*1 On June 5, 2018, Defendants County of San Bernardino (“County”), Lance Higgins, Kevin Allen, Donald Patton, Jason Costa, Oswaldo Rodrigues, Jonathan Thorp, Jonathan Millard, and Lindsay Cristobal (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a single motion with three distinct prongs: (1) a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) a Motion to Join Party Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (3) a Motion for a More Definitive Statement Pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (“Motion,” Dkt. No. 29.) Also on June 5, 2018, Defendants filed a Request for Judicial Notice to support their Motion. (“RJN,” Dkt. No. 31.) Plaintiff Robert Harley Fisher (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition on July 9, 2018. (“Opposition,” Dkt. No. 34.) Defendants filed a reply on July 26, 2018. (“Reply,” Dkt. No. 35.) The Court considers this matter appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 78; L.R. 7-15. Upon consideration of the papers filed in support of and in opposition to this Motion, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion, GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' RJN, and VACATES the hearing scheduled for July 30, 2018.

On May 3, 2018, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendants which contained seventeen causes of action: (1) unreasonable seizure of person under the Fourth Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983); (2) use of unreasonable force on person under the Fourth Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983); (3) unlawful entry into and search of private residence under the Fourth Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983); (4) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for interference with familial relationship via unreasonable seizure and interrogation of minor children (42 U.S.C. § 1983); (5) violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights for removal of minor children (42 U.S.C. § 1983); (6) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for continued detention of minor children (42 U.S.C. § 1983); (7) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unreasonable seizure of personal property under the Fourth Amendment; (8) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unreasonable search and seizure of electronic communications under the Fourth Amendment; (9) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for right to freedom of speech and to petition government for redress of grievances under the First Amendment; (10) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for right to record police under First Amendment; (11) violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1; (12) false arrest and false imprisonment; (13) battery; (14) assault; (15) conversion; (16) unauthorized access to computer, computer systems, and computer data; and (17) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (“FAC,” Dkt. No. 15.)

The following factual summary is taken from the FAC: Plaintiff and his wife, “Paula Fisher,” have two natural minor children, “S.F.” and “A.F.” (Id. ¶ 6.) S.F. is Plaintiff's daughter and A.F. is Plaintiff's son. (Id. ¶¶ 7–8.) S.F. made claims of abuse by Paula Fisher to her church, school counselors, teachers, and Child and Family Services (“CFS”). (Id. ¶ 28.) In response, Defendant Cristobal, a CFS social service practitioner, interviewed S.F. on January 12, 2017. (Id. ¶ 29.) Cristobal again questioned S.F. on January 26, 2017 and physically inspected her at S.F.'s school. (Id. ¶ 30.) On both occasions, Cristobal found no evidence of child abuse, and reported it to Defendant Higgins, a deputy sheriff with the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department. (Id. ¶¶ 29–30.) Defendant Higgins, however, refused to close the investigations of Plaintiff and Paula Fisher. (Id.)

*2 On February 9, 2017, Defendant Thorp, a deputy sheriff, and Defendant Cristobal detained and interviewed S.F. without Plaintiff's or Paula Fisher's consent. (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Thorp and Defendant Cristobal interrogated S.F. and did not advise her of her right to counsel and right against self-incrimination. (Id.) The allegations of child abuse were found to be unsubstantiated, but Defendant Thorp did not write his police report until February 26, 2017. (Id.) Defendant Higgins subsequently interviewed S.F. under identical custodial conditions, during which S.F. stated Paula Fisher “kicked her, pushed her into a wall and made her take unknown pills that made her throw up.” (Id. ¶ 35.)

The bulk of the following events take place on February 23, 2017, when Defendant Higgins initiated surveillance on Plaintiff's home. (Id. ¶ 39.) Because no one was present at Plaintiff's home at the time, Defendant Allen, a deputy sheriff, interviewed S.F.'s grandmother at her home. (Id. ¶ 42.) S.F.'s grandmother denied knowledge of any child abuse. (Id.) Defendant Allen then telephoned Plaintiff, who told Defendant Allen he did not want officers at his home “drawing attention from his neighbors” and he would not go to the sheriff's substation. (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff alleges he offered to be interviewed at a neutral place with his wife and S.F. (Id.) However, Defendant Allen declined. (Id.) Defendant Allen threatened to alert Plaintiff's employer that Plaintiff was refusing to cooperate with the investigation. (Id. ¶¶ 43–44.)

At 6:30 p.m. on February 23, 2017, Defendant Higgins conducted a traffic stop of Plaintiff and Paula Fisher's automobile. (Id. ¶ 48.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Higgins did not have a warrant, probable cause, or a reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff or Paula Fisher had committed a crime. (Id. ¶ 47.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Higgins fabricated false statements in his police report, in which he stated he believed S.F. was in the car at the time of the traffic stop. (Id. ¶ 47.)

Defendants Allen, Rodriguez, and Patton, all deputy sheriffs, arrived on the scene and told Plaintiff and Paula Fisher they were being detained for questioning about S.F. (Id. ¶ 50.) None of the arresting deputies had their belt recorders on. (Id. ¶ 51.) This prompted Plaintiff to begin recording with his cell phone, which in turn prompted the deputies to handcuff and arrest Paula Fisher. (Id. ¶ 52.) Plaintiff was subsequently handcuffed and arrested after refusing to let the deputies search his home absent a warrant. (Id. ¶ 53.) Plaintiff alleges the handcuffs were excessively cinched, causing “excruciating pain and agony.” (Id. ¶ 56.)

Plaintiff and Paula Fisher were thereafter booked at the Yucaipa sheriff substations. (Id. ¶ 58.) Sometime during the course of the arrest, Plaintiff, Paula Fisher, and S.F.'s cell phones were seized and searched. (Id. ¶ 60.) Plaintiff's key was also taken and used to search his home. (Id. ¶ 64.) After questioning, S.F. and A.F. were given to Defendant Millard, a CFS social service practitioner, and placed into a foster home. Plaintiff's employer, the Banning Police Department, was told Plaintiff refused to cooperate with the investigation and suspended Plaintiff pending an internal investigation that eventually found him innocent. (Id. ¶ 70.) On February 28, 2017, Defendant Patton accessed Plaintiff's email account without a warrant and forwarded eight photographs to his own email account. (Id. ¶ 71.)

The San Bernardino County District Attorney's Office refused to file criminal charges against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 72.) On August 22, 2017, Plaintiff filed a claim for damages against the County of San Bernardino pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act (“Government Tort Claim”). (Id. ¶ 4.)

A. Motion to Join Party

*3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) permits a Court to dismiss an action for failure to join a party whose presence is needed for just adjudication under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. See Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1991). In order to grant a dismissal on such grounds, courts are to consider: (1) whether an absent party is necessary to the action under Rule 19(a); (2) whether it is feasible to order that the absent necessary party be joined; and (3) if both the absent party is necessary and joinder is infeasible, then courts must determine, under Rule 19(b), “whether the case can proceed without the absentee, or whether the absentee is an ‘indispensable party’ such that the action must be dismissed.” See E.E.O.C. v. Peabody Western Coal Co., 400 F.3d 774, 779–80 (9th Cir. 2005); Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 878 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

B. Motion to Dismiss

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may bring a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As a general matter, the Federal Rules require only that a plaintiff provide “ ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept all material allegations in the complaint — as well as any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them — as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005); ARC Ecology v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005); Moyo v. Gomez, 32 F.3d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1994).

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Rather, the allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Ninth Circuit has clarified that (1) a complaint must “contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively,” and (2) “the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

C. Motion for More Definitive Statement

Under Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 12(e)”), “[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” “If a pleading fails to specific the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice, a defendant can move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) before responding.” Swiekiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).

A. Request for Judicial Notice

*4 Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of two matters: (1) the California Governmental Tort Claims filed by Plaintiff and Paula Fisher on August 22, 2017 in the County of San Bernardino (“Exhibit 1”); and (2) the rejection of those claims, which was promulgated on October 5, 2017 (“Exhibit 2”). (RJN at 2.) This request is unopposed.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, “[a] court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(d). “A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is ... capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Judicial notice is appropriate for “materials incorporated into the complaint or matters of public record.” Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). Proceedings of other courts, including orders and filings, are also the proper subject of judicial notice when directly related to the case. See United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”) “It is unnecessary to take judicial notice of opinions from other courts because this Court can consider other legal authorities without judicially noticing the opinions.” Rios v. CWGS Enterprises, LLC, No. CV1703614RSWLAFMX, 2017 WL 3449052, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2017).

The Court finds it appropriate to take judicial notice of Exhibit 1. See Coto Settlement, 593 F.3d at 1038. The Court declines to take judicial notice of Exhibit 2, as the Court does not rely on it in its decision. Thus, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' RJN.

B. Motion to Join Party

Defendants argue Paula Fisher is a necessary party to this litigation and must be joined for the action to continue. (Motion at 3.) Specifically, Defendants argue Paula Fisher's interest in this lawsuit is “identical or nearly identical” to Plaintiff's, and it is obvious from the face of the FAC that Paula Fisher was originally intended to be included as a plaintiff. (Id. at 3, 5 (citing FAC ¶¶ 6–8, 28, 30, 33, 35–36, 38, 48–52, 60, 89–90).) Defendants believe Paula Fisher is not a plaintiff in this action because there is a criminal case currently pending against her based on the claims of S.F., and if she were a part of this litigation then this case would need to be stayed pending the outcome of her criminal case. (Id. at 4 (citing Cal. Gov. Code § 945.3).) Defendants contend that if Paula Fisher is not joined in this action, she may file her own lawsuit once her criminal case is resolved, which would require Defendants to defend against new litigation concerning the same facts and circumstances at issue here. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff seems to concede Defendants' assessment of the situation, and argues Paula Fisher cannot feasibly be joined in this litigation until her prosecution ends. (Opposition at 7.) Additionally, Plaintiff argues his case needs to proceed as his claims have already accrued, while some of Paula Fisher's claims have yet to accrue. (Id.) Joinder is not feasible in three circumstances: (1) when venue is improper; (2) when the absentee is not subject to personal jurisdiction; and (3) when joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction. See Peabody, 400 F.3d at 779; Diodem, LLC v. Lumenis Inc., No. CV03-2142 GAF (RCX), 2005 WL 6219898, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2005). Where these circumstances are not present, “the Court shall order the joinder of the necessary party, and apparently lacks discretion to do otherwise.” Diodem, 2005 WL 6219898, at *16. Neither of the three factors above are present in this case, nor is there any contention otherwise. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff must amend his FAC to add Paula Fisher as a named plaintiff. Plaintiff must file an amended complaint, if any, by August 17, 2018. Thus, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED. However, for the sake of efficiency, the Court will analyze the other prongs of Defendants' Motion.

C. Motion to Dismiss

*5 Defendants argue Plaintiff's Government Tort Claim failed to put County or Defendants on notice of Plaintiff's Thirteenth Claim alleging battery, his Fourteenth Claim alleging assault, and his Sixteenth Claim alleging unauthorized access to computer systems. (Motion at 7.) A plaintiff must comply with the Government Tort Claims Act when asserting a claim for money damages against a public entity and when asserting a claim for money damages against a public employee. Jadwin v. City of Kern, No. 1:07–CV–00026–OWW–DLB, 2009 WL 926844, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009). The tort claims act is intended to provide the public entity with sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate the claims. Id. at *8. If a plaintiff relies on more than one theory of recovery, each cause of action must have been reflected in the timely claim. Id. A claim must “fairly describe what the [the] entity is alleged to have done.” Stockett v. Ass'n of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Auth., 34 Cal. 4th 441, 446 (2004). Plaintiff's Government Tort Claim reads as follows:

(RJN, Exh. 1.)

Plaintiff argues his claim of being falsely arrested and his family residence unlawfully searched would put Defendants on notice of state law assault, battery, and unlawful computer access claims. (Opposition at 6.) Plaintiff essentially argues that because he put Defendants on notice of a false arrest claim, he automatically put Defendants on notice of assault and battery. Plaintiff cites no authority for this proposition, and the Court knows of none. The elements of false arrest are different from the elements of battery and assault. Plaintiff must clearly assert each cause of action in the claim. Jadwin, 2009 WL 926844, at * 8. Plaintiff's Government Tort Claim did not place Defendants squarely on notice that they should have investigated a potential claim for assault and battery. However, Defendants were on notice that Plaintiff would seek legal redress for an unlawful search and seizure of his property. His Government Tort Claim clearly alleges Defendants unlawfully searched his home and his cell phones. (RJN, Exh. 1.) The legality of these searches are generally at issue, which serves as an adequate basis for Plaintiff to pursue legal redress for a specific subset of these searches. The nexus between Plaintiff's Government Tort Claim and his FAC is sufficiently close for exhaustion purposes.

Defendants, however, make one more argument in favor of dismissing Plaintiff's Sixteenth Claim. Defendants note Plaintiff brings suit under California Penal Code § 502, under which the established remedy is compensatory damages. Cal. Penal Code § 502(e)(1). This includes compensation for expenditures reasonably and necessarily incurred by the owner to verify whether a computer system was altered by the access. (Motion at 8 (citing Cal. Penal Code § 502(e)(1) ).) Plaintiff, however, seeks damages relating to pain and suffering, medical and psychological costs, attorneys' fees, loss of business wages, and other various types of damages. (FAC ¶ 190.) Defendants argue these costs are not available as a remedy under California Penal Code § 502, and Plaintiff does not respond to these arguments in his Opposition. Plaintiff fails to set forth facts which could justify compensatory damages, and thus fails to state a viable legal theory.

*6 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiff's Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth claims. If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, a “district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Given the nature of Plaintiff's FAC, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Thirteenth and Fourteenth claims WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. These claims are unexhausted, and no factual additions could remedy this deficiency. However, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Sixteenth Claim WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

D. Motion for More Definitive Statement

Defendants argue Plaintiff's First Claim is ambiguous and they are unable to prepare a reasonable response or a motion for summary judgment. (Motion at 9.) Defendants argue the length and amount of the facts in the claim make it impossible to determine which factual allegations are actually relevant. (Id.) Defendants characterize Plaintiff's First Claim as akin to a general “Statement of Facts,” and note several later causes of action repeat portions of the First Claim. (Id. at 9–10.) In Opposition, Plaintiff states he intentionally included all relevant facts under the first claim of relief “in order to improve the narrative quality of the complaint.” (Opposition at 6 n.2.) Upon review, the Court agrees with Defendants. In his thirteen-page claim of relief, Plaintiff mixes in factual elements relevant to other claims, which makes it difficult to understand precisely what conduct is relevant to this claim. (FAC ¶¶ 27–81.) For each claim of relief, Plaintiff should clearly and cleanly allege only facts relevant to that particular claim. A claim of relief should not be used as a makeshift Statement of Facts, as that only leads to confusion. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff is ORDERED to provide a more definitive statement regarding his First Claim in his Second Amended Complaint.

The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion in its entirety. Plaintiff is ORDERED to add Paula Fisher as a named Plaintiff in this litigation. Plaintiff's Thirteenth and Fourteenth claims for relief are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff's Sixteenth Claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff is ORDERED to provide a more definitive statement regarding his First Claim. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint must be filed by August 17, 2018. The July 30, 2018 hearing is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.