After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the transcript of the pretrial conference before Judge Orenstein on April 3, 2013, and his order dated April 18, 2013 denying Sasmor’s motion for reconsideration of his earlier rulings, the court affirms Judge Orenstein’s discovery rulings for the reasons provided below.

BACKGROUND

Sasmor, the 287 Franklin Avenue Residents’ Association, and other individual plaintiffs represented by counsel commenced this action by filing a complaint on March 1, 2011. (ECF No. 1, Complaint, 3/1/11.) Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint on July 7, 2011. (ECF No. 41, First Amended Complaint, 7/7/11.) Plaintiffs allege that defendants, who are individuals, real estate companies that employed those individuals, and a related trust,[1] violated New York State consumer protection laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), including through the commission of predicate acts of extortion, money laundering, and mail, wire, and bank fraud. (Id. ¶¶ 30-40, 97-186, 220-66.)

On December 12, 2012, Judge Orenstein issued an amended scheduling order extending the deadline for completion of discovery for the third time to February 28, 2013. (ECF No. 193, Amended Scheduling Order, 12/12/12; Scheduling Orders dated 1/11/12, 8/18/12, 10/18/12.) Between February 20 and February 28, 2013, Sasmor filed nine motions requesting deposition subpoenas and the reinstatement of previously denied discovery motions. (ECF Nos. 200-203, 209-210, 212, 215-216.) On February 26, 2013, Judge Orenstein denied one of Sasmor’s motions, which sought to subpoena documents from OneWest, and stated that he would address Sasmor’s remaining discovery motions at the final pretrial conference, which took place on April 3, 2013. (Orders dated 2/26/13, 3/1/13, 3/11/13.)

*2 Before the pretrial conference, Sasmor withdrew another motion, in which he sought to issue a deposition subpoena to Fifth Avenue Committee, Inc., and filed a motion seeking additional discovery from defendant Isaac Teitelbaum. (ECF Nos. 221-222.) On April 3, 2013, Judge Orenstein granted in part Sasmor’s motion to subpoena additional phone records from Teitelbaum, granted in part Sasmor’s motion for a supplemental deposition of Teitelbaum, and denied the remainder of Sasmor’s discovery motions and closed discovery. (ECF No. 227, Minute Entry for Proceedings held on 4/3/2013; ECF No. 250-1, Transcript of Civil Cause for Pretrial Conference before the Honorable James Orenstein (“Tr.”), 6/17/13, at 38.) On April 17, 2013, Sasmor filed a motion seeking reconsideration of several rulings made by Judge Orenstein at the April 3, 2013 pretrial conference. (ECF No. 228, Motion for Reconsideration, 4/17/13 (“Sasmor Motion for Reconsideration”).) On April 18, 2013, Judge Orenstein denied Sasmor’s motion for reconsideration in its entirety, explaining that he had not overlooked any facts or law presented by Sasmor. (ECF No. 229, Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, 4/18/13.) On April 24, 2013, Sasmor timely appealed to this Court, seeking review of Magistrate Judge Orenstein’s denial of reconsideration and the underlying discovery rulings. (Sasmor Appeal.)

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standards

A. Standard of Review

A district court will set aside a magistrate judge’s order concerning non-dispositive matters if the order is found to be “clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1990)(considering matters of pretrial discovery “nondispositive of the litigation” and subject to the “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard). An order is clearly erroneous if, after considering all the evidence, “the reviewing court ... is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985); see also United States v. Isiofia, 370 F.3d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 2004) (same). An order is contrary to law “when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Dorsett v. Cnty. of Nassau, 800 F. Supp. 2d 453, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm’t Corp., 206 F.R.D. 78, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). “Pursuant to this highly deferential standard of review, magistrate judges are thus afforded broad discretion in resolving discovery disputes, and reversal is appropriate only if that discretion is abused.” Garcia v. Benjamin Group Enter. Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 399, 403 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (emphasis added); see also Conway v. Icahn & Co., Inc., 16 F.3d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) (same). Thus, “a party seeking to overturn a discovery order bears a heavy burden.” Garcia, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 403 (quoting AP Links, LLC v. Global Golf, Inc., No. 08-CV-1730, 2011 WL 888261, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2011)).

B. Scope of Permissible Discovery

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevance is “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978); see also Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 882 F.2d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 1989)(“The broad scope of discovery ... is designed to achieve disclosure of all the evidence relevant to the merits of a controversy.”).

Still, the scope of discovery is not unrestricted. While designed to help define and clarify the issues, discovery “has ultimate and necessary boundaries.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). Matters not “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” are not encompassed by Rule 26(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Furthermore, “[t]he party seeking the discovery must make a prima facie showing, that the discovery sought is more than merely a fishing expedition.” Evans v. Calise, No. 92-CV-8430, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6187, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1994); see also In re Grand Bahama Petroleum Co., 550 F.2d 1320, 1327 (2d Cir. 1977) (discovery request was “fishing expedition” where defendants made no prima facie showing to support allegation).

*3 Additionally, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C), a district court may limit or deny discovery, even where the material sought could be relevant, if (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or can be obtained from another source with less burden or expense, (ii) the party seeking discovery had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery, or (iii) the burden or expense of the discovery outweighs its likely benefit, “considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

II. Application

A. Discovery Related to Dudjak

Sasmor argues that Judge Orenstein committed clear error or acted contrary to law in denying his motion to compel the deposition of Dudjak and to reinstate subpoenas to third parties JPMorgan Chase Bank and AirBnB. (Sasmor Appeal at 2.) Sasmor claims Dudjak’s deposition is necessary because (i) Dudjak could authentic certain documents, (ii) Dudjak could provide evidence of predicate acts of extortion and wire fraud, and (iii) Dudjak would reveal his involvement in operating illegal hostels with Teitelbaum and in threatening residents so they would move out. (Tr. at 6-9.)

Judge Orenstein denied Sasmor’s motion on procedural grounds – Dudjak had not been properly noticed by Sasmor – as well as on substantive grounds. (Id. at 8.) First, Judge Orenstein denied Sasmor’s request to compel Dudjak’s deposition for authentication purposes, reasoning it was unnecessary because Sasmor could still issue a trial subpoena to Dudjak to authenticate documents. (Id. at 6.) Second, Judge Orenstein ruled that, because Dudjak had already defaulted by failing to appear for another previously scheduled deposition noticed by other parties, Sasmor could file a default motion against Dudjak and did not need Dudjak’s deposition to prove his claims. (Id. at 5-6.) Third, Judge Orenstein ruled that even if Dudjak would have testified that he had advertised hostels in the building, such advertisements would not be fraudulent material misrepresentations or omissions to constitute wire fraud predicate acts of racketeering for RICO liability. (Id. at 6-8.)

Finally, after stressing the importance of balancing Sasmor’s interest in finding “potentially discoverable information against the burdens that it imposes on parties and nonparties,” Judge Orenstein pointed out that the court had already extended discovery several times to accommodate Sasmor’s “voluminous requests, many of which [had] been frivolous,” and rejected Sasmor’s requests to reinstate subpoenas to AirBnB and JPMorgan Chase Bank. (Id. at 10.)

The court finds that Judge Orenstein did not commit any clear error or rule contrary to law in denying Sasmor this additional discovery. As a preliminary matter, Judge Orenstein correctly pointed out that Sasmor had “never noticed Mr. Dudjak’s deposition,” “the parties who have noticed his deposition have not sought any relief with respect to it,” and that Sasmor could issue a trial subpoena to Dudjak to authenticate any documents. (Id.at 6-9.) Moreover, Judge Orenstein did not commit clear error in denying Sasmor’s motion on the merits after finding that even an admission by Dudjak that he had advertised hostels would be insufficient to establish a predicate act of wire fraud for RICO liability because Sasmor did not plausibly allege that the advertisements contained any material misstatements or omissions. (Id.) Finally, Judge Orenstein did not commit clear error in denying Sasmor’s requests to reinstate subpoenas to AirBnB and JPMorgan Chase for similar reasons and properly took into consideration the burden on the parties that would result from permitting last-minute discovery by Sasmor that was unlikely to result in any admissible evidence. (Id. at 10.)

B. Discovery Related to Real Estate Licensing Records

*4 Sasmor also seeks the release after an in camera review of real estate licensing records for nine defendants and related licensees from the New York Department of State that had been produced under seal and reviewed by Judge Orenstein, arguing that this information could show prior misconduct of the defendants within the real estate business. (ECF No. 209, Motion for In Camera Review and Release of Subpoenaed Records from DoS (“Licensing Records Motion”), 2/25/13; Tr. at 11.) Sasmor conceded that he did “not have “any independent evidence that the contents of the materials ... will include additional prior bad acts by the appearing Defendants,” yet nevertheless argued that the court should take an “inclusionary approach” to Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 404(b) and permit discovery of the records. (Licensing Records Motion at 2; Tr. at 11-12.)

Judge Orenstein denied Sasmor’s motion at the pretrial conference, finding that (i) the information requested would, at best, only establish propensityrather than intent and was thus not likely to result in admissible evidence, and (ii) that because an initial review of the material produced under seal did not show any evidence of misconduct by defendants, there was no indication any documents related to defendants’ bad acts would actually be in the records. (Tr. at 12.)

The court finds that Judge Orenstein did not commit clear error in denying Sasmor’s requests for licensing records. First, Judge Orenstein correctly determined that Sasmor’s basis for seeking the records was speculative and was unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence because Sasmor articulated propensity-based reasons for the request. The Second Circuit uses the “inclusionary” approach of “other act” evidence under Rule 404(b) to determine proper purpose, relevance, and admissibility at trial. United States v. Muniz, 60 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1995).[2] Judge Orenstein properly considered admissibility to determine whether the requested discovery should be permitted and correctly denied Sasmor’s request.

In this case, Judge Orenstein correctly found that, aside from Sasmor’s speculation, the licensing records sought by Sasmor would not lead to admissible evidence because Sasmor stated that the records would be offered to show “[d]efendants’ prior misconduct in the real estate business.” (Tr. at 11.) Because propensity evidence is inadmissible, Judge Orenstein denied Sasmor’s request. (Id.) Although evidence of prior similar bad acts can be admitted to show intent, see United States v. Caputo, 808 F.2d 963, 968 (2d Cir. 1987), Sasmor was unable to offer any credible explanation of how these records could show defendants’ intent in the instant case. When asked by Judge Orenstein how any of these records would “establish intent in any way other than showing that they have a propensity,” Sasmor replied that, if any records showed previous violations by defendants, then such records “would show that [defendants’ conduct in the instant action] was intentional because they were already aware of the law.” (Tr. at 12.) As Judge Orenstein correctly pointed out, even though his review of the licensing records revealed no evidence of misconduct, Sasmor’s argument only highlighted that the records sought would only be used to establish propensity that defendants were acting in accordance with previous acts. (Id.)

*5 Second, Judge Orenstein also accurately found that there was no indication that the records sought by Sasmor would contain information of prior bad acts by defendants. Sasmor admitted he had no “independent evidence that the contents of the materials ... will include additional prior bad acts.” (Licensing Records Motion at 2.) Judge Orenstein conducted a brief initial review of materials and did not find “anything there that would in any event show such misconduct” by defendants. (Tr. at 12.) This court has also independently reviewed the records and agrees with Judge Orenstein that the records do not appear to contain evidence of misconduct by defendants. Accordingly, the court finds that Judge Orenstein’s ruling was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.

C. Discovery Related to craigslist

Sasmor also seeks discovery from craigslist related to the craigslist accounts of defendants Goldberger, Smith and Bosch to show (i) that they posted advertisements related to 287 Franklin Avenue on the internet, and (ii) to determine the exact locations of craigslist servers to establish the interstate commerce element of his wire fraud claims. (ECF No. 235-2; ECF No. 212, Motion to Reinstate Subpoena to craigslist (“craigslist Motion”), 2/26/13, at 1.) Judge Orenstein denied Sasmor’s request, reasoning that the burden of the proposed discovery outweighed its likely benefit. (Tr. at 20-21.)

As Judge Orenstein pointed out, counsel for defendants stipulated to the existence of craigslist advertisements related to the 287 Franklin Avenue property at the final pretrial conference. (Id. at 19-20.) Sasmor failed to explain how the benefits of additional discovery would outweigh the burden of such discovery, especially given that he sought information related to advertisements over a range of seven years. (Id.; craigslist Motion.) Thus, the court finds that Judge Orenstein did not make a clear error in denying this discovery given that defendants were willing to stipulate to certain findings and it is unclear why Sasmor would need additional discovery given the proffered stipulation.

D. Discovery Related to Signature Bank Records

Sasmor also appeals Judge Orenstein’s denial of his motion to subpoena records from Signature Bank related to the business account of 287 Franklin Avenue from January 2009 to present, arguing that this material is relevant to his allegations of money laundering. (ECF No. 215, Motion to Release Subpoenaed Materials from Signature Bank (“Signature Bank Motion”), 2/28/13.) Although defendants said they would consider disclosure of bank records for a smaller date range, Sasmor had rejected this request. (Tr. at 23-25.) Consequently, Judge Orenstein denied Sasmor’s request as overbroad and unduly burdensome. (Id. at 23, 27.)

The court finds no clear error in Judge Orenstein’s denial of Sasmor’s request. Sasmor had failed to limit the time period for which he sought discovery and was unwilling to compromise with opposing counsel. (Id.) Although Sasmor was willing to change his position at the final pretrial conference, Judge Orenstein found that this shift in Sasmor’s position after numerous extensions of discovery came too late in light of the burdens imposed by his belatedly modified requests on the eve of the close of discovery. (Id. at 27.) Judge Orenstein also pointed out that the bank records sought by Sasmor would only show where money went after it had already been purportedly laundered, and was thus irrelevant to show how, or if the money had actually been laundered. (Id. at 22-23.)

E. Discovery Related to Apple Bank and Provident Municipal Bank Records

Sasmor also appeals Judge Orenstein’s denial of his request to subpoena Apple Bank and Provident Municipal Bank for (i) records related to accounts into which checks from tenants were allegedly deposited, and (ii) to determine what happened to a $25,000 check withdrawn from an Apple Bank account. (ECF No. 216, Motion to Issue Subpoenas to Apple Bank and Provident Municipal Bank (“Bank Subpoenas Motion”), 2/28/13, at 1.) Sasmor claims that these rent checks were deposited into accounts at Apple Bank and Provident Municipal Bank based on deposition testimony and his review of certain checks. (Id. at 1-3.) Judge Orenstein denied Sasmor’s request because he found that the request was made too late to merit further extending discovery and that the materials sought were likely to be irrelevant to proving claims of money laundering and mail fraud. (Tr. at 28.)

*6 The court agrees with Judge Orenstein and finds that there was no clear error in denying Sasmor this discovery. It is unclear whether the accounts Sasmor sought to subpoena are directed at the correct banks, given that Sasmor identified the accounts based on his independent analysis of which bank accounts rent checks may have been deposited in. (Bank Subpoenas Motion at 1-3.) But even if Sasmor’s discovery requests were targeted to the correct bank accounts, Sasmor has failed to articulate how any information on deposits or withdrawals from those accounts would be relevant to his claims of money laundering or fraud as the records would only show the contents of the accounts and any withdrawals and deposits, but not how any money was allegedly laundered. (Tr. at 28.) Finally, Judge Orenstein properly exercised his discretion and oversight of discovery in finding that Sasmor’s last minute requests would impose an undue burden on the parties by needlessly prolonging discovery in the search of records that were likely irrelevant. (Id.)

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Judge Orenstein’s rulings were correctly decided, affirms Judge Orenstein’s discovery rulings in all respects, and denies Sasmor’s appeal of those discovery rulings in its entirety. The court further respectfully refers this case to Judge Orenstein to schedule summary judgment briefing and to issue a report and recommendation on any motion for summary judgment.

SO ORDERED.

Defendants include Chaim Meisels, Chaim Goldberger, Isaac Teitelbaum, Abraham Schneebalg, the Ronald Henry Land Trust, Henry Management, LLC, Peter Henry, Louis Garcia, Joel Kaufman, Kings County Realty Corp., Nathan Smith, Josh Bosch, and People Choice Real Estate, LLC, Brian Dudjak, and Samuel Emmanus. Plaintiffs include the 287 Franklin Avenue Residents’ Association, Sasmor, Lisa Lin, William Osterweil, Kurt Fletcher, and Vilija Skubutyte.

Under this approach, the court must determine “if the evidence satisfies the probative-prejudice balancing test of Fed. R. Evid. 403 ... and is relevant to an actual issue in the case.” Bass v. Grottoli, No. 94 CIV. 3220, 1996 WL 455016, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1996) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1118 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). The court must also “make a determination under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) in order to determine whether the information sought is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, and preparation, but notto show action in conformity with an individual’s previous actions. Valenzuela v. Abate, No. 92 Civ. 9309, 1996 WL 22373, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1996).