Graysen D. CROSS, Deceased, BY AND THROUGH His Personal Representative Valerie STEELE, Plaintiff, v. XPO EXPRESS, INC. f/k/a Express 1 Inc.; XPO Logistics, Inc.; Cliffside Transporting Services, LLC; and Timothy Craig Groshans, Defendants Civil Action No. 4:15-cv-2481-BHH United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Florence Division Signed May 03, 2016 Counsel Mark Christopher Joye, Mark Joseph Bringardner, Joye Law Firm, Charleston, SC, for Plaintiff. T. David Rheney, William T. Young, III, Gallivan White and Boyd, Greenville, SC, for Defendants XPO Express Inc, XPO Logistics Inc. Mark Steven Barrow, Sweeny Wingate and Barrow, Columbia, SC, Martin S. Driggers, Jr., Richard Edward McLawhorn, Jr., Sweeny Wingate and Barrow, Hartsville, SC, for Defendant Timothy Craig Groshans. Hendricks, Bruce Howe, United States District Judge ORDER *1 Plaintiff moves to compel a full response to her discovery requests (ECF No. 37) and seeks a forensic examination of the personal laptop of Defendant Timothy Craig Groshans (“Groshans”) (ECF No. 29). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to compel and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for a forensic examination. BACKGROUND This matter arises from a car accident between Defendant Groshans and decedent Graysen D. Cross on March 21, 2015. In this civil action, Plaintiff brings direct negligence causes of action against Defendants XPO Express, Inc. f/k/a XPO Logistics, Inc. (“XPO Express”) and XPO Logistics, LLC (“XPO Logistics”) (collectively, “the XPO Defendants”) alleging negligent hiring, negligent training, negligent supervision, and negligent retention of their driver, Timothy Groshans (“Groshans”). (ECF No. 1.) In their combined answer, XPO Express and XPO Logistics state that: (1) Groshans was an independent contractor for whom it was not legally responsible as an employer; (2) the only proper XPO defendant in this case is XPO Express; and (3) the XPO Logistics trailer Groshans hauled at the time of the crash was empty and therefore XPO Express and XPO Logistics are not liable. (ECF No. 8.) According to Plaintiff, the XPO Defendants now also assert that Groshans was on a personal errand and therefore not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the crash. (ECF No. 43 at 2.) The XPO Defendants dispute the applicability of its insurance coverage in this case. (Id.) The XPO Defendants responded to Plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories and first requests for production on December 11, 2015. On December 16, 2015, counsel had a telephone conference with Judge R. Bryan Harwell to review issues pending in discovery responses. Plaintiff narrowed its discovery requests, but the parties have still been unable to resolve the discovery issues without the Court’s intervention. LEGAL STANDARD Parties to civil litigation may obtain discovery regarding “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” including any information that “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Courts are to construe broadly rules enabling discovery. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 983 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ). However, while the parties' ability to obtain information through civil discovery is broad, it is not without limits. See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (“[D]iscovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries.”). “The scope and conduct of discovery are within the sound discretion of the district court.” Columbus-Am. Discovery Grp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 56 F.3d 556, 568 n.16 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Erdmann v. Preferred Research, Inc. of Ga., 852 F.2d 788, 792 (4th Cir. 1988) ); see also Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Courts have broad discretion in [their] resolution of discovery problems arising in cases before [them].” (alterations in original and internal quotation marks omitted) ). DISCUSSION A. Motion to Compel *2 Plaintiff’s motion to compel seeks a full response to her interrogatories and requests for production. The Court addresses each discovery issue in turn: Interrogatory 15: Provide a description of the departments and/or divisions which comprise Defendants and the hierarchy of the departments and/or divisions. For each department or division identified, please provide the name and title of the head of the department or division on March 21, 2015. The XPO Defendants object on the basis of relevance. However, as explained by Plaintiff, the Complaint alleges negligence against the entity responsible for the hiring, training, supervision and retention of Groshans. This interrogatory is therefore relevant to Plaintiff’s negligence claim, as it helps clarify which departments or divisions are responsible for drivers like Groshans. To the extent XPO Logistics objects on the basis that it is not a proper party to this case, Plaintiff has established a good faith basis for its discovery requests to XPO Logistics given her allegations that: (1) at the time of the crash Groshans was pulling an XPO Logistics trailer, emblazoned with the XPO Logistics logo; (2) the fatal crash was first reported to XPO Logistics; (3) contracts with third parties regarding the supervision and monitoring of drivers' speed and hours of service were executed by XPO Logistics; and (4) XPO Logstics' website and discovery responses create questions as to potential overlap between “leaders” of XPO Logistics and XPO Express. (ECF No. 43 at 4–7.) Accordingly, the Court finds this interrogatory to be relevant and directs the XPO Defendants to respond. Further, to the extent XPO Logistics objects to other discovery requests on the basis that it is not a proper party, the Court finds this objection meritless and directs XPO Logistics to respond accordingly. Interrogatory 21: Identify the following people: (a) The Safety Director/Chief Safety Officer for Defendants on the date of the Subject Incident and now; (b) The person(s) primarily responsible for compliance with state and federal safety regulations for the Defendants on the date of the Subject Incident and now; (c) The person(s) responsible for training Timothy Craig Groshans; and (d) Timothy Craig Groshans' supervisor and manager on the date of the Subject Incident. The XPO Defendants have only identified the former and current Safety Director. For the reasons previously stated, the Court finds this interrogatory relevant to Plaintiff’s negligence claim and directs the XPO Defendants to respond to all subparts of this question. Interrogatory 24: With respect to the tractor operated by Timothy Craig Groshans at the time of the Subject Incident, provide the following information: (e) Identify all systems and devices of any kind in or on the tractor that allowed for communication between the driver and any other person or entity, state whether the data for the time period surrounding the Subject Incident has been preserved, and identify the person who has custody of the data and of the system from which the data was acquired. The XPO Defendants identified Omnitracs and Qualcomm as communication programs on the tractor involved in this crash and produced vehicle inspection reports and a vehicle position history, but have not produced any communications between Groshans and XPO dispatch. The XPO Defendants assert that Groshans was not under dispatch at the time. Plaintiffs request proof of this assertion. The Court directs the XPO Defendants to respond to this subpart of the interrogatory or provide proof that Groshans was not under dispatch at that time if such proof is available. *3 Interrogatory 26: With respect to the trip that Timothy Craig Groshans was on at the time of the Subject Incident, provide the following information: (a) Identify all shippers and brokers involved; (b) Explain where and when (date and time) Timothy Craig Groshans picked up the load he had at the time of the Subject Incident – if you claim Timothy Craig Groshans was empty at the time of the Subject Incident, please explain where and when (date and time) Timothy Craig Groshans picked up and dropped off the last load he had immediately prior to the Subject Incident; (c) Identify where (name and address of location) and when (date and time) the load was to be delivered; (d) Identify the location, time, duration and reason for each stop Timothy Craig Groshans made from the time he picked up the load until the time of the Subject Incident; and (e) Identify the route Timothy Craig Groshans intended to follow from the point of origin to the point of destination. (f) If you claim Timothy Craig Groshans was empty at the time of the Subject Incident, identify the route Timothy Craig Groshans intended to take following his last load dropoff. AND Interrogatory 40: Identify and explain all communications of any kind between Timothy Craig Groshans and anyone acting for or on behalf of Defendants during the twenty-four (24) hours before and after the Subject Incident. For each communication, identify the method of communication (cell phone, QualComm, other), time of communication, persons involved, and the general subject. The XPO Defendants have responded with additional logs and bills of lading. However they have not responded as to the location, time and duration for each stop Groshans made from the time he picked up a load and delivered it to Pell City to when he started driving through South Carolina where this collision occurred. The XPO Defendants assert that they have not located additional information as to the Qualcomm communications. Plaintiff doubts this assertion, noting that the XPO Defendants produced vehicle inspection reports and vehicle positioning data, and the requested communication would have been gathered by the same company. The Court directs the XPO Defendants to continue searching for the requested information and to fully respond to these interrogatories to the extent they are able. Request 10: Defendant Timothy Craig Groshans' driver’s logs from January 1, 2014 to March 21, 2015. (The Cross Family agreed to reduce the length of this request down to six months in an attempt to compromise). AND Request 28 [second]: All trip log sheets, driver daily logs, driver trip records, driver trip reports, and driver mileage records concerning Defendant Timothy Craig Groshans from January 1, 2014 through March 21, 2015. The XPO Defendants have produced logs and records trips dating back to January 1, 2015 and generally assert that these requests “seek[ ] information that is immaterial, irrelevant and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence.” (ECF Nos. 37-1 at 42; 37-2 at 37.) Plaintiff argues that these requests are relevant to establishing whether Groshans was under dispatch at the time of the crash. Specifically, she notes that the XPO Defendants have provided pay records showing that Groshans has received “empty mile pay.” (ECF No. 43 at 10.) She argues that the requested logs and trip records would help determine the frequency that Groshans received “empty mile pay” and whether Groshans drove in and through South Carolina with any frequency. The Court finds these requests are relevant to Plaintiff’s claims and directs the XPO Defendants to produce the requested documents dating back to January 1, 2014. *4 Request 29: All documents, reports and materials of any type prepared by Defendants as a result of the subject collision. AND Request 48: Defendants' complete inter-company investigative file concerning the subject collision. The XPO Defendants object that these requests seek work product and information protected by attorney-client privilege. Plaintiff notes that the XPO Defendants have not produced a privilege log for any documents they claim should be shielded from discovery. She seeks clarification as to whether the documents requested here exist, which a privilege log would establish. At this time, the Court directs the XPO Defendants to produce a privilege log for those documents that they wish to protect from discovery. The Court reminds the XPO Defendants that “[f]ailure to produce a timely or sufficient privilege log may constitute a forfeiture of any claims of privilege.” AVX Corp. v. Horry Land Co., No. 4:07-CV-3299, 2010 WL 4884903, at *4 (D.S.C. Nov. 24, 2010); see also Herbalife Int'l, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2006 WL 2715164, at *4 (N.D.W. Va. Sept. 22, 2006) (“Failure to timely produce a privilege log or the production of an inadequate privilege log may constitute waiver of any asserted privileges.”); Ruran v. Beth El Temple of W. Hartford, Inc., 226 F.R.D. 165, 168–69 (D. Conn. 2005)(finding attorney-client privilege waived because defendant failed to provide a privilege log and consequently failed to perfect privilege claim); Banks v. Office of Senate Sergeant–at–Arms, 222 F.R.D. 7, 20–21 (D.D.C. 2004)(“withholding of such a privilege log may ... be viewed by the court as a waiver of any privilege or protection”). Request 32: The minutes from March 21, 2010 through March 21, 2015 of all company committees and meetings concerning safety, operations, driver management, driver training, driver supervision, driver retention, and driver hiring. (Plaintiff reduced the time period from five years to one year in an effort to compromise). The XPO Defendants object that this request is “overbroad, unduly burdensome, and seeks information that is immaterial, irrelevant and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence.” (ECF Nos. 37-1 at 44; 37-2 at 38.) Plaintiff argues that this request is relevant to her claims of negligent training, supervision and driver retention. She notes that the XPO Defendants have already produced example Daily Safety Messages, making their objections here at odds with material already produced. The Court finds the requested documents are relevant to the claims and defenses in this case and directs the XPO Defendants to produce the requested documents from March 21, 2014 through March 21, 2015. Request 34: All documents received from or sent to safety consultants employed by or in any way contacted by Defendants from March 21, 2010 through March 21, 2015 regarding the operation of motor vehicles. (The Cross Family is reducing the period of time down to two years before the collision, and is NOT seeking documents relating to the crash that forms this case). The XPO Defendants again object that this request is “overbroad, unduly burdensome, [and] seeks information that is immaterial, irrelevant and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence.”[1] (ECF Nos. 37-1 at 44; 37-2 at 38.) Plaintiff argues that this request will help determine who was responsible for the supervision, retention and training for Groshans and is therefore relevant to her claims. She notes that the XPO Defendants have already produced example SpeedGauge Coaching Tools data, making their objections here at odds with material already produced. The Court finds the requested documents are relevant to the claims and defenses in this case and directs the XPO Defendants to produce the requested documents from March 21, 2014 through March 21, 2015. *5 Request 75: For the tractor involved in the Subject Incident, produce the following documents: (g) All documents evidencing any repairs and/or modifications to the tractor at any time within 6 months before the Subject Incident; (h) All documents evidencing any repairs made to the tractor as a result of the subject collision (including insurance submissions); (l) Documents evidencing mileage and weight at time of the Subject Incident; (The Cross Family has agreed to reduce this request to a weight ticket). AND Request 76: For the trailer involved in the Subject Incident, produce the following documents: (g) All documents evidencing any repairs and/or modifications to the trailer at any time within 6 months before the Subject Incident; (h) All documents evidencing any repairs made to the trailer as a result of the subject collision (including insurance submissions); (l) Documents evidencing mileage and weight at time of the Subject Incident; (The Cross Family has agreed to reduce this request to a weight ticket). The XPO Defendants object to these requests on the basis of relevance and assert that the requests have been asked and answered. Plaintiff asserts that not all of the requested documents here have been produced. The Court finds these requests relevant as they relate to Plaintiff’s negligence claim and directs the XPO Defendants to fully respond to these requests to the extent they are able. Request 80: Produce copies of all e-mails between Timothy Craig Groshans and Defendants for the time period beginning 90 days prior to the Subject Incident and present. AND Request 81: Produce copies of all communications and transmissions between Timothy Craig Groshans and Defendants that were transmitted through any system on-board of the tractor or trailer involved in the Subject Incident for the period beginning 30 days before the Subject Incident and ending seven days after the Subject Incident. The XPO Defendants object on the basis of relevance and assert that they are attempting to locate responsive information. (ECF Nos. 37-1 at 59; 37-3 at 3.) The Court finds these requests relevant as they relate to the claims and defenses in this case and directs the XPO Defendants to fully respond to these requests to the extent they are able. Request 86: Produce all documents given to any person or entity, including any insurance company in return for payment in whole or in part for property damage, e.g., loan receipt(s), release(s), assignment(s), etc. The XPO Defendants object on the basis of relevance and respond that they do not possess responsive information. (ECF Nos. 37-1 at 60–61; 37-2 at 44.) The Court finds this request relevant to the claims and defenses and directs the XPO Defendants to fully respond to this request to the extent they are able. Request 92: All documents authored by anyone working for or on behalf of Defendants that set forth any facts relating to the Subject Incident. The XPO Defendants object that this request seeks work product, information prepared in anticipation of litigation, and impermissible consulting expert witness discovery. (ECF Nos. 37-1 at 62–63; 37-2 at 57.) Plaintiff again notes that XPO Defendants have not produced a privilege log and seeks clarification as to whether the documents requested here exist. The Court again directs the XPO Defendants to produce a privilege log and reminds the XPO Defendants that “[f]ailure to produce a timely or sufficient privilege log may constitute a forfeiture of any claims of privilege.” AVX Corp., 2010 WL 4884903, at *4. *6 Request 100: If an Accident Review Board or similar entity reviewed the Subject Incident, produce the following: (a) A copy of all documents (as defined) and other materials of any kind reviewed by said board or entity; (b) A copy of all reports and documents (as defined) of any kind generated by said board or entity; (c) Documents evidencing who was on the board; (d) Documents evidencing all criteria for review; and (e) Determination of preventability and all other conclusions reached by said board or entity. The XPO Defendants object on the basis of relevance and respond that they do not possess responsive information. (ECF Nos. 37-1 at 66; 37-2 at 59.) The Court finds this request relevant to the claims and defenses and directs the XPO Defendants to fully respond to this request to the extent they are able. Request 108: Copy of documents showing the hierarchy of managerial positions at Defendants and who occupied such positions as of the time of the subject incident and presently. The XPO Defendants object that this request is “overbroad, and seeks information that is immaterial, irrelevant and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence.” (ECF Nos. 37-1 at 68; 37-2 at 62.) Plaintiff asserts that this request will help to clarify the apparent overlap between XPO Express and XPO Logistics with regard to safety and driver supervision. The Court finds this request relevant to determining the proper parties in this case and directs the XPO Defendants to respond to the request. B. Motion to Conduct Forensic Examination In addition to her discovery requests, Plaintiff seeks permission to conduct a forensic examination of Defendant Groshans' personal laptop, which was found in the tractor he drove at the time of the crash. Plaintiff explains that she “wants to examine the laptop to determine if there is [sic] any communication messages, documents, programs, and/or any other information and/or documents on this laptop that will shed light on his relationship with Defendants XPO and Cliffside.” (ECF No. 29 at 2.) Plaintiff maintains that she cannot obtain this information through any other means. (Id.) Defendant Groshans objects that there are less intrusive ways to discover the information Plaintiff seeks and argues that the forensic examination would lead to little evidence that would resolve the scope of his employment. (ECF No. 30 at 2.) He asks that if the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion, it limit the examination to non-personal information and require the parties to agree to a specific protocol to be approved by the Court. (Id. at 3.) The Sixth Circuit, quoting the Sedona Principles, has held that [c]ivil litigation should not be approached as if information systems were crime scenes that justify forensic investigation at every opportunity to identify and preserve every detail.... [M]aking forensic image backups of computers is only the first step of an expensive, complex, and difficult process of data analysis that can divert litigation into side issues and satellite disputes involving the interpretation of potentially ambiguous forensic evidence. John B. v. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448, 460 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting The Sedona Principles: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Production, Second Edition, 34, 47 (2007), available athttps://thesedonaconference.org/publication/The%20Sedona%20Principles). In light of the expense and difficulty of forensic examinations, “courts must consider the significant interests implicated by forensic imaging before ordering such procedures.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a) Advisory Committee Note (2006) (“Courts should guard against undue intrusiveness resulting from inspecting or testing [electronic information] systems.”) ). Indeed, “mere skepticism that an opposing party has not produced all relevant information is not sufficient to warrant drastic electronic discovery measures.” Id. (citing McCurdy Grp. v. Am. Biomedical Grp., Inc., 9 F. App'x 822, 831 (10th Cir. 2001) ). *7 Here, the Court finds that the circumstances of this case do not “warrant such a drastic discovery measure” as a forensic examination. McCurdy Grp., 9 F. App'x at 831. Unlike in other cases where forensic examinations have been ordered, there is no evidence here that Groshans' laptop has crashed or been wiped clean. See Orrell v. Motorcarparts of Am., Inc., 2007 WL 4287750, at *7 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 5, 2007) (allowing forensic examination of the plaintiffs' home computer where the computer had allegedly crashed); Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 (D. Minn. 2002) (permitting “mirror imaging” of a hard drive under Rule 34 in order to retrieve deleted computer records, including email); Simon Prop. Grp. L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 640 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (same). In addition, in Koosharem Corp. v. Spec Personnel, LLC, the magistrate judge ordered a forensic examination only after plaintiffs served document requests for particular emails and, in response, defendants “produced some 1,936 pages of emails,” none of which were “an accurate copy of the original email.” No. 6:08-cv-583, 2008 WL 4458864, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2008). The court noted that “the date and time stamp on every email ha[d] been modified to reflect the dates the emails were compiled rather than the dates they were sent,” that “many emails [were] missing their attachments,” and further, that many emails contained “irregularities.” Id. Here, no similar irregularities have occurred in the discovery process. Even when a forensic examination is not warranted, the Federal Rules require a party to conduct a reasonable search of its files to determine whether it has responsive documents in its possession, custody or control. E.g., Hock Foods, Inc. v. William Blair & Co., LLC, 2011 WL 884446 at *8 n.64 (D. Kan. Mar. 11, 2011) (listing cases); Moore v. Chertoff, 255 F.R.D. 10, 22 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g) (requiring a “reasonable inquiry”). Thus, a party cannot meet its discovery obligations by “sticking its head in the sand” and claiming ignorance. In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litigation, 168 F.R.D. 651, 653 (D. Kan. 1996). A party conducting a search of electronically stored information (“ESI”) has the burden of demonstrating that its methodology was reasonable. E.g., Smith v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., No. 2:07-cv-681, 2009 WL 2045197 at *7 (W.D. Pa. July 9, 2009). An “explanation of the search terms and procedures used would be a large step in that direction.” Id. The Court finds that the information contained on Groshans' laptop could establish whether Groshans was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident and is therefore relevant to the claims and defenses in this case. Accordingly, the Court directs Defendant Groshans to conduct a search of his laptop to determine whether it contains any responsive documents. Groshans will need to confer with Plaintiff as to his search methodology and agree to a specific ESI protocol. If the parties cannot agree on a proposed ESI protocol, they will need to brief this issue. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to compel, (ECF No. 37) and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for a forensic examination, (ECF No. 29). Defendants have thirty (30) days to comply with the directives set forth in this Order in reference to the motion to compel. In addition, rather than compel Defendant Groshans to submit to a forensic examination, the parties are encouraged to confer and attempt to resolve this dispute. However, if they cannot, Defendant Groshans will have fifteen (15) days from the date of this Order to file a proposed ESI protocol that explains how Defendant will search for documents responsive to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. Plaintiff will have seven (7) days thereafter to file a response to the proposed ESI protocol and suggest alternatives. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. [1] According to Plaintiff, the XPO Defendants are no longer objecting that the documents are privileged. (ECF No. 43 at 12.)