EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. GOLD, INC. D/B/A SAMMY'S GENTLEMEN'S CLUB, Defendant Case No. 3:17cv439-RV-CJK United States District Court, N.D. Florida Signed June 25, 2018 Counsel Gerald Lee Miller, Harriett F. Oppenheim, Kurt S. Fischer, Marsha Rucker, Russell Paul Parker, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm - Birmingham AL, Birmingham, AL, Suntrease Williams-Maynard, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff. Erick M. Drlicka, Michael S. Thomas, Rupert Bradley Adams, Emmanuel Sheppard & Condon, Pensacola, FL, for Defendant. Kahn, Jr., Charles J., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 In this action, plaintiff, an agency of the United States, alleges defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by preventing a man (James Sharp) from applying for a bartender position at a Ft. Walton Beach strip club on October 5, 2015. (Doc. 55). As relief, plaintiff seeks, among other things, damages for back pay and “emotional distress, pain and suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, [and] mental anguish and humiliation[.]” (Id., p. 6). Defendant's answer raises a mitigation of damages defense. (Doc. 7, p. 5). The case does not raise legal or societal issues of earth-shattering significance. Nothing advanced by the parties suggests factual complexity. Nevertheless, the parties have repeatedly proven unable to cooperate during discovery. Each party filed multiple motions decrying the opposing party's conduct. The court held a hearing on the various motions on June 22, 2018, and issued rulings from the bench. A brief recitation of the rulings and rationale is provided below. Defendant's Motion to Compel Deposition of EEOC Corporate Representative Defendant moved to compel plaintiff to designate an individual to testify for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition.[1] (Doc. 32). Plaintiff responded in opposition and moved for a protective order forbidding the deposition. (Doc. 38). Plaintiff argued the areas of inquiry identified by defendant implicated privileged information. Plaintiff, however, also took the position that it should not be required to produce a corporate representative at all, regardless of the questions to be asked, because it would be a “waste of public resources.” Defendant's motion to compel will be granted. See EEOC v. AZ Metro Distribs., LLC, No. 15-cv-5370(ENV)(PK), 2016 WL 4768796 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2016) (permitting the deposition of “four EEOC officials involved with [the former employees'] investigation, solely for purposes of determining the factual basis of allegations made in the charges”); SEC v. Merkin, 283 F.R.D. 689, 695 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (“[S]everal district courts have applied 30(b)(6) to government agencies and have rejected sweeping arguments that a deposition could not go forward because of the possibilitythat some questions might seek protected information.”). Plaintiff will be required to designate an individual to testify regarding the factual basis for Mr. Sharp's discrimination charge. Defendant is cautioned that the granting of this motion does not mean it may question the deponent regarding matters that are privileged or otherwise nondiscoverable. See Merkin, 283 F.R.D. at 694 (“[J]ust like any party litigating in federal court, [the defendant] has the right to take a 30(b)(6) deposition from the SEC, subject to privilege and work product claims available to all litigants as well as special privileges enjoyed by the Government.”). Furthermore, based on plaintiff's blanket assertion that any Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is inappropriate, defendant is entitled to the reasonable expenses it incurred in compelling the deposition. Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order Re: Financial and Medical Records *2 Defendant seeks to serve subpoenas duces tecum on three of Mr. Sharp's current or former financial institutions (BBVA Compass Bank, Regions Bank, and Eglin Federal Credit Union), and two of his past medical providers (Fort Walton Beach Medical Center and Twin Cities Hospital).Plaintiff moved for a protective order forbidding the discovery, asserting the subpoenas seek information that is irrelevant, an invasion of Mr. Sharp's and his wife's privacy, overbroad, and not proportional to the needs of the case. (Doc. 34). Plaintiff's motion will be granted in part and denied in part. The subpoenas to the medical providers are overbroad, a fishing expedition, and not proportional to the needs of the case. For example, copies of Mr. Sharp's X-rays are not relevant to any issue in this case. Given the nature of the claims and defenses, nothing so far developed in this case suggests that these subpoenas are likely to lead to relevant evidence. The subpoenas to the financial institutions, however, are relevant to damages and the (rather dramatic) claims of financial strain on Mr. Sharp's family. Defendant, therefore, may seek bank and/or credit card statements from the three identified institutions from January 1, 2015, to the present. The subpoenas may seek information from accounts held jointly by Mr. Sharp and his wife, as well as accounts held solely by Mr. Sharp or his wife. Cf. Fla. Stat. 61.075(8) (“All assets acquired and liabilities incurred by either spouse subsequent to the date of the marriage and not specifically established as nonmarital assets or liabilities are presumed to be marital assets and liabilities.”). Because the motion for protective order is being granted in part and denied in part, neither party shall recover expenses. Defendant's Motion to Compel Responses to its First Request for Production Defendant moved to compel plaintiff “to fully answer and respond” to defendant's first request for production of documents. (Doc. 40). In Request No. 2, defendant sought Mr. Sharp's tax returns from 2015, 2016, and 2017. Plaintiff has turned over the 2016 and 2017 returns but is still in the process of obtaining the 2015 return. Defendant's motion to compel production of the 2015 tax return will be granted. Because plaintiff has made efforts to provide the tax return, and the return is in the possession of the IRS, defendant will not be awarded expenses. In Request No. 14, defendant sought production of the declaration of Klaylan Burchett. Plaintiff provided the declaration 10 days after defendant filed the April 27 motion to compel. Defendant's request for notes of conversations with Burchett and earlier drafts of the declaration will be denied as protected by the work-product doctrine. Defendant will be awarded expenses for its efforts to obtain Burchett's declaration. Plaintiff's counsel (not the lawyer who appeared before me for this hearing) exhibited bad faith by delaying production of the Burchett declaration. At the April 11 deposition of defendant's corporate representative, plaintiff's counsel gave evasive answers regarding the existence of the declaration and the duty to supplement plaintiff's discovery responses and Rule 26 disclosures.[2] In a phone conversation on April 17, plaintiff's counsel indicated he could “neither confirm nor deny” the existence of the Burchett declaration. Defendant subsequently contacted Burchett and confirmed the EEOC provided him with a declaration, which he signed and returned. These actions have needlessly delayed the progress of this case, and, it must be said, over a small item, that was produced shortly after service of the motion to compel. *3 In Request No. 19, defendant sought production of messages Mr. Sharp sent and received on social media related to this case. Plaintiff has provided defendant with all such messages, though production occurred after the motion to compel was filed. Nevertheless, expenses will not be awarded to defendant because plaintiff made good-faith efforts to produce the messages, which were not in its possession. Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 1. Defendant's motion to compel the deposition of the EEOC's corporate representative (doc. 32) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's motion for protective order (doc. 38) is DENIED. 2. Plaintiff's motion for protective order (doc. 34) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant is permitted to subpoena Mr. Sharp's bank and/or credit card statements from BBVA Compass Bank, Regions Bank, and Eglin Federal Credit Union. Defendant is not permitted to subpoena Mr. Sharp's medical records from Fort Walton Beach Medical Center and Twin Cities Hospital. 3. Defendant's motion to compel responses to its first request for production (doc. 40) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff shall produce Mr. Sharp's 2015 tax return. Plaintiff is not required to produce notes from interviews with Klaylan Burchett or drafts of his declaration. 4. Defendant is awarded $500.00 in expenses, including attorney's fees, for litigating plaintiff's April 8 motion for protective order (doc. 27), and $500.00 in expenses, including attorney's fees, for litigating plaintiff's Rule 72(a) objections (doc. 47). 5. Defendant is entitled to its reasonable expenses for moving to compel the deposition of plaintiff's corporate representative and moving for production of Klaylan Burchett's declaration. The parties shall promptly confer concerning the appropriate resolution of the expenses issue. Within 7 days from the date of this order, the parties shall file a report indicating whether a dispute still exists regarding the issue. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the court will enter a separate order directing defendant to submit an affidavit and/or other evidence supporting its request for expenses, and allow plaintiff an opportunity to respond. If necessary, a further hearing will be conducted. 6. The discovery deadline is extended to September 24, 2018. The dispositive motion deadline is extended to 30 days from the new discovery deadline. DONE AND ORDERED this 25th day of June, 2018. [1] See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) (“[A] party may name as the deponent a ... governmental agency ... and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination. The named organization must then designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf[.] ... The persons designated must testify about information known or reasonably available to the organization.”). [2] For example, defendant's counsel asked, “When do we expect to get a copy of the affidavit you're reading from and supplementing your Rule 26 to reference Klay Burchett?” (Doc. 40-12, p. 7). Plaintiff's counsel suggested he would supplement the disclosures and discovery responses, “If there's anything to be supplemented ...” (Id.).