I. Background and Procedural History

This case concerns Grumpy Cat, a viral Internet meme that transformed a house cat named Tardar Sauce into one of the most famous cats in the world. Complaint (Dkt. 1) ¶ 13. Plaintiff owns intellectual property rights associated with Grumpy Cat, including a registered trademark and four registered copyrights. See id. ¶¶ 14, 15, 16. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Grenade Beverage LLC (“Grenade”) and its members, Defendants Nick and Paul Sandford—in creating and selling a ground coffee product—used the Grumpy Cat name and image beyond what was authorized in a licensing agreement (which Plaintiff alleged only authorized iced coffee products). Id.¶ 2; see generally MSJ Order (Dkt. 92). Grenade defaulted, and Grumpy Beverage LLC (“Grumpy Beverage”) intervened and joined with the Sandfords (collectively, “Defendants”) in filing a counterclaim. Counterclaim (Dkt. 39).

A jury trial in this matter was held on January 16–19 and 22, 2018. SeeMinutes (Dkts. 121, 122, 124–26). On January 22, 2018, a jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff Grumpy Cat Limited (“Plaintiff”), finding as follows:

Redacted Jury Verdict Form (Dkt. 131) at 1–7. On May 31, 2018, the Court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Dkt. 148), holding that Plaintiff is not entitled to prevail on its cybersquatting claim and Defendants Grumpy Beverage, LLC (“Grumpy Beverage”) and Paul Sandford (collectively, “Defendants”), are not entitled to declaratory relief of copyright and trademark non-infringement. On June 8, 2018, the Court entered Judgment (Dkt. 153).

On June 22, 2018, Plaintiff filed a initial Motion for Attorney Fees (Dkt. 156) and Motion for Costs (Dkt. 157). At a July 23, 2018 hearing, the Court directed Plaintiff to refile the motions. On July 23, 2018, Plaintiff filed another Motion for Attorney’s fees and Cost (Dkt. 165). On August 21, 2018, the Court denied in part Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Requested Supplemental Briefing on the Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs. See Prior Fees Order (Dkt. 176). In that order, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to the extent that Plaintiff sought attorney fees pursuant to its trademark and copyright claims, or attorney fees against Paul Sandford pursuant to breach of contract claims or counterclaims. See id. The Court held that Plaintiff is a prevailing party for the purposes of its request for attorney fees as to Grumpy Beverage pursuant to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim and Grumpy Beverage’s breach of contract counterclaim. Id.The Court ordered supplemental briefing from Plaintiff: (1) requesting reasonable hours pursuant to work that is related to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim and Grumpy Beverage’s breach of contract counterclaim (to the extent that work is related to these claims along with other claims under which Plaintiff is not entitled attorney fees, Plaintiff shall estimate the amount of time spent solely on the contract claims); (2) clearly explaining the reasonableness of the hourly rate requested for each attorney for which Plaintiff seeks fees; and (3) providing a request for costs associated with the actual preparation of the trial graphics. Id.

*2 Plaintiff filed the instant Motion on August 28, 2018. Defendants opposed (“Opp’n”) (Dkt. 183) on September 4, 2018. Plaintiff replied (“Reply”) (Dkt. 184) on September 11, 2018.

II. Legal Standard

Once the Court has determined that attorney’s fees are warranted in a given case, the Court must then assess whether the amount of fees requested is reasonable. “In setting a reasonable attorney’s fee, the district court should make specific findings as to the rate and hours it has determined to be reasonable.” Gracie v. Gracie, 217 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1557 (9th Cir. 1989) ).

The first step the district court must take is to “determine the presumptive lodestar figure by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by the reasonable hourly rate.” Gracie, 217 F.3d at 1070(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To determine reasonable hourly rates, the Court must look to the prevailing rate in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2008). Counsel bears the burden of establishing that the number of hours expended is reasonable by submitting detailed time records justifying the hours claimed to have been expended. Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986), amended on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987). The party requesting fees first must prove the hourly rate and number of hours that go into the lodestar calculation are reasonable themselves. Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1993). The amount may be reduced if the hours are duplicative, excessive, or otherwise unnecessary. Id.; Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). After calculating the lodestar, the Court “may adjust the ‘presumptively reasonable’ lodestar figure based upon the factors listed in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69–70 (9th Cir. 1975), that have not been subsumed in the lodestar calculation.” Intel, 6 F.3d at 622(internal citation omitted).[1]

III. Discussion

*3 Plaintiff requests an award of $95,072.50 for attorneys’ fees expended on its breach of contract claim and Grumpy Beverage’s breach of contract counterclaim. Mot. at 1. Plaintiff also requests an award of $9,450 for the costs associated with the preparation of trial graphics. Id. The Court will address in turn hourly rates, expended hours, the lodestar, and costs.

A. Hourly Rates

The Court must determine whether Plaintiff has met its burden of producing evidence showing that the hourly rates are in line with “those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)

Plaintiff seeks an hourly rate for David Jonelis of $425, arguing that his average hourly rate over the course of this action (discounted from his normal rate), was that amount. Mot. at 2. Plaintiff seeks an hourly rate for Jake Camara of $175, arguing that his average hourly rate over the course of this action (discounted from his normal rate), was that amount. Mot. at 2. Jonelis states that he is a 2009 cum laude graduate of Loyola Law School Los Angeles with more than eight years of experience in general commercial and entertainment litigation, including working on multiple trials and arbitrations, and has been selected as a Southern California Super Lawyers “Rising Star” each year from 2014 to the present. Declaration of David B. Jonelis (“Jonelis Decl.”) (Dkt. 180) ¶ 5. Jonelis states that Camara is a 2010 cum laude graduate of the University of Southern California and a 2015 graduate of Loyola Law School Los Angeles, where he was a recipient of the Loyola Merit Scholarship, and that Camara has more than two years of general litigation experience. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff assert that these rates are reasonable and lower than the prevailing market rates for similarly qualified attorneys in the Southern California region. Id.; see also Jonelis Decl. ¶ 7 (“As an attorney working in Southern California for over eight years, I am generally familiar with the billing rates of attorneys of comparable seniority and experience at comparable firms during the pendency of this litigation. Based on that familiarity, I am informed and believe my rate and Mr. Camara’s rate are not only reasonable but are lower than prevailing market rates for attorneys of comparable seniority and experience at comparable firms during the pendency of this litigation.”).

Based on the Court’s knowledge of prevailing rates in the community, the Court finds the requested rates reasonable. Cf. Baez v. Pension Consulting All., Inc., No. 217CV01938RGKAGRX, 2018 WL 2572643, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2018)

B. Expended Hours

Next, the Court had asked Plaintiff to “request[ ] reasonable hours pursuant to work that is related to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim and Grumpy Beverage’s breach of contract counterclaim (to the extent that work is related to these claims along with other claims under which Plaintiff is not entitled attorney fees, Plaintiff shall estimate the amount of time spent solely on the contract claims).” See Prior Fee Order. Plaintiff requests fees for one third of the total hours that Jonelis and Camara spent on the case (Joneles spent 543 total hours and Camara spent 311.1 total hours), which results in 181 hours for Jonelis and 103.7 hours for Camara . Mot. at 2. Plaintiff contends: “[b]ecause the contract and infringement claims at issue in this case were inextricably intertwined with one another, it is impossible to provide a precise apportionment of the time spent in connection with the contract claims .... Nevertheless, based on a review of the invoices from Plaintiff’s counsel, Plaintiff reasonably estimates that no less than one third of Mr. Jonelis and Mr. Camara’s time was spent solely on the contract claims.” Id. (citing Jonelis Decl. ¶ 4). In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s billing statements are heavily redacted, and despite this redaction, Defendants have reviewed the billing items and are able to identify 99.7 hours (88.9 for Jonelis and 10.8 for Camara) with descriptions that specifically denote work being done on non-recoverable claims for work: (1) on Plaintiff’s cybersquatting claim; (2) against parties against whom Plaintiff did not obtain judgment; (3) necessitated by Plaintiff’s acts; and (4) on matters unrelated to this litigation. Opp’n at 3–5. In its reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendants overlook the fact that the only redacted entries were those disclosing privileged communications with Plaintiff’s representatives. Reply at 1.

*4 Based on the billing records, and having presided over this case, the Court is satisfied that at least one third of Jonelis and Camara’s total hours reasonably concerned the contract claims, and should be awarded.

C. Lodestar and Adjustments

Next, multiplying the attorney billing time by the hourly rate ( (Jonelis: 181 hours x $425 rate) + (Camara: 103.7 hours x $175 rate) ), the presumptive loadstar calculation is $95,072.50. After calculating the lodestar, the Court may adjust the presumptively reasonable lodestar based on the Kerrfactors, or impose up to a 10 percent “haircut” based on an exercise of discretion. See Intel, 6 F.3d at 622; Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court declines to adjust the lodestar, resulting in a total attorneys’ fee award of $95,072.50.

D. Costs

Plaintiff also requests $9,450 in costs under Local Rule 54-3.12 for Dave Botwin’s 63 hours, at an hourly rate of $150, preparing trial graphics. Mot. at 2–3 (citing Declaration of Dave Botwin (“Botwin Decl.”) (Dkt. 180) ¶ 2–4. Local Rule 54-3.12 provides: “Upon order of the Court, the following items may be taxed as costs: (a) Summaries, computations, polls, surveys, statistical comparisons, maps, charts, diagrams, and other visual aids reasonably necessary to assist the jury or the Court in understanding the issues at the trial ....” L.R. 54-3.12.

Botwin describes his work as follows:

Id. Defendants argue that these costs should not be allowed because discovery in this case was pursuant to a stipulation whereby counsel agreed to produce all documents in pdf format (with the option of producing/requesting native files where appropriate). Opp’n at 9. As a result, Defendants argue, all of the documents that Mr. Botwin “prepared” were already digitized in the form of pdf files and Plaintiff is not seeking costs to prepare trial graphics; instead, Plaintiff is seeking costs associated with the “method of exemplification,” which are not allowable. Id. (citing, e.g. Gunchick v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. CV141162RSWLPJWX, 2015 WL 4451041, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015) (rejecting request $21,031.25 for graphical presentations used at trial–namely, slides prepared for closing argument as forty-eight of the fifty slides were merely enlarged copies of exhibits already entered into evidence, and the other two were simple slides that do not seem to justify their high price tag: “These slides did not contain complicated or technical information, diagrams, or blueprints for the jury’s understanding. Accordingly, the Court opts not to award costs for these demonstratives.”) ) In its Reply, Plaintiff asserts:

Reply at 2.

Having presided over the trial, and having considered Botwin’s declaration and the parties’ arguments, the Court finds that the requested expenses for preparing trial graphics were “reasonably necessary to assist the jury or the Court in understanding the issues at the trial ....” See L.R. 54-3.12. Accordingly, the Court AWARDS Plaintiff $9,450 in costs.

IV. Disposition

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees.

The Court AWARDS Plaintiff $95,072.50 in attorneys’ fees against Defendant Grumpy Beverage LLC.

The Court AWARDS Plaintiff $9,450 in costs against Defendants Paul Sandford and Grumpy Beverage, LLC, jointly and severally.

The Clerk shall serve this minute order on the parties.

The Kerr factors are: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70. Courts have determined that at least five of the Kerr factors have been deemed “subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363–64 (9th Cir. 1996). These factors include “(1) the novelty and complexity of the issues, (2) the special skill and experience of counsel, (3) the quality of representation ... (4) the results obtained, and (5) the contingent nature of the fee agreement.” Id. at 364 n.9 (citations omitted). At least one of the “subsumed” Kerr factors, “the contingent nature of the fee agreement,” has been rejected by the Supreme Court as a basis to adjust the lodestar after it has been calculated. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1992).