I. BACKGROUND.

On August 28, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants for negligent selection or retention of an independent contractor, Gerald Reimer (“Reimer). Doc. No. 2. Plaintiffs allege that Reimer was a driver for Uber, and on his way to begin driving for Uber at a local Starbucks “hot spot,” when he struck Plaintiff Gayna Hansen from the rear while she was riding her bicycle. Doc. No. 2 at 3. Plaintiffs allege that Reimer, who is in his eighties, had two traffic citations after being accepted as an Uber driver. Doc. No. 2 at 3. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants knew or should have known Reimer was unfit to drive but failed to deactivate him as a driver. Doc. No. 2 at 4. An Amended Complaint was filed on June 18, 2018. Doc. No. 27. On June 25, 2018, Defendants filed their Answer and Affirmative Defenses. Doc. Nos. 29 and 31.

On October 25, 2018, Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc. and Raiser (FL) LLC, filed a Motion for Entry of Protective Order as to Plaintiffs’ Rule 30(b)(6) Notice or in the Alternative Motion to Quash Certain Areas of Inquiry and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (the “Motion”) related to Plaintiffs’ notice of taking the deposition of Defendants’ corporate representatives on October 30, 2018. Doc. No. 50. This Court issued an Order on October 26, 2018, directing Plaintiffs to file a response to the Motion on or before November 2, 2018. Doc. No. 52. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Response to Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order, or in the Alternative, Motion to Quash Areas of Inquiry, on November 2, 2018. Doc. No. 54.

In the Motion, Defendants argue that the scope of the depositions of their corporate representatives should be limited and certain areas of inquiry quashed. Doc. No. 50. Specifically, Defendants seek to preclude Plaintiffs from inquiring about the following matters: 1) Area of Inquiry (“AOI”) No. 2: a copy of Defendant Uber’s entire personnel or other similar driver-partner file for Gerald Burnell Reimer (“Reimer”); 2) AOI No. 3: Reimer’s driver-partner application, “driver screening,” selection, or acceptance as an Uber driver; 3) AOI No. 4: any and all background checks and investigations done for Reimer at the request of Uber, results thereof, and actions taken in response; 4) AOI No. 5: contents of any and all documents in Uber’s possession or control relating to any traffic citations, criminal record, civil record, medical record, driving record, or accidents relating to or involving Reimer and actions taken in response; 5) AOI No. 6: any and all ratings, rider reviews and complaints relating to Reimer; 6) AOI No. 7: any and all communications between Uber and Reimer, including but not limited to telephone conversations, emails, and messages sent or received through any Uber application; 7) AOI No. 8: any and all communications between Uber riders and Reimer, including but not limited to telephone conversations, text messages, and messaging through any Uber application; 8) AOI No. 9: any and all internal records, notations, and correspondence, whether in paper or electronic form, concerning Reimer; 9) AOI No. 10: any and all training materials, guidelines, and policies provided to new driver-partners; 10) AOI No. 12: any and all policies or procedures of Uber relating to the investigation of prospective driver-partners’ driving records or criminal histories as part of the initial “driver screening” process; 11) AOI No.13: any and all policies or procedures of Uber relating to the ongoing monitoring or screening of its driver-partners’ driving record or criminal history subsequent to the initial “driver screening” process; 12) AOI No.14: any and all actions taken by Uber to investigate, screen, monitor, discipline, restrict, reassign, suspend, deactivate or discharge Reimer; 13) AOI No. 16: Uber’s knowledge of and basis for its position relating to the incident on March 15, 2016 described in Plaintiffs’ Complaint involving Plaintiff Gayna Hansen and Reimer; 14) AOI No. 18: Uber’s compensation structure for Reimer including all compensation, commissions, bonuses, expense reimbursements and any other monies paid to Reimer; 15) AOI No. 19: Uber’s policies with respect to all bases for suspension, termination, or deactivation of Uber drivers; 16) AOI No. 21: Uber guidelines, requirements or restrictions on the number of hours that its driver-partners, including but not limited to Reimer, should or may be engaged in driving for Uber; 17) AOI No. 23: all hours and times Reimer was logged onto the Uber app, tripping or on a trip, ride available, online ready, and offline; 18) AOI No. 24: all location, time, speed, and trip history data related to Reimer; 19) AOI No. 27: any and all guidance given to driver-partners, including Reimer, concerning protocol in the event that an accident occurs; 20) AOI No. 30: terms “logged on,” “tripping” or “on a trip,” ride “available,” “online ready,” and “offline,” and similar terminology employed by Uber apps, materials, employees, and users; 21) AOI No. 32: Uber rider app features, including but not limited to, how each feature may be used, and usage of said features by any riders or prospective riders who sought a ride in the area for the date of the collision at issue in this litigation; 22) AOI No. 33: Uber’s ability to track and monitor app usage; 23) AOI No. 34: Uber’s storage and management of app data; 24) AOI No. 35: articulation, description, and explanation of all app data relative to Reimer’s time as a driver-partner for Uber; 25) AOI No. 37: information regarding company size, including but not limited to, number of Uber employees; 26) AOI No. 38: information regarding Uber’s financial value; 27) AOI No. 39: all persons with knowledge of the above matters. Doc. No. 50 at 9-16.

*2 With respect to the duces tecum request that accompanies the notices of the corporate representatives’ depositions, Defendants object to the following requests: 1) Duces Tecum Request (“DTR”) No. 1: copies of any and all contracts or agreements entered into between Defendant Uber and Reimer; 2) DTR No. 2: a copy of Uber’s entire personnel or other similar driver-partner file for Reimer; 3) DTR No. 3: a copy of any and all documents in relation to Reimer’s driver-partner application, “driver screening,” selection, or acceptance as an Uber driver; 4) DTR No. 6: copies of any and all ratings, rider reviews and complaints relating to Reimer; 5) DTR No. 7: copies of any and all records, reflecting any and all communications between Uber and Reimer, including but not limited to telephone conversations, emails, and messages sent or received through any Uber application; 6) DTR No. 8: copies of any and all records reflecting any and all communications between Uber riders and Reimer, including but not limited to telephone conversations, text messages, and messaging through any Uber applications; 7) DTR No. 9: copies of any and all internal records, notations, and correspondence, whether in paper or electronic form, concerning Reimer; 8) DTR No. 10: copies of any and all training materials, guidelines, and policies provided to new driver-partners; 9) DTR No. 12: copies of any and all policies or procedures of Uber relating to the investigation of prospective driver-partners’ driving records or criminal histories as part of the initial “driving screening” process; 10) DTR No. 13: copies of any and all policies or procedures of Uber relating to the ongoing monitoring or screening of its driver-partners’ driving record or criminal history subsequent to the initial “driver screening” process; 11) DTR No. 16: copies of any and all documents in Uber’s possession and control reflecting Uber’s knowledge of and basis for its position relating to the incident on March 15, 2016, described in Plaintiffs’ Complaint involving Plaintiff Gayna Hansen and Reimer; 12) DTR No. 18: copies of any and all documents reflecting Uber’s compensation structure for Reimer, including all compensation, commissions, bonuses, expense reimbursements and any other monies paid to Reimer; 13) DTR No. 19: copies of any and all documents reflecting Uber’s policy with respect to any and all bases for suspension, termination, or deactivation of Uber drivers; 14) DTR No. 21: copies of any and all documents reflecting whether Uber prescribed or restricted the number of hours that its driver-partners, including Reimer, should or may be engaged in driving for Uber; 15) DTR No. 23: documentation of all hours and times Reimer was logged onto the Uber app, “tripping,” “on a trip,” ride available, online ready, and offline; 16) DTR No. 24: any and all detailed records or app data related to the locations, time, speed, or trip history of Reimer; 17) DTR No. 27: any and all guidance given to driver-partners, including Reimer, concerning protocol in the event that an accident occurs; 18) DTR No. 30: any and all materials explaining or illustrating the Uber driver app features; 19) DTR No. 31: any and all materials explaining or illustrating the Uber rider app features; 20) DTR No. 32: any and all materials describing Uber’s ability to track and monitor app usage; and 21) DTR No. 33: any and all materials describing Uber’s storage and management of app data. Doc No. 50 at 17-24.

Defendants also request a protective order for the documents to be produced as some of the materials are proprietary, confidential, and trade secret. Doc. No. 50 at 2. Plaintiffs state that they are not opposed to a confidentiality agreement related to confidential, trade secret, and proprietary information, only that they object to the scope of the agreement as proposed by Defendants. Doc. No. 54 at 2. Plaintiffs represent the parties have been unable to agree on language because of disagreements related to scope. Doc. No. 54 at 2.

II. APPLICABLE LAW.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “strongly favor full discovery whenever possible.” Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985). “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

A party is entitled to the facts relevant to the litigation. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc. v. Mary’s Donuts, Inc., 206 F.R.D. 518, 520 (S.D. Fla. 2002). The party seeking discovery has the threshold burden of demonstrating that the discovery requested is relevant. Zorn v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84721, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2010) (citing Canada v. Hotel Development-Texas, Ltd., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58110, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 30, 2008) ).[1] Relevant information need not be admissible at trial, but rather discovery must be “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Zorn, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84721, at *4.[2]

“The discovery process is designed to fully inform the parties of the relevant facts involved in their case.” U.S. v. Pepper’s Steel & Alloys, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 695, 698 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) ). The Court has the discretion, however, to limit discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides that upon motion by a party, accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action, and for good cause shown, the court may make any order which justice requires to protect the party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. When discovery sought appears otherwise relevant, the party resisting discovery has the burden to establish the request is improper or creates an undue burden. O’Connor v. GEICO Indem. Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46285, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2018); Gober v. City of Leesburg, 197 F.R.D. 519, 521 (M.D. Fla. 2000).

*3 A party moving for a protective order must demonstrate “good cause” for such relief. In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litigation, 820 F.2d 352, 356 (11th Cir. 1987). In Dovin v. Nair and Co., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135743, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jun. 30, 2009), the Court provided further guidance regarding the good cause standard:

Dovin, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135743, at *2 (citations omitted). Thus, the Court should only issue a protective order when the movant demonstrates, through affidavit or testimony, the specific harm that would result from disclosure or loss of confidentiality. Id. Furthermore, generalized concerns, conclusory statements, or unsupported contentions are not sufficient reasons for entry of a protective order. Id.; see also United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that a showing of good cause “contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements”).[3]

III. ANALYSIS.

Defendants essentially argue that much of Plaintiffs’ proposed areas of inquiry and requests for production of related documents are either irrelevant, overly broad, or vague. Having reviewed the areas of inquiry and the materials requested in the duces tecum notice, the Court finds that Defendants’ objections to certain AOI’s are well-taken, including: AOI Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 19, 23, 24, 27, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38 and 39. The Court also finds that Defendants’ objections to DTR Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 19, 21, 23, 24, 27, 30, 31, 32, and 33 are well-taken and the Court will limit the corporate representatives’ depositions and related document production to those AOIs and DTRs that are not identified herein.

With respect to Defendants’ request for a protective order for confidential, proprietary, or trade secret information, such request is premature in that Defendants have failed to comply with this Court’s standing order on confidential information. See Standing Order re Confidential Information, 6:18-mc-21-Orl-GJK, (available at www.flmd.uscourts.gov/judges/gregory-kelly). First, the parties must confer pursuant to the terms of the Standing Order then, if that is unsuccessful, Defendants must seek a protective order and provide the required information to the Court to both support their request and demonstrate “good cause.” See Dovin, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135743, at *2.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on November 6, 2018.

In this circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2.

Demonstrating relevance progresses in layers. “When the discovery sought appears relevant on its face, the party resisting it must show the lack of relevance by demonstrating that it: (1) does not come within the broad scope of relevance as defined under discovery rule; or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm the discovery may cause would outweigh the presumption in favor of broad disclosure. When relevancy of a discovery request is not apparent on the face of the request, then the party seeking discovery has the burden to show its relevancy.” Zorn, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84721 at *4 n. 3 (citing Transcor, Inc. v. Furney Charters, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 588, 591 (D. Kan. 2003) ).

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.