The court held a hearing on the motion on May 1, 2018. Based on the parties' written and oral arguments and submissions, the court grants in part and denies in part plaintiff's motion for the reasons that follow.

I. BACKGROUND

A. This Case and the Discovery at Issue

Plaintiff brings this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of herself and others similar situated. See docket no. 75 at 4, 8. She alleges defendants, the City of Los Angeles, LAPD, and Chief of Police Charlie Beck, violated her civil rights by impounding her vehicle for thirty days without a warrant. Id. at 7-8. Defendants seized and impounded her vehicle pursuant to California Vehicle Code § 14602.6. Id. at 16. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, namely the return of the seized vehicles, and compensatory damages proximately caused by the 30-day impoundments. Id. at 12-19.

Defendant City of Los Angeles contracts with eighteen private towing and vehicle storage companies, each of which is known as an Official Police Garage (“OPG”), for the seizure and storage of LAPD vehicle seizures. Donald Decl. ¶ 4. Defendant City of Los Angeles requires OPGs to record data on vehicle seizures in the Vehicle Impound Information Center Database (“VIIC”), which includes the following information: vehicle's registered and legal owners; vehicle seizure and release dates; whether the vehicle was sold at a lien sale; and if it was sold, the amount recovered, total fees collected; and year, make, model, and license plate number of the seized vehicle (including the state). Id. ¶¶ 5, 6. These records are stored and managed by OPG-LA, a non-profit organization that coordinates and manages the OPGs' activities. Id. ¶ 6. When the LAPD seizes a vehicle, an officer fills out a CHP 180 form documenting the seizure. Id. ¶¶ 7, 10, 12. The OPG receives a copy of these forms, which it scans into a database called Laserfiche. Id. ¶ 7.

Plaintiff served a subpoena dated January 8, 2018 on OPG-LA. JS, Ex. A. The subpoena seeks:

JS, Ex. A at 72.

OPG-LA objected to the subpoena on grounds including the following: the data sought is not proportional, and is oppressive and burdensome; privacy concerns; violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”); and violations of California statutory provisions. Donald Decl., Ex. B at 75-77.

Plaintiff also served a production request on defendant City of Los Angeles to produce the VIIC data. JS at 6; Donald Supp. Decl., Ex. A at 5. Defendant objected to this request on April 23, 2018 because it claims VIIC is not owned or managed by any defendant and therefore defendants cannot produce the data. See Donald Supp. Decl., Ex. A at 5. Plaintiff also requested defendant to produce all CHP 180 forms from November 2, 2012 to the present where a vehicle was seized under § 14602.6. Id. Defendant objected to this request as unduly burdensome, maintaining production would require a manual search that would take over nine years to complete. Id. at 6.

B. Similar Discovery Sought in Prior Lawsuits

Plaintiff's counsel has previously filed similar suits seeking the VIIC data plaintiff seeks here, in both state and federal courts. On September 10, 2013, plaintiff's counsel, representing Ricardo Castillo, et al., issued a deposition subpoena to Eric Rose, the Executive Director of OPG-LA, seeking OPG-LA records and computer data for vehicle seizures between January 1, 2008 and the present, where the seizure was pursuant to California Vehicle Code § 14602.6. Garber Decl., Ex. S. The subpoena also sought other vehicle information, such as dates of tows, whether the vehicle was stored, and vehicle disposition. Id. According to OPG-LA, the Superior Court ultimately refused to order disclosure of the DMV information contained in the VIIC database. Garber Decl. ¶ 11.

On March 27, 2014, plaintiff's counsel, then representing Colleen Flynn in a different case, filed a motion in the Los Angeles Superior Court to compel the City of Los Angeles to disclose all data recorded in the VIIC database, and all documents in Laserfiche regarding vehicle seizures, under the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”). Garber Decl., Ex. K. The court denied the motion. Garber Decl, Ex. L. Plaintiff's counsel then filed a petition for writ of mandate to the California Court of Appeal, which was denied on February 20, 2015. Garber Decl., Ex. M. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review on April 29, 2015. Garber Decl., Ex. N.

*3 On June 18, 2015, plaintiff's counsel, then representing Cynthia Anderson-Barker in a third case, filed another petition for writ of mandate under the CPRA, asking the court to order the City of Los Angeles to disclose the following records: “all data recorded in the VIIC database, for any vehicle seized at LAPD direction at any time from June 1, 2010 to the present, for which a CHP 180 form was prepared” and “allCHP 180 forms for any vehicle seized at LAPD direction at any time from June 1, 2010 to the present, for which a CHP 180 form was prepared.” Garber Decl., Ex. O. The court denied the petition on August 23, 2017. Garber Decl., Ex. Q. The court reasoned plaintiff Anderson-Barker was collaterally estopped from seeking disclosure of VIIC and Laserfiche data because she and Flynn were attorneys who shared the same business address (and incidentally, shared an address with counsel as well), which was sufficient to establish privity. Id. at 183. The court also denied the petition in the alternative because it found the language in the OPG agreements assigned ownership of the VIIC and Laserfiche data to OPG-LA instead of the City. Id. at 185.

On July 13, 2017, plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to compel OPG-LA to provide further responses to request for production and compliance with a subpoena in this court, in case number CV 16-194-FMO (Ex), Leonardo Gonzalez-Tzita, et al. v. City of Los Angeles, et al., seeking:

Case no. 16-194, docket no. 56. On August 4, 2017, the court ordered OPG-LA to provide the plaintiffs with the log numbers, dates of seizures and releases, and total fees collected for the seizures and impounds for each vehicle seized pursuant to Cal. Vehiclde Code § 21100.4 between January 11, 2014 and May 31, 2017, but denied production of other categories of VIIC data, including names and addresses of vehicle owners. Case no. CV 16-194, docket no. 58; Garber Decl., Ex. V. The court found the information it ordered to be produced was relevant, proportional, and nonprivileged. Id.

On January 24, 2018, plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to compel OPG-LA to produce VIIC data pursuant to a December 6, 2017 subpoena in Gonzalez-Tzita. The VIIC data sought was largely the same as that sought in this case, except covering a shorter time period and for seizures under Vehicle Code § 21100.4 rather than § 14602.6. See case no. CV 16-194, docket no. 73. The court denied plaintiffs' motion on February 8, 2018 because plaintiffs had failed to prove documents sought from OPG-LA would be a more accurate source of the information than documents available from defendant City of Los Angeles. Garber Decl., Ex. T; case no. CV 16-194, docket no. 78. Plaintiff's counsel then filed a motion for review of the February 8, 2018 order, which is currently under submission as of the date of this order. Garber Decl. ¶ 12; case no. CV 16-194, docket no. 84.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff believes the putative class contains about 50,000 or more vehicle owners. JS at 5. She contends identifying information for these owners and costs associated with the impounds is found in the VIIC data. Id. OPG-LA contends the information is not relevant and is otherwise not proportional and oppressive to OPG-LA. Id. at 8.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) permits “discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). To be relevant, the information sought “need not be admissible in evidence”; however, it must be “proportional to the needs of the case.” Id. In determining the needs of the case, the court “consider[s] the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. A “relevant matter” under Rule 26(b)(1) is any matter that “bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 57 L.Ed. 2d 253 (1978). Relevancy should be “construed ‘liberally and with common sense’ and discovery should be allowed unless the information sought has no conceivable bearing on the case.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1992) ).

A. Plaintiff Is Not Improperly Forum-Shopping

*4 OPG-LA argues plaintiff's counsel has been improperly forum-shopping, as he has repeatedly tried to obtain the information he seeks here from different judges. JS 14-18. The court disagrees.

Although plaintiff's counsel has filed several cases related to vehicle seizures by the LAPD in state and federal court, these cases do not constitute forum shopping. See Seneca Ins. Co. v. Strange Land, Inc., 862 F.3d 835, 846 (9th Cir. 2017) (“It typically does not constitute forum shopping where a party ‘acted within his rights in filing a suit in the forum of his choice,’ even where ‘[t]he chronology of events suggest that both parties took a somewhat opportunistic approach to th[e] litigation.’ ”) (citing Travelers Indem. Co. v. Madonna, 914 F.2d 1364, 1371 (9th Cir. 1990) and R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Transport Inc. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 981 (9th Cir. 2011) ). Further, the findings in the state cases are not applicable, and are particularly of no relevance to this court since they largely concerned efforts to obtain the data under the CPRA.

The court does take note of the pending case in this district, Gonzalez-Tzita. But Gonzalez-Tzita relates to vehicle seizures pursuant to a different Vehicle Code section and seeks vehicle seizures in a different timeframe. Moreover, to the extent the court denied plaintiff discovery in that case, the order is under review and is not binding in this case in any event. Accordingly, the court decides the instant motion independent of prior rulings on efforts to obtain the same or similar data.

B. Plaintiff Is Not Limited to Only Class Certification Discovery at This Stage

OPG-LA argues the discovery sought is premature at the pre-certification stage, because the VIIC data is not needed for the class certification motion. JS at 18. But there is no phased discovery in this case, and therefore discovery is not limited to issues related to class certification. Plaintiff is free to seek discovery related to damages, which this discovery is.

Nonetheless, the court is mindful that if class certification is denied some of the discovery sought here may become irrelevant or disproportionate to the needs of the case. Accordingly, in conducting its proportionality analysis below, the court considers whether burdensome or intrusive discovery should be deferred until after class certification is decided.

C. Disclosure of Only Some of the Requested Information Is Restricted Under State and Federal Law, and Not Absolutely

OPG-LA does not contend it would be logistically difficult or time-consuming to physically produce the requested VIIC data. But it does argue that for it to produce at least some of the requested data would require OPG-LA to run afoul of several statutory provisions and infringe on privacy interests. The court considers each such provision.

1. Driver's Privacy Protection Act

The DPPA provides: “A State department of motor vehicles, and any officer, employee, or contractor thereof, shall not knowingly disclose or otherwise make available to any person or entity: (1) personal information ... except as provided in subsection (b) of this section; or (2) highly restricted personal information ....” 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)(1). Personal information is defined as “information that identifies an individual, including an individual's photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information, but does not include information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver's status.” 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3). Highly restricted personal information refers to “an individual's photograph or image, social security number, medical or disability information.” 18 U.S.C. § 2725(4). It is also unlawful “for any person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for any use not permitted under section 2721(b) of this title.” 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a).

*5 Plaintiff argues she falls under the § 2721(b)(1) and (4) exceptions, which allow disclosure “for use by any government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency in carrying out its functions, or any private person or entity acting on behalf of a Federal, State, or local agency in carrying out its functions” and “for use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding in any Federal, State, or local court or agency or before any self-regulatory body, including the service of process, investigation in anticipation of litigation, and the execution or enforcement of judgments and orders, or pursuant to an order of a Federal, State, or local court.” 18 U.S.C. § 2821(b)(1), (4).

OPG-LA argues it is a contractor as defined in the DPPA and is therefore responsible for disclosure of personal information. JS at 33-34. Although OPG-LA claims to be a contractor, it does not offer any support for this claim. But even assuming OPG-LA is a contractor, the DPPA only prohibits dissemination of personal information related to a driver's identification information. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)(1)(prohibiting DMV contractors from disclosing “personal information in a motor vehicle record”); 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a) (prohibiting any person from knowingly disclosing “personal information from a motor vehicle record”). The DPPA plainly does not prohibit release of the vehicle information plaintiff seeks here: dates of vehicle seizures and releases; whether a vehicle was sold at a lien sale, and if so, the amount recovered; total fees collected for a vehicle seizure and impound; and the year, make, model, and license plate number of the seized vehicle (including the state) (collectively “vehicle information”). JS at 11.

Names, addresses, and driver's license numbers of the person to whom the vehicle was released is similarly not barred by the DPPA. That information would not come from a state department of motor vehicles, but rather OPG-LA itself since it collected such information. The same is true of OPG-LA's own log numbers.

In contrast, disclosure of the names, addresses, and driver's license numbers of the vehicle's registered owners is generally barred by the DPPA, because that is personal information as defined in the statute. But the DPPA does not bar disclosure of this information for use by a court or in connection with a court proceeding, including investigation in anticipation of litigation or pursuant to a court order. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1), (b)(4). In Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 66, 78, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 186 L.Ed. 2d 275 (2013), the Supreme Court found bulk solicitation of potential clients was not a use “in connection with” litigation, and therefore held that “sending communications for the predominant purpose of solicitation is not a use of personal information exempt from DPPA liability.” OPG-LA argues plaintiff seeks owner identification information here for the purpose of soliciting new clients. JS at 34. But that is simply an unsupported argument that conflicts with the realities of this case.

Plaintiff asserts she needs the identification information to give class notice. JS at 30. If a class is certified, the information will be needed for class notice, and the Supreme Court found using DPPA-protected information to send class notice is not barred by the DPPA. Maracich, 570 U.S. at 72-73. The Supreme Court also made clear that such information may be used to locate and contact witnesses in existing or imminent litigation. Id. at 63, 72. But unlike in some class actions, plaintiff's counsel has acknowledged he does not need to contact putative class members to support his class certification motion here.

*6 In sum, most of the VIIC data plaintiff seeks is not protected by the DPPA. Although owner identification information is protected, use of such information to give class notice is permitted under the DPPA. And at a minimum, if the court orders production of such information, OPG-LA would not be in violation of the DPPA. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4). But whether owner identification needed for class notice should be produced at this juncture will be further discussed below.

2. California Vehicle Code § 1808.21

OPG-LA also argues disclosure of the VIIC database violates California Vehicle Code § 1808.21 and DMV regulations. JS at 36-37. It argues the court is permitted to consider state laws in its decision. Id. at 35. Plaintiff argues state law may not be invoked to bar discovery of relevant information in a federal case. Id. at 28. Even so, plaintiff argues California Vehicle Code § 1808.22(d) permits disclosure of the data. Id. at 28-29.

Although the parties have referred to the state statutory provisions addressing disclosure as creating “privileges,” this is really not a matter of privilege. The statutes in question fundamentally address privacy concerns. “[T]he right to privacy is not a recognized privilege,” but courts still nonetheless consider it in discovery disputes. Ragge v. MCA/Universal Studios, 165 F.R.D. 601, 604, n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1995). Courts balance the importance of the information to plaintiff's claim and relevant privacy interests. See id. at 605. Accordingly, the court considers § 1808.21 and the other state privacy statutes and rights raised.

California Vehicle Code § 1808.21(a) states “any residence address in any record of the department is confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person, except ... as authorized in Section 1808.22 or 1808.23.” But this provision “does not apply to an attorney, if the attorney states, under penalty of perjury, that the motor vehicle or vessel registered owner or driver residential address information is necessary in order to represent his or her client in a criminal or civil action that directly involves the use of the motor vehicle or vessel that is pending, is to be filed, or is being investigated.” Cal. Veh. Code § 1808.22(d). OPG-LA argues this does not apply to OPG-LA because it and its members are not attorneys. JS at 36. But this is irrelevant; what is relevant is whether the information is being disclosed to an attorney. See State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 53 Cal. App. 4th 1076, 1083, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178 (1997)(“language of the exception plainly indicates the Legislature's intent to give attorneys access to information necessary to investigate claims that directly involve the use of a motor vehicle ....”); Hua Cao Xu v. Ghigliotti, 2009 WL4189851, at *11, n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2009) (“Section 1808.22 of the Vehicle Code allows an attorney to obtain confidential motor vehicle and driver information ....”). As such, it does not matter that OPG-LA and its members are not attorneys.

Here, plaintiff seeks information related to vehicle seizures when an individual is driving a vehicle with suspended or revoked driving privileges, or without having ever been issued a driver's license. See Cal. Veh. Code § 14602.6(a)(1). As such, plaintiff, through counsel, seeks information in order to represent class members. This is within the permissible disclosure under § 1808.22(d), since the vehicles in question are directly involved in the lawsuit, and the information is being disclosed to an attorney. Furthermore, the exception allows an attorney to seek residential address information for a civil action that is pending or being investigated. See Cal. Veh. Code § 1808.22(d). “The exception thus authorizes the release of address information in situations in which an attorney is investigating a potential claim ....” State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 53 Cal. App. 4th at 1081 (emphasis in original). Therefore, this statute does not prevent OPG-LA from disclosing information in the VIIC database to plaintiff.

3. California Penal Code § 13201

*7 With respect to California Penal Code § 13201, OPG-LA argues it would be subject to criminal liability if it released the CHP 180 forms because these forms would not be impounded unless LAPD suspected a crime was committed. JS at 36. California Penal Code § 13201states in whole: “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize access of any person or public agency to individual criminal offender record information unless such access is otherwise authorized by law.” Cal. Penal Code § 13201.

OPG-LA's reliance on this statute is misplaced. Criminal offender record information is defined in this chapter as:

Cal. Penal Code § 13102. There is nothing before the court to indicate individuals who have had their vehicles seized and impounded pursuant to Cal. Veh. Code § 14602.6 have had any criminal proceedings initiated against them, or have otherwise been detained or arrested. Moreover, the information sought has not been compiled by a criminal justice agency into a summary for purposes of identifying criminal offenders. As such, this statute does not apply.

4. California Penal Code §§ 11142 and 11143

OPG-LA also argues California Penal Code §§ 11142 and 11143 make it a misdemeanor to furnish to or receive a criminal record by a person not authorized to receive such a record. JS at 36. But “record” refers to the “state summary criminal history information,” which is defined as “information compiled by the Attorney General pertaining to the identification and criminal history of a person, such as name, date of birth, physical description, fingerprints, photographs, dates of arrests, arresting agencies and booking numbers, charges, dispositions, sentencing information, and similar data about the person.” See Cal. Penal Code § 11140; Cal. Penal Code § 11105(a)(2)(A). Indeed, this term does not refer to records “compiled by criminal justice agencies other than the Attorney General.” See Cal. Penal Code § 11105(a)(2)(B). These statutes do not apply here since plaintiff does not seek information compiled by the Attorney General, or information related to individuals' criminal history. Therefore, California Penal Code §§ 11142 and 11143 do not prohibit OPG-LA from disclosing the vehicle or personal information plaintiff seeks.

OPG-LA further argues release of this information will violate its obligations to the DMV. But these obligations simply require OPG-LA to comply with applicable federal and state statutes. Donald Decl., Ex. H, ¶ 16; JS at 37. As discussed above, release of the information sought is not prohibited by the DPPA or any state statute. Therefore, OPG-LA's obligations to the DMV do not prohibit release of this information.

5. Federal Constitutional Right to Privacy

Lastly, OPG-LA notes federal courts “ordinarily recognize a constitutionally based right of privacy that can be raised in response to discovery requests.” Guthrey v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 2012 WL 2499938, at *15 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) (citing Breed v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Northern District, 542 F.2d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 1976) ). “Resolution of a privacy objection ... requires a balancing of the need for the information sought against the privacy right asserted.” Keith H. v. Long Beach Unified School Dist., 228 F.R.D. 652, 657 (C.D. Cal. 2005)(citations omitted). The court will accordingly balance plaintiff's need for the requested information at this stage of the proceedings against the privacy concerns raised by OPG-LA, also weighing the “strong public interest in uncovering civil rights violations.” Id. (citation omitted).

*8 Here, OPG-LA only cites to cases that relate to medical information. JS at 37-38 (citing Stallworth v. Brollini, 288 F.R.D. 439, 444 (N.D. Cal. 2012) and Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 97 S. Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed. 2d 64 (1977) ). There is no indication the vehicle information in the VIIC database is protected to the same extent as medical records. See Ragge, 165 F.R.D. at 604 (requested information was not related to sexual, health, or financial matters, which are generally considered private or confidential). Medical information, which can reveal potentially embarrassing or implicating information about an individual's history, is distinguishable from vehicle information.

Nonetheless, individuals do have some privacy interest in their personal and residential information. By contrast, their privacy interest in the other, vehicle-centered VIIC data sought – particularly without their names attached to it – is de minimus. But although individuals have a legitimate privacy interest in their identification information, such privacy interest may be addressed to large extent by a protective order, and may be further addressed by notice where warranted.

When and if a class is certified, plaintiff will have a strong need for the identification information, and that need should outweigh any privacy concerns. But at this juncture, plaintiff has acknowledged she does not need the identification information to move for class certification. Accordingly, the court finds there is no significant privacy interest that weighs against disclosure of the log number or vehicle information sought, but there is a significant privacy interest in the identification information pertaining to both owners and those to whom the vehicles were released, and that privacy interest outweighs plaintiff's only slight need for the information at this juncture.

D. Production of Non-Identifying VIIC Data Is Not Disproportionate

Plaintiff argues there is no burden to OPG-LA to produce the requested data because it will only take minutes to provide the data. JS at 38, Dwight Decl. ¶ 8. OPG-LA makes many irrelevant arguments in response, referencing deficiencies in Dwight Cook's declaration, defendant City's access to the VIIC data (which the City denies), and plaintiff's providing an outdated version of the OPG agreement. JS at 40-48. But OPG-LA acknowledged at the hearing that the act of production requires no significant effort. And OPG-LA's argument that plaintiff should instead seek the information from defendant City via CHP 180 forms makes no practical sense. The City claims it would take nine years to gather the responsive forms. Further, despite some potential errors in transferring information from the CHP 180 forms to VIIC, there has been no showing of significant errors. There is no reason plaintiff should spend time going over forms manually when virtually the same information – plus more – may be electronically obtained from VIIC. Although OPG-LA is a non-party, it is a non-party with close ties to defendants, and should fairly assume the limited discovery burden asked here.

The only true burden argument OPG-LA makes is that the discovery sought places a great burden on it due to the threat of criminal and civil liability and other expenses in giving notice to the vehicle owners as required by the DMV. Id. at 48-49. But as discussed above, OPG-LA would not be violating any laws by producing this information, particularly under court order. Therefore, the court is not convinced OPG-LA would be unduly burdened by producing the information to plaintiff.

*9 The court also does not find production of the log number is disproportionate to the needs of the case or unwarranted. Although OPG-LA argues the log numbers may act as a key to the private Laserfiche System, when pressed it acknowledged that even with the log numbers plaintiff still would not be able to access Laserfiche, absent a further court order. Additionally, while the log numbers may not be needed to organize and sort the data, they could be useful to track vehicle and, ultimately if needed, owner information.

Due to the privacy concerns discussed above, however, coupled with the potential expense of giving notice, the court does not find production of the owner identification information sought is proportionate to the needs of the case at this point. If the class is certified, plaintiff may again seek this data.

E. VIIC Data Must Be Produced Electronically as Requested

Plaintiff argues if production is ordered, the VIIC data must be produced as computer text data because it is created and stored as electronic text data. JS at 51-52. OPG-LA argues it does not maintain reports of the requested data in its ordinary course of business, and it is not ordinarily stored in the manner in which plaintiff seeks. JS at 52. It argues Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require the responding party to create new documents in responding to a document production request. JS at 53.

The court finds the vehicle information in the VIIC database should be produced electronically as plaintiff requests. OPG-LA argues it does not store data according to the California Vehicle Code violation, but it does not argue there is some other procedure preventing it from producing vehicle information as it exists in the VIIC database. Although OPG-LA may have to conduct some electronic sorting to produce only the requested data, this is akin to conducting electronic keyword searches for responsive emails. The alternative is for OPG-LA to grant plaintiff access to VIIC to search the database herself, an option OPG-LA did not seem interested in at the hearing.

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART plaintiff's motion to compel (docket no. 82) as follows:

OPG-LA is ordered to produce the following VIIC data in electronic format, for vehicles seized on or after November 2, 2012 under California Vehicle Code § 14602.6: log numbers; date the vehicle was seized; date the vehicle was released; whether the vehicle was sold at a lien sale; if the vehicle was sold at a lien sale, the amount recovered; total fees collected for the vehicle seizure and subsequent impound; and year, make, model, and license plate number of the seized vehicle (including the state).

OPG-LA is not required to produce the following VIIC data at this time: the name(s), address(es), and driver's license number(s) of the vehicle's registered owner(s) and the name(s), address(es), and driver's license number(s) of the person to whom the vehicle was released. Plaintiff's motion to compel production of this data is denied at this time without prejudice.