HAROUT BAGDASARYAN, et al. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al Case No. 2:15-cv-01008-JLS (KES) United States District Court, C.D. California Filed November 01, 2017 Counsel Harout Bagdasaryan, Tujunga, CA, pro se. Masis Bagdasaryan, Tujunga, CA, pro se. Kenneth T. Fong, Yongdan Li, Terry P. Kaufmann Macias, Michael Nelson Feuer, Steven N. Blau, Los Angeles City Attorney's Office, Los Angeles, CA, for City of Los Angeles, et al. Scott, Karen E., United States Magistrate Judge Order DENYING in Part and GRANTING in Part Plaintiffs' Request to Compel Discovery and for Evidentiary Sanctions (Dkt. 89.) *1 On September 15, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Request to Compel Discovery and for Evidentiary Sanctions (the “Motion”). (Dkt. 89.) For the reasons below, the Motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. On August 25, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a discovery motion requesting a variety of relief, including evidentiary sanctions and the production of records. (Dkt. 69.) On August 30, 2017, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to file additional information (including the at-issue discovery demands, Defendant's responses, and a description of the parties' meet and confer efforts) by September 15, 2017 if Plaintiffs wished to pursue their motion. (Dkt. 78.) The Court advised that the specified information would not be deemed a new motion in violation of the August 30, 2017 discovery motion cutoff if submitted by September 15, 2017. (Id.) Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed the Motion. (Dkt. 89.) The Motion seeks relief including (1) the compelled production of documents responsive to Plaintiffs' documents requests (“RFPs”) Nos. 1-5, 11-15, 17-19, 23, 25, 26, 32-38; and (2) evidentiary sanctions or special jury instructions related to spoliation. (Id. at 9-21; 21-22.) On September 18, 2017, Defendant filed a request for instruction regarding the Motion. (Dkt. 92.) Defendant disputed the adequacy of Plaintiffs' meet and confer efforts and requested an extended opposition deadline. (Id. at 2-3.) In response, the Court vacated the noticed hearing date, and ordered the parties to meet and confer. (Dkt. 93.) If issues raised by the Motion remained unresolved following that conference, then Defendant was ordered to oppose the Motion and summarize the parties' further meet and confer efforts. (Id.) On September 26, 2017, Defendant filed an opposition to the Motion (the “Opposition”). (Dkt. 99.) The Opposition did not address further meet and confer efforts. It did, however, take issue with the merits of each of Plaintiffs' discovery demands. Plaintiffs filed reply briefing on October 10, 2017 (the “Reply”). (Dkt. 104.) The Court finds the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. II. PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS. The claims in Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) relate to several parcels of property used for residential and commercial purposes. (TAC ¶¶ 10; 38; 42.) The key addresses are 6908 Shadygrove Street, Tujanga, California (“6908 Shadygrove”); 11234 West Tuxford Street, Unit #D, Sun Valley, California (“11234 Tuxford”); and 11224 West Tuxford Street, Sun Valley, California (“11224 Tuxford”). (Id.) The operative TAC alleges that Defendant's inspectors fabricated invoices related to Defendant's Annual Inspection and Monitoring (“AIM”) program and engaged in other misconduct while inspecting the properties and enforcing the municipal code. (See id. ¶¶ 10-26; 38-59.) In particular, Plaintiffs take issue with the allegedly improper conduct of Inspector Eric Jakeman of the Los Angeles Code Enforcement Division. (See id. ¶¶ 10-25.) The TAC also alleges that a provision of the Los Angeles Municipal Code known as Ordinance 181033 is unconstitutional, and contends that the ordinance's “underlying factor” is to “collect fees from hard working minorities” who have “taken over” the automotive repair industry. (Id. at ¶ 29.) *2 Plaintiffs have amended their complaint several times. (Dkts. 1; 12; 24.) The remaining claims against Defendant are as follows: • As to Plaintiff Masis Bagdasaryan: (1) violations of substantive due process; (2) violations of procedural due process; (3) violations of the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”); (4) abuse of process; (5) elder abuse; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Dkt. 37 at 2-3.) • As to Plaintiff Harout Bagdasaryan: (1) violations of the CPRA; and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id.; Dkt. 19 at 24.) In connection with Defendant's motions to dismiss, the Court previously limited the scope of Plaintiffs' claims as follows: • Masis Bagdasaryan's procedural due process claim is confined to the allegation that he was billed and paid for late charges that accrued during months when he lack notice that his tenant had failed to pay. (Dkt. 19 at 16; 24.) • Masis Bagdasaryan's substantive due process claim is limited to allegations that Mr. Jakeman demanded payment of fabricated invoices. (Dkt. 19 at 19; 24.) • Plaintiffs, having failed to state a claim after leave to amend, may not assert other claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant, including claims based on Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). (Dkt. 19 at 19-21; 23.)[1] • Plaintiffs may not assert facial challenges to the constitutionality of Ordinance 181033, because they are time-barred. (Dkt. 19 at 11-12; 23.) III. PERSONNEL FILES (RFP NOS. 1-5; 11-15; 18-19). A. Plaintiffs' Requests. The first category of RFPs in dispute relates to requests for the production of personnel records for County employees. Specifically, Plaintiffs move to compel production of documents responsive to the following demands: • RFP No. 1: All personnel files which concern, refer to and/or describe Defendant's employee, Eric Jakeman. • RFP No. 2: All personnel files which concern, refer to and/or describe Defendant's employee, Jason Sibley. • RFP No. 3: All personnel files which concern, refer to and/or describe Defendant's employee, Frank Bush. • RFP No. 4: All personnel files which concern, refer to and/or describe Defendant's employee, Larry Galstian. • RFP No. 5: All personnel files which concern, refer to and/or describe Defendant's employee, Henry Baghdassarian. • RFP No. 11: All documents related to complaints filed against Mr. Eric Jakeman from 2012 to Present. • RFP No. 12: All documents related to allegations filed or made against Mr. Eric Jakeman from 2012 to Present. • RFP No. 13: Documents which describe all supervisory functions of the position(s) held by Eric Jakeman while working for YOU and the duties of same, from 2012 to present. • RFP No. 14: Documents which describe all supervisory functions of the position(s) held by Kim Arther while working for YOU and the duties of same, from 2012 to present. • RFP No. 15: Documents which describe all supervisory functions of the position(s) held by Larry Galstian while working for YOU and the duties of same, from 2012 to present. *3 • RFP No. 18: Any and all documents showing performance reviews or evaluations of Eric Jakeman during PLAINTIFF'S Inspection Complaints with YOU. • RFP No. 19: Any and all documents showing commendations or awards to Eric Jakeman during his employment with YOU. (Dkt. 89 at 9-12.) B. Parties' Positions. Defendant objected to these requests on grounds of relevance (except for RFP No. 18), privacy, and confidentiality. (Dkt. 99-6 [Fong Decl.], Ex. 1 at 5-27.)[2] It appears that Defendant did not produce any responsive documents. In the parties' meet and confer correspondence, Defendant offered to produce a narrowed set of personnel information for Mr. Jakeman. (Dkt. 90 [M. Bagdasaryan Decl.] Ex. 1 at 10.) That offer was qualified, however, by the conditions that the information (1) be produced subject to a stipulated protective order; and (2) that Plaintiffs “clarify” their position “re whether abuse of process is the only cause of action for which [they] believe the personnel information sought is relevant.” (Id.) Plaintiffs did not accept this offer, but instead brought the Motion. In the Motion, Plaintiffs assert that the personnel files “include many documents which are likely to lead to admissible evidence relating to the professional conduct, training and experience, bias of the persons and witnesses, and evidence for impeachment purposes.” (Dkt. 89 at 12.) They argue that the “central issue” is the “abuse of power by the inspectors....” (Id.) Plaintiffs also contend that the files are “highly relevant” to Defendant's “practice or custom” of failing to properly hire, screen, train, and discipline. (Id. at 13.) They admit that they “would not contend that all documents in the files will contain relevant information.” (Id. at 12.) Plaintiffs continue, however, by stating that “without knowing what is contained in the files” they “cannot identify” which documents need to be produced. (Id.) In particular, Plaintiffs state that they are requesting personnel information that would indicate “job performance, acts related to misconduct, investigations regarding any misconduct, documented complaints, ‘coaching;’ or feedback from managers regarding behavior and performance.” (Id. at 13.) In support of their arguments, Plaintiffs cite State v. Januszewski, 182 Conn. 142 (1980), a Connecticut Supreme Court criminal law decision holding that the trial court had committed harmless error in refusing to conduct an in camera review of the personnel file of a police officer—who was the state's “key witness”—to determine whether it contained material “relevant to the issue of credibility ....” Id. at 173-174. Januszewski noted, under the circumstances, that “[t]he trial court should make available to the defendant only information that it concludes is clearly material and relevant to the issue involved.” Id. at 173. *4 Defendant responds that Plaintiffs' requests for personnel files are a “massive ‘fishing expedition.’ ” (Dkt. 99 at 8; 11.) With respect to Mr. Jakeman, Defendant faults Plaintiffs for failing to explain how his personnel files are relevant to any cause of action. As for the remaining at-issue employee, Defendant takes the position that nothing in the TAC implicates their files. Defendant asserts that, because Plaintiffs' claims under Monell were dismissed without leave to amend, the “custom and practice” of Defendant is also irrelevant. (Id. at 11.) It further contends that character evidence in personnel files cannot be used as evidence to prove action in conformity with that character. (Dkt. 99 at 11 [citing Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)].) C. Analysis. Generally, parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is “relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. “Federal courts recognize “[a] person's interest in preserving the confidentiality of sensitive information contained in his [or her] personnel files.” Detroit Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 440 U.S. 301, 319 n. 16 (1979). Based on Plaintiffs' allegations, requests for the entire personnel files of Mr. Jakeman, Jason Sibley, Frank Bush, Larry Galstian, and Henry Baghdassarian are overbroad and seek irrelevant records. The demands for documents describing “all supervisory functions” of Mr. Jakeman, Ms. Arther, and Mr. Galstian suffer the same defects. Although no individual is a named defendant, the TAC's allegations focus on misconduct by Mr. Jakeman. The TAC alleges only limited facts regarding the other individuals. Plaintiffs assert, for example, that: Mr. Sibley accompanied Mr. Jakeman on 2011 inspections (TAC ¶¶ 12; 23); Mr. Bush was a friend and mentor of Mr. Jakeman (id. ¶ 51); Mr. Bush was a leader of the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety who, along with Ms. Arther and Mr. Jakeman, was “well aware” of the “issues and actions” (id. ¶ 95); Mr. Galstian engaged in conversation with Mr. Jakeman regarding Mr. Jakeman's decisions about who would inspect a property (id. ¶ 26); Mr. Galstian was present at a November 2014 meeting involving Plaintiffs and “presented another bill” during this interaction (id. ¶ 52); Mr. Galstian offered to “work” with Plaintiffs if they withdrew their complaints (id. ¶ 55); Mr. Baghdassarian has unspecified conflicts with Mr. Jakeman (id. ¶ 119); and Mr. Baghdassarian was “removed” as inspector of the at-issue properties because Mr. Jakeman “believed that [Mr. Baghdassarian was] related to Masis Bagdasaryan.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Given that these allegations are not central to Plaintiffs' claims, Plaintiffs' requests for personnel files of Ms. Arther and Messrs. Sibley, Bush, Galastian, and Baghdassarian, along with records describing “all supervisory functions” of Mr. Jakeman, Ms. Arther, and Mr. Galstian, are not justified. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1) (discovery must be “proportional to the needs of the case,” considering whether “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”). The Court agrees with Defendant that the at-issue documents likely contain sensitive information. Among other things, personnel files may include salary history, personal contact and background information, performance assessments, and records of physical and/or environmental limitations. Moreover, given Plaintiffs' focus on discrete incidents, the production of the demanded personnel files would not be relevant to a municipal policy under Monell. Plaintiffs' citation to the nonbinding Januszewski case, which itself stated that only personnel information “clearly material and relevant to the issue involved” should be produced, does not alter this conclusion. While it is possible that Plaintiffs could have framed their demands more narrowly, they did not, and “it is not the province of the Court to rewrite discovery requests.” Mycosafe Diagnotics GMBH v. Life Techs. Corp., 13-cv-93, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193543, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013). In light of these facts, and Plaintiffs' admission that not all documents in the requested files will be relevant, production of the personnel files of Ms. Arther and Messrs. Sibley, Bush, Galastian, and Baghdassarian is DENIED. *5 In contrast to the other at-issue individuals, Mr. Jakeman's conduct is more specifically alleged in the TAC. In particular, the TAC asserts that Mr. Jakeman “created a duplicate bill for collection,” (TAC ¶ 40), and engaged in a “pattern of harassment.” (Id. ¶ 43) These allegations are at the heart of Plaintiffs' case. Therefore, although a demand for Mr. Jakeman's entire personnel file is overbroad, some discovery into Mr. Jakeman's relevant history is appropriate. That discovery includes personnel records that could support the claims that Mr. Jakeman fabricated inspection invoices (i.e., “created a duplicate bill”) or intentionally caused harassment or distress. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (past acts may be admissible for purposes such “as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident”).[3] Defendant is therefore ordered to produce within 14 days of this order the following records, if any exist: (1) documents reflecting complaints against Mr. Jakeman relating to (a) the creation and distribution of invoices, or (b) intimidating behavior, threats, harassment, racial or ethnic discrimination, or other abuse of power during the course of inspections; (2) documents in Mr. Jakeman's personnel file reflecting his dishonesty, deceptive acts, or false statements; or (3) non-privileged documents in Mr. Jakeman's personnel file reflecting investigations into the complaints or dishonest behavior listed in (1) or (2). Further, Defendant shall produce any documents from Mr. Bush's personnel file reflecting Mr. Bush's handling of complaints about Mr. Jakeman. Sensitive personal information such as birthdate, addresses, and identification numbers may be redacted. If no responsive documents exist, Defendant shall provide to Plaintiffs a verified response within 14 days of this order so stating. The production of this narrowed category of documents is consistent with Defendant's offer during the parties' meet and confer to produce (subject to conditions) “personnel information that would indicate [Mr. Jakeman's] job performance, acts related to misconduct, investigations regarding any misconduct, documented complaints, ‘coaching;’ or feedback from manager regarding behavior and performance.” (Dkt. 99-10 at 40.) To the extent Defendant believes that responsive documents exist that should be subject to a protective order, the parties are ordered to meet and confer and submit a proposed stipulated protective order without 10 days of this order. A standard form protective order may be found on the webpage listing this Court's procedures. Plaintiffs' failure to participate in that process may result in the denial of discovery. IV. INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS (RFP NOS. 25, 26). A. Plaintiffs' Requests. Plaintiffs next seek to compel productions responsive to RFP Nos. 25 and 26: • RFP No. 25: Documents describing, summarizing or referring to any investigation conducted by YOU, at any time referring in any way to any allegations of discrimination or misconduct by Mr. Eric Jakeman. • RFP No. 26: A copy of the report by Mr. Steve Davey regarding his investigation of the Plaintiffs [sic] inspection complaints prepared for the Mayor's office. B. Parties' Positions. Defendant asserts that RFPs Nos. 25 and 26 are duplicative, and relate to a single report prepared by an individual named Steve Davey (the “Davey Report”). (Dkt. 99 at 12). Plaintiffs dispute that conclusion, stating that RFP No. 25 is “separate and apart” from RFP No. 26 and seeks “non-privileged documentations related to allegations of discrimination or misconduct by” Mr. Jakeman. (Dkt. 104 at 8.) The Court ordered a narrowed production of such records above in Section III. It therefore focuses in this section on the production of the Davey Report. Defendant objected to that production on attorney-client privilege and work product grounds. (Dkt. 99-6 [Fong Decl.], Ex. 1 at 29-31.) In their Motion, Plaintiffs contend that the Davey Report is not privileged. (Dkt. 89 at 16.) They assert that Mr. Davey is not related to the City Attorney's office, and that the Davey Report was not made at the request of that office. (Id.) Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Davey asserted in “audio recordings” that his investigation was not related to the “pending litigation” or made at the request of the City Attorney. (Id.)[4] They allege that Mr. Davey conducted an interview with both Plaintiffs “two months prior to the case being filed.” (Dkt. 104 at 6.) Further, Plaintiffs claim that even if the attorney-client privileged does apply, the “factual recitations” in the Davey Report do not reveal legal strategy or analysis such that the report should be produced. (Dkt. 89 at 16.) Lastly, Plaintiffs assert that the work-product doctrine should not preclude production as they have demonstrated a substantial need for the report. (Id. at 17.) *6 Defendant counters by submitting evidence that Mr. Davey is a special investigator in the City of Los Angeles Personnel Department. (99-4 [Davey Decl.] at ¶ 1.) Mr. Davey declares that he prepared a report about investigation into Plaintiffs' allegations, dated July 26, 2015, after Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 3.) Mr. Davey states that he prepared his report “specifically” for Tayo Popoola of the Los Angeles City Attorney's office, who he understood to be the attorney representing Defendant. (Id. at ¶ 5.) He addressed the report to Mr. Popoola and Phyllis Lynes, an Assistant General Manager of the Personnel Department. (Id. at ¶ 6.) After submitting his report, Mr. Davey discussed it with Mr. Popoola several times, but did not share it with any third-party. (Id. ¶¶7-8.) Defendant disputes that Mr. Davey made the claimed “audio recording” statements, characterizing that as a “baseless accusation.” (Dkt. 99 at 15.) C. Analysis. Courts applying federal law have “[t]ypically” used an eight-part test to determine whether the attorney-client privileged exists: “(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection be waived.” United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 607 (9th Cir. 2009).[5] As the party asserting the privilege, Defendant has the burden on proving it applies. Id. at 609 (“[T]he party asserting the privilege ... was obliged by federal law to establish the privileged nature of the communications ....”). “In addition to communications directly between client and counsel, it is well-established that the attorney-client privilege may extend to communications with a third party where that third party has been retained as an agent for the purposes of assisting a lawyer in providing legal advice to a client.” Todd v. STAAR Surgical Co., 14-cv-05263-MWF-RZ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189237, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015) (citing United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2nd Cir. 1961); United States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 2011)). “The fact that the communications relate solely to fact-finding ... is not sufficient to defeat the privilege.” Id. at *16 (citing United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“In the context of an organization's internal investigation, if one of the significant purposes of the internal investigation was to obtain or provide legal advice, the privilege will apply.”). Here, Defendant has carried its burden of establishing the privileged nature of the Davey Report. Mr. Davey states that he prepared the report after litigation commenced “specifically” for Defendant's attorney as part of his normal work duties. (99-4 [Davey Decl.] at ¶¶ 1; 5.) He further declares that he later discussed the report with counsel. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiffs do not make any evidentiary showing that the report was not prepared post-litigation, that it was distributed to third parties other than Ms. Lynes, or that it was not prepared for Defendant's attorney, other than to rely on an unidentified “audio recording.” (Dkt. 89 at 16.) Further, Plaintiffs' assertion that Mr. Davey interviewed them “two months” before the commencement of this litigation is inconsistent with Plaintiffs' claim that Mr. Davey said during that interview that “his investigation was not ... related to the pending litigation.” (Dkt. 89 at 16 (emphasis added).) It would not make sense for Mr. Davey to disclaim a relationship to a “pending” lawsuit if there was, in fact, none pending. *7 Defendant alternatively asserts that the Davey Report should not be produced because it is attorney work product. Subject to certain exceptions, “a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent).” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(3)(A). Courts have determined that internal investigations can constitute work product. See Patel v. L-3 Communs. Holdings, Inc., 14-cv-6038, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97241, at *13 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2016) (citing, inter alia, In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., 05-md-01695, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16922 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2007) (designating as protected work product documents created by outside counsel's forensic accountants in order to assist outside counsel in providing legal advice regarding an internal investigation)). Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that the work product doctrine may apply to the Davey Report, but instead assert that they have demonstrated a substantial need for factual information in the Davey Report pursuant to Rule 26(b)(3)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. 89 at 17.) The Court rejects this argument, particularly where Plaintiffs have not deposed Mr. Davey or any other person. As a result, Plaintiffs' request to compel production of the Davey Report is DENIED. V. REMAINING RFPS (RFP NOS. 17, 23, 32-38). A. Plaintiffs' Requests. Plaintiffs also seek to compel the production of documents responsive to the following RFPs, paraphrased here for purposes of brevity: • RFP No. 17: Communications between Plaintiffs and any supervisor / manager of Defendant. • RFP No. 23: Communications among Defendant's agents concerning Plaintiffs' complaints. • RFP No. 32: Documents related to deletion of records related to the Department of Building and Safety. • RFP No. 33: Documents related to intentional destruction of “Pipertech” records. • RFP No. 34: Policy and procedures related to destruction of “Pipertech” records. • RFP No. 35: Documents reflecting “accounts” opened for property at 11234 Tuxford. • RFP No. 36: Documents reflecting “accounts” opened for property at 11224 Tuxford. • RFP No. 37: Documents related to inspections conducted at 6908 Shadygrove by Mr. Jakeman. • RFP No. 38: Documents related to any order to comply issued “on” 11234 Tuxford. (Dkt. 89 at 14-15; 17-21.) B. Parties' Positions. In response to each of these RFPs, Defendant objected but indicated that it would produce specified records. (Dkt. 99-6 [Fong Decl.], Ex. 1 at 25-37.) Plaintiffs now contend that documents they believe should exist are missing from the productions. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant has not produced (1) “any policy or procedures ... related to Pipertech,” including a “document read to [Plaintiffs] by a person at the [C]ity records office;” and (2) internal notes related to 6908 Shadygrove and 11234 Tuxford, including notes the “Finance Office” read “verbatim” to Plaintiffs and “digital records.” (Dkt. 89 at 18; 20.) In its opposition to the Motion, Defendant states that, with respect to each of RFPs Nos. 17, 23, and 32-38, it has produced “all existing documents responsive ... in its possession, custody, or control.” (Dkt. 99 at 16-21; Dkt. 99-2 [Van Do Decl.] ¶¶ 4-6.) Defendant further argues that RFPs Nos. 35 and 36 seek irrelevant information. (Dkt. 99 at 19.) C. Analysis. “A court cannot order a party to produce documents that do not exist. Plaintiffs' mere suspicion that additional documents exist does not justify a motion to compel.” MGA Entm't, Inc. v. Nat'l Prods., 10-cv-07083 JAK-SS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113557, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2011) (collecting relevant cases). “[T]he moving party must have a colorable basis for its belief that relevant, responsive documents exist and are being improperly withheld.” Id. at *5. Here, Defendant asserts that it has provided all records responsive to RFPs Nos. 17, 23, and 32-38. (Dkt. 99 at 16-21; Dkt. 99-2 [Van Do Decl.] ¶¶ 4-6.) While Plaintiffs contend that certain records are missing, including a policy read to them at the “City Records Office” and notes read to them at the “Finance Office,” their vague allegations do not raise a colorable claim that documents are being improperly withheld. Plaintiffs provide insufficient facts stating who “read” them the purported documents or when this happened. Further, Defendant's employee Michael Van Do declares that he collected for production those responsive documents that he could locate “after diligent search and reasonable inquiry.” (Dkt. 99-2 [Van Do Decl.] ¶¶ 4-6.) *8 Although the Court accepts Defendant's assertion that it has located and produced responsive documents, it notes that Defendant's responses to the at-issue discovery demands are deficient. Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 34”) requires that a RFP response “either state that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 34(b)(2)(B). It further mandates that an objection “state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 34(b)(2)(C). Defendant's responses to RFPs Nos. 17, 23, and 32-38 are not compliant with Rule 34. In those responses, Defendant asserts objections. It then provides answers which purport to unilaterally narrow the document demands, without stating whether responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of its objections. For example, RFP No. 17 requests certain communications between Plaintiffs and Defendant's supervisors. Defendant objects and responds that it will produce “inspection files” regarding the relevant properties. This does not allow Plaintiffs to ascertain whether all responsive documents have been produced. Despite this shortcoming, Defendant's opposition states that all documents responsive to RFPs Nos. 17, 23, and 32-38 have been produced. (Dkt. 99 at 16-21; Dkt. 99-2 [Van Do Decl.] ¶¶ 4-6.) Accordingly, consistent with that representation, Defendant is ordered to provide within 14 days of this order amended responses to RFPs Nos. 17, 23, and 32-38 stating that all responsive, non-privileged responsive documents have been produced. VI. REQUESTS BASED ON DECEMBER 8, 2015 COURT ORDER. In addition to the RFPs raised above, Plaintiffs base portions of their Motion on a December 8, 2015 Court order that provided a list of “[d]ocuments likely relevant to the parties' claims and defenses.” (Dkt. 28 at 2.) That order related to obligations surrounding initial disclosures. Nonetheless, because there appears to be overlap between the Court's order and Plaintiffs' discovery demands, the Court will address the relevant document categories below. A. “All Records of County Inspections at the Properties Identified in the TAC.” (Dkt. 28 at 2.) 1. Photographs of 11234 Tuxford. Plaintiffs assert that they have not received photographs of the inspection of 11234 Tuxford conducted in November 2012. (Dkt. 89 at 2.) Such records appear responsive to RFP No. 38 (documents related to any order to comply “issued on” 11234 Tuxford). Plaintiffs argue that they received photographs for inspections in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016, but not for 2012. (Dkt. 104 at 11.) They assert that 2012 photographs would show that a “tenant” did not occupy the unit during the time of inspection, and that thus no invoice should have been issued. (Id.) Defendant has submitted evidence that the relevant inspection file does not contain photos. (Dkt. 99-8 [Ross Decl.] ¶ 2.) As noted above, Defendant cannot be compelled to produce records that do not exist. Consistent with the Court's order above, however, Defendant shall provide an amended response to RFP No. 38 stating that all responsive, non-privileged documents have been produced. 2. Photographs of 6908 Shadygrove. Plaintiffs ask the Court compel to the production of photographs taken by Eric Jakeman and Jason Sibley of 6908 Shadygrove. (Dkt. 89 at 2.) These documents, at least as to photos taken by Mr. Jakeman, appear responsive to RFP No. 37 (all documents related to inspections at 6908 Shadygrove conducted by Mr. Jakeman). Defendant submits evidence that Mr. Jakeman never took photos of 6908 Shadygrove, and that Mr. Sibley did recall taking such photos, but did not save them or place them in the inspection files. (Dkt. 99-5 [Jakeman Decl.] ¶ 5; Dkt. 99-9 [Sibley Decl.] ¶ 4.) As noted above, Defendant cannot be compelled to produce records that do not exist. Consistent with the Court's order above, however, Defendant shall provide an amended response to RFP No. 37 stating that all responsive, non-privileged documents have been produced. 3. 1994 Northridge Earthquake Inspections. *9 Plaintiffs ask the Court to compel the production of records of 1994 Northridge earthquake inspections and approvals for 11224 Tuxford related to “Disaster SBA funds.” (Dkt. 89 at 3.) Defendant frames this request as “irrelevant and nonsensical,” and asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to link the alleged “SBA Funds” to any allegations concerning Defendant. (Dkt. 99 at 28 n. 19.) Plaintiffs do not address the request for earthquake inspections records in their Reply. Plaintiff did not expressly request records arising from the 1994 earthquake in their RFPs. RFP No. 39 requests all documents “related to” any order to comply issued on 11224 Tuxford. The Court agrees with Defendants that records related to the 1994 Northridge earthquake are irrelevant to Plaintiffs' current claims that Defendant improperly issued an order to comply related to 11224 Tuxford in 2014. (TAC ¶ 42.) While Plaintiffs contend that such records could potentially indicate that the 11224 Tuxford property was in compliance with regulatory standards over two decades ago (Dkt. 89 at 3), such compliance would not foreclose a later order to comply. RFP No. 39, however, which requests all documents related to any order to comply issued on 11224 Tuxford, appears more narrowly tailored to this case, and seeks relevant records. Defendant's original response to RFP No. 39 states that it will produce “inspection files” related to 11224 Tuxford. As set forth above, Defendant's unilateral attempt to limit the scope of the RFP is improper. Defendant shall provide an amended response to RFP No. 39 stating that all responsive, non-privileged documents have been produced. B. “All invoices for Fees or Fines/Penalties” (Dkt. 28 at 2). 1. All Invoices for Fees or Fines / Penalties And Records of Payment / Nonpayment. Without indicating which RFP is at issue, Plaintiffs request the production of “[a]ll invoices for fees or fines/penalties related to inspections at the properties identified in the TAC dating back to the inception of the AIM program,” and “[a]ll records or payment of non-payment of invoices.” (Dkt. 89 at 3.) Defendant correctly points out that relevant documents are limited to invoices relating to 11234 Tuxford. (Dkt. 99 at 27.) As explained above, Defendant has submitted evidence that it has produced documents responsive to potentially relevant requests, i.e. RFPs Nos. 35 and 38. Further, the Court has ordered Defendant to provide amended responses indicating that it has produced all non-privileged, responsive documents. Additional relief is therefore unnecessary. 2. “Second Page” of AIM Surveys. Plaintiffs contend that the AIM “Survey reports for 11234 Tuxford” that Defendant produced are missing a second page containing information related to prior bills and invoices. (Dkt. 89 at 21.) They assert that reports issued after 2011 were missing the second page and request the forms in the “digital native format” to verify that no page was omitted.[6] (Dkt. 104 at 11.) Defendant counters that some AIM reports are simply one page long, and submits an example of one such document. (Dkt. 99 at 23; Dkt. 99-2 [Van Do Decl.] ¶ 6, Ex. 3.) There are a limited number of at-issue AIM surveys or reports for 11234 Tuxford. Defendant is ordered to provide Plaintiffs a declaration, signed by an individual with appropriate authority, indicating that no pages have been omitted from the production of such surveys or reports. If pages have been omitted, Defendant shall produce them or explain the reason for this omission. 3. Collection Activities. *10 Plaintiffs request the production of communications between Defendant and the “collection companies” used for the “invoices.” (Dkt. 89 at 22.) Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the “December 2011 invoice” was paid through collections. (Id.) Plaintiffs do not indicate which RFP they believe that these documents may be responsive to, and it does not appear that any of their requests sought such records. Further, Defendant presents evidence that neither of the two at-issue invoices related to 11234 Tuxford were paid though a collection agency. (Dkt. 99-3 [Truong Decl.] ¶ 4.) Therefore, this request is denied. C. Metadata / Native Format. Plaintiffs also make various requests for metadata and/or files in native formatting, citing the Court's statement in its December 8, 2015 order that “[r]ecords showing the creation date and author” of invoices related to county inspections may be relevant, and that the County “may have document control software that provides such data.” (Dkt. 28 at 2.) Specifically, throughout their Motion, Plaintiffs request: • “[M]eta data or the data that explains the data to show when these invoices and order to complies were created and by whom ....” (Dkt. 89 at 2.) • “[A] copy of the code enforcement data in its native form including any of the hand written notes the city would have archived ....” (Dkt. 89 at 3.) • “[M]eta data for the photos [of 6908 Shadygrove] to indicate when they were taken and verify that the dates of the photos are accurate and to provide that in a digital format ....” (Dkt. 89 at 22.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs have not requested metadata in any RFP. (Dkt. 99 at 25.) Further, it points out that Defendant has compiled a record for Plaintiffs containing data regarding invoices relating to 11234 Tuxford, including the name of the inspector conducting the inspection, the date of the inspection, and the date an invoice was printed. (Id. at 26.) In independently reviewing Plaintiffs' requests, the Courts notes that their second set of RFPs could be construed as seeking ESI production in native format. (See, e.g., Dkt. 99-10 [Li Decl.] Ex. 3 at 23 [Plaintiffs' RFP Set Two, No. 9].)[7] It does not appear, however, that Plaintiffs' initial document requests asked for native formats or metadata. Pursuant to Rule 34, a requesting party is entitled to specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be produced. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1)(C). However, “courts have generally only ordered ‘the production of metadata when it is sought in the initial document request and the producing party has not yet produced the documents in any form.’ ” United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 10-cv-01401, 305 F.R.D. 225, 245-46 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2015) (citing Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enf't Div., 07-cv-8224, 255 F.R.D. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2008); In re Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. Plastic Coolant Tubes Prods. Liab. Litig., 11-md-2233, 279 F.R.D. 447, 449 n.5 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 24, 2012); R.F.M.A.S. Inc. v. So, 06-cv-13114, 271 F.R.D. 13, 45 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2010)). “Additionally, courts have required the requesting party to show ‘a particularized need for the metadata,’ not simply a generalized view as to its importance.” Id. at 246. In this case, it does not appear that Plaintiffs requested documents in native format (and correspondingly, with metadata) in their initial requests. Even if they had, Plaintiffs have not shown any particularized need for the production of metadata or native files for the majority of document categories raised. These documents include (1) photographs of 6908 Shadygrove (which have not been located in any event); (2) unspecified “code enforcement data;” and (3) AIM inspection reports. *11 The one exception to this conclusion, however, relates to the invoices that Masis Bagdasaryan alleges were fabricated with respect to 11234 Tuxford. Because his claims are based on allegations that Defendant improperly created false invoices, the Court finds that the metadata related to those invoices, which may reveal information about dates of creation and edits, is of particular relevance. (See Dkt. 28 at 2.) Accordingly, Defendant is ordered to produce in native format the Annual Inspection Invoices listed in Exhibit 4 to the Truong Declaration. (Dkt. 99-3 at 27.) To the extent that these documents are maintained in a database using specialized software such that production of discrete native files is not feasible, or such that the data would not be usable by Plaintiffs, Defendant and Plaintiffs shall meet and confer to schedule a date within 14 days upon which Plaintiffs may inspect the relevant electronic files at Defendant's place of business. VII. SPOLIATION. A. Legal Standard. Courts have powers arising out of “ ‘the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’ ” Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)). Among these are “the inherent discretionary power to make appropriate evidentiary rulings in response to the destruction or spoliation of relevant evidence.” Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993). Many trial courts in this circuit have followed the Second Circuit opinion Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002)) to hold that “a party seeking an adverse inference instruction based on the destruction of evidence must establish: (1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were destroyed with a culpable state of mind; and (3) that the evidence was relevant to the party's claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense.” In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Residential Funding Corp.); Compass Bank v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, 104 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1054 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (same). Regarding the pertinent “state of mind,” bad faith is not necessary; willfulness or fault may suffice. Unigard, 982 F.2d at 368 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); Glover, 6 F.3d at 1329 (“[A] finding of ‘bad faith’ is not a prerequisite to this corrective procedure.”). “[D]estruction of evidence qualifies as willful spoliation if the party was ‘some notice that the documents were potentially relevant to the litigation before they were destroyed.’ ” Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis original) (citing United States v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 2002)); Glover, 6 F.3d at 1329 (“simple notice of ‘potential relevance to the litigation’ ” suffices); cf. United States v. $40,955.00 in U.S. Currency, 554 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A party does not engage in spoliation when, without notice of the evidence's potential relevance, it destroys the evidence according to its policy or in the normal course of business.”). “[T]he presence of bad faith automatically establishes relevance; however, when the destruction is negligent, relevance must be proven by the party seeking sanctions.” SEC v. Mercury Interactive LLC, 07-cv-02822, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112224, at *34 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012) (citing Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 02-cv-1243, 220 F.R.D. 212, 220 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2003) (citing Residential Funding Corp.)). The party alleging spoliation bears the burden of demonstrating that the spoliator destroyed evidence with notice that it was relevant. Ryan v. Editions Ltd. W., Inc., 786 F.3d 754, 766 (9th Cir. 2015). *12 Further, evaluating whether “harsh sanctions” like an adverse inference is proper “requires an analysis of the prejudice suffered by the non-spoliating party.” Moore v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 07-cv-03850, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26156, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2012) (citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distributors, 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 1995) (addressing sanction of dismissal). “The prejudice inquiry looks to whether the [spoiling party's] actions impaired [the non-spoiling party's] ability to go to trial or threatened to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” Leon, 464 F.3d at 959 (alternation in original) (citing United States v. Kahaluu Construction Co., Inc., 857 F.2d 600, 604 (9th Cir. 1988)). Plaintiffs assert that “evidentiary sanctions” are necessary based on Defendant's alleged conduct in connection with destroyed boxes of documents, and allegedly altered reports. For the reasons explained, the Court DENIES that request. B. Forty-Six Boxes of “Research Reports.” Plaintiffs contend that Defendant, through Frank Bush, the “head” of the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety (“LADBS”), improperly ordered the destruction of forty-six boxes of material dated from 1960 to 2004 as “soon as it became evident that [d]iscovery would commence in this case....’ ” (Dkt. 89 at 21; Dkt. 104 at 10.) Plaintiffs point out that the Court issued a report and recommendation on March 9, 2016 ordering Defendant to answer the TAC. (Dkt. 37.) Plaintiffs note that Mr. Bush signed a document authorizing destruction of the boxes of documents shortly thereafter on March 31, 2016. (Dkt. 104 at 10.) That authorization indicates that the “inclusive dates” of the destroyed records are February 24, 1961 to August 1, 2004. (Dkt. 75 [M. Bagdasaryan Decl. re MSJ] Ex. 6 at 146.)[8] Plaintiffs contend that LADBS documents relevant to this litigation may have been created during this time period, including because (1) “Code Enforcement actions” took place in 2004 where Plaintiffs obtained the “variance approval” and “the permits and signoffs for the continued use and maintenance” of an accessory building at 6908 Shadygrove; and (2) “issues” regarding the “use and approval of the structures for 11224 Tuxford” “would have taken place from 1988 to 2004.” (Dkt. 104 at 10.) While Plaintiffs concede that “[t]here is no way to truly ascertain” what “the actual documentations destroyed was,” they draw from these facts the inference that Defendant, upon learning that this matter would proceed to discovery, undertook to spoliate relevant evidence through the destruction of the record boxes. (Id.) Defendant disputes that the documents in the forty-six boxes have “any relevance to any aspect of this litigation.” (Dkt. 99 at 22.) It points out that Mr. Bush's destruction authorization states that the document destruction does not violate “applicable laws,” thereby demonstrating that no documents were destroyed in violation of Defendant's discovery obligations. (Id. (citing Dkt. 75 [M. Bagdasaryan Decl. re MSJ] Ex. 6 at 145).) Further, Defendant submits a declaration from Michael Van Do, a management assistant at LADBS's Office of the Custodian of Records, stating that Mr. Van Do was “not aware” of any instruction from Mr. Bush to destroy any inspection files related to the at-issue properties. (Dkt. 99-2 [Van Do Decl.] ¶ 8.) *13 Plaintiffs have not affirmatively demonstrated that (1) records contained in the forty-six boxes destroyed related to their properties; or (2) that Defendant was on notice that the records contained relevant information. The Court recognizes that “the relevance of ... [destroyed] documents cannot be clearly ascertained because the documents no longer exist,” so a party “can hardly assert any presumption of irrelevance as to the destroyed documents.” Leon, 464 F.3d at 959 (citing Alexander v. Nat'l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1205 (8th Cir. 1982)). But, as Plaintiffs concede, their conclusion that relevant information was spoliated when the forty-six boxes were destroyed is speculative. “Mere speculation that other deleted documents may exist that might be helpful to a party's case is ... an insufficient basis for a finding of spoliation.” Reinsdorf v. Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 10-cv-7181-DDP-SS, 296 F.R.D. 604, 631 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 19, 2013); U.S. Legal Support, Inc. v. Hofioni, 13-cv-1770, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5436, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2014) (“Mere speculation is an insufficient basis for a finding of spoliation.”). Nonetheless, even if the Court were to assume that the forty-six destroyed boxes contained the documents that Plaintiffs assert were created between 1961 and 2004 (i.e., documents related to 2004 “Code Enforcement actions” involving a “variance approval and permits and signoffs” for the accessory building at 6908 Shadygrove or “the use and approval of the structures for 11224 Tuxford”), those are not relevant to the TAC's remaining claims. Masis Bagdasaryan's substantive and procedural due process claims are limited to allegations that he (1) did not receive notice of invoices; and (2) that Defendant fabricated invoices. Inspection documents from 2004 and earlier would not support either claim. Further, although Masis Bagdasaryan's pleadings appear to rely on Defendant's demand that he complete unneeded repairs in contravention of prior approvals to assert a claim for “abuse of process,” (Dkt. 24 at ¶¶98-111), such claims are limited to allegations that a party “uses the court's process for a purpose other than that for which the process was designed.” S.A. v. Maiden, 229 Cal. App. 4th 27, 41 (2014). The tort has “been ‘interpreted broadly to encompass the entire range of ‘procedures’ incident to litigation,’ ” id., but Masis Bagdasaryan has cited no authority for the proposition that the extra-judicial revocation of a pre-2004 permit or variance approval can establish a claim. Plaintiffs have likewise failed to demonstrate how documents from 2004 and earlier could be relevant to a claim for IIED, elder abuse, or violations of the CPRA. Such relevance is a prerequisite to an adverse inference sanction. In re Napster, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 1078; Compass Bank, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 1054. Therefore, sanctions are denied. C. Archives of AIM Reports. Plaintiffs next assert that Defendant failed to archive case reports from AIM, resulting in spoliation. They contend that these reports are in “perpetual motion and subject to editing.” (Dkt. 89 at 21.) Plaintiffs assert that these “changes cannot be tracked and as such a report being presented today may not be the same report” as it was at a prior time. (Dkt. 104 at 11.) For example, Plaintiffs argue that “notations placed by Henry Baghdassarian, prior inspector, may have been replaced or removed by Willie Ross.” (Id.) It is not entirely clear from Plaintiffs' briefing what relief they seek regarding the AIM reports. Plaintiffs appear to assert that the AIM case reports are dynamic documents that may be electronically altered, and Defendant has failed to save (or produce) every version. In response, Defendant rejects Plaintiffs' contention that AIM case reports are subject to editing, and asserts that it has produced all existing AIM inspection reports. (Dkt. 99 at 23.) *14 Even accepting Plaintiffs' argument that the AIM case reports may be altered over time—which Defendant appears to dispute—Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that Defendants have withheld or destroyed prior versions of reports in its possession, and Defendant has submitted evidence that it produced reports that it could locate. (Dkt. 99-2 [Van Do Decl.] ¶6.) Under these circumstances, sanctions for spoliation are not appropriate. To the extent that Plaintiffs possess additional factual evidence supporting their AIM report spoliation claim (for example, that Defendant altered or failed to preserve hard copies of relevant versions of electronic documents after the commencement of litigation), they may submit evidence of this conduct in a separate filing seeking reconsideration after they have received from Defendant the declaration addressed in Section VI.B.2 related to AIM reports. VIII. REMAINING ISSUES. A. CPRA. Through the Motion, Plaintiffs request “an order for the [LADBS] to comply with the [CPRA] ....” (Dkt. 89 at 4.)[9] As earlier explained in an August 30, 2017 minute order, the “Court has not yet determined ... that Plaintiffs have established a right to relief pursuant to the CPRA, nor that preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate. As a result, the Court will not grant declaratory or injunctive relief or otherwise compel production pursuant to the CPRA at this time.” (Dkt. 78 at 4.) As the Court noted in its prior order, “[t]o the extent that Plaintiffs believe that they can pursue an expedited remedy, including in the form of a preliminary injunction, they are advised to address such a request to the assigned district court judge.” (Id.) B. Clouds On Title. Plaintiffs request that the Court “compel” Defendant to correct records related to “liens recorded on the properties” and “have them reported as closed.” (Dkt. 89 at 22.) These requests—which appear to seek injunctive relief—are not appropriate in connection with a discovery motion, and are DENIED. Although Defendant indicates that it has recorded a release of the 11234 Tuxford lien (Dkt. 99 at 25), nothing prevents the parties from stipulating to correct any errors or oversights if they agree errors or oversights occurred. IX. CONCLUSION. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs' Motion is DENIED, except as follows: • Defendant is ordered to produce within 14 days of this order the following records, if any exist: (1) documents reflecting complaints against Mr. Jakeman relating to (a) the creation and distribution of invoices, or (b) intimidating behavior, threats, harassment, racial or ethnic discrimination, or other abuse of power during the course of inspections; (2) documents in Mr. Jakeman's personnel file reflecting his dishonesty, deceptive acts, or false statements; or (3) non-privileged documents in Mr. Jakeman's personnel file reflecting investigations into the complaints or dishonest behavior listed in (1) or (2). Further, Defendant shall produce any documents from Mr. Bush's personnel file reflecting Mr. Bush's handling of complaints about Mr. Jakeman. If Defendant intends to withhold documents on privilege grounds that have not already been logged, it shall provide to Plaintiffs such a log. • Defendant is ordered to provide within 14 days of this order amended responses to RFPs Nos. 17, 23, and 32-39 stating that all responsive non-privileged responsive documents have been produced. If any such documents have not been produced, Defendant shall produce them. • Defendant is ordered to provide to Plaintiffs a declaration, signed by an individual with appropriate authority, indicating that no pages have been omitted from the production of AIM surveys or reports for 11234 Tuxford. If such pages have been omitted, Defendant shall produce them or explain the reason for this omission. *15 • Defendant is ordered to produce in native format the Annual Inspection Invoices listed in Exhibit 4 to the Truong Declaration. (Dkt. 99-3 at 27.) To the extent that these documents are maintained in a database using specialized software such that production of discrete native files is not feasible, or such that such data would not be usable by Plaintiffs, Defendant and Plaintiffs shall meet and confer to schedule a date within 14 days upon which Plaintiffs may inspect the relevant electronic files at Defendant's place of business. Footnotes [1] Because the Court expressly gave Plaintiffs leave to amend their due process claims against Defendant (Dkt. 19 at 24), those claims were not included among the Monell claims dismissed with prejudice. (Id. at 23-24.) [2] In its objections, Defendant cited Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 1990) for the proposition that government personnel files are subject to a qualified privilege for official information. (Dkt. 89 at 10.) Defendant does not raise Sanchez in opposing the Motion, and does not appear to have submitted factual information sufficient to invoke the privilege. See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 511 F.2d 192, 198 (9th Cir. 1975) (the privilege “must be formally asserted and delineated in order to be raised properly,” and the party opposing disclosure must “state with specificity the rationale of the claimed privilege”). [3] Defendant asserts that prior acts cannot be used for impeachment evidence. (Dkt. 99 at 11.) The Motion, though, does not request the discovery only for impeachment. (Dkt. 89 at 12.) [4] Neither party has submitted a copy of the cited “audio recording” reflecting an interview or exchange between Plaintiffs and Mr. Davey on an unstated date. (See Dkt. 89 at 16.) Defendant states that the recording has been produced to Plaintiffs. (Dkt. 99 at 15.) If relevant and if Plaintiffs later submit the audio recording in a manner that complies with evidentiary requirements, then the Court will consider the recording in connection with a request to reconsider of the portion of this order addressing the Davey Report. [5] In federal law matters, Rule 501 of the Federal Rule of Evidence provides that “[t]he common law—as interpreted by the United States courts in the light of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege....” Conversely, “in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.” Id. Plaintiffs assert that federal law applies in this matter (Dkt. 89 at 15), and although Defendant cites case law relying on California principles, see Amco Ins. Co. v. Madera Quality Nut LLC, 04-cv-06456, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21205 (E.D.Cal. Apr. 11, 2006), it does not dispute this fact. [6] Plaintiffs' concerns regarding metadata and native files are addressed below in Section VI.C. [7] The request seeks “All correspondence, email, and ... other documents, including electronically recorded information, produced electronically in its native format, in your custody or control, pertaining to work or services to be performed at or on behalf of any of the parties in this action.” [8] In support of this argument, Plaintiffs rely on evidence submitted with their summary judgment briefing. While Defendant disputes that this is proper (Dkt. 99 at 22), the Court will favorably construe Plaintiffs' filings given their pro se status. [9] The Motion also takes issue with “one Robert Gold's” refusal to produce “full reports of the annual inspection and monitoring program from the specified properties in the complaint.” (Dkt. 89 at 4.) This appears to relate to Plaintiffs' CPRA demands; as explained, those demands will not be addressed in the context of a discovery motion.