I. Background.

Plaintiff Stephanie Shannon filed this action on April 26, 2005, alleging that her former employer, ADS Alliance Data Systems, discriminated and retaliated against her because she had taken leave from work under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FLMA”). Shannon twice took leave under the Act: once from October 18, 2004 to November 14, 2004; and again, from November 17, 2004 to November 30, 2004.

Shannon alleges that after returning to work, her supervisors treated her differently and in a less respectful manner–including reducing her hours, delaying performance reviews, and then ultimately replacing her in retaliation for her taking FMLA leave. Defendant claims that no actions were taken in retaliation for using the FMLA leave. Rather, it maintains that the reduction in hours was due to a restructuring of the Human Resources Department and that plaintiff voluntarily resigned in May 2005.

During the course of the litigation, Shannon has made various discovery request on defendant. On August 19, 2005, Shannon served ADS with her first set of interrogatories and request for production of documents. ADS objected to Document Requests No. 12 and 14. Request Number 12 seeks any complaints or charges filed by any of ADS’s employees from Shannon’s former office alleging FMLA violations over the past 5 years. Request Number 14 seeks “any and all documents, constituting, showing, explaining, or otherwise referring to electronic communications between Plaintiff and her immediate supervisor and/or the supervisor to her immediate supervisor.” Pl.'s Mot. to Compel, p. 3.

On December 12, 2005, plaintiff served on ADS a second set of interrogatories and request for production of documents. ADS objected to Interrogatory No. 11, which asks for the most recent contact information for former employee Rick Propp. ADS also objected to Document Requests Nos. 23 through 26, which requested the personnel files of Mr. Propp, Shelly Marks, Nancy Tallman, and Marlo Rubenstein. Because the parties were unable to resolve these discovery disputes, Shannon filed this Motion to Compel Discovery on February 8, 2006.

II. Discussion.

Rule 26(b)(1) provides that a party:

*2 Although courts held that the pre-December 1, 2000 version of Rule 26(b)(1) was to be liberally construed, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989), the recent revisions communicate the message that discovery is not unlimited. To obtain discovery without court approval, the information sought must meet the requirement of Rule 26(b)(1) that it either be “relevant to the claim or defense of any party” or that it be “relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). For information that is merely relevant to the subject matter to be discoverable, however, the party seeking discovery must show good cause for that information to be discovered. Id. Second, the court always has a duty to limit discovery under Rule 26(b)(2)(i)-(iii).

Under Rule 26(b)(2)(i) the court may limit discovery that is unreasonably cumulative, duplicative, or “obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive....” The court may also consider whether the “burden or expense of the proposed discovery, outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, a party’s resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.” Rule 26(b)(2)(iii), Fed. R. Civ. P. Moreover, the court has the power to issue a protective order to prevent a party or third party to the litigation from experiencing “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” of discovery. The court may also protect privacy interests, confidential trade secrets, confidential business information, and the like. Rule 26(c), Fed. R. Civ. P

In Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657, the Supreme Court held that the discovery provisions of the pre-December 1, 2000 version of Rule 26(b)(1) gave “plaintiffs broad access to employers' records in an effort to document their claims.” Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989).

In the employment area, a plaintiff’s discovery is normally limited to the employer’s conduct toward similarly situated employees who were supervised by the same supervisors alleged to have engaged in the unlawful discriminatory conduct. See, Scales v. J. C. Bradford & Co., 925 F.2d 901, 906-07 (6th Cir. 1991); Hill v. Motel 6, 25 F.R.D. 490, 495 (S.D. Ohio 2001); Early v. Champion International Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1084 (11th Cir. 1990); Franklin v. Living Centers-East, Inc., 1999 WL 615171 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 1999); Obijulu v. City of Rochester, 166 F.R.D. 293, 296 (W.D. My. 1996); Hasselhorst v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 10, 11 (D. Kan. 1995). See also, Williams v. Nashville Network, 132 F.3d 1123, 1130 (6th Cir. 1997) (trial court properly excluded testimony of two non-party former employees who testified they were also discriminated against because of their age, because their situations were dissimilar and the same supervisors who allegedly discriminated against the plaintiff were not involved).

In this case, Shannon’s discovery requests can be broken down into four areas: (1) the electronic communications between herself and her immediate supervisor and/or between that supervisor and her immediate supervisor for the past five years, (2) the most recent contact information for Rick Propp, (3) the personnel file for Rick Propp, and (4) the personnel files for Shelly Marks, Nancy Tallman, and Marlo Rubenstein. Each of these requests will be discussed below.

III. Analysis.

A. The Electronic Communications.

Shannon argues that the electronic communications are necessary to support her claims of “animus, retaliatory motive, or lack of good faith belief that the Defendant’s actions were not in violation of [sic] the FMLA.” (Doc. 16). She claims that such communications made after she returned from her FMLA leave show that her supervisors were rude and condescending to her. However, she argues that she needs additional electronic communications from a time period before her FMLA leave to compare to the later communications to determine if her supervisors had changed their tone and attitude toward her once she returned from her leave. Plaintiff offers no affidavit or other evidence supporting her assertion that the tone of the pre-October 2004 emails were more business-like.

*3 ADS objected to the request on the grounds that it lacks relevance, is overbroad, and would be burdensome. It argues that it has already provided Shannon with all the relevant documents responsive to her requests that were in its possession. Additionally, ADS argues that it would be “logistically impossible” to retrieve all electronic communications between Shannon and her supervisors over her entire employment tenure. Shannon acknowledges that she has received electronic communications that were responsive to her request, but these communications are all from the period of time after she returned from her FMLA leave. Shannon has agreed to limit her request to communications for the last five years. ADS argues that limiting the request to five years “does nothing to make the retrieval of the requested electronic communications less burdensome or more accessible.” ADS offered no factual information to support its claim of burdensomeness.

Given the absence of any facts supporting either side’s position, I am forced to resolve this dispute based on the uncorroborated assertions of the parties. I cannot say that a comparison of the electronic communications that preceded Shannon’s leave with those that followed her leave may not show a change in attitude Shannon’s supervisors toward her once she returned. However, plaintiff fails to explain why she needs five-years of emails to make that comparison: electronic communications between September 2003 and plaintiff’s discharge should be sufficient. Defendant’s over-breath argument is dissipated by Shannon’s willingness to limit her request to those communications made between herself and her immediate supervisor and her immediate supervisor’s supervisor. Defendant’s relevance argument fails to address plaintiff’s allegations that ADS reduced her hours and terminated her employment because she had taken FMLA leave. Her supervisors had no control over whether Shannon got FMLA leave, but they did make the decisions about which employees' hours would be reduced. If plaintiff can prove they reduced her hours because she took FMLA leave, ADS violated the FMLA. Therefore, Shannon’s request for the electronic communications is GRANTED, subject to the limitations set out above.

B. The Contact Information for Rick Propp.

Shannon seeks Mr. Propp’s contact information to determine whether he could be a possible witness in this case as well as whether he is “similarly situated” to Shannon. Propp was also terminated by ADS soon after he returned from FMLA leave. ADS argues that Shannon may only contact Propp through defense counsel because of a confidentiality agreement between ADS and Propp regarding his severance of employment. In addition, ADS argues that Shannon can contact Propp on her own by seeking his contact information via public records or the Internet.

In this situation, the information that Shannon seeks appears to be readily available by other means, such as any public records. While ADS’s contention that Shannon should go through defense counsel to contact Propp is without merit, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that information is not readily accessible through other sources. Therefore, based on the court’s ability to limit discovery under Rule 26(b)(2)(i), Shannon’s request for Propp’s contact information should be DENIED.

C. Mr. Propp’s Personnel File.

Shannon seeks Propp’s personnel file for the same reasons that she is seeking his contact information. She asserts that the personnel file is relevant to show a lack of good faith ADS’s part in dealing with both Propp and herself after they took their FMLA leaves. She claims that she and Propp are “similarly situated” in that they both took FMLA leave, they both were treated poorly upon their return to work, they were both subject to the same supervisors and worked in the same department, and they were both separated from employment shortly after their return to work.

ADS argues that Mr. Propp is not similarly situated for purposes of Shannon obtaining access to his personnel file because Propp left his employment under different circumstances than Shannon. In addition, ADS argues that Shannon’s request is a fishing expedition. ADS further argues that the confidentiality agreement between it and Propp exempts his personnel file from discovery.

*4 Shannon has shown good cause for this request to be granted, in part. Both parties rely on Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992) for the standard of determining whether employees are “similarly situated.” Mitchell states that similarly-situated employees must have dealt with the same supervisors, have been subjected to the same standards, and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that they could distinguish themselves from one another or distinguish the employer’s treatment of one another. Id. Here, Shannon has met this standard. They worked in the same department, shared the same supervisors, took FMLA leave, and ended their employment shortly after their respective returns from leave.

However, Shannon does not have free rein to access the entire personnel file of Propp in this case. First, Shannon will be subject to the Confidentiality Order filed with this Court regarding the contents of Propp’s file. Second, Shannon does not have an absolute right to all of the contents of Propp’s file. Propp does have some privacy interests that limit Shannon’s access to his file.

In Hill v. Motel 6, the court, in granting part of a discovery request by the plaintiff, restricted the plaintiff’s access to personnel files by excluding private information such as “unlisted addresses and phone numbers, marital status, wage information, medical information, and credit history.” Hill v. Motel 6, 205 F.R.D. 490, 495 (S.D. Ohio 2001). Here, Shannon will be subject to the same restrictions to protect Propp’s privacy interests. Thus, Shannon’s request for discovery of Propp’s personnel file is GRANTED, subject to the Confidentiality Order on file with this Court; however, Propp’s marital status, wage information, medical information, credit history, and any unlisted contact information will be excluded from this discovery. Further, the initial production is for attorney’s-eyes-only. It is possible that there will be information in the personnel file tending to prove or disprove plaintiff’s claims. In that event, Propp is entitled to the maximum protection of his privacy. Before turning over the material, ADS should redact those protected portions of Propp’s personnel file.

D. The Personnel Files of Ms. Marks, Ms. Tallman, and Ms. Rubenstein.

Shannon seeks the personnel files of Ms. Marks, Ms. Tallman, and Ms. Rubenstein arguing that this materials is discoverable because they were Shannon’s supervisors during the relevant time-frame. Specifically, Shannon maintains that the three women were involved in ADS’s retaliatory conduct and that their personnel files are reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence. ADS argues that the request is overly broad and unduly burdensome. Additionally, ADS argues that the conduct of Marks, Tallman, and Rubenstein is not connected to Shannon’s FMLA leave. Finally, ADS argues that it has already provided Shannon with the information she seeks.

ADS’s argument is misplaced. Its argument focuses on the granting of the FMLA leave and not the purported retaliatory conduct following Shannon’s return from leave. Additionally, Shannon has shown good cause, including her demotion to a part-time position, reduction in pay, diminished duties, and alleged ridicule and harassment, that the discovery request is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The managers in question had supervisory authority over Shannon both before and after her leave, with the exception of Ms. Tallman, who only supervised Shannon, after her return from leave. However, Tallman’s supervision took place during the alleged retaliatory conduct.

These managers are alleged to have engaged in retaliatory conduct against Shannon. Again, under Hill, the personnel files of such supervisory personnel are discoverable upon a showing of good cause. Id. at 495-96. These personnel files are discoverable subject to the same restrictions as those imposed on the discovery of Propp’s personnel file, which are designed to protect the privacy interests of these supervisors. Shannon’s discovery request for the personnel files of Marks, Tallman, and Rubenstein is GRANTED, subject to the Confidentiality Order on file with this Court. This initial production shall be fore attorney’s-eyes-only. Prior to turning over the requested material, ADS shall redact any protected information from the personnel files including redacting material stating the marital status, wage information, medical information, credit history, and any unlisted contact information for all three supervisors.

IV. Conclusion.

*5 Accordingly, plaintiff’s February 8, 2006 motion to compel discovery (doc. 16) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Shannon’s motion to compel is GRANTED IN PART as follows: (1) in accordance with the limitations set out above, ADS will produce the electronic communications between Shannon and her immediate supervisor and that supervisor and her immediate supervisor, for dates beginning on September 2003 and through Shannon’s termination date; and (2) ADS will produce the personnel files of Rick Propp, Shelly Marks, Nancy Tallman, and Marlo Rubenstein, subject to the Confidentiality Order filed with this Court and excluding marital status, wage information, medical information, credit history, and unlisted contact information. Shannon’s motion to compel Propp’s contact information is DENIED. Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs is DENIED.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Rule 72(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., and Eastern Division Order No. 91-3, pt. F, 5, either party may, within ten (10) days after this Order is filed, file and serve on the opposing party a motion for reconsideration by the District Judge. The motion must specifically designate the Order, or part thereof, in question and the basis for any objection thereto. The District Judge, upon consideration of the motion, shall set aside any part of this Order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.