1. Plaintiff has sued, among others, the Federal Detention Center, the Philadelphia U.S. Attorney's Office, and several Assistant United States Attorneys involved in his prosecution and conviction for illegal drug distribution and related crimes. See Criminal Action No. 05-193. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the Constitution, the Privacy Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the Wiretap Act: 1) when the Federal Detention Center produced, pursuant to subpoenas duces tecum, copies of recordings of telephone calls he made from the FDC; and 2) when his co-defendant Atul Patil translated a number of those recordings. 5 U.S.C. § 552a; 18 U.S.C. § 2701; 18 U.S.C. § 2510.

2. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to prevent the AUSAs from obtaining copies of various phone calls and records, and to prevent the Bureau of Prisons from monitoring and keeping his phone communications in its system of records. (Doc. No. 37, at 57).

3. Injunctive relief is appropriate when the party seeking such relief has shown (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that he will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting such relief will not result in greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a); KOS Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d. Cir. 2004). Construing Plaintiff's Motion as liberally as I can, I conclude that Plaintiff has not remotely shown an entitlement to the injunctive relief he seeks.

4. The events giving rise to this lawsuit were fully set out during Plaintiff's sentencing after his criminal prosecution. See Criminal Action No. 05-193. In companion civil-criminal cases, the Court may take judicial notice in one case of events transpiring in the other. Fed. R. Evid. 201; SeeMacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Flintkote Co., 760 F.2d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 1985), Funk v. C.I.R., 163 F.2d 796, 801 (3d Cir. 1947).

5. Plaintiff was arrested in April, 2005 and incarcerated at the FDC, where, on April 19, 2005, he signed an acknowledgment form respecting monitoring the BOP would conduct of his telephone calls. (Tr. Dec. 5, 2007 at 16-17).

6. The terms of that form provided that all Plaintiff's calls from the FDC would be monitored unless Plaintiff told his prison case manager that he needed to call his attorney. The case manager would then permit calls to be made from his office and would confirm that the call had been placed to Plaintiff's attorney. (Tr. Dec. 5, 2007, at 14:11-18).

7. In preparation for Plaintiff's criminal trial, the Government subpoenaed from the FDC copies of all recordings made of Plaintiff's monitored telephone calls. (Tr. Dec. 5, 2007, at 20-23).

*2 8. Plaintiff conducted most of his monitored calls in Hindi. Accordingly, prosecutors asked various people fluent in Hindi -- allegedly including Plaintiff's co-defendant Atul Patil -- to translate some of those conversations. (Tr. Dec. 5, 2007, at 22-23).

9. After obtaining the recordings, the Government realized that, Plaintiff's acknowledgment of the FDC monitoring rules notwithstanding, Plaintiff made a number of calls to his counsel without first notifying his case manager. (Tr. Dec. 5, 2007, at 21-22).

10. As was demonstrated at Plaintiff's sentencing, in an abundance of caution, the Government did not listen to any of Plaintiff's recorded conversations with his counsel. (Tr. Dec. 5, 2007, at 21-22; 29).

11. Plaintiff now contends that Defendants' actions in monitoring, recording, disseminating, and translating his prison calls violated his constitutional and statutory rights and must be enjoined. I disagree. First, it is apparent that because there is no legal basis for the relief he seeks, Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits of this dispute.

12. The Privacy Act prohibits government agencies from disclosing any record contained in a system of records without the written consent of the person to whom the record pertains. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). The Act provides an exception, however, for “routine use” disclosures made to federal law enforcement officials for law enforcement purposes. Id. at (a)(7); 67 FR 16762-01, 2002 WL 516900. The Government actions Plaintiff complains of -- production of telephone calls made at the FDC -- fall within this “routine use” exception. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Privacy Act claim is unlikely to succeed on the merits.

13. The Stored Communications Act prohibits individuals from intentionally accessing an electronic communication service facility without authorization. 18 U.S.C. § 2701. The Act does not apply to the subpoenaed production of conversations taped and maintained by a BOP facility for security purposes. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits in his Stored Communications Act claim.

14. The Wiretap Act prohibits an individual from using or disclosing the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication obtained through an invalid interception. 18 U.S.C. § 2511. The Act does not prohibit a person acting under color of law from intercepting a wire, oral, or electronic communication where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. Id. at § 2511(2)(c). As Plaintiff acknowledged in his Amended Complaint (and at his sentencing), he consented to the monitoring and recording of his outgoing phone calls while at the FDC. (Doc. No. 30). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Wiretap Act claim is unlikely to succeed on the merits.

15. Plaintiff's constitutional claims are also unlikely to succeed on the merits. Plaintiff alleges that disclosure of his monitored telephone communications chilled his First Amendment right to expression. (Doc. No. 37, at 28). Reasonable restrictions on prisoners' telephone privileges do not, however, violate the First Amendment. Perez v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 229 Fed. Appx. 55, 57 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1986), a prisoner's telephone rights are “subject to rational limitations in the face of legitimate security interests of the penal institution.”).

*3 16. Plaintiff also alleges that the AUSAs violated his Fourth Amendment rights by recording privileged attorney-client communications. (Doc. No. 37, at 33). Routine recording of a prisoner's telephone calls does not violate the Fourth Amendment, particularly when prisoners are told that the conversations are being monitored. United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 380 (2d Cir. 1987). Moreover, in deciding to make calls to his counsel on a phone line he knew to be monitored, Plaintiff waived the attorney-client privilege. United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 1981) (attorney-client communication is only protected from government intrusion when it is reasonably expected and understood to be confidential).

17. Plaintiff also argues that the AUSAs violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when they obtained recorded communications from the BOP. (Doc. No. 37, at 34). The Fifth Amendment protects individuals against compelled, incriminating testimony; it does not protect someone who voluntarily provides incriminating information. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943). Plaintiff's consensual conversations, conducted on an FDC telephone Plaintiff knew was monitored, were not compelled.

18. Plaintiff also argues that the AUSAs violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights when they obtained his recorded communications without providing notice to Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 37, at 35-36). Due process is implicated only when prison restrictions impose such hardship on an inmate as to appear atypical in relation to ordinary prison life. Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 522-523 (3d Cir. 2002). The FDC's call monitoring program does not remotely create such a hardship.

19. Finally, Plaintiff claims that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and to a fair trial because the Government obtained recordings of conversations he had with his attorney. (Doc. No. 37, at 41). This claim typifies Plaintiff's apparent desire to conflate his criminal and civil cases. As I have already ruled, however, there was no violation of Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment rights. (Tr. Dec. 14, 2007, at 4-5). In choosing to speak to his lawyer over a line he knew was monitored, Plaintiff waived any privilege that might otherwise have attached to those conversations. See United States v. Gartner, 518 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1975) (attorney-client privilege does not exist when communications were knowingly made in the presence of a third party); Melvin, 650 F.2d at 645. In these circumstances, I do not see how Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment rights are even implicated here. Overheard conversations between a defendant and his counsel do not constitute a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 424-425 (5th Cir. 1973) (telephone conversation between incarcerated defendant and his attorney overheard by state officials discharging their prison security responsibilities did not constitute Sixth Amendment violation).

20. In these circumstances, it is apparent that Plaintiff has not remotely shown any likelihood that he will prevail on the merits of this dispute. Moreover, although I will not engage in an extended analysis of the other injunction prerequisites, it is equally apparent that Plaintiff meets none of them. I can see no immediate or irreparable harm -- indeed, I can see no harm -- caused by Defendants' actions. Moreover, the relief Plaintiff seeks would undoubtedly jeopardize security at the FDC and so ill-serve the public interest.

21. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief is DENIED.

*4 22. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment deeming multiple Government actions unconstitutional or in violation of the Privacy Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that courts have authority to “declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party” before actual injury occurs to allow litigants to clarify legal rights and obligations before acting on them in suits on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2201; Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 1990). All injuries Plaintiff alleges have already occurred. Moreover, insofar as I addressed the merits in denying Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief, there is no further need to clarify Plaintiff's rights and obligations in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Declaratory Relief is DENIED.

23. Plaintiff also asks me to compel the Defendants to: (1) disclose to him any and all documents concerning his records and communications; (2) produce copies of all phone communications and other records acquired through unlawful and unconstitutional subpoenas or other requests submitted to the Bureau of Prisons; (3) return to Plaintiff the originals, copies, and transcripts of all acquired communications; and (4) produce and submit to Plaintiff all originals and copies of the summaries prepared by co-defendant Atul Patil and provided to AUSA Pavlock and AUSA Costello. Plaintiff has previously requested similar relief. See (Doc. Nos. 18, 22, 27).

24. Defendants have established that they responded in good faith to all Plaintiff's discovery demands. See (Doc. No. 18, at 3-5). Plaintiff has not impugned the adequacy of that showing. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff's Motion is one to compel discovery, that Motion is DENIED. Insofar as Plaintiff otherwise asks me to order materials produced (i.e., the “return” of various communications), he has not shown any entitlement to those materials.