E. Randol SCHOENBERG v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Case No. LA CV18-01738 JAK (AGRx) United States District Court, C.D. California Filed April 29, 2019 Counsel David E. Rosen, Jodi M. Newberry, Paul D Murphy, Murphy Rosen LLP, Santa Monica, CA, for E. Randol Schoenberg. Stuart Justin Robinson, US Department of Justice, Civil Division - Federal Programs Branch, San Francisco, CA, Jennie L. Kneedler, US Department of Justice, Civil Division - Federal Programs Branch, Washington, DC, for Federal Bureau of Investigation. Kronstadt, John A., United States District Judge ORDER RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 24) I. Introduction *1 E. Randol Schoenberg (“Plaintiff”) filed this action seeking certain injunctive relief as to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI” or “Defendant”) based on the claim he brought under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Complaint, Dkt. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks an order directing the FBI to produce, in unredacted form, four documents (the “Warrant Materials”): a search warrant; the application for the warrant; the affidavit in support of the warrant; and the warrant return. The warrant authorized a search of a laptop computer that had been used by former Congressman Anthony Weiner. The warrant authorized a search of this laptop for emails related to a closed investigation concerning former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Weiner's former wife, Huma Abedin, had worked with Secretary Clinton at the State Department. On June 8, 2018, a magistrate judge in the Southern District of New York granted the application of the United States to unseal the Warrant Materials, but with three redactions: (i) the name of the FBI Supervisory Special Agent (“SSA”) who signed the search warrant application, the affidavit in support of the search warrant and the warrant return, Defendant's Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law (“FBI SUF”), Dkt. 25 ¶ 14; see alsoExhibit L to Declaration of David M. Hardy (“Hardy Decl.”), FBI August 13, 2018 Response to FOIPA Request No. 1361976-001 (“FOIA Production”), Dkt. 24-1 at 114, 115, 127, 130 (locations where SSA's name is redacted); (ii) the name of the FBI Special Agent (“SA”) who is identified as being present when the SSA made an inventory following the execution of the search warrant, FBI SUF, Dkt. 25 ¶ 15; see also FOIA Production, Dkt. 24-1 at 130 (location where SA's name is redacted); and (iii) a personal Yahoo! email address for Abedin that is included in the affidavit in support of the warrant, FOIA Production, Dkt. 24-1 at 123. On August 13, 2018, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment (the “Motion”). Dkt. 24. Plaintiff filed an opposition (Dkt. 28) and Defendant replied (Dkt. 31). A hearing was held on the Motion on October 22, 2018 and it was taken under submission. Dkt. 37. In light of the June 8, 2018 unsealing order, the narrow question presented by the Motion is whether Defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to redact the information identified above from its FOIA production. For the reasons stated in this Order, the Motion is GRANTED.[1] II. Factual and Procedural Background A. The Midyear Investigation In July 2015, the FBI commenced an investigation, which has been referred to as the “Midyear” investigation, into “the storage and transmission of classified information on” the “unclassified private servers” of former Secretary of State Clinton. U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, A Review of Various Actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election at 1, Election Oversight and Review Division 18-04 (June 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1071991/download (“IG Report”).[2] “There were approximately 15 agents, agents, analysts, computer specialists, and forensic accountants assigned on a full-time basis to the Midyear team, as well as other FBI staff who provided periodic support.” Id. at 42. As relevant here, this included a team of four case agents who reported to a Supervisory Special Agent. Id.; see also id. at 45 (chain of command for Midyear team). The SSA and SA whose identities have been redacted from the materials at issue in this action are “experienced counterintelligence agents” who “were assigned to the Midyear team.” Hardy Decl., Dkt. 24-1 ¶ 36; FBI SUF, Dkt. 25 ¶ 16.[3] Approximately a year after the investigation was opened, FBI Director James Comey issued a public statement that was critical of Secretary Clinton, but also included “that the investigation should be closed.” IG Report at 2. The next day, July 6, 2016, Attorney General Loretta Lynch formally declined to prosecute Secretary Clinton. Id. *2 On September 26, 2016, as part of an unrelated investigation into former Congressman Anthony Weiner, the FBI obtained an iPhone, iPad, and laptop computer each of which belonged to him. Id. at vii. Within the next day, a case agent involved in that investigation reported that he found on the laptop at least one message between Secretary Clinton and Huma Abedin, to whom Weiner was then married. She had served as Deputy Chief of Staff and personal assistant to Secretary Clinton. Id. at ii, vii. Although in late September and early October 2016, members of the Midyear team discussed reviewing these emails, the Department of Justice Inspector General “found no evidence that anyone associated with the Midyear investigation ... took any action on the Weiner laptop issue until the week of October 24.” Id. at viii. This inaction, and the events that followed in late October, “had potentially far-reaching consequences” with respect to the upcoming election in which Secretary Clinton was a candidate for President. See id. at ix. On October 26, 2016, the Midyear team conducted a conference call regarding the Weiner laptop. Id. at 315. Three who participated stated that, during this call, they learned of “the potential [that] a large number of” Secretary Clinton's emails would be found on the laptop, possibly including the “missing emails” -- “emails from Clinton's first three months as Secretary of State.” Id. at 315-16.[4] On October 27, 2016, Director Comey authorized the Midyear team to seek the issuance of a search warrant. Id. at x. “On October 28, 2016, 11 days before the presidential election, Comey sent a letter to Congress announcing the discovery of emails that ‘appear[ed] to be pertinent’ to the Midyear investigation.” Id. at 2. Two days later, on October 30, 2016, the FBI obtained a search warrant. Id.Investigators spent the next six days “process[ing] and review[ing] a large volume of emails.” Id. Then, “[o]n November 6, 2016, 2 days before the election, Comey sent a second letter to Congress stating that the review of the emails on the laptop had not changed the FBI's earlier conclusions with respect to Clinton.” Id. at 2. B. Plaintiff's Efforts to Compel Release of the Warrant Materials The FOIA request at issue seeks the release, without redaction, of certain materials related to the October 30, 2016 search warrant for Congressman Weiner's laptop. In November 2016, Plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to the FBI for a copy of “the search warrant and related application, affidavits and receipts used by the FBI and the Justice Department to obtain the review of Huma Abedin's emails related to Hillary Clinton.” FBI SUF, Dkt. 25 ¶ 1 (quoting Hardy Decl., Dkt. 24-1 ¶ 7). Plaintiff also filed two actions in the Southern District of New York in December 2016. In one -- a miscellaneous matter seeking to unseal the Warrant Materials -- the government “effectively withdrew its opposition to Schoenberg's application, and requested that the materials be unsealed subject to redactions suggested by the government.” See Corrected Memorandum and Order, In re Search Warrant Issued on October 30, 2016, No. 1:16-mc-00464-PKC, slip op. at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2016), ECF No. 12. The Government's proposed redactions concerned identities and information related to law enforcement personnel as well as the identity of “Subject 1, who is the subject of an ongoing criminal investigation unrelated to Secretary Clinton's email server.” Id. Judge Castel ordered that the Warrant Materials be released to the public; provided, however, all redactions that had been proposed by the government would remain in place, and the identity of the person identified as “Subject 2” would also be redacted. Id. at 9. *3 Thereafter, Plaintiff continued to pursue, through a FOIA request to the FBI, the release of the information that had been redacted from the Warrant Materials. FBI SUF, Dkt. 25 ¶ 4. The FBI did not release the information. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action on March 1, 2018. In June 2018, the United States filed an application in the Southern District of New York to release publicly a version of the materials with fewer redactions. FBI SUF, Dkt. 25 ¶ 6. On June 8, 2018, Magistrate Judge Lehrburger granted the Government's application. Exhibit K to Hardy Decl., Dkt. 24-1 at 86-107. This version of the Warrant Materials, which was also provided to Plaintiff through his counsel, see FOIA Production, Dkt. 24-1 at 109-132; Exhibit 2 to Declaration of Jennie L. Kneedler (“Kneedler Decl.”), Dkt. 24-2 at 6, redacts the following information: (i) the name of the SSA who signed the search warrant application, the affidavit in support of the search warrant and the warrant return, FOIA Production, Dkt. 24-1 at 114, 115, 127, 130; (ii) the name of the SA who is identified as being present when the SSA made an inventory upon execution of the search warrant, id. at 130; and (iii) a personal Yahoo! email address for Abedin, id. at 123. III. Analysis A. Legal Standards 1. Summary Judgment A motion for summary judgment will be granted where the “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations[,] ... admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” show that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden to show the basis for its motion and to identify those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Where the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof on an issue, however, the movant need only demonstrate that there is an absence of evidence to support the claims of the nonmoving party. See id. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must set forth “specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” In re Oracle Corp. Secs. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Only admissible evidence may be considered in connection with a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In considering such a motion, a court is not to make any credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. All inferences are to be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987). However, conclusory, speculative testimony in declarations or other evidentiary materials is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. See Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). 2. FOIA a) Jurisdiction and Standard of Review *4 District courts have “jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). A court reviews the matter de novo and may examine the agency records in camera to determine if records are properly being withheld under the nine statutory exemptions of § 552(b). Id. “[F]ederal jurisdiction [to order disclosure] is dependent on a showing that an agency has (1) improperly (2) withheld (3) agency records. Unless each of these criteria is met, a district court lacks jurisdiction to devise remedies to force an agency to comply with the FOIA's disclosure requirements.” Spurlock v. F.B.I., 69 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Most FOIA cases are resolved by the district court on summary judgment, with the district court entering judgment as a matter of law.” Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 836 F.3d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (per curiam). However, there is no departure from the “usual procedure” that would apply to the determination of summary judgment a civil case: “if there are genuine issues of material fact in a FOIA case, the district court should proceed to a bench trial or adversary hearing. Resolution of factual disputes should be through the usual crucible of bench trial or hearing, with evidence subject to scrutiny and witnesses subject to cross-examination.” Id. at 990; see also id. at 989 (overruling Ninth Circuit precedent that had established a different standard of review for summary judgment in FOIA cases). b) FOIA Exemptions The “FOIA was enacted to facilitate public access to Government documents. The statute provides public access to official information shielded unnecessarily from public view and establishes a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands.” Lahr v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 569 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, the “FOIA contemplates that some information may legitimately be kept from the public. The statute contains nine enumerated exemptions allowing the government to withhold documents or portions of documents.” Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) ). The agency that invokes a FOIA exemption bears the burden of proving that it applies. Id.; see also Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991). In light of the “FOIA's purpose ... to encourage disclosure,” the “exemptions are to be interpreted narrowly.” Assembly of State of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 1992)(citing Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) ). B. Application 1. Whether the FBI Properly Withheld Information Under FOIA Exemption 7(C) a) Specific Legal Standards 5 U.S.C § 552(b)(7)(C) (“Exemption 7(C)”) exempts from disclosure “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ... could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” As a threshold matter, determining whether information has been “compiled for law enforcement purposes” includes identifying the agency that compiled the information. “[A]n agency which has a clear law enforcement mandate, such as the FBI, need only establish a rational nexus between enforcement of a federal law and the document for which an exemption is claimed, or a rational nexus between its law enforcement duties and such documents.” ACLU of N. Cal. v. FBI, 881 F.3d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Rosenfeld v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 57 F.3d 803, 808 (the FBI “has a clear law enforcement mandate,” and therefore the exemptions in FOIA section 7 require only that the FBI “ ‘establish a “rational nexus” between enforcement of a federal law and the document for which [a law enforcement] exemption is claimed’ ”) (quoting Church of Scientology v. Dep't of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 1979) (alterations in original) ). *5 If the threshold requirement is met, the next required step is to determine whether there has been an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). “[T]o determine whether a record is properly withheld, [courts] must balance the privacy interest protected ... against the public interest in government openness that would be served by disclosure.” Lahr v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 569 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).[5] b) Application The threshold requirement for Exemption 7(C) has been satisfied. The Warrant Materials were compiled and submitted to a court by the FBI, which is “[a]n agency which has a clear law enforcement mandate.” Church of Scientology, 611 F.2d at 748. The materials bear a “rational nexus” to the FBI's enforcement of laws regarding treatment of classified information. See ACLU of N. Cal., 881 F.3d at 778. Thus, the FBI compiled the materials during its investigation into whether Secretary Clinton violated those laws. See Hardy Decl., Dkt. 24-1 ¶ 32. Plaintiff's suggestion that these exemptions might not apply because the Warrant Materials were “filed in Court,” Plaintiff's Response to FBI SUF, Dkt. 28-2 at 23-24, is unpersuasive. Plaintiff has not cited any authority to support the position that documents that are filed in court are not included in these exemptions, and no basis for such a distinction has been demonstrated. Because this threshold requirement is met, the personal privacy interests must be balanced against the public interest in disclosure. See Lahr, 569 F.3d at 973. This balance will be assessed separately with respect to each of the three redactions. (1) Name of Supervising Special Agent (SSA) (a) Privacy Interests “[P]ersonal privacy interests encompass a broad range of concerns relating to an ‘individual's control of information concerning his or her person,’ and an ‘interest in keeping personal facts away from the public eye.’ ” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 974 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763, 769 (1989)). With respect to the privacy interests of FBI agents, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that “individuals do not waive all privacy interests in information relating to them simply by taking an oath of public office, but by becoming public officials, their privacy interests are somewhat reduced.” Id. at 977 (quoting Lissner v. U.S. Customs Serv., 241 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) ). However, “lower level officials ... generally have a stronger interest in personal privacy than do senior officials.” Dobronski v. FCC, 17 F.3d 275, 280 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994). Further, “FBI agents have a legitimate interest in keeping private matters that could conceivably subject them to annoyance or harassment.” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 977 (quoting Hunt v. FBI, 972 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1992) ). As to whether the name of an FBI agent should be disclosed, agents have “an interest in keeping private their involvement in investigations of especially controversial events.” Id. *6 The Ninth Circuit has “recognized that a government employee's privacy interests may be diminished in cases where information sought under FOIA would likely disclose ‘official misconduct,’ ” Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., 524 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008), or “when there are doubts about the integrity of [an investigator's] efforts,” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 977 (citing Castenada v. United States, 757 F.2d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 1985 (per curiam) ). However, such a limitation on the privacy interests of an FBI agent requires “evidence ... that the particular FBI agents mentioned in the requested documents themselves behaved improperly, or that their individual efforts were unreliable.” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 977. Two Ninth Circuit decisions are instructive. Each held that redacting the names of government agents serves a cognizable interest in privacy. Lahr addressed whether the FOIA compelled the release of the names of FBI agents that had been redacted from the government's production. 569 F.3d at 973. The documents at issue related to the government's investigation of the 1996 explosion of airborne Trans World Airlines Flight 800, which occurred off the coast of Long Island. Id. at 969. Because there was “some likelihood that the agents would be subjected to unwanted contact by the media and others” if their names were revealed, and insufficient evidence of improper behavior by the particular agents, there was “a cognizable privacy interest” in redacting the names of the agents. Id. at 977. In Forest Service Employees, the question presented was whether FOIA required the Forest Service to disclose the names of 22 employees. Their names had been redacted from the agency's report summarizing its investigation into the 2003 “Cramer Fire” in Idaho. 524 F.3d at 1022-23. Two firefighters had died while working to contain the Cramer Fire, which prompted several federal agencies to investigate. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that there was a cognizable privacy interest in the names of the employees. Id. at 1026-27. The opinion identified several factors that supported this conclusion: (i) the employees were all “low and mid-level employees,” id. at 1026; (ii) “although the Forest Service has disciplined six of these employees, none has been accused of official misconduct and the remaining employees were merely cooperating witnesses,” id.; (iii) there was “potential for harassment” of the employees by “the media and others” “in light of the significant public attention that the Cramer fire received,” id.; and (iv) “the public association of the employees with this tragedy would subject them to the risk of embarrassment in their official capacities and in their personal lives,” id. Lahr and Forest Service Employees show that there is a cognizable privacy interest in redacting the name of the SSA, who was responsible for signing the application for and affidavit in support of the search warrant as well as the inventory form after the search was conducted. First, it is at a minimum “conceivabl[e]” -- that is, there is a “potential” or “some likelihood” -- that revealing the SSA's name would “subject [the SSA] to annoyance or harassment,” including “unwanted contact by the media and others.” See Lahr, 569 F.3d at 977. Second, the SSA is not a high-level official. See IG Report at 45 (chain of command of FBI Midyear team); id. at 48 (describing briefings that “typically were attended by a core team of senior officials”; this “core team” included the official to whom the SSA directly reported, but not the SSA).[6] That he was a supervisor of a team of agents, and by one account a member of “the leadership of the [Midyear] team,” IG Report at 315 n.176, does not strip him of his privacy interest. See, e.g., Ray v. FBI, 441 F. Supp. 2d 27, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that name of FBI Supervisory Special Agent can be withheld under Exemption 7(C) ). *7 Third, the SSA's privacy interest is not reduced due to evidence of “official misconduct” by the SSA, Forest Service Employees, 524 F.3d at 1025, or of a deficiency in the “integrity of [the SSA's] efforts,” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 977. See also id. (privacy interests of FBI agents only diminished where there is “evidence ... that the particular FBI agents mentioned in the requested documents themselves behaved improperly, or that their individual efforts were unreliable”); Forest Service Employees, 524 F.3d at 1026 (“[A]lthough the Forest Service has disciplined six of these employees, none has been accused of official misconduct ....”).[7] Plaintiff contends that the SSA “actively participated in, and encouraged, an unnecessary, ill-timed search that was obtained without the necessary probable cause directed toward the evidence being sought.” Opposition, Dkt. 28 at 14-15; see also Plaintiff's Additional Undisputed Material Facts (“Plaintiff SUF”), Dkt. 28-2 at 27 ¶ 21 (stating that search warrant application fails to disclose “the true design of the warrant -- the missing three months of e-mails from early in Clinton's tenure”; moreover, “there was no probable cause,” and “the search warrant application itself was purposely misleading and pretextual”). At the hearing, Plaintiff's counsel argued that the IG Report supports this claim of misconduct. In support of this position, Plaintiff's counsel cited a portion of the IG Report. It states that two days before the warrant was obtained, “the FBI had limited information” about what would be found on the laptop; “the Midyear team was uncertain they would even be able to establish sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant.” IG Report at 373. Plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidentiary support for a claim of misconduct. Cf. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004) (“bare suspicion” that “officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly in the performance of their duties” is insufficient to compel disclosure). Plaintiff states that “[t]he only fair conclusion[ ]” to be drawn from the Warrant Materials and the IG Report is that the SSA participated in an “ill-timed search” that occurred “without the necessary probable cause.” See Plaintiff SUF, Dkt. 28-2 at 47, 52-53 ¶¶ 21, 28. This position is not convincing. For example, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the SSA presented fabricated evidence to the magistrate judge who approved the warrant application. Moreover, the IG Report does not establish misconduct by the SSA. To the contrary, after closely scrutinizing the actions surrounding the warrant and determining that the decisions of several FBI officials warranted some criticism, the Inspector General issued the IG Report. It did not identify any misconduct by the SSA either in his preparation of the warrant application or otherwise. See FBI SUF, Dkt. 25 at 13 ¶¶ 27-28. (b) Public Interest in Disclosure “Once the government has identified a cognizable privacy interest, ‘the only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis is the extent to which disclosure of the information sought would shed light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let citizens know what their government is up to.’ ” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 974 (quoting Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355, 355-56 (1997) (per curiam) ). “[A] requester must demonstrate that the interest served by disclosure ‘is a significant one, an interest more specific than having the information for its own sake,’ and that disclosure is likely to advance that interest.” Id. (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 172) ). Where “only the names of ... agents are missing from the released documents, ... the ‘marginal additional usefulness’ of the names in exposing government misconduct must outweigh the privacy interests at stake.” Id. at 978 (quoting Painting Indus. of Haw. Mkt. Recovery Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 26 F.3d 1479, 1486 (9th Cir. 1994) ). *8 Once again, Forest Service Employees and Lahr apply. Forest Service Employees determined that the identities of the employees alone will shed no new light on the Forest Service's performance of its duties beyond that which is already publicly known. Instead, the FSEEE seeks to contact these employees itself ... to confirm the veracity of the publicly-available reports.... The public benefit the FSEEE asserts and the privacy interests of the Forest Service employees are equally inseparable. Under the FSEEE's theory, the only way the release of the identities of the Forest Service employees can benefit the public is if the public uses such information to contact the employees directly. As we held in Painting Industry, such use cannot justify release of the information the FSEEE seeks.... Moreover, OSHA and the OIG had little to gain from withholding criticism of the Forest Service, as their pointed and disapproving conclusions indicate. As a result of the substantial information already in the public domain, we must conclude that the release of the identities of the employees who participated in the Forest Service's response to the Cramer Fire would not appreciably further the public's important interest in monitoring the agency's performance during that tragic event. Forest Service Employees, 524 F.3d at 1027-28. Lahr explained that the issue presented was “for all relevant purposes identical to that in Forest Service Employees”: The requester “already possesses the substance of ... the FBI agents' thoughts as they are expressed in the released memoranda and emails. The only way the identities of the ... FBI agents mentioned in the documents already released would have public value is if these individuals were contacted directly by the plaintiff or by the media.” 569 F.3d at 979. Whether to disclose the identity of the SSA presents an issue that is “for all relevant purposes identical to” the facts presented in Forest Service Employees and Lahr. See id. The “marginal additional usefulness” of the SSA's name is limited to the possibility that the SSA could be “contacted directly by the plaintiff or by the media.” Id. “[T]he substance of” the SSA's thoughts about the warrant, see id., are already contained in the Warrant Materials, including in the supporting affidavit signed by the SSA. The public's understanding of this thought process has also been supplemented by the IG Report. Any benefit to the public that would result from releasing the SSA's name is “ ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the invasion of the [SSA's] privacy.” Forest Service Employees, 524 F.3d at 1028(quoting Painting Industry, 26 F.3d at 1485). Finally, to the extent that revealing the SSA's name would facilitate the public's ability to uncover misconduct -- something that is uncertain given the amount of information already available to the public about the relevant conduct -- Plaintiff has not established “more than a ‘bare suspicion’ of wrongdoing” for the reasons stated above. See Lahr, 569 F.3d at 974 (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 174). *9 Plaintiff contends that “[i]f the public has a right to know about the actions of” other FBI officials whose names have been released, “it has the right to know about the aggressive SSA.” Opposition, Dkt. 28 at 15. However, there is already substantial public information about the actions of the SSA. Plaintiff seeks the release of the name of the SSA. Thus, its release would only “shed light on an agency's performance” or “let citizens know what their government is up to” if it would lead to further public scrutiny of those actions through direct contact of the SSA by Plaintiff, the media or others. As in Lahr and Forest Service Employees, any such public benefit is “inextricably intertwined” with the invasion of the SSA's privacy and thus insufficient to justify disclosure.[8] For the foregoing reasons, there is a cognizable privacy interest in redacting the name of the SSA that is not outweighed by the public interest in disclosure. Therefore, the FBI acted properly when it elected to withhold the name of the SSA under FOIA Exemption 7(C). (2) Name of Special Agent (SA) For similar reasons, the FBI also properly withheld the name of the SA. The SA's privacy interest is stronger than that of the SSA because the SA is a “lower level official[ ]” than the SSA. See Forest Service Employees, 524 F.3d at 1025; see also IG Report at 45 (chain of command of FBI Midyear team). Nor does Plaintiff identify any specific, alleged wrongdoing by the SA. See Opposition, Dkt. 28 at 15-16. This both supports the SA's privacy interest and reduces any potential public benefit of disclosure. In short, the claim of an “enormous public interest” in details about the Warrant Materials, id. at 15, cannot compel disclosure of the name of the SA. For these reasons, the FBI acted appropriately in withholding the name of the SA under FOIA Exemption 7(C). (3) Personal Email Address of Abedin There is a cognizable privacy interest in Abedin's personal email address. “The Supreme Court has indicated that the privacy interests of citizens are highest when disclosure would reveal information collected about them in conjunction with a criminal inquiry, especially where their link to the investigation is the result of ‘mere happenstance.’ ” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 975 (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 166). This is why Abedin's email address appears in the Warrant Materials. Thus, the information was collected and presented to a magistrate judge “in conjunction with a criminal inquiry” about Secretary Clinton with whom Abedin formerly worked. Plaintiff contends that this privacy interest is diminished because a Yahoo! email address for Abedin, “presumably” the one that has been redacted here, was previously disclosed by the State Department. Opposition, Dkt. 28 at 18. However, that disclosure was inadvertent, and the State Department subsequently took corrective action. SeeExhibit 3 to Kneedler Decl., Dkt. 24-2 at 30. Further, even if the State Department had decided affirmatively to reveal certain information, that would not “diminish[ ]” the “ability” of another agency, i.e., the FBI, to refuse disclosure pursuant to its application of a FOIA Exemption. See Forest Service Employees, 524 F.3d at 1025 n.3. Nor is there merit to Plaintiff's contention that all email addresses are “not intended to be kept secret, since they are used to communicate with third parties,” Opposition, Dkt. 28 at 18-19. See, e.g., Yagman v. Dep't of Justice, No. 2:13-cv-00354-PA-E, 2014 WL 1245305, at *9 (C.D. Cal. March 22, 2014), aff'd 605 Fed. Appx. 666 (9th Cir. 2015) (agency employee phone numbers and email addresses properly withheld under Exemption 7(C) ). The extent to which an email address has been used broadly requires a case-by-case assessment. *10 These privacy interests are not outweighed by any public interest in revealing Abedin's email address. Plaintiff's reliance on “[t]he public interest in having a historically important search warrant application unredacted,” Opposition, Dkt. 28 at 18, is in effect an argument for the release of “information for its own sake.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 172. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that revealing Abedin's email address would advance “the only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis”: “the extent to which disclosure of the information sought would shed light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let citizens know what their government is up to.’ ” Bibles, 519 U.S. at 355-56 (1997) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Forest Service Employees, 524 F.3d at 1025 (“ ‘[I]nformation about private citizens that is accumulated in various governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct’ is not the type of information to which FOIA permits access.”) (quoting U.S. Dep't of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 495-96 (1994) ). Thus, the FBI acted properly when it withheld Abedin's email address under FOIA Exemption 7(C).[9] IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated in this Order, the Motion is GRANTED. Not later than May 9, 2019, after meeting and conferring with Plaintiff's counsel in an effort to reach agreement as to the form of a proposed judgment, Defendant shall lodge a proposed judgment and state whether Plaintiff has agreed to its form. If the parties have not agreed to the form of the judgment, within seven days after the proposed judgment is lodged by Defendant, Plaintiff shall timely file any objection(s) in accordance with the Local Rules. IT IS SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] Plaintiff filed certain evidentiary objections with respect to evidence submitted in connection with the Motion. Dkt. 28-1. Defendant contends that Plaintiff's “objections are not well founded.” Reply, Dkt. 31 at 7 n.2. Rulings on Plaintiff's evidentiary objections are set forth in a separate order. Dkt. 42. [2] Plaintiff and Defendant both cite the IG Report. Plaintiff has provided many excerpts from the IG Report as an exhibit to its Opposition; Defendant has cited the IG Report in its briefs and supporting declarations. See Exhibit A to Declaration of E. Randol Schoenberg, Dkts. 28-4, 28-5; FBI SUF, Dkt. 25 ¶¶ 26-31. The full report is a document of which judicial notice is appropriate because its authenticity is undisputed and it reflects information obtained from a publicly available government document. SeeDaniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010). [3] Plaintiff contends that this statement “lacks foundation” because “Mr. Hardy does not appear to have any personal knowledge to support his statements.” Plaintiff's Response to FBI SUF, Dkt. 28-2 ¶ 16. Hardy's statement that his declaration is based on his personal knowledge, including through his work as an FBI Section Chief, and his awareness of the FBI's response to Plaintiff's FOIA request, is sufficient to provide the necessary foundation. See Hardy Decl., Dkt. 24-1 ¶¶ 1-3. [4] “Witnesses, including former Director Comey, told [the Inspector General] that they believed that” emails sent and received at the beginning of Secretary Clinton's tenure “could contain important evidence regarding Clinton's intent in setting up a private email server.” IG Report at 73 n.63. After the hearing, Plaintiff submitted further evidence regarding the relevance of emails from early in Secretary Clinton's tenure, including as to: Director Comey's December 7, 2018 interview that was part of an investigation by two committees of the House of Representatives. See Plaintiff's Submission of New Evidence in Further Support of Opposition to Summary Judgment Motion, Dkt. 40. In that interview, Director Comey stated that “the key ingredient that was missing in the Clinton investigation” as of July 2016 “was any indication that she knew she was doing something she shouldn't be doing.” Id. at 6 (page 197 of transcript). “[W]hat the Weiner trove potentially held was evidence of that intention, especially in the form of the emails from her BlackBerry during her first 3 months as Secretary of State.” Id. [5] The FBI contends that the Warrant Materials can be withheld under both Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Exemption 6 involves a balancing test that is similar to the one that applies under Exemption 7(C). SeeLahr, 569 F.3d at 973. However, “the Government's burden in establishing the requisite invasion of privacy to support an Exemption 6 claim is heavier than the standard applicable to Exemption 7(C).” U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 172 (1991). Thus, as long as the threshold requirement for Exemption 7(C) is satisfied, as it is here, there is “no need to consider Exemption 6 separately because all information that would fall within the scope of Exemption 6 would also be immune from disclosure under Exemption 7(C).” Roth v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 2011). [6] At the hearing, Plaintiff's counsel disputed the FBI's description of the SSA as a “non-executive level employee[ ].” See FBI SUF, Dkt. 25 ¶ 29. The available evidence on the SSA's role shows that he was not the type of official whose privacy interests are very modest. [7] Because “official misconduct” or evidence of lack of “integrity” has the effect of “reduc[ing]” -- but not eliminating -- an agent's privacy interests, Lahr, 569 F.3d at 977, even some evidence of such impropriety would not require a particular outcome from the balancing test. [8] Plaintiff cites four cases in support of his contention that the name of the SSA should be disclosed: Lissner v. U.S. Customs Service, 241 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2001); Hardy v. FBI, No. 95-883 (D. Ariz. July 29, 1997); Butler v. DOJ, 1994 WL 55621 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1994); and Weiner v. FBI, No. 83-1721 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1995) (filed as Dkt. 33-1). With respect to Lissner, the question was whether to release “[a] general physical description” of officers whose “identities [had] already been released.” 241 F.3d at 1224. There, the physical description of the officers did not raise any “personal privacy interest” and did not carry a risk of “subject[ing] either [of the officers] to danger, harassment, or embarrassment.” Id.With respect to the three district court cases, the FBI's contention that later-decided Ninth Circuit cases “foreclose[ ] Plaintiff's argument,” Dkt. 31 at 12, is persuasive. [9] In light of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to address the FBI's argument that the Motion must be granted because the Warrant Materials have been sealed pursuant to an order of the Southern District of New York. See Motion, Dkt. 24 at 13-15. But cf. Morgan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 923 F.2d 195, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he mere existence of a court seal is, without more, insufficient to justify nondisclosure under the FOIA.”).