David (for Laditel).” The Chart identifies the purpose of this transaction as “[p]urchase [o]ffice [s]pace.” Row 12 describes a September 29, 2006, wire for $37,078 from Blue Green to Lolly Lu for $37,078, noting the purpose of the transaction as “[a]ssessment on [o]ffice.” Ms. Knight explained these transactions as follows: Lolly Lu bought the condominium that Laditel purchased in May, 2005, from Laditel in May of 2006, for roughly $200,000, plus $37,000 for an assessment on the building, for a total of approximately $240,000. Tr. 104:3-5; 105:2-25; 106:1-25; 107:1-4. The assessment was to re-face the building, an expense charged to all tenants in the building, according to Ms. Knight’s testimony. Tr. 105:23-25; 106:1-19. According to Ms. Knight, no loan documents exist regarding these transactions between Blue Green and Third Parties because Blue Green is Ms. Knight’s father’s company, and, as noted previously, Ms. Knight testified and Mr. Villarroel attested to not entering into formal loan agreements with his daughter. For the same reasons that I recommend a finding of compliance with respect to Ms. Knight’s obligations regarding Mr. Villarroel’s records, see supra, I recommend a finding of compliance with regard to Ms. Knight’s production obligations with respect to documents relating to the transactions reflected in Rows 11 and 12 of the Transaction Summary Chart. *42 As for the remaining entries appearing at Rows 29, 34, 35, 36, and 37, the Transaction Summary Chart purports to identify the purposes of these checks as, respectively, “[d]istribution,” “[n]ot specified,” and, with regard to the last three checks, “[r]ent on office space.” Beginning with Check 1696, this document is dated December 30, 2005, from Lolly Lu to Defendant Gurian for $2,000, and bears the memo notation, “Distribution - Dec.” D.E. 222, Ex. 13 (WSB 00383). Presumably, this notation refers to a profit distribution from Lolly Lu, as the check was issued in the same month that the rent appeared to decrease from $5,000, indicating that the agreement between Third Parties and Defendant Gurian for Lolly Lu to pay taxes, maintain the property, and share profits, took effect at that time. On the other hand, Third Parties have not asserted this. Indeed, they have done nothing to elucidate the meaning of the notation on the check. Nor have they submitted any corroborating documentation, such as records showing that Lolly Lu (or any other entity for which the check purports to make a distribution) was profitable in the month of December, 2005, or demonstrating any other basis for the alleged “distribution.” Third Parties’ Transaction Summary Chart is similarly unenlightening as it relates to Check 218 (Row 34), dated January 3, 2006, for $649.79 from Mr. and Ms. Knight to Defendant Gurian. See D.E. 222, Ex. 13 (WSB 00387). This check contains no notation and its purpose is described in Transaction Summary Chart as “not specified.” With respect to the remaining checks noted above (Rows 35, 36, 37), although they are all purported to constitute “[r]ent on office space,” none of them have been filed with the Court, so the Court cannot examine them. Moreover, the checks vary in amounts: Check 1721, dated February 24, 2006, is for $3,985; Check 1730, dated March 28, 2006, is for $243.50; and Check 1734, dated a mere three days later than Check 1730, is for $1,000. See D.E. 331-2, Ex. A, p. 20-23. None of these amounts appear to make sense, in view of Ms. Knight’s testimony and the evidence that the rent at this point in time was determined based on interest owed on the outstanding loans, and in view of the widely varying amounts of the checks, against the background of prior interest payments made. Thus, I am unable to recommend a finding that Third Parties are in compliance with their production obligations as they relate to Rows 29, 34, 35, 36, and 37 of the Transaction Summary Chart because I cannot discern the purposes of these payments, and, thus, cannot identify what other documents should exist relating to these payments. 8. Ms. Knight and Lolly Lu’s Bank and Credit Card Accounts Regarding this document group, Plaintiff alleges that Third Parties have “created undisclosed schemes to compensate Gurian for . . . [the obligations discussed in Section B.7, supra]; or veil his fiances . . [since] he has been a fugitive.” D.E. 359, p. 20. For support, Plaintiff points to the records Third Parties have produced pertaining to their credit cards and bank accounts, in accordance with the requirement of the Subpoenas for Third Parties to provide all documents relating to Defendant Gurian, including any documents regarding any compensation of him. Id.Additionally, Plaintiff complains that unexplained expenditures by Third Parties appear in their credit card and bank statements, indicating that Third Parties may have received other unidentified monies from Defendant. Gurian. In these regards, Plaintiff seeks documentation regarding the following items: (a) statements that show how Ms. Knight paid for her alleged business trip to Canada in November of 2007; (b) documents related to any funds transferred by Third Parties to casinos for the benefit of Defendant Gurian; and (c) documents related to airline tickets and hotel benefits procured for Defendant Gurian’s benefit by Third Parties. Id. Plaintiff requests that Third Parties be compelled to produce these documents, and documents regarding any other transactions involving the persons or entities referred to in the Subpoenas. Id. a. Canadian Business Trip Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that in November of 2007, Ms. Knight was on an alleged business trip in Canada when an warrant was issued for her arrest. D.E. 359; see D.E. 318. Plaintiff notes that Ms. Knight has failed to provide any Lolly Lu (or personal) account statements disclosing how she paid for this alleged business trip. D.E. 359, p. 20. Plaintiff seems to imply that this business trip was paid for or somehow otherwise funded by Defendant Gurian, and that Ms. Knight has not provided documentary evidence regarding his payment or funding of this trip. Plaintiff suggests that documents regarding this alleged business trip to Canada are responsive under Subpoena Requests 4, 5, 7 and 8, and under the December 17, 18, and 20, 2007, Letters (¶ 4, 3-7, and 10) of correspondence between Plaintiff and Third Parties, and that Third Parties should be compelled to be produced them. *43 Third Parties assert that documents related to Ms. Knight’s Canadian business trip in November of 2007 [see D.E. 318], fall outside the scope of the Subpoenas. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 38. Further, as evidenced through Ms. Knight’s testimony, Third Parties argue that there are no responsive documents to provide to Plaintiff regarding this Canadian business trip. During her testimony, Ms. Knight stated affirmatively that at the time the arrest warrant was issued in November of 2007, she was in Canada on the business trip. Tr. 112:20-25. She explained that in order to pay for the airline tickets for this business trip to Canada, she used one of the Lolly Lu accounts for which she produced documents. Tr. 113:1-6. Later, however, Ms. Knight testified that she paid for the airline tickets via Just Gotta Have It and that it was a Just Gotta Have It business trip. Tr. 118:1-5. Ms. Knight further explained that she was in Canada for a conference by “Umbra,” a line that she represents, along with a total of seventy other sales representatives who attended the conference. Tr. 144:2-5; 112:20-25. Ms. Knight confirmed that Defendant Gurian was in Canada while she was there in November of 2007, and she knew she was going to see Defendant Gurian before she went to Canada. Tr. 113:21-24; 143:23-25; 144:1. During her Canadian trip, Ms. Knight testified, she did not stay in a hotel, but rather, stayed in the home of a nephew of one of Defendant Gurian’s friends. Tr. 117:20-23. Ms. Knight further noted that she did not charge “everything” during her trip, explaining that Defendant Gurian paid for some items in cash and Ms. Knight “didn’t use . . . [her] own cash.” Tr. 113:9-20. Although Ms. Knight testified that she did not know how much cash Defendant Gurian gave her while she was in Canada, Ms. Knight said that it was not specific amount; instead, Defendant Gurian paid for dinner if they went together, lunch, and sweat pants. Tr. 113:25; 114:1-7. Ms. Knight clarified that Defendant Gurian did not pay for anything other than the meals and sweat pants. Tr. 145:1-4. In addition, Ms. Knight expressly denied that Defendant Gurian paid in any way for Ms. Knight’s transportation to and from Canada for this trip. Tr. 144:23-25. Plaintiff did not counter Ms. Knight’s testimony about the legitimate purpose of her trip. Nor did he provide actual evidence of documents that show a transfer of benefits between Ms. Knight and Defendant Gurian or that Defendant Gurian funded this trip. As a threshold matter, as previously discussed, see supra, Third Parties’ Hearing Exhibit 2, dated December 17, 18, and 20, 2007 [see also D.E. 359, Ex. 6-7], represents an agreement by Third Parties to comply with the document requests as interpreted in those letters by Plaintiff, as part of the Third Parties’ obligations under the Subpoenas, which include under Paragraphs 3 and 6, respectively, all Third Parties’ documents concerning or relating to, in this case, Defendant Gurian, and all documents concerning or related to the transfer of benefits, assets or funds, to or from Third Parties to, in this case, Defendant Gurian. Based on these agreements and a review of the evidence presented, any existing documents from Ms. Knight’s Canadian business trip would be responsive if they related to Defendant Gurian or demonstrated a transfer of benefits to or from Third Parties. *44 Nevertheless, the parties have given the Court no reason to believe that any such documents exist that have not been produced. Unlike with loans, leases, and business agreements, I would not anticipate a wealth of documentation to exist regarding Defendant Gurian’s purchases in Canada of lunch, dinner, and sweat pants for Ms. Knight. Thus, I recommend a finding of compliance as it relates to this component of the credit card and bank account records. b. Casino Funds Regarding the documents related to casino funds, Plaintiff alleges that Third Parties conferred a benefit on Defendant Gurian by providing him with funds at casinos, and Third Parties have failed to provide the documents evidencing this transfer of these funds, even though Ms. Knight should possess such documentation. [D.E. 359, p. 20]. As direct evidence of the transfer of funds, Plaintiff relies on wire transfers for $15,000 from Blue Green T, LLC (Mr. Villarroel’s company), to the Bellagio Hotel in Las Vegas, on June 12, 2007, according to previously produced records from Gibraltar (LL 02918). Id. Additionally, Plaintiff relies on a second transaction for $25,078.00 from Blue Green T, LLC, to the Venetian Hotel, on August 26, 2005, evidenced by the records of Global Bank (LL 00608). Id. Plaintiff requests that all documents regarding any casino funds procured for Defendant Gurian’s benefit be produced by Third Parties. Id. In response, Third Parties argue that they have already provided all documents regarding any alleged funds, compensation, and benefits responsive under the Subpoenas. D.E. 331, p. 9-10. In this regard, Ms. Knight has testified that she has produced all of the documents she has that are relevant and responsive to the Subpoenas. Tr. 171:17-20. Among others, for example, Third Parties produced bank records from Blue Green T, LLC’s Gibraltar account showing the wire transfer of $15,000 from that account to the Bellagio Hotel. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 41. Similarly, Third Parties provided bank records from Blue Green T, LLC’s Global Bank account showing the transfer of $25,078 from that account to the Venetian Hotel on August 26, 2005. Id. at p. 43. Third Parties assert that, despite efforts to obtain from the Venetian and Bellagio Hotels other records pertaining to what happened to these funds once they were transferred to the hotels, Third Parties have been unable to do so, based on refusals by both the Bellagio and Venetian Hotels to provide these documents, citing their policies not to produce any financial records of guests in the absence of consent or compulsory process.[50] [D.E. 331, p. 9, Ex. F and G; Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 41-44]. Ms. Knight also testified that to the best of her recollection, the last time she provided Defendant Gurian with funds involved a Las Vegas transaction about year ago, but she was unsure. Tr. 121:3-11. With respect to this transaction, Ms. Knight recalled transferring funds to Las Vegas for Defendant Gurian from the Antigua Account, i.e., the Blue Green T, LLC, account at Global Bank of Commerce. Tr. 44:15-19. Plaintiff presented no evidence to counter Third Parties’ presentation and testimony regarding their efforts and the refusal of the hotels to provide them with documents. Based on the evidence presented, I recommend a finding that with respect to the casino funds, Ms. Knight is in compliance under the Subpoenas. Third Parties have demonstrated that they have made all reasonable efforts to provide additional documentation to Plaintiff regarding these transactions, as well as the refusals of the Bellagio and Venetian Hotels to provide Third Parties with any additional documentation, in the absence of Defendant Gurian’s consent or a subpoena. Third Parties are in a position to provide neither. c. Airline Tickets and Hotel Accommodations Procured for Defendant Gurian’s Benefit *45 Plaintiff also argues that Third Parties conferred benefits on Defendant Gurian by using Lolly Lu’s credit cards to pay for Defendant Gurian’s flights and hotel accommodations. [D.E. 359, p. 20]. Plaintiff seems to suggest that there are no documents regarding the repayment to Third Parties for the conferral of benefits on Defendant Gurian or an explanation as to why Third Parties continued to allow Defendant to use the Lolly Lu credit cards after he resigned as a member of Lolly Lu, LLC. Plaintiff requests that Third Parties be compelled to produce all documents evidencing the conferral of benefit to Gurian for airline tickets and hotel accommodations and the repayment of those funds from Gurian to Third Parties. Id. Third Parties do not deny having provided Defendant Gurian with these benefits. Rather, Third Parties have openly admitted that they had provided Defendant Gurian with these benefits, but asserted that they have produced to Plaintiff all documents evidencing benefits from Third Parties to Defendant Gurian for airline and hotel accommodations. D.E. 331, p. 9-20; 331-2, p. 13. In this regard, during her testimony, Ms. Knight confirmed that she had provided Defendant Gurian with benefits from Lolly Lu and that Defendant Gurian had used a Lolly Lu credit card. Tr. 100:3-11. She stated that Defendant Gurian was issued a Lolly Lu credit card because he was an owner or a board member of the company for six months. Id. Ms. Knight further testified that after Gurian’s official affiliation with Lolly Lu ended on March 21, 2006, Defendant Gurian continued “a few times” to use the Lolly Lu credit card, resulting in some charges on the Lolly Lu American Express card in his name or on his behalf. Tr. 100:12-21; 153:7-25; 154:1-4, 11-25; 155:1; 155:12-23. Ms. Knight further clarified her testimony, stating that Defendant Gurian had a Lolly Lu credit card for a couple of years. Tr. 155:2-4. Ms. Knight explained that she procured tickets for Defendant Gurian using Defendant Gurian’s sky mile account. Tr. 147:15-17. According to Ms. Knight, “one or two times” Defendant Gurian provided her with his sky mile account and she logged in and ordered the tickets for him. Tr. 101:17-24; 147:15-17. Related to this activity, Ms. Knight identified charges on the Lolly Lu American Express credit card by Delta Airlines for $50, $50 and $10, which Ms. Knight described as the booking fees associated with Ms. Knight’s redemption of Defendant Gurian’s SkyMiles on his behalf, although Ms. Knight admitted that she paid these booking fees. Tr. 156:2-6; 157:15-25. Third Parties similarly do not deny that they allowed Defendant Gurian to use the benefits of Lolly Lu credit cards after he resigned as member of Lolly Lu. In this regard, Ms. Knight discussed Defendant Gurian’s purchases on the Lolly Lu credit card after he no longer had any formal association with the company. Tr. 153:7-25; 154:1-4, 11-25; 155:1,15-23; see also D.E. 359, Ex. 34. According to her testimony, Ms. Knight made the following airline ticket-related purchases for Defendant Gurian on the Lolly Lu American Express credit card: US Airways for $823.90 in April of 2007; Southwest Airlines for $112.30 in November of 2006; Delta Airlines for $50 in October of 2006; Delta Airlines for $469.30 and for $10, in July of 2006; Delta Airlines for $50 and $10 in September of 2006; Expedia for $288.61 in June of 2006, Delta Airlines for $55 in May of 2006; and Delta Airlines for $347.10 and $60 on March 25th and 29th of 2006. Tr. 151:6-18; 153:7-25; 154:1-6; 155:24-25; 156:1-6, 19-23; 157:1-3, 15-25; 158:1-5, 19-25[51]; 159:1-16; see also D.E. 359, Ex. 34. An additional charge on Ms. Knight’s Delta SkyMiles Business Credit Card for Lolly Lu showed a purchase on behalf of Defendant Gurian for $274.40 from June of 2007. D.E. 359, Ex. 35; Tr. 160:15-18. *46 Ms. Knight also testified to other charges Defendant Gurian made on the Lolly Lu credit cards after his resignation from Lolly Lu. For example, in the month of October, 2006, alone, six months after he had resigned from Lolly Lu, Defendant Gurian made $4,432.59 in charges on the Lolly Lu American Express credit card. Tr. 156:10-18; D.E. 359, Ex. 34. Similarly, in the month of July of 2006, Ms. Knight confirmed that Defendant Gurian incurred $5,700 in new American Express credit card charges for airline tickets and expenditures at the Bellagio Hotel. Tr. 156:19-25; D.E. 359, Ex. 34. Third Parties also paid $35 in January, 2007, for Defendant Gurian’s American Express membership renewal fee. Tr. 157:4-10; D.E. 359, Ex. 34. In December, 2006, Defendant Gurian charged $2,001.86 at the Bellagio Hotel on the Lolly Lu credit card, and the following month, in January of 2007, he charged $1,134.09 at the Bocatar Casino in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Tr. 154:11-23; 155:15-21; D.E. 359, Ex. 34. Despite these admissions, however, Third Parties dispute Plaintiff’s conclusion that additional documents relating to these transaction have not been produced by Third Parties. To the contrary, they assert that they have provided Plaintiff with all documents regarding the conferral of any airline ticket or hotel accommodation benefit on Defendant Gurian. D.E. 331, p. 9; 331-2, p.13. According to Third Parties, they have provided Plaintiff with the general ledgers evidencing all of Lolly Lu’s financial transactions, Lolly Lu’s bank account statements and cancelled checks and all Lolly Lu credit card statements. D.E. 321, p. 6; Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 39-40. Indeed, Ms. Knight testified that she had provided to Plaintiff all documents regarding the tickets purchased on the Lolly Lu credit cards, including American Express and Delta SkyMiles cards, and the tickets she bought via Defendant Gurian’s SkyMile account. Tr. 147:15:20; 155:2-8;100:18-20; 169:3-7. Ms. Knight further testified that she had produced all credit card statements while Defendant Gurian had his own Lolly Lu credit card. Tr. 155:2-14. Ms. Knight also confirmed that Third Parties had produced the Lolly Lu bank account statements and cancelled checks, and credit card statements, which included the charges related to the airline tickets. Tr. 147:25; 148:1-3; 155:2-8; 168. 17-19. Additionally, she verified that she had provided Plaintiff with the corporate documents for Lolly Lu demonstrating when Defendant Gurian became a member of the company and when he resigned. Tr. 168:22-25; 169:1-2; see also D.E. 359, Ex. 1. Furthermore, through the testimony of Ms. Knight, Third Parties argue that there are no documents evidencing the repayment of these charges incurred on the Lolly Lu credit cards by Defendant Gurian because he repaid Ms. Knight in cash, in person, for all of these charges. Tr. 159:17-23; 160:11-14. In explaining how the relationship worked, Ms. Knight stated that she imposed no time frame for Defendant Gurian to pay her back, “like the next day or the next month. It was whenever.” Tr. 159:24-25; 160:1-2. In order to let Defendant Gurian know he was obligated to her for certain funds, Ms. Knight stated that she would call him on the phone. Tr. 160:3-5. Although Ms. Knight asserted that Defendant Gurian reimbursed her for use of the Lolly Lu credit card by cash, she had no evidence of her deposits of that cash into a bank account. Tr 160:1-10; 100:22-25; 101:1-3. In this regard, Ms. Knight stated that she did not believe that any evidence exists that shows that Defendant Gurian provided Third Parties with reimbursement. Tr. 101:4-6. Further, according to her testimony, whatever cash Defendant Gurian gave her as reimbursement, she used. Tr. 101:7-8. She stated that the most cash that Defendant Gurian gave her at one time was $5,000, where Gurian took $5,000 cash out of his pocket and handed it to her. Tr. 101:9-14. When asked by Plaintiff why some of the transactions are on a credit card for Defendant Gurian and others on Third Parties’ credit cards, Ms. Knight stated that the ones on her credit card probably were incurred at times that Defendant Gurian called her and asked for assistance, and she helped him. Tr. 158:6-18. *47 Third Parties offered an explanation as to why Ms. Knight conferred these benefits on Defendant Gurian. Ms. Knight testified that she did this for him because they were friends. Tr. 158:14-18. She stated that she would help Defendant Gurian “do things,” as he “does not like the mundane details of every day life.” Tr. 102:1-5. Ms. Knight also stated she “would help him with his travel arrangements because he didn’t like to those things.” Tr. 101:17-24; 147:16-19. Additionally, Ms. Knight testified that she would, on average a couple of times a month, call a restaurant or make a reservation for Gurian, like a concierge. Tr. 102:6-10. In putting items on Third Parties’ credit cards for the benefit of Defendant Gurian, which, Ms. Knight testified Defendant Gurian subsequently reimbursed, Ms. Knight explained that she received the benefit of SkyMiles. Tr. 100:20-21. Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to counter Third Parties’ claim that they have produced all documents and that there are no additional documents regarding conferral of these benefits on Defendant Gurian, including the non-existence of documents of repayment for these hotel accommodations and airline tickets, or Ms. Knight’s explanation as to why she conferred these benefits on Defendant Gurian. Because the transactions involved occurred using Lolly Lu credit cards, I would expect Lolly Lu’s general ledger and business records to reflect such transactions. In this case, however, Third Parties have argued that they have already provided Plaintiff with all of Lolly Lu’s business records pertaining to the transactions at issue, including the ledger entries and any other such business records. In view of the absence of conflicting evidence regarding this assertion, as well as the lack of evidence that other specific documents have not been produced, I recommend a finding of compliance with respect to the records discussed in this category. 9. E-mail Accounts Plaintiff also complains that Third Parties have failed to provide Plaintiff with all e-mail records relating to specific e-mail accounts and addresses. During the hearing, Ms. Knight testified that Third Parties’ e-mail accounts included only “bigcaseycourt, inc@msn.com,” lollylugifts@yahoo.com, barbara@shoplucys.com, “ijustgot2haveit.com@lollylu.com,” and shoplucylu@yahoo.com, an e-mail address used for e-bay transactions, although Ms. Knight was unsure of the specific address. Tr. 125:23-25; 126:1-4; 181:1-6. Ms. Knight noted that she does not have access to any e-mail accounts in her father’s name or for her father’s benefit. Tr. 181:10-14. She stated that she does not believe that Blue Green T, LLC, has an e-mail account. Tr. 181:21-23. The Court will assess each account or group of accounts for which Plaintiff argues Third Parties still have outstanding production obligations under the Subpoenas. a. Yahoo Account: lollylugifts@yahoo.com Regarding this account, Plaintiff asserts that Third Parties’ argument that they cannot produce responsive documents absent a subpoena or “Consent to Search” form is without merit. D.E. 359, p. 21; D.E. 316-2, p. 5-6. In this regard, Plaintiff reasons, “if Knight and Lolly Lu ha[d] complied with the Preservation Order[s], they could (and should) have printed responsive ‘lollylugifts’ e-mails on their own.” D.E. 359, p. 21. Instead, Plaintiff complains that no responsive documents have been produced from this e-mail account. Id., p. 22. In response, Third Parties deny that they have refused to produce documents from this Yahoo account. D.E. 316-2, p. 5-6; see also Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 46. Rather, Ms. Knight testified that she gave Plaintiff access to all of her e-mail accounts. Tr. 171:14-16. She also stated that she has provided written, executed consent forms to Plaintiff so that Plaintiff could obtain Third Parties’ e-mail accounts. Tr. 109:5-17. Additionally, Ms. Knight asserted that she has produced from what she has, all of the documents that are relevant and responsive to the Subpoenas. Tr. 171:17-20; 128:22-25. Indeed, Ms. Knight testified that she believes that she and her counsel have done everything they can possibly do to obtain access to all responsive information from her e-mail accounts that the e-mail companies preserve and save on their servers. Tr. 173:14-18. To this end, Ms. Knight explained that she has provided authorizations to everyone, including her e-mail providers, so that Plaintiff can actually go there and get the documents. Tr. 55:23-25; 56:1. She affirmed that with respect to each and every e-mail account in her name or over which she has some control, she has personally undertaken an effort to produce to Plaintiff all e-mails responsive to the Subpoenas. Tr. 175:4-11. *48 As stated in Third Parties’ Supplemental Response dated December 27, 2007 (included in their Notice of Compliance), and via Ms. Knight’s testimony, Ms. Knight’s counsel issued a subpoena to Yahoo on December 17, 2007, with respect to this account, and Yahoo responded that Plaintiff had previously requested the e-mails and had provided Yahoo with a “Consent to Search” form. D.E. 316-2, p. 5-6; see also Tr. 122:11-19, 23-25; 123:14-23. Ms. Knight confirmed during her testimony that on December 19, 2007, she provided Plaintiff with a signed “Consent to Search” form regarding her Yahoo account for Lolly Lu Gifts. Tr. 172:12-15; 122:7-16. Yahoo informed Ms. Knight’s counsel that Yahoo had advised Plaintiff on December 10, 2007, that the “Consent to Search” form had been filled out improperly and provided Plaintiff with the new “Consent to Search” form. D.E. 316-2, p. 6. According to Ms. Knight, Plaintiff has not requested that Third Parties execute the new form, nor has Plaintiff provided Ms. Knight with the new “Consent to Search” form, although Ms. Knight stated that she is willing to provide any additional information as needed. Id. In Third Parties’ Hearing Exhibit 1, p. 46, Third Parties noted that at this time no responsive documents have been produced to Plaintiff from this Yahoo Account. Later during cross-examination, however, Ms. Knight clarified that she herself had printed out from her account some documents and provided these documents to her counsel. Tr. 128:22-25; 129:1-7; 122:7-10. Plaintiff did not contest Ms. Knight’s testimony or written submissions of these facts. Plaintiff, however, alleges that Third Parties’ arguments demonstrate that they “violated the [Court’s] Preservation Orders.” D.E. 359, p. 21. Thus, Plaintiff requests that Third Parties be ordered provide an affidavit detailing the extent to which they have complied with the Preservation Orders (and exactly how they have done so), and if all responsive documents have not been produced, that Third Parties be required to provide to Plaintiff with the remaining documents within seven calendar days of the issuance of an order. Id. Regarding compliance with the Preservation Orders, Ms. Knight stated that she had deleted spam e-mails and non-relevant e-mails and did not realize that the Preservation Orders meant she could not delete any e-mails at all. Tr. 124:1-6; 174:23-25; 175: 1-3. Rather, Ms. Knight testified, she understood the Preservation Orders to require her to save only e-mails relevant to this case. Tr. 124:7-11. With respect to this account, Ms. Knight confirmed that as of August 1, 2007, she believes she has received e-mails from and probably sent or responded to the persons listed in the Subpoenas. Tr. 125:24-25; 126:5-12; 129:1-10; see also 174:23-25; 175:1-3. However, Ms. Knight affirmatively testified that she had not deleted any of those e-mails to or from the persons listed in the Subpoenas in this e-mail account. Tr. 125:24-25; 126:5-14; 180:3-7. Plaintiff did not contest Ms. Knight’s testimony or written submissions of these facts. The Court does not agree with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding this account. Third Parties have not refused to produce documents from this account, nor does their position demonstrate that they violated the Preservation Orders. To the contrary, Ms. Knight’s testimony shows that she has, in fact, complied with the Preservation Order by not deleting e-mails to and from any of individuals named in the Subpoenas. Further, while Plaintiff alleges that Third Parties should have printed all responsive e-mails themselves, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Third Parties have access to allelectronic documents in this account. Rather, it appears that in order to gain complete access to all the documents, the parties need Yahoo’s assistance. Ms. Knight has executed at least one “Consent to Search” form, and there appears to be no dispute that although Yahoo rejected that form, Plaintiff, who received the new consent form from Yahoo, has not asked Ms. Knight to execute it. Nevertheless, Ms. Knight has stated under oath that she will do so upon being presented with the form by Plaintiff. Other than having Ms. Knight correctly execute a new “Consent to Search” form, I can think of nothing more Third Parties could be expected to do to provide access to this particular e-mail account, in view of the fact that Ms. Knight testified that she has already provided responsive documents she was able to print from home. But it is not Ms. Knight’s responsibility to cause Plaintiff to provide the new form to her. Thus, I recommend that should Plaintiff wish to continue to pursue the documents relating to this e-mail account, he be required to provide Ms. Knight with the appropriate consent form within seven calendar days of the Court’s order. Should he fail to do so, Third Parties should be held in compliance with regard to this aspect of the Subpoenas. On the other hand, should Plaintiff timely provide the requisite form, in order to be in compliance with respect to this part of the Subpoenas, I recommend that Ms. Knight be required to execute the new form correctly and provide it to Yahoo within 24 hours of receipt of the form from Plaintiff. b. MSN Account: bkc_inc@msn.com *49 Plaintiff contends that he has the “same concerns” with this account as with “lollylugifts.” D.E. 359, p. 21. The Court interprets this to signify that Plaintiff is alleging that Ms. Knight has refused to produce all the responsive documents from this account. Third Parties, on the other hand, insisted that they did not refuse to produce documents from this MSN account. D.E. 316-2, p. 6-7; see also Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 47-50. Indeed, Ms. Knight testified that she gave Plaintiff access to all of her e-mail accounts. Tr. 171:14-16. Furthermore, Ms. Knight asserted that she has produced from what she has, all of the documents that are relevant and responsive to the Subpoenas. Tr. 171:17-20. As recounted in their Supplemental Response dated December 27, 2007 (included in their Notice of Compliance) and via Ms. Knight’s testimony, Third Parties submitted that Ms. Knight requested all of her e-mails directly from MSN’s online web page and received a service request number on December 12, 2007. D.E. 316-2, p. 6. Ms. Knight represented that MSN then advised her that she could retrieve e-mails for a period of only twenty-four hours. Id. As a result, Ms. Knight stated that she made an additional request online to MSN for a copy of all of her e-mails, even though Ms. Knight had previously deleted them. Id. Ms. Knight testified that she recalled requesting all e-mails that were retained on that server or by that service, and she received no response other than the documents that she was able to produce on her own server. Tr. 172:16-21. After receiving no response from Ms. Knight’s on-line request, on December 17, 2007, Ms. Knight submitted that her counsel issued a subpoena to MSN regarding this account. D.E. 316, Ex. 1 at p. 6. In response, MSN contacted Ms. Knight’s counsel on December 20, 2007, and represented that upon receipt of an earlier “Consent to Search,” MSN had the e-mails as they existed on July 16, 2007.” Id. at p.6-7. Thus, MSN sent by overnight courier a compact disc with those e-mails to Ms. Knight’s counsel, and represented that they may retrieve current e-mails by providing MSN with a new “Consent to Search” form. Id. (referring to e-mail confirmation with MSN: W 04421- W 04423). Id. at p. 7. Ms. Knight executed the new “Consent to Search” form and transmitted it to MSN. D.E. 316-2, p. 7 (referring to email confirmation to MSN: W 05196-98; W 06751-52). On December 26, 2007, MSN provided Ms. Knight’s counsel with a compact disc of e-mails, which, according to MSN’s cover letter, provided “snapshots” of her account, one from July, 2007, and one from December 21, 2007. Id. However, counsel for Ms. Knight was unable to access the files on the compact disc. Id. With the assistance of DocuSolutions, Ms. Knight’s counsel gained access to the files on December 27, 2007. Id. Ms. Knight submits that due to time constraints and the volume of e-mails, her counsel performed electronic word searches for the “Search Names,” Philip Gurian, Jeannine Gurian, a/k/a Jeannine Schnapik, Benil Finance, Limited, Blue Green T, LLC, Rheal Cote and Jaime Villarroel. D.E. 331, p. 10. Third Parties submitted that they then produced to Plaintiff responsive, non-privileged documents found by searching for the “Search Names.” Id. (referring to W 06808- 06824); Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 50. Another review of the MSN e-mails was conducted and additional responsive e-mails were produced in the Second Supplemental Response. Id. (referring to W 06871- W 06895). Third Parties also submitted that they were willing to review all e-mail accounts again for any other search terms, to be provided by Plaintiff. D.E. 331, p.10; Tr. 172:3-11. *50 Ms. Knight’s testimony or written submissions of these facts was not countered by Plaintiff. Plaintiff complains, however, that Ms. Knight has not complied with this Court’s Preservation Orders. D.E. 359, p. 21-22. Further, Plaintiff contends that in Third Parties’ supplemental production, Ms. Knight has produced no responsive e-mails from this account after issuance of the July 24th Order (part of the Preservation Orders). Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff concludes that Ms. Knight has violated the Preservation Orders and that sanctions should be imposed on Third Parties. Id. Plaintiff requests that Third Parties be ordered to provide an affidavit detailing the extent to which they have complied with the Preservation Orders (as well as how they did so), or, if all responsive documents have not been produced, that they be required to provide to Plaintiff the remaining documents within seven days of the issuance of an order from this Court. Id. As with the lollylugifts account, Ms. Knight admitted that she had deleted spam e-mails and non-relevant e-mails but stated that she did not realize that the Preservation Orders meant she could not delete any e-mails at all. Tr. 124:1-6; 174:23-25; 175: 1-3. Rather, she testified that she believed the Preservation Orders to require Third Parties to save only those e-mails relevant to the case. Tr. 124:7-11. Regarding this account, Ms. Knight confirmed that as of August 1, 2007, she believes she has received e-mails from and probably sent or responded to the persons listed in the Subpoenas. Tr. 125:24-25; 126:5-12. However, Ms. Knight stated that with regard to this account, she had not deleted any of those e-mails to or from the persons listed in the Subpoenas. Tr. 125:24-25; 126:5-14. Ms. Knight’s testimony and Third Parties’ submission regarding their efforts demonstrate a substantial effort by Third Parties to provide responsive documents from this e-mail account. As recently as the end of December, 2007, Third Parties obtained a copy of all records for this e-mail address and searched the records for the names in the Subpoenas. Moreover, Third Parties have offered to perform searches for any additional terms desired by Plaintiff, but as of the April 24th hearing, Plaintiff had not taken advantage of this offer. While Plaintiff has, no doubt, had to contend with numerous other issues regarding this litigation, Third Parties cannot be faulted for Plaintiff’s failure to pursue additional records. Thus, I recommend a finding that Ms. Knight not be found in violation of the Preservation Orders, and further, that to the extent that Plaintiff has not already done so, he be required to submit to Third Parties any additional search terms he desires within seven calendar days of the Court’s order. Should Plaintiff choose not to do so, I recommend a finding of compliance for Third Parties with respect to this e-mail account. If Plaintiff provides additional search terms, Third Parties should have seven calendar days to run the terms and provide any new responsive documents from the MSN account. c. Internal Accounts for Ms. Knight’s other Businesses: Lolly Lu, Just Gotta Have it and Shop Lucy’s: barbara@lollylu.com, barbara@justgo2haveit.com, barbara@shoplucy.com *51 With respect to these internal business accounts of Ms. Knight, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Knight has provided no responsive e-mails regarding barbara@lollylu.com. D.E. 359, p. 22. According to Plaintiff, Third Parties have refused to produce all responsive electronic documents, including those from Ms. Knight’s companies “Just Got 2 Have It” and “Shop Lucy’s.” D.E. 359, p. 21. Regarding Barbara@justgot2haveit.com and Barbara@shoplucy.com, Plaintiff claims that since the July 24th Order (part of the Preservation Orders) with an effective preservation date of August 1, 2007, Ms. Knight has produced only e-mails to Defendant Gurian, and not from Gurian. Id. Third Parties respond that they have not refused to produce documents from these accounts and that all of these accounts were searched using the “Search Terms,” based on individuals named in the Subpoenas. As a result of these searches, Third Parties assert that they provided Plaintiff with all responsive, non-privileged e-mails between Ms. Knight and individuals identified in the Subpoenas. D.E. 331, p. 10; Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 1, p. 51. Ms. Knight confirmed in her testimony that she gave Plaintiff access to all of her e-mail accounts. Tr. 171:14-16. Furthermore, Ms. Knight testified that she has produced from what she has all of the documents that are relevant and responsive to the Subpoenas. Tr. 171:178-20. Plaintiff also contends that Third Parties have not complied with the Preservation Orders regarding these internal accounts. D.E. 359, p. 22. Plaintiff requests that Third Parties be ordered to provide an affidavit detailing the extent to which they have complied with the Preservation Orders (and how they did so), or, if all responsive documents have not been produced, that they be required to provide to Plaintiff the remaining documents within seven days of the issuance of an order. Id. Regarding compliance with the Preservation Orders and these accounts, as she did with the other e-mail accounts, Ms. Knight stated that she had deleted spam e-mails and non-relevant e-mails and did not realize that the Preservation meant she could not delete any e-mails at all. Tr. 124:1-6; 174:23-25; 175: 1-3. Rather, she stated that she understood the Preservation Orders to require her to save only those e-mails relevant to the case. Tr. 124:7-11. Ms. Knight confirmed that regarding these e-mail accounts, as of August 1, 2007, she believes she has received e-mails from and probably sent or responded to the persons listed in the Subpoenas. Tr. 125:24-25; 126:5-12. However, Ms. Knight affirmatively testified that she had not deleted any of those e-mails to or from the persons listed in the Subpoenas in this e-mail account. Tr. 125:24-25; 126:5-14. Ms. Knight further noted that with regard to both her Lolly Lu and Just Gotta Have It accounts, since the Preservation Orders, to the best of her knowledge, she has not deleted any e-mails that concern or relate to any of the persons or entities set forth in the Subpoenas. Tr. 180:8-25. Plaintiff also complains that Third Parties have searched these internal e-mail accounts only for names in the “Search Terms.” D.E. 359, p. 22. Plaintiff, nevertheless, admits that Third Parties have agreed to a supplemental review of these e-mail accounts and requests that the Court enforce that agreement. In this regard, Plaintiff notes that it agreed to provide Third Parties with the “additional search terms” during the week of April 21, 2008. Id., p. 22, n.11; Tr. 176:21-25; 177:1-4. As indicated above, Third Parties are willing to re-search these internal e-mail accounts with “any additional, reasonable search terms” or “additional responsive search terms.” D.E. 331, p. 10; Tr. 172: 3-11. As of the April 24th hearing, however, Third Parties had received no such additional search terms from Plaintiff. Id. *52 Despite efforts by Third Parties articulated above, I note that Third Parties did not address Plaintiff’s concerns that 1) after August 1, 2007, Ms. Knight has produced only e-mails to Defendant Gurian, and not from Gurian from the Barbara@justgo2haveit.com and Barbara@shoplucy.comaccounts; and 2) no responsive e-mails have been provided from the Barbara@lollylu.com account. In view of Ms. Knight’s admittedly close relationship with Defendant Gurian and her belief of the probability that she responded to or sent e-mail to him and other individuals in the Subpoenas since August 1, 2007, it is not clear to me that Third Parties have provided all responsive documents for the period of time from August 1, 2007, forward. In light of these circumstances, I recommend that Third Parties be directed to undertake a search of each of these accounts for all documents containing “Search Terms,” existing as of the date of the Court’s order with respect to Third Parties’ Notice of Compliance, and to provide all such responsive documents to Plaintiff within seven calendar days of the Court’s order. Additionally, as with the other e-mail accounts, should Plaintiff wish to have Third Parties perform searches of other terms, Plaintiff should be required to provide such terms to Third Parties within seven calendar days of the Court’s order. Third Parties should then have another seven calendar days to run the searches and provide responsive documents to Plaintiff. Upon completion of these tasks, Third Parties should be found in compliance with the Subpoenas as they relate to these e-mail accounts. d. Other E-Mail Account: Shoplucy@yahoo.com The Court notes that during Ms. Knight’s testimony, she mentioned an additional e-mail account that was not briefed by Plaintiff or Third Parties called Shoplucy@yahoo.com. Tr. 125:24-25; 126:1-4; 181:1-5. While Ms. Knight was “not positive” about the exact address of this account, Ms. Knight testified that this account “was a new one,” and indicated that it was for “e-bay transactions.” Id. As this account is “new,” it is unclear to the Court whether all responsive, non-privileged e-mails have been provided to Plaintiff. Accordingly, I recommend that Third Parties be required to provide Yahoo with a correctly executed “Consent to Search” form regarding this account referred to by Ms. Knight during her testimony, within two calendar days of the issuance of an order by the Court. Once electronic files are provided to Third Parties from Yahoo regarding this account, in accordance with this Court’s Preservation Orders, Third Parties should have seven calendar days to provide responsive, non-privileged documents to Plaintiff, and to provide a privilege log regarding any privileged communications. Once Third Parties comply with this directive, I recommend a finding that they are in compliance with this aspect of the Subpoenas. C. Conclusion After careful consideration of Third Parties Barbara Knight and Lolly Lu, LLC’s Notice of Compliance with Production Requirements [D.E. 316] and their Response to Plaintiff’s Response to Notice of Compliance and Request for Hearing [D.E. 321], all responsive motions, evidence and testimony presented at the April 24th Hearing, and the record in this case, I RECOMMEND the following findings regarding each category of documents alleged by Plaintiff to remain outstanding under the Subpoenas, as of April 24, 2008: 1. The Octagon Account: Third Parties are in compliance. Should Third Parties receive any additional responsive Octagon documents, however, Third Parties must provide Plaintiff with such responsive documents within seven calendar days of receipt. To the extent that Third Parties claim any additional documents received to be privileged, they shall provide Plaintiff with a privilege log within seven calendar days of receipt of the additional Octagon documents. 2. The Antigua Account Third Parties are in compliance. Should Third Parties receive any additional responsive Global Bank documents, however, Third Parties must provide Plaintiff with such responsive documents within seven calendar days of receipt. To the extent that Third Parties claim any additional documents received to be privileged, they shall provide Plaintiff with a privilege log within seven calendar days of receipt of the additional Global Bank documents. 3. The Gibraltar Account Third Parties are in compliance. Should Third Parties receive any additional responsive Gibraltar Bank documents, however, Third Parties must provide Plaintiff with such responsive documents within seven calendar days of receipt. To the extent that Third Parties claim any additional documents received to be privileged, they shall provide Plaintiff with a privilege log within seven calendar days of receipt of the additional Gibraltar Bank documents. *53 4. Bolivian Accounts Third Parties are in compliance. Should Third Parties receive any additional responsive Banco Union and Cooperativa Fatima documents, however, Third Parties must provide Plaintiff with such responsive documents within seven calendar days of receipt. To the extent that Third Parties claim any additional documents received to be privileged, they shall provide Plaintiff with a privilege log within seven calendar days of receipt of the additional Banco Union or Cooperativa Fatima documents. 5. Investment Accounts Third Parties are out of compliance. Third Parties should be directed to produce “any and all documents related to any investment accounts in which . . . [Third Parties have] a beneficial interest, or for which [they have] acted in any capacity,” “about which Gurian gave trading instructions,” within seven calendar days of the issuance of the Court’s Order. Additionally, Third Parties should be required to submit a privilege log regarding any Investment Account documents withheld on the basis of privilege, within seven calendar days of the issuance of the Court’s Order. 6. Joint Operation documents Third Parties are in compliance. 7. Obligations to Defendant Gurian for at least $644,000 a. The Notations for $57,500 and $127,500 Third Parties are out of compliance. Third Parties must either present additional evidence to demonstrate the veracity of Ms. Knight’s contentions with respect to these transactions, or, if Ms. Knight’s prior submissions did not accurately represent the nature of the transactions at issue, Ms. Knight must correct her testimony and provide any corroborating documents that exist. b. The Notations for $318,975 and $268,000 Third Parties are out of compliance. Third Parties must either present additional documentation relating to the loans, lease, and business agreements between Third Parties and Defendant Gurian (or anyone else allegedly acting on his behalf, including Mr. Cote), or, if Ms. Knight’s prior submissions did not accurately represent the nature of the transactions at issue, Ms. Knight must correct her testimony and provide any corroborating documents that exist. c. Third Parties’ Transaction Summary Chart Third Parties are out of compliance. Third Parties must provide documentation concerning the purposes of the entries at Rows 29, 34, 35, 36, and 37, as well as any documentation relating to the transactions noted at these lines of the Transaction Summary Chart. 8. Ms. Knight and Lolly Lu’s Bank and Credit Card Accounts a. Canadian Business Trip Third Parties are in compliance. b. Casino Funds Third Parties are in compliance. c. Airline Tickets and Hotel Accommodations Procured for Defendant Gurian’s Benefit Third Parties are in compliance. . E-mail Accounts a. Yahoo Account: lollylugifts@yahoo.com: Third Parties are tentatively in compliance. Such compliance shall become final if Plaintiff does not provide Third Parties with the appropriate consent form for this e-mail account within seven calendar days of the issuance of the Court’s Order. Should Plaintiff choose to provide Third Parties with the appropriate consent form, Third Parties must provide the correctly executed consent form to Yahoo within 24 hours of receipt of it from Plaintiff in order to remain in compliance. *54 b. MSN Account: bkc_inc@msn.com Third Parties are tentatively in compliance. Such compliance shall become final if Plaintiff does not provide Third Parties with additional search terms within seven calendar days of the issuance of the Court’s Order. Should Plaintiff choose to provide Third Parties with additional search terms, Third Parties must provide any additional responsive documents to Plaintiff within seven calendar days of receipt of the search terms from Plaintiff in order to remain in compliance. c. Internal Account for Ms. Knight’s other Business: Lolly Lu, Just Gotta Have it and S hop L ucy’s: barbara@lollylu.com, barbara@justgo2haveit.com, barbara@shoplucy.com Third Parties are tentatively in compliance. Such compliance shall become final if Plaintiff does not provide Third Parties with additional search terms within seven calendar days of the issuance of the Court’s Order. Should Plaintiff choose to provide Third Parties with additional search terms, Third Parties must provide any additional responsive documents to Plaintiff within seven calendar days of receipt of the search terms from Plaintiff in order to remain in compliance. d. Other E-Mail Account: Shoplucy@yahoo.com Third Parties are out of compliance. Third Parties shall provide Yahoo with a correctly executed “Consent to Search” form regarding this account within two calendar days of the issuance of the Court’s Order. Once electronic files are provided to Third Parties by Yahoo, Third Parties shall provide responsive, non-privileged documents to Plaintiff within seven calendar days of receipt of the documents from Yahoo. To the extent that Third Parties claim privilege with respect to any of these documents, Third Parties shall provide Plaintiff with a privilege log for such documents within seven calendar days of the receipt of documents from Yahoo. Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b), the parties have ten (10) days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections, if any, with the Honorable Kenneth L. Ryskamp, United States District Judge. Failure to file written objections timely shall bar the parties from a de novodetermination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the report and bar the parties from attacking on appeal any factual findings contained herein. R.T.C. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); LoConte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc);[52] 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Footnotes [1] Although Plaintiff served several third parties other than Ms. Knight and Lolly Lu with subpoenas, in this Opinion the reference to “Third Parties” will include only Third Parties Ms. Knight and Lolly Lu, LLC, as only their filings are currently under consideration in this Report and Recommendation. [2] Whitney Farber, another managing member of Lolly Lu, LLC, was also served with a subpoena duces tecum in aid of execution on May 19, 2006. [D.E. 47, Ex. A, p. 28-36]. She, however, is not a party to Third Parties Barbara Knight and Lolly Lu, LLC’s Notice of Compliance with Production Requirements [D.E. 316] or their Response [D.E. 321] presently in front of the Court. Based on this fact, this Report and Recommendation does not consider Ms. Farber’s compliance. [3] This refers to Defendant Gurian. [4] This refers to Defendant Jeannine Gurian. Ms. Gurian, a/k/a Ms. Schnapik, is the mother of Defendant Gurian and allegedly assisted Defendant Gurian in transferring his assets beyond the reach of Plaintiff. See D.E. 36 at ¶ 7, 23-24; 45 at ¶ 3; 162 at ¶ 10, 16. [5] Benil Finance Limited is alleged to be a business controlled by Defendants Gurian, Ms. Gurian, and non-parties who have allegedly assisted Defendant Gurian in transferring his assets. See D.E. 36 at ¶ 7, 23, 25-26; 45 at ¶ 3; 81 at ¶ 7-12, 13-15. [6] Blue Green T, LLC, is a Bahamian company, owned by Jaime Villarroel, father to Ms. Knight and allegedly close associate of Defendant Gurian, and allegedly by Ms. Knight. See D.E. 36 at ¶ 31-32; 85 at ¶ 18; D.E. 47 at ¶ 14; 359, Ex. 25 at ¶ 4. Among various assertions, Plaintiff charges that Defendant Gurian (1) illegally traded on a brokerage account of Blue Green T’s; (2) granted Blue Green T a mortgage on one of his homes; and (3) utilized Blue Green T in transferring his assets beyond Plaintiff’s reach. See D.E. 85 at ¶ 18; 359, p.13-14, n. 7, 16-17; 162 at ¶ 14. [7] Mr. Cote is the paramour or significant other of Defendant Ms. Gurian, mother of Defendant Gurian, an alleged close associate of Defendant Gurian, and has allegedly assisted Defendant Gurian in transferring his assets beyond Plaintiff’s reach. SeeD.E. 36 at ¶ 7; 45 at ¶ 3; 47 at ¶ 14; 162 at ¶ 10, 16-17. [8] Defendant Gurian’s responses to the interrogatories entered by Plaintiff’s counsel appear in the record as Exhibit 9 of Plaintiff’s April 25, 2007, Hearing Exhibit List. See D.E. 111. [9] Mr. Knight is the husband of Ms. Knight, and allegedly is involved in Defendant Gurian’s business deals. See D.E. 299, Tr. 10:9-20; 162 at ¶ 15. [10] Ms. Side, a/k/a Ms. Wells, is alleged by Plaintiff to be a close friend of Defendant Ms. Gurian and supposedly assisted Defendant Gurian in transferring his assets. See D.E. 162, ¶ 16-17. [11] Laditel Investments and Dinter Finance are alleged to be businesses controlled by Defendant Gurian, Defendant Ms. Gurian, or non-parties who have assisted Defendant Gurian in transferring his assets. See D.E. 81 at ¶19; 162 at ¶ 13, 18; 222, p. 9-10. [12] On August 6, 2008, Plaintiff served Mr. Knight, Ms. Knight’s husband, with a subpoena duces tecum in aid of execution. SeeD.E. 175. As Mr. Knight is not a party to Third Parties’ Notice of Compliance and their Response before the undersigned today, Mr. Knight’s compliance with his subpoena will not be addressed in this Report and Recommendation. [13] The September 5, 2007, Order notes that if the chosen copy service did not comply with these requirements, Plaintiff was ordered to notify the Court immediately, and the Court would at that time order that the entire original file be delivered to Plaintiff, where Plaintiff’s information technology department would Bates-stamp the documents and send them to appropriate counsel based on to whom the e-mail account related. [D.E. 220, p. 3 at ¶ 5]. [14] Additionally, the September 5, 2007, Order directed that Third Parties and other appropriate Defendants and non-parties pay the fee for the copy service. [D.E. 200, p. 3-4 at ¶ 9]. [15] Additionally, the Court’s October 16th Order named “Copy Scan” as the agreed upon copy service to which documents should be produced, and Plaintiff agreed to accept a version of the “Consent to Search” form with certain personal information redacted to prevent Plaintiff’s access to the accounts. The Court also ordered that if an electronic repository required any further identity verification, counsel for the non-party account holder was to provide the repository with the necessary information within 24 hours of the request. [D.E. 223]. [16] Through December 11, 2007, Third Parties and Ms. Faber shared counsel. On December 12, 2007, a separate notice of counsel was filed for Ms. Farber. [D.E. 271]. [17] David Roth, Esq., represented to the Court on the day of the December 13th Hearing that he was appearing on behalf of Ms. Knight solely for the purpose of advising her as to her legal responsibilities concerning the bond imposed by the Court. 12/13/07 Tr. 3:2-5. [18] On April 11, 2008, I granted Ms. Farber’s Unopposed Motion to Be Excused cused From Hearing [see D.E. 344], with the agreement that Ms. Farber’s counsel would attend the hearing. [D.E. 346]. I also granted Plaintiff, Trustee Edwin B. Mishkin’s Motion to Be Excused From Personally Attending the April 24, 2008, Discovery Compliance Hearing [See D.E. 347], on April 14, 2008. [D.E. 351]. [19] On April 14, 2008, Third Parties filed a Motion to Require Trustee to Set Forth with Specificity His Objections to Compliance [D.E. 349], regarding Plaintiff’s March 17, 2008, Response to the Order Show Cause. In light of the sua sponteApril 15, 2008, Order requiring Plaintiff to file specific objections to Third Parties’ Notice of Compliance, however, Judge Ryskamp denied Third Parties’ Motion for Specificity on April 16, 2008. [D.E. 354]. [20] Counsel for Ms. Farber requested to be excused from the hearing midway through hearing, which no party objected to, and the Court granted his request. Tr. 94:20-25; 95:1-4. [21] The transcript for this hearing was filed in Mishkin v. Lolly Lu, LLC, Case No. 08-80282 (S.D. Fla.), as D.E. 18 on April 30, 2008. [22] This refers to a brokerage account at Octagon Capital Corporation, a brokerage company located in Canada, on behalf of Blue Green T, LLC. See D.E. 359, p.13-14, n. 7. It is alleged that Octagon took orders and other direction from Defendant Gurian regarding accounts at Octagon, including Blue Green T LLC’s account, allegedly owned by Ms. Knight and her father Mr. Villarroel, even though Defendant Gurian was not listed as an owner or registered trader. See D.E. 36 at ¶ 25; 222, p.5-8, 7, n.5, 15, 17-18, 25, 31-32, 31, n.31; 359, p. 13-14, n. 7. It also alleged that this account was used to transfer the assets of Defendant Gurian. See D.E. 359, p.16-17. [23] This refers to an account for Blue Green T, LLC, at the Global Bank of Commerce, located in Antigua. This account is controlled by Mr. Villarroel and allegedly Ms. Knight and, Plaintiff charges, was used to transfer the assets of Defendant Gurian. See D.E. 85 at ¶ 18; 222, p. 6-7, 6, n.10, 7, n. 5; 359, p.14-15, 16-17. It is also alleged that Blue Green T’s Octagon account, totaling $1.64 million, was liquidated into this Antigua account on November 15, 2007. See D.E. 359, Ex. 16 (W 07870). [24] This refers to a brokerage account on behalf of Blue Green T, LLC, at Gibraltar Global Securities, a brokerage company located in the Bahamas. See D.E. 222, p. 32; 359, p.15-16. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gurian controlled the Gibraltar trading account of Blue Green T, LLC, ostensibly owned by Ms. Knight and her father Mr. Villarroel, even though Defendant Gurian was not listed as an owner or registered trader. See D.E. 222, p. 15, 25, 32-33, 35-36; 359, p. 15-16. Additionally, documents from Defendant Gurian’s counsel demonstrate that Gurian’s legal bills have been paid from an account at Gibraltar. [D.E. 359, Ex. 23]. [25] This refers to Mr. Villarroel’s accounts located in Bolivia, Mr. Villarroel’s current residence. [D.E. 359, Ex. 16]. Plaintiff alleges the Antigua Account was liquidated by Mr. Villarroel into a Bolivian account on August 10, 2007, and that these Bolivian accounts have been used to transfer the assets of Defendant Gurian. Id., p.16-17, Ex. 16, 25. [26] This refers to any investment accounts for which Defendant Gurian provided investment advice to Ms. Knight, Mr. Villarroel and Blue Green T, LLC, and for which Ms. Knight compensated Defendant Gurian for the investment advice. See D.E. 359, p. 17. [27] This refers to an e-mail from Defendant Gurian to Ms. Knight, dated June 9, 2001, where Gurian writes the following: Hey sugar wassup . . . . I hope to go to Atlanta to see OUR operation in the near future. Hope everything goes well your first week. [D.E. 359, Ex. 28 (W 7064-65) ]. Plaintiff calls this the “Joint Operation.” See D.E. 359, p 17-18. [28] This refers to Plaintiff’s allegation that Third Parties have not provided a credible explanation or documents regarding monetary loans at least $644,000.00 owed to Defendant Gurian. See D.E. 359, p. 18-19; 222, p.4-5, n. 5 (describing how Defendant Gurian provided Third Parties with cash and real property totaling at least $400,000.00). [29] Plaintiff alleges that even though Defendant Gurian was no longer a managing member of Lolly Lu after March, 2006, Ms. Knight continued to confer benefits upon Defendant Gurian, by using Lolly Lu credit cards for Gurian’s benefit, and providing funds to casinos on Defendant Gurian’s behalf. See D.E. 359, p. 20. Plaintiff asserts that Third Parties have assisted in creating schemes to compensate Defendant Gurian for outstanding loans or to veil Defendant Gurian’s finances. [D.E. 222, p. 25, 27; 359, p. 20]. [30] Plaintiff alleges that Third Parties have refused to produce all documents from all e-mail accounts, including other companies owned by Ms. Knight, and Plaintiff states he has not received confirmation that Ms. Knight has complied with this Court’s July 24th Order, directing preservation of all electronically stored information. [D.E. 359, p. 20-22]. [31] Plaintiff makes a similar request for Ms. Knight to provide an affidavit regarding whether she has requested that her father, Mr. Villarroel, or Defendant Gurian assist her with complying with her responses to the Subpoenas. [D.E. 359]. [32] Third Parties raise their motion within the body of their Response to Notice of Compliance and Request for Hearing. See D.E. 321 at p. 4, Section III. [33] To the extent that I have misinterpreted the comments of the Court during the December 13th hearing as endorsing the agreement between Plaintiff and Third Parties, and should the Court wish to consider Third Parties’ compliance efforts as they relate to orders of this Court issued before December 13, 2007, the Court certainly has the inherent power to vindicate its own orders, despite any agreement entered into by the parties. [34] Third Parties cite Cytodyne Tech., Inc. v. Biogenic Tech., Inc., 216 F.R.D. 533 (M.D. Fla. 2003), and suggest that their burden in responding to the Subpoenas is lighter than it otherwise would be because they are non-parties to the litigation. The Court disagrees. First, both Cytodyne and the cases upon which it relies in quashing a subpoena on a non-party involve motions by the non-parties either to quash or for protective order. In other words, the non-parties resisted compliance with the subpoenas. Thus, the courts considering those requests applied a balancing test in determining whether the non-parties should be required to comply at all with the subpoenas at issue in those cases; the courts were not making determinations regarding what constituted complete compliance. Here, however, Third Parties did not object in any way to the subpoenas. It is too late now for them to begin to do so. Thus, I find Cytodyne and the line of cases it cites to be inapplicable to the issue pending before the Court. [35] Pursuant to Bonner v. Prichard, 35, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11thCir. 1981), opinions of the Fifth Circuit issued prior to October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. [36] Of course, Mr. Villarroel may well have independent obligations pursuant to any legal process served upon him, but his compliance with any such process, or lack thereof, is not currently before the Court. [37] The Court notes that the actual quote states that “[i]f, however, any further documents are produced by Octagon, they will be promptly provided to Plaintiff.” (Emphasis added). However, as this paragraph is discussing efforts to retrieve and produce Global Bank records, the Court assumes this was a typographical error and that Third Parties were referring to Global Bank records, not Octagon records. [38] Plaintiff is referring to the following paragraph in Mr. Villarroel’s Affidavit, where he states the following: 6. Blue Green and I loaned Barbara the following amounts for Lolly Lu (the “Loans”): $30,000 from my personal account to Lolly Lu on 12/24/2003; $57,500 from my personal account to Lolly Lu on 6/4/2004; $29,175 from my personal account to Lolly Lu on 8/12/2004; $20,000 from my personal account to Lolly Lu on 9/23/2004; . . . . [D.E. 359, Ex. 25 at ¶ 6 (W 06733) ]. [39] The Court notes that Third Parties objected on December 20, 2007, to Plaintiff’s request for Third Parties to search e-mail accounts of “Just Got To Have It” and “Shop Lucy’s”as outside the scope of the Subpoenas, as well as to Plaintiff’s request for e-mails between Third Parties and their former counsel. Third Parties’ Hearing Ex. 2, letter from Third Parties to Plaintiff’s counsel, dated December 20, 2007, at ¶ 3. However, Third Parties represented in their Hearing Exhibit 1, p. 51, and in their Supplemental Response dated December 27, 2007 (included in their Notice of Compliance), that they had produced responsive non-privileged documents from these e-mail accounts. Furthermore, the Court agrees with Third Parties that they do not and did not have to produce e-mails between Third Parties and former counsel, because such e-mails fall outside the scope of the Subpoenas. [40] Prior to the December 13, 2007, hearing, the Court also held Ms. Knight to have had outstanding production obligations with respect to Requests 1, 4, 5, 6 and 8, of her Subpoena, and Lolly Lu was found to have had outstanding production obligations under Requests 1, 4, 5, and 6. See D.E. 226, 238. [41] Plaintiff is attempting to find the assets and money of Defendant Gurian. To the extent that Third Parties invested money for Gurian or compensated him (or continue to owe him compensation) regarding his investment advice, the requested Investment Account documents will provide further information regarding the location of Gurian’s moneys. Ms. Knight’s testimony pointed to “compensation” for Gurian existing for accounts not in Third Parties’ names. In response to a question about whether Ms. Knight caused Gurian to be compensated for investment advice relating to accounts that are not in Ms. Knight’s name, for example, Ms. Knight testified that her father, Mr. Villarroel had compensated Defendant Gurian for his trading advice. Tr. 89:3-6. She stated she did not create criteria for how Defendant Gurian was compensated; that was between her father and Defendant Gurian. Tr. 91:2-9. However, Ms. Knight admitted that, based on Gurian’s securities advice, Ms. Knight authorized transactions from accounts not in her name. Tr. 89:7-11. Furthermore, Ms. Knight testified that Gurian provided trade consulting for the Octagon account, Meyers account and her personal account. Tr. 43:9-20. [42] Plaintiff does not challenge documents relating to a $60,000 loan referred to in Check No. 1676, of paragraph 14 of the Villarroel Affidavit. [43] The transcript of Ms. Knight’s testimony refers to Laditel phonetically as “Lottie Tell.” [44] $5,000 does not actually constitute 3.5% of $218,000 or $318,975. This discrepancy is addressed infra, p. 84. [45] Although the $75,000 loan from Mr. Cote to Lolly :u does not appear in the memo notations as an outstanding loan, according to Third Parties, this loan amount is still outstanding. [46] The parties have not submitted the actual checks to the Court, so I cannot ascertain whether this description appears on the faces of the checks, or whether, instead, it constitutes Third Parties’ after-the-fact description of the purpose of each of these checks. [47] $781.67 equals 1/12 (a monthly payment) of $9,380, which, in turn, amounts to 3.5% of $268,000. [48] Because the parties have not submitted Checks 1414 and 1637, the two checks whose descriptions in Third Parties’ Transaction Summary Chart refer to “rent,” while the payment numbers instead appear to correspond to interest amounts and seem sequentially to fit into the chronology of interest payments, I cannot determine the purported purposes of these checks. [49] Although the transcript refers to “the Alco Pave,” I understand Ms. Knight’s counsel to have been referring to Rheal Cote at this time, based on my recollection of the testimony and a review of the Transaction Summary Chart. [50] It appears that what happens in Las Vegas really does stay in Las Vegas. [51] While Ms. Knight testified that the Delta Airlines ticket purchased for Defendant Gurian in May of 2006 was “35,” the actual American Express invoice reflects a charge of $55.00. See D.E. 359, Ex. 24 (LL 01286). [52] Decisions rendered by Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit constitute binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Stein v. Reynolds Secs., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982).