*1 THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery (“Motion to Compel”) (Doc. 30), Plaintiff's Response thereto (Doc. 46), Plaintiff's Notice of Clarification (“Notice”) (Doc. 47), and Defendant's Unopposed Motion to Seal (“Motion to Seal”) (Doc. 31).

In the Notice, Plaintiff states that he mistakenly believed that he did not have to respond to certain requests for admission (“RFAs”) at issue based on prior discussions with Defendant. (Doc. 47.) Because Plaintiff did not respond at all to certain RFAs, other than asserting general objections to all of the RFAs, he now requests that the Court construe his Response as a Motion for Protective Order, and construe Defendant's Motion to Compel as a Response. (Id. at 2.) Defendant does not oppose this request, which will be granted. For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff's Response, which is construed as a Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 46), is due to be GRANTED, and Defendant's Motion to Seal is due to be DENIED.[1]

I. Analysis

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) governs the scope of discovery in civil cases. In general, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Under Rule 26(c)(1), “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including ... forbidding the disclosure or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A). “A district court has broad discretion when fashioning protective orders.” In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 357 (11th Cir. 1987).

Upon review, Plaintiff has shown good cause for entry of a protective order because Defendant's Sixth Request for Admissions, which totals 98 pages, contains 527 separate requests, and attaches 5,001 pages of exhibits, is excessive, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of this case.[2] (See Doc. 30-1; Doc. 46 at 5.)

“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ... [do not set] a presumptive limit on the number of requests for admission that may be propounded by a party.” Layne Christensen Co. v. Purolite Co., Case No. 09-2381-JWL-GLR, 2011 WL 381611, at *4 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 2011). However, “admissions should not be of such great number and broad scope as to cover all the issues [even] of a complex case, and [o]bviously ... should not be sought in an attempt to harass an opposing party.” Wigler v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 108 F.R.D. 204, 206–07 (D. Md. 1985) (citations and quotations omitted). A protective order is appropriate where the requests for admission are “more than an attempt to nail down the disputed core facts of the case,” but rather are “an attempt to pick every nit that a squad of lawyers could possibly see in it.” U.S. v. Medtronic, Inc., Case Nos. 95-1236-MLB, 96-1309-MLB, 2000 WL 1478476, at *4–5 (D. Kan. July 13, 2000) (granting motion for protective order and finding that 506 requests for admission were “most assuredly excessive”) (quotations omitted).

*2 The Court finds that further review of over 5,000 pages of attachments to the subject RFAs, and serving amended responses to all 527 RFAs, would be unduly burdensome in light of the circumstances. For example, in opposing Plaintiff's prior motion to extend discovery, Defendant itself characterized this as a “simple ‘breach of contract’ action” between only two parties wherein the central issue is whether Plaintiff has provided “due proof of death of the insured to the Defendant.” (Doc. 26 at 2, 12 n.9.) Moreover, approximately three weeks prior to serving its Sixth Request for Admissions and Eighth Request for Production, Defendant stated that “[b]oth parties have had a full and ample opportunity, indeed, a once-extended and exhaustive opportunity, to have conducted all necessary discovery.” (Id. at 4.) Defendant fails to sufficiently explain why 527 additional RFAs are now necessary. Thus, the Motion for Protective Order will be granted as to Defendant's Sixth Request for Admissions. See, e.g., Joseph L. v. Conn. Dept. of Children and Families, 225 F.R.D. 400, 403 (D. Conn. 2005) (granting motion for protective order and finding that 163 requests for admission were “excessive to the point of being abusive”); Medtronic, Inc., 2000 WL 1478476, at *4–5.[3]

Plaintiff has also shown good cause for a protective order regarding the two requests for production in dispute, which seek, among other things, emails between Plaintiff or his counsel and certain non-parties. (Doc. 30 at 23–24; Doc. 30-3 at 4–5.) In light of the lengthy, compound, and confusing nature of the requests, Plaintiff argues that it would be unduly burdensome and expensive to produce the requested documents. (Doc. 46 at 18–19.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(B) states in relevant part:

Plaintiff states that he sends and receives hundreds of emails each day, that he has two email accounts and does not keep his emails in designated folders, that he would have to review emails on an individual basis to determine whether each email was responsive, and that it would cost thousands of dollars and would take at least five full business days to review all of his emails since October 5, 2014, a period of over 845 days.[4] (Id.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently shown “that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B); Ekokotu v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 408 F. App'x 331, 336 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The burden is on the movant to show the necessity of the protective order, and the movant must meet this burden with a ‘particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978) ).[5] Additionally, the Court finds that Defendant has not shown “good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C),” as required to overcome Plaintiff's showing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B). Rule 26(b)(2)(C) states in part that “the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery ... if it determines that: ... the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(ii). As noted above, prior to serving the subject requests, Defendant stated that the parties had already had ample opportunity to conduct all necessary discovery. (See Doc. 26 at 4.) Therefore, a protective order is appropriate for these requests as well.

*3 Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. The Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 46) is GRANTED.

2. The Motion to Seal (Doc. 31) is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, on February 13, 2017.