*1 On July 25, 2017, Plaintiff Aristides Francisco filed two motions to compel against Defendants Emeritus Corporation (“Emeritus”) and Brookdale Senior Living Communities (“Brookdale”) (collectively, “Defendants”):[1] (1) a Motion to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories (Dkt. No. 36); and (2) a Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production (“RFP”). (Dkt. No. 37). Pursuant to Local Rule 37-2, the Parties filed a single Joint Stipulation addressing both Motions, (“Jt. Stip.,” Dkt. No. 38), including the declaration of Aristides Francisco in support of the Motions, (“Francisco Decl.,” Dkt. No. 39), and the declarations of Liberty Stansberry, (“Stansberry Decl.,” Dkt. No. 41), and Rachel T. Segal (“Segal Decl.,” Dkt. No. 42), in opposition to the Motions. On August 1, 2017, each side separately filed a single Supplemental Memorandum addressing both Motions. (“P Supp. Memo.,” Dkt. No. 45; “D Supp. Memo.,” Dkt. No. 46).

On September 5, 2017, the Court held a hearing. For the reasons stated below and on the record, the Motion to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

Defendants employed Plaintiff as a “Resident Assistant,” i.e., an assisted living caregiver. (Jt. Stip. at 1). Plaintiff brings this putative class action based on Defendants' alleged failure to pay all overtime and minimum wages. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied required meal periods and rest breaks; failed to provide “proper compensation” for the overtime hours; failed to provide accurate wage statements; and failed to pay all wages due and owing to Plaintiff and other similarly situated persons (the “Putative Class Members”). (Id., Exh. A (“Complaint”) at 2). Plaintiff seeks to certify a class “of all current and former non-exempt employees of Defendants who worked in California at any time from March 16, 2013, to the present,” and several subclasses. (Id. at 4-5). Defendants removed this action from the Los Angeles County Superior Court on April 4, 2017 pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). (Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4).

III. SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE DISCOVERY

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), as amended on December 1, 2015, provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the right to discovery, even plainly relevant discovery, is not limitless. Discovery may be denied where: “(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C); accord Tedrow v. Boeing Employees Credit Union, 315 F.R.D. 358, 359 (W.D. Wash. 2016).

While federal policy generally favors a party's right to discovery, special considerations apply to discovery during the pre-certification stage of a putative class action. Courts are not required to authorize pre-certification discovery in all circumstances. “District courts have broad discretion to control the class certification process, and ‘[w]hether or not discovery will be permitted ... lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” Shaw v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 306 F.R.D. 293, 297 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009)). Where discovery is permitted, the district court also retains broad discretion to determine which issues should be deemed relevant to the certification of a class. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Aldapa v. Fowler Packing Company, Inc., 310 F.R.D. 583, 588 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (“In federal court, the scope of pre-certification discovery lies entirely within the discretion of the court.”).

“[C]ourts generally permit such discovery if it would substantiate the class allegations or if plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied.”[2] Vallabharpurapu v. Burger King Corp., 276 F.R.D. 611, 615 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (emphasis added); see also Dittmar v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2016 WL 7188231, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2016) (“[O]ften putative class action pleadings alone will not resolve the question of class certification and ... some pre-certification discovery will be warranted.”) (citing Vinole, 571 F.3d at 942). The Ninth Circuit has long held that the denial of discovery “where [it] is necessary to determine the existence of a class or set of subclasses” may be an abuse of discretion. Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Baldwin & Flynn v. Nat'l Safety Assoc., 149 F.R.D. 598, 600 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (“[W]here the propriety of class certification cannot be fairly determined without discovery, it is an abuse of discretion to deny it.”); see also Vinole, 571 F.3d at 942 (“Our cases stand for the unremarkable proposition that often the pleadings alone will not resolve the question of class certification and that some discovery will be warranted.”).

IV. DISCUSSION

*3 As modified in Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum, Plaintiff seeks pre-certification discovery for the period from May 11, 2013 to July 31, 2014 (the “Discovery Period”), for “all persons who worked in California ... in Plaintiff's job position and any other position with similar job duties/functions, including the following positions: Resident Assistant, Medication Technician, Universal Night Worker, Wellness Nurse, Lead Resident Assistant, and MCP [Memory Care Program] Resident Assistant” (the “Discovery Employees”). (P Supp. Memo. at 4). Specifically, Plaintiff requests an Order requiring Defendants to amend their prior RFP and interrogatory responses to provide: (1) the Discovery Employees' timesheets and pay records, (2) the complete, “unredacted” Employee Handbook from which previously produced policies were taken, and (3) the Discovery Employees' contact information, including their “first, middle and last names, last known home addresses, last known home and mobile telephone numbers, and last known personal email addresses.” (Id.).

A. Scope Of Class Discovery

Defendants do not dispute Plaintiff's right to conduct some pre-certification discovery. Nor do Defendants contend that the proposed thirteen and a half month “Discovery Period” is unreasonable. However, they do argue that the breadth of the information that Plaintiff seeks is unwarranted in light of the purportedly conclusory, factually unsupported allegations of the Complaint and the myriad “individualized issues” that necessarily arise when different types of facilities, different individual managers, and employees of different job classifications are at issue. (Jt. Stip. at 9). Accordingly, Defendants maintain that at most, “Plaintiff should only be able to conduct class-wide discovery as to either employees at the sole location where he worked or, alternatively, limited to Resident Assistants who, like him, worked for Emeritus in California from May 11, 2013 to July 31, 2014.” (Id. at 9-10).

In support of these contentions, Defendants offer the declaration of Liberty Stansberry, who was a Senior Vice President of Human Resources at Emeritus until the company's acquisition by Brookdale on July 31, 2014. (Stansberry Decl. ¶ 2). According to Stansberry, Emeritus employed approximately 2,344 non-exempt employees in California during the Discovery Period at seventy-six facilities in approximately thirty-two job classifications. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5). “These communities varied in size from small standalone memory care facilities with just twenty-five (25) units to large facilities with 150 units which offered multiple product lines within one community (e.g., skilled nursing, assisted living, memory care, and/or independent living).” (Id. ¶ 4). Approximately nine facilities in California offered skilled nursing care, and forty provided memory care services. (Id.).

Plaintiff was one of approximately 671 Resident Assistants whom Emeritus employed in California during the Discovery Period. (Id. ¶ 7). Resident Assistants directly interacted with residents to assist them with activities of daily living, such as “bathing, dressing, grooming, toileting, positioning, transfer, mobility, and incontinence care.” (Id. ¶ 6). Memory Care Program Resident Assistants, a more specialized position, “work[ed] to encourage resident socialization, physical activity, and brain health within the memory care environment.” (Id. ¶ 17). In particular, MCP Resident Assistants received “specialized training” in communicating with cognitively impaired residents and identifying “exit seeking” behavior among them. (Id. ¶ 18).

Some communities employed a Lead Resident Assistant, who was responsible for in-service training, scheduling Resident Assistant shifts, monitoring attendance and “ensuring proper coverage for meal breaks.” (Id. ¶ 9). Communities may also have employed Universal Night Workers who worked the night shift and who were “expected to assist in all areas of the community, with specific duties assigned on an as needed basis.” (Id. ¶ 9). “Wellness Coordinators” and “Wellness Nurses” supervised the work within the “Wellness Department,” which included Resident Assistants. (Id. ¶ 10). Wellness Coordinators and Nurses were responsible for maintaining and enforcing policies, including timekeeping and meal period policies, and participating in staff training and orientation. (Id.). Medical Technicians supervised and assisted with “the storage, distribution, and discontinuation of residents' oral medication(s),” and reported any change in a resident's condition to a supervisor and/or licensed nurse. (Id. ¶ 11).[3]

*4 The Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to some pre-certification discovery, which is likely either to prove or disprove the Complaint's class allegations. The Court further finds that the proposed Discovery Period of May 11, 2013 to July 31, 2014 is reasonable. However, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is entitled to information about job classifications other than Resident Assistants. While Plaintiff has attempted to identify positions with related responsibilities, he has not shown why pre-certification discovery pertaining only to Resident Assistants, who represent a substantial portion of the entire Putative Class that Plaintiff seeks to have certified, would be inadequate. The district court “has discretion in controlling the scope of pre-certification discovery to balance [class plaintiffs'] need for discovery to substantiate their class allegations and concerns regarding overly burdensome discovery requests directed on [defendants],” particularly where, as here, the plaintiffs' claims are as yet “speculative.” Aldapa, 310 F.R.D. at 589 (limiting pre-certification discovery to a sampling of “approximately 25% of employees that fall within the putative class”).

The Francisco declaration, offered in support of the Motions to Compel, hardly demonstrated grounds for discovery of more than 2000 employees' payroll and personnel information. In a conclusory and extremely limited statement, Plaintiff asserts that “[t]here were a number of other job titles with similar job duties.” [Francisco Decl. ¶3). In contrast, the Stansberry declaration explains in great detail how the different job titles had vastly different job duties. The Stansberry declaration demonstrates that it will be difficult for Plaintiff to show that employees at different locations, with a range of treatment purposes and job descriptions, were treated similarly for overtime and break issues.

Defendant has acknowledged that some pre-class certification discovery “limited to Resident Assistants who, like [Plaintiff], worked for Emeritus in California from May 11, 2013 to July 31, 2014” would be appropriate. (Jt. Stip. at 9-10). The Court agrees. Resident Assistants comprise 671 members of the approximately 2,344 non-exempt employees in California during the Discovery Period, i.e., just over 28% of the entire Putative Class, as Plaintiff defines the class. This is an adequate sampling for the Parties to prove or disprove the existence of a class. The scope of discovery of the Putative Class Members shall be limited to Resident Assistants who worked for Defendants throughout the state of California during the Discovery Period.

At the hearing, Plaintiff's counsel argued that this description of the scope of discovery -- the other Resident Assistants employed during the Discovery period -- essentially “certified” the class before the class motion. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff's class motion is not due to be filed until December 2017. Plaintiff has more than 90 days to conduct discovery and investigate the possibility that individuals in job descriptions other than Resident Assistant could be part of the class. Nothing in the Court's order prevents Plaintiff from interviewing witnesses, reviewing documents, or otherwise investigating the details of other positions within Defendant's employment to determine if the actual class should encompass more than the Resident Assistants. However, based upon the parties' submissions in connection with the pending discovery motion, Plaintiff has not set forth grounds to permit the discovery at issue in the Motion to be directed to more than the Resident Assistants.

B. Requests For Production Of Documents

Plaintiff seeks an Order requiring production of the Discovery Employees' timesheets[4] and pay records,[5] and the complete, “unredacted” Employee Handbook from which previously produced policies were taken. (Jt. Stip. at 6-8).

1. Timesheets and Payroll Data

*5 Plaintiff contends that timesheets and pay records of all of the Discovery Employees are necessary as this data will help show commonality and numerosity under Rule 23. (Id. at 7). Defendants do not argue that timesheets and payroll data are irrelevant, but emphasize that the production should be quite limited in light of Plaintiff's failure to present evidence to support his class allegations. (Id. at 13).

As stated in Part IV.A. above, the scope of pre-certification discovery is limited to Resident Assistants who worked for Defendants throughout the state of California during the Discovery Period. The Motion to Compel is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks production of timesheets and payroll data for Resident Assistants during the Discovery Period, and DENIED as to the remainder of the “Discovery Employees” identified in Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum.

2. “Unredacted” Employee Handbook

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to an “unredacted” version of the Employee Handbook containing all of Defendants' policies during the Discovery Period because (1) it is improper to “scrub” purportedly non-responsive information from responsive documents, (2) policies may bear on the alleged behavior even if a given policy does not “directly govern the alleged behavior,” and (3) the redaction renders the employee handbook inadmissible at trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 1002.[6] (Id. at 6). Defendants argue that they have produced all of the relevant hours, pay, and workplace behavior policies in their entirety, as well as the Employee Handbook's table of contents. (Id. at 11-12). Defendants further state that during the meet and confer process, they specifically asked, in reference to the table of contents, which additional policies Plaintiff wanted, but Plaintiff refused to identify any. (Id.). Defendants further contend that Federal Rule of Evidence 1002 does not render a “partial handbook” inadmissible, particularly when, as here, Defendants have offered to stipulate to their admissibility. (Id. at 13).

The Court recognizes that some courts have approved redaction of employee manuals and handbooks on relevancy grounds, particularly where plaintiffs have the opportunity to select from the manual's table of contents the portions of the manual they wish the defendant to produce. See, e.g., Sharma v. Burberry Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 3d 443, 467 (E.D. N.Y. 2014); Joseph v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 2010 WL 5136010, at *7 (D. Nev. Dec. 10, 2010); Breedlove v. Mandell, 2008 WL 596864, at *2 (W.D. N.Y. Feb. 29, 2008). However, the Court finds more persuasive the arguments against “relevancy redactions” as expressed by the court in Bartholomew v. Avalon Capital Grp., Inc., 278 F.R.D. 441 (D. Minn. 2011).

The Bartholomew court found:

Bartholomew, 278 F.R.D. at 451–52 (footnotes omitted); see also In re State St. Bank & Trust Co. Fixed Income Funds Inv. Litig., 2009 WL 1026013, at *1 (S.D. N.Y. Apr. 8, 2009) (“[Unilateral] redactions are generally unwise. They breed suspicions, and they may deprive the reader of context.”); In re Medeva Securities Litigation, 1995 WL 943468, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 1995) (“The Court does not welcome unilateral editing of documents by the producing party. Even when implemented with restraint and in good faith, the practice frequently gives rise to suspicion that relevant material harmful to the producing party has been obscured.”); Estate of Fahner ex rel. Fahner v. County of Wayne, 2009 WL 4644788, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2009) (granting motion to compel production of entire policy and procedure manual where defendant did not state grounds for withholding portions of the manual in written objections to the request); U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 2015 WL 2148394, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2015) (ordering production of unredacted operations manual and noting that “redaction of otherwise discoverable documents is the exception rather than the rule”).

Even though Defendants' initial selection of “relevant” portions of the Employee Handbook was made unilaterally, the procedure Defendants now propose is not entirely “unilateral” as it would allow Plaintiff to choose which additional portions of the Employee Handbook would be produced, based on the headings in the handbook's table of contents. However, this procedure would require Plaintiff to accept sight unseen the contention that only particular sections of the handbook are relevant or useful to his case. Neither Plaintiff nor the Court can say with confidence that the only relevant portions of the handbook can be discerned from a review of a table of contents. Accordingly, the Motion to Compel is GRANTED with respect to the request for production of an unredacted copy of the complete employee handbook.

C. Interrogatories

Plaintiff seeks an Order requiring Defendants to provide the following contact information for the Discovery Employees employed at any time during the Discovery Period: “first, middle, and last names, last known home address, last known home and mobile telephone numbers and last known personal e-mail address.” (Jt. Stip. at 23; P Supp. Memo. at 4).

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to the names and contact information of the Discovery Employees because they are “essential witnesses” whose information may help him establish the commonality and typicality prongs of Rule 23. (Jt. Stip. at 24). According to Plaintiff, “this information should be produced without a notice and opt-out process in light of the short deadline by which Plaintiff must file for class certification (November 13, 2017).”[7] (Id. at 25). Plaintiff states that he is “agreeable to telling potential putative class members [whom counsel] contact that, if the person chooses not to talk to counsel, counsel will end the contact and not contact the person again.” (Id. at 27) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

*7 Defendants argue that the information sought is protected from disclosure by the putative class members' right to privacy. (Id. at 28). However, Defendants also contend that to the extent that any disclosure is ordered, it should be limited to the employees' names and addresses only, particularly with respect to former employees. (Id. at 30).

The Supreme Court instructs that class counsel must generally be permitted to communicate with potential class members for the purpose of notification and gathering information, even prior to class certification. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1981). Accordingly, “[d]isclosure of contact information for putative class members is a common practice in the class action context.” Aldapa, 310 F.R.D. at 588 (citing Artis v. Deere & Co., 276 F.R.D. 348, 352 (N.D. Cal. 2011)). However, in balancing the putative class members' privacy interests against the plaintiffs' need for the information, courts must keep in mind “the principle that individuals' private information, which they entrusted in their employer, shall not be disclosed except for cause.” Lewis v. Huntington Nat. Bank, 2011 WL 8960489, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 20, 2011). Courts vary widely in the quantity and type of contact information they require to be produced.

Some courts have permitted relatively extensive discovery of putative class members' contact information. In Salazar v. McDonald's Corp., 2016 WL 736213, (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016), for example, the court required disclosure of “the names, employee ID numbers, last known personal addresses, telephone numbers, and email addresses of prospective class members,” as well as the employees' dates of employment, job titles and job descriptions, on the ground that the requested information “is likely to produce information to help determine whether a class or subclasses exist ....” Id. at *5; see also Stebbins v. S&P Oyster Co., 2017 WL 1246334, at *4 (D. Conn. Apr. 3, 2017)(requiring defendants to provide “(1) full name; (2) last known mailing address; (3) last known email address; (4) last known telephone number; (5) present or last known place of employment; (6) job title during the time in question; and (7) dates of employment at S&P Oyster Restaurant” for each of the sixty-three putative class members).

Other courts, while approving multiple forms of contact information, have limited disclosure to names, addresses, and telephone numbers. See, e.g., Nehmelman v. Penn Nat. Gaming, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 745, 767 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (requiring production of putative class members' “names, addresses, email addresses and telephone numbers”); Guan Ming Lin v. Benihana Nat. Corp., 275 F.R.D. 165, 178–79 (S.D. N.Y. 2011) (requiring production of names, last known addresses, and telephone numbers); Acevedo v. Ace Coffee Bar, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 550, 554 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (same); Khalilpour v. CELLCO P'ship, 2010 WL 1267749, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2010) (“[T]he disclosure of names, addresses, and telephone numbers is common practice in the class action context because it does not involve revelation of personal secrets, intimate activities, or similar private information.”).

The Court is most persuaded, however, by those courts that have restricted contact information to names, email and mailing addresses only, both on the ground that the provision of names and addresses is sufficient to enable counsel to contact putative class members, and out of consideration for putative class members' heightened privacy interest in their telephone numbers. See, e.g., Behnken v. Luminant Mining Co., 997 F. Supp. 2d 511, 526 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (“[T]he court concludes that the need for compelled disclosure of prospective class members' telephone numbers is outweighed by their privacy interests, and that there is no apparent reason to conclude that sending a letter to a person's last known address will be inadequate.”); Taylor v. Autozone, Inc., 2011 WL 2038514, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2011) (“[I]n the interest of protecting class members' privacy, [the court] will not order defendant to provide telephone numbers and social security numbers. Such information is sensitive, and putative class members may have provided personal data to defendant with the expectation of confidentiality.”); Stickle v. SCI Western Market Support Center, L.P., 2009 WL 3241790, at *7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2009) (“Because notice will be accomplished via first class mail, there is no need to provide Plaintiffs with the telephone numbers of all of the potential conditional class members. In any event, supplying the attorneys in this case with the phone numbers of thousands of Defendants' current and former employees seems like a needless intrusion into the privacy of these individuals and their families.”); Mairena-Rivera v. Langston Constr., LLC, 2017 WL 2778346, at *5 (M.D. La. June 27, 2017) (declining to require disclosure of potential class members' telephone numbers on the ground that “providing the names, e-mail addresses, and last known addresses is adequate”) (citing cases); cf. Campbell v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP, 2008 WL 2345035, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2008) (authorizing disclosure of class members' telephone numbers only if class notices are returned undelivered “and the information is needed to obtain the new address”).

*8 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to the name and last-known email and home address of each Resident Assistant in California during the Discovery Period. Such information shall be provided under an appropriate protective order. See, e.g., Putnam v. Eli Lilly & Co., 508 F. Supp. 2d 812, 814 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“[Contact] information must be disclosed to enable plaintiff to proceed; a protective order can strike the appropriate balance between the need for the information and the privacy concerns.”); Artis v. Deere & Co., 276 F.R.D. 348, 353 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“[T]he parties can craft a protective order that limits the use of any contact information to the parties in this litigation and protects it from disclosure. The discovery is to be produced to Plaintiff's counsel only and to be used only in this litigation. Under these circumstances, the potential privacy interests of putative class members are adequately balanced.”).

At the hearing, Defendants' counsel raised a burdensomeness objection to providing email addresses. However, even though it was clear in the Motion that Plaintiff was seeking email and phone numbers for potential class members, Defendants failed to assert a specific burdensomeness objection to production of email addresses or offer evidence to show burdensomeness in Defendants' opposition to the Motion. See Caliper Technologies Corp. v. Molecular Devices Corp., 213 F.R.D. 555, 562 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“A producing party is obligated to show, by affidavits or other evidence, the specific nature of the burden imposed.”). Accordingly, the Court overrules the burdensomeness objection to the production of email addresses. The Court notes that Defendant need only produce what it actually possesses, i.e., if Defendant does not possess an email address for a particular employee, then no email address need be produced for that employee.

The Parties are ORDERED to submit a proposed Stipulated Protective Order within seven days of the date of this Order. The Court's website (see http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov) contains guidance regarding protective orders and a sample protective order, which the Court strongly encourages the Parties to use as a template. This information is available in Judge Segal's section of the link marked “Judges' Procedures & Schedules.”

The Court further finds that the proper balance between access to information and privacy rights is accomplished through an opt-out notice. In the opt-out procedure, employees “receive notice of the putative class action and the fact that Plaintiffs [are] seeking their personal contact information.” Aldapa, 310 F.R.D. at 588. Employees then have an opportunity to “send written notice that they do not want their contact information shared with the Plaintiffs' attorneys.”[8] Id. The Parties shall submit a proposed Order setting deadlines for the implementation of an opt-out procedure, including the language of the opt-out notice and the method of delivery (e.g., whether to use a third party vendor, or which vendor), and the subsequent production of employee contact information, within ten days of the date of this Order.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Parties shall submit a proposed Stipulated Protective Order within seven days of the date of this Order. The Parties shall submit a proposed Order setting deadlines for the implementation of an opt-out procedure, including the production of employee contact information, within ten daysof the date of this Order. Defendant shall produce supplemental documents as required by this Order within fourteen days of the date of this Order.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff was employed solely by Emeritus and that his employment terminated before Brookdale's acquisition of Emeritus in 2014. (Jt. Stip. at 1). While Plaintiff consistently refers to “Defendants” in the plural throughout the briefs, Emeritus/Brookdale refer only to “Defendant” in the singular and appear to argue on behalf of Emeritus alone. Because neither party submitted to the Court a copy of the discovery requests as served, the Court is unable to determine whether the discovery at issue was served on Emeritus, Brookdale, or both entities. Solely for the sake of convenience, the Court will adopt Plaintiff's usage and refer to “Defendants” in the plural.

The Ninth Circuit has explained,

Plaintiff does not currently maintain that he is entitled to pre-certification discovery concerning the other non-exempt employee positions described in Stansberry's declaration. (See P Supp. Memo. at 4).

The term “timesheets” in the RFPs refers to “all DOCUMENTS that evidence the clock in and clock out times for employees, including all records of time spent by employees.” (Id. at 2). The request asks for all timesheets to be produced “in their native electronically-usable format.” (Id.).

The term “pay records” in the RFPs refers to “all DOCUMENTS in their original computer usable native format that evidence the information that would be communicated to employees with each of their wage payments, including but not limited to all records that must be maintained according to California Labor Code § 226.” (Id.).

Rule 1002 provides: “An original writing, recording, or photograph is required in order to prove its content unless these rules or a federal statute provides otherwise.” Fed. R. Evid. 1002.

On August 22, 2017, the District Judge granted the Parties' stipulated request to extend the class certification motion deadline to December 4, 2017. (See Dkt. No. 56).

A version of this opt-out procedure is discussed in Belaire–West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 4th 554, 561 (2007). “Federal courts have adopted the Belaire opt out procedure in employment class actions.” Aldapa, 310 F.R.D. at 588.