Louis A. CARDINALI, Plaintiff(s), v. PLUSFOUR, INC., et al., Defendant(s) Case No.: 2:16-cv-02046-JAD-NJK United States District Court, D. Nevada Signed June 20, 2019 Counsel Mohammed Omar Badwan, Pro Hac Vice, Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd., Lombard, IL, Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, Matthew C. De Re, Zimmerman Law Offices, P.C., Chicago, IL, Sean N. Payne, Payne Law Firm LLC, Miles N. Clark, Matthew I. Knepper, Knepper & Clark LLC, Las Vegas, NV, David H. Krieger, Haines & Krieger, LLC, Henderson, NV, for Plaintiff(s). Adam William Wiers, Pro Hac Vice, Christopher A. Hall, Pro Hac Vice, Chicago, IL, Andrew J. Sharples, Jennifer L. Braster, Naylor & Braster, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant(s). Koppe, Nancy J., United States Magistrate Judge Order *1 Defendant Experian’s attempts to obtain discovery from Haines & Krieger regarding whether it acted as a credit repair organization now returns to the Court for the fourth time. See Docket No. 95 (denying motion to quash deposition subpoena); Docket No. 157 (ordering Haines & Krieger to appear for a redeposition); Docket No. 167 (overruling objections). In the instant motion practice, Experian seeks an order compelling Haines & Krieger to produce documents. Docket No. 130. Haines & Krieger filed a response in opposition. Docket Nos. 132, 137 (corrected image). Experian filed a reply. Docket No. 139.[1] The Court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion and heard oral argument. See Docket Nos. 172, 174, 176; see also Docket Nos. 177-78 (transcripts). For the reasons discussed below, the motion to compel is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. I. BACKGROUND This is a putative class action bringing a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. See Docket No. 57. Plaintiff alleges that he filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and that his debt to Webbank was discharged through the bankruptcy. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 19. Plaintiff alleges that Webbank failed to properly report credit information in light of those bankruptcy proceedings, providing a misleading impression as to Plaintiff’s creditworthiness. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 27. Plaintiff alleges that this shortcoming led to inaccurate information being provided by Experian. See id. at ¶ 28. Plaintiff further alleges that he disputed that information by notifying Experian in writing and that Experian was therefore required to conduct a reinvestigation of the dispute. Id. at ¶¶ 29-30. Plaintiff alleges that Experian failed to conduct a proper reinvestigation. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 38. Plaintiff alleges that his claims are typical of those existing for other potential class members. See id. at ¶ 80. Plaintiff is represented in this case by several attorneys, including David Krieger of the law firm of Haines & Krieger, LLC. At his deposition, Plaintiff testified regarding Haines & Krieger’s role in drafting and sending the dispute letter identified in the complaint. See, e.g., Docket No. 87-3 at 19-20. Experian contends that Haines & Krieger’s conduct with respect to drafting and sending consumer dispute letters may result in Haines & Krieger being classified as a “credit repair organization” for purposes of the Credit Repair Organization Act. See, e.g., Docket No. 87 at 3. Such a determination turns, in part, on whether Haines & Krieger received monetary payment or “other valuable consideration” for those services. See 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(A). Experian explains that this determination is significant because a credit reporting agency has no duty to investigate a dispute sent to it by a credit repair organization. See Docket No. 87 at 3 (citing In re Experian Info. Sols., Inc., Case No. CV-15-01212-PHX-GMS, 2017 WL 3559007, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 17, 2017)). *2 The current discovery dispute arises out of Experian’s subpoena for 12 categories of documents from Haines & Krieger that Experian indicates are pertinent to determining whether Haines & Krieger acted as a credit repair organization. II. STANDARDS “[B]road discretion is vested in the trial court to permit or deny discovery.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998). Discovery is limited to any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and is proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also ATS Prods., Inc. v. Champion Fiberglass, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 527, 530 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (stating that the scope of nonparty discovery is subject to the same limitations). “The discovery process in theory should be cooperative and largely unsupervised by the district court.” Sali v. Corona Reg’l Med. Ctr., 884 F.3d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir. 2018). Parties are permitted to subpoena nonparties for the production of documents. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). When a nonparty objects to a subpoena, the serving party may move to compel compliance. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i). A nonparty seeking to avoid discovery bears the burden of persuasion in opposing a motion to compel. See Goodman v. United States, 369 F.2d 166, 169 (9th Cir. 1966). District courts enjoy wide discretion in deciding relevancy for discovery purposes. E.g., Shaw v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 306 F.R.D. 293, 296 (S.D. Cal. 2015). To be permissible, discovery must be “relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” In re Bard IVC Prods. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 563-64 (D. Ariz. 2016) (discussing 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). The concept of relevancy remains broad in scope. See, e.g., Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, Case No. 2:14-cv-02046-JAD-PAL, 2016 WL 778368, at *2 n.16 (D. Nev. Feb. 25, 2016). The scope of permissible discovery is limited by the common-sense concept of proportionality, which is designed to eliminate unnecessary or wasteful discovery. Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 312 F.R.D. 594, 603 (D. Nev. 2016). Undue burden in the context of nonparty discovery is judged by the same standard as that used regarding discovery served on parties to the litigation. See Mount Hope Church v. Bash Back!, 705 F.3d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 2012). To meet its burden of persuasion, the objecting party must provide specific facts that indicate the nature and extent of the burden. See, e.g., Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Flamingo Trails No. 7 Landscape Maintenance Ass’n, 316 F.R.D. 327, 334 (D. Nev. 2016) (citing Jackson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 173 F.R.D. 524, 529 (D. Nev. 1997)). Conclusory or speculative statements of harm, inconvenience, or expense are plainly insufficient. Id. (citing U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Entm’t, 237 F.R.D. 428, 432 (D. Nev. 2006)). “An evaluation of undue burden requires the court to weigh the burden to the subpoenaed party against the value of the information to the serving party.” Moon v. SCP Pool Corp., 232 F.R.D. 633, 637 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 228 F.R.D. 111, 113 (D. Conn. 2005)).[2] III. OVERARCHING ARGUMENTS *3 Before turning to the specific requests at issue, the Court first addresses some of Haines & Krieger’s overarching arguments. A. Objection to “Discovery on Discovery” Haines & Krieger argued at that hearing that the Court was improperly allowing “discovery on discovery.” See, e.g., Docket No. 177 at 9-10 (referencing Ashcraft v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., Case No. 2:16-cv-02978-JAD-NJK, 2018 WL 6171772 (D. Nev. Nov. 26, 2018)). The underlying discovery in dispute is aimed at obtaining evidence as to whether Haines & Krieger acted as a credit repair organization and is not “discovery on discovery.” Although somewhat vague, this repeated line of argument appears instead to challenge the Court’s hearing on the motion to compel as itself constituting “discovery on discovery” because Haines & Krieger was required to support its factual positions advanced in resisting discovery.[3] Even taking Haines & Krieger’s premise as true that a hearing on a motion to compel could constitute “discovery on discovery,” the circumstances of this case more than justify that relief. The undersigned’s order relied upon by counsel addresses the applicable standards governing “discovery on discovery”: Responding parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies as to their own electronically stored information. Brewer v. BNSF Rwy. Co., 2018 WL 882812, at *2 (D. Mont. Feb. 14, 2018). Discovery into another party’s discovery process is disfavored. See Fish v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 2017 WL 697663, at *17 (D. Md. Feb. 21, 2017) (collecting cases); see also Bombardier Recreational Prods., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 2014 WL 10714011, at *14-15 (D. Minn. Dec. 5, 2014) (denying discovery on discovery as not relevant to any claim or defense in the case). “[R]equests for such ‘meta-discovery’ should be closely scrutinized in light of the danger of extending the already costly and time-consuming discovery process ad infinitum.” Freedman v. Weatherford Int’l Ltd., 2014 WL 4547039, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2014); see also Brewer, 2018 WL 882812, at *2 (identifying a “presumption” against such discovery). The Court agrees with Defendant that the circumstances of this case do not justify the meta-discovery requested. Ashcraft, 2018 WL 6171772, at *2 n.2. In short, discovery on discovery is disfavored and will be closely scrutinized. There is no outright prohibition on such line of inquiry, however, and the appropriateness of such discovery turns on the particular circumstances of each case. This case involves extraordinary circumstances. On November 1, 2018, Haines & Krieger presented Laura Ferranti as its witness designated to testify pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ms. Ferranti testified at the deposition that she knew very little about Haines & Krieger despite being the office manager for seven years. See, e.g., Docket No. 131-2 at 11. By way of example, she testified that she did not know whether Haines & Krieger represents clients in bankruptcy filings or whether Haines & Krieger keeps client files. See, e.g., id. at 24, 45. Ms. Ferranti also disclaimed any knowledge as to the burden involved in searching for files or whether Haines & Krieger maintains an electronic document system. See id. at 45-46. These were not isolated instances of Ms. Ferranti answering “I don’t know” during the deposition. The undersigned characterized the deposition conduct as “troubling and wrong” because it included the regular provision of “evasive and ridiculous answers” and improper coaching by counsel. Docket No. 157 at 1. In rejecting Haines & Krieger’s objections to that order, United States District Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey agreed that, inter alia, “attorney and deponent misconduct is rife in the transcript” and the deposition transcript is “redolent of obfuscation.” Docket No. 167 at 3. *4 Despite that deposition misconduct, only a few weeks later on December 7, 2018, Ms. Ferranti attested that she had acquired the knowledge necessary to sign a ten-page declaration detailing the reasons why responding to the requests for production now in dispute would be unduly burdensome, including detailed discussion as to the review of the files she had just indicated she did not know existed. See Docket No 136-15. Haines & Krieger then opposed the pending motion to compel relying heavily on an undue burden argument that was supported factually only by Ms. Ferranti’s declaration. See Docket No. 137 at 13-17. Making matters worse, Experian unearthed sworn testimony from Mr. Krieger himself that appeared to contradict the declaration. See Docket No. 131-1. These are highly unusual circumstances that justified further exploration at a hearing of the factual basis for Haines & Krieger’s positions. The need for the hearing is also evident in its results. For example, Ms. Ferranti effectively admitted at the hearing that some of her deposition testimony was untruthful. See Docket No. 177 at 163-65 (despite “I don’t know” answers given at the deposition, acknowledging that she did in fact know at the deposition that Haines & Krieger represents clients in bankruptcy filings and that Haines & Krieger assists clients with consumer disputes).[4] Ms. Ferranti also testified at the hearing that providing some responsive documents would result in no burden at all. See, e.g., id. at 177. Ms. Ferranti also testified at the hearing that the burden to which she attested in her declaration does not account for Experian’s proposals during the meet-and-confer process to narrow the requests in an effort to lessen any burden. See, e.g., id. at 190-92.[5] In short, the Court agrees with Haines & Krieger that attempts to probe into the basis for discovery responses should be viewed with skepticism and are disfavored. See, e.g., Ashcraft, 2018 WL 6171772, at *2 n.2. In the unusual circumstances of this case, however, Experian’s skepticism was well-founded and the record supported holding an evidentiary hearing at which it could test the factual basis for Haines & Krieger’s positions in opposing discovery. B. Service of Subpoena for David Krieger to Testify *5 Haines & Krieger objected at the hearing several times to the service of the subpoena for David Krieger to testify at the hearing. See, e.g., Docket No. 177 at 5, 127-33. The fundamental problem with this argument is that Mr. Krieger appeared at the hearing without having filed a motion to quash the subpoena, and no reasonable explanation has been advanced for failing to file a proper motion. If Haines & Krieger or Mr. Krieger believed a valid basis exists for the Court to quash the subpoena for Mr. Krieger to testify, a motion to quash should have been filed to develop the argument properly. See, e.g., id. at 134-35.[6] As such, the Court overruled this objection from the bench. The Court notes further for the record that the failure to file a proper motion to quash supported by points and authorities is especially problematic in this case. The argument at the hearing focused on whether personal service was effectuated. See, e.g., Docket No. 177 at 5. The text of the applicable rule does not specify the required manner of service and, instead, requires that a copy of the subpoena be “deliver[ed]” to the witness. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1). While the case law is mixed as to whether personal service is required under Rule 45(b)(1), courts are trending to find that it is not. See 9A Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2454, at p. 399-400 (2019 suppl.); see also 9 James Wm. Moore, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 45.21[1] (2019 ed.) (advocating for conclusion that personal service is not required).[7] To that end, several courts have found that sufficient service exists so long as it is made in a manner that reasonably ensures actual notice. See, e.g., Firefighters’ Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 220 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2000); CresCom Bank v. Terry, 269 F. Supp. 3d 708, 711 (D.S.C. 2017) (collecting cases); Hall v. Sullivan, 229 F.R.D. 501, 503-04 (D. Md. 2005)(discussing cases). *6 The circumstances of this case show that the service objection is baseless. Mr. Krieger is not a stranger to this litigation, but rather is an officer of the Court listed as attorney of record on the docket in this case. Cf. Chambers, 2016 WL 9451361, at *2 (lamenting that attorneys did not agree to waive service requirements for subpoenas). Experian attempted personal service on Mr. Krieger twice, and on one of those occasions the subpoena was left with Mr. Krieger’s office staff when he did not appear within an hour. See Docket Nos. 169, 171.[8] The subpoena was also served on the attorney who represented Mr. Krieger at the hearing. See id. Mr. Krieger himself was twice served with notice of the subpoena electronically through CM/ECF. See id. These efforts were made in a manner that reasonably ensured actual notice, and Mr. Krieger had actual notice since he appeared at the hearing. Other courts have found Rule 45(b)(1)’s delivery requirements satisfied in similar circumstances. Cf. Chevron, 2010 WL 3584520, at *7 (concluding that service of a subpoena was effective when sent by overnight mail on the respondent and served on counsel through the court’s electronic case filing system); Green, 2005 WL 283361, at *1 n.1 (concluding that service of a subpoena was effective when left at the witnesses’ offices). In short, there is an ample legal and factual basis on which to conclude that service was effective in this case. Given that this objection should have been raised in a motion supported by points and authorities, however, the Court declines to opine further on the merits of the objection. C. Haines & Krieger’s Denials of Acting as a Credit Repair Organization Haines & Krieger also argues repeatedly that discovery into whether it acted as a credit repair organization is improper because it denies being one. See, e.g., Docket No. 177 at 91-92. The Court has heard several variations of this argument from Haines & Krieger and has already rejected it. See Docket No. 95 at 8. The entire premise of Haines & Krieger’s argument is faulty. Haines & Krieger cannot stonewall discovery into whether it acted as a credit repair organization by denying that it acted as a credit repair organization. Discovery is the very process by which Experian can gather evidence to test that denial. Moreover, although the Court is mixing metaphors here, this is by no means a “fishing expedition” because, regardless of Haines & Krieger’s denials, there is sufficient smoke for Experian to explore whether there is also fire. See, e.g., Docket No. 95 at 5 n.3. D. Attorney-Client Privilege Objection *7 At the hearing, Haines & Krieger’s counsel moved to strike Mr. Krieger’s testimony based on attorney-client work product and attorney-client privilege. Docket No. 177 at 136. The Court ordered that a motion to strike that testimony must be made in writing and filed on the docket by May 13, 2019. See id. No such motion was filed. Accordingly, the request to strike will be denied. IV. ANALYSIS Having now resolved the overarching issues, the Court turns to the specific discovery requests in dispute and will address them separately in turn below. A. Request for Production 1 This request seeks the production of all documents referring or relating to Haines & Krieger drafting consumer disputes, including but not limited to form or template letters. Mot. at 4. Although a variety of objections were lodged, Haines & Krieger’s responsive brief focuses on the burden of complying with the request “as written.” Resp. at 13.[9] The fundamental weakness with that argument is that Experian offered during the meet-and-confer process to narrow the scope of the request in an effort to mitigate any burden on Haines & Krieger. See, e.g., Mot. at 13. At this point, the burden of complying with the request “as written” is not the appropriate measuring stick. In particular, Experian offered to narrow this request such that Haines & Krieger need only produce the dispute letters it sent for consumers in a subset of the cases it has filed. See id. Haines & Krieger’s responsive brief does not address that offer. See Resp. at 13-14.[10] At the hearing, Ms. Ferranti testified that obtaining dispute letters for particular cases would require pulling the electronic file for each case and finding the file entitled “dispute letter.” Docket No. 177 at 196. This would involve minimal time and effort. The Court finds Experian’s proposal to be an appropriate resolution of this matter, especially given the minimal burden on Haines & Krieger. As such, the Court will require Haines & Krieger to produce the dispute letters it drafted for consumers named in 30 suits brought against Experian in this District. The Court leaves it to counsel to confer on an appropriate method of determining which 30 suits should be selected.[11] *8 Accordingly, this aspect of the motion to compel will be granted consistent with the above. B. Request for Production 2 This request seeks the production of all documents that refer or relate to form retention agreements or contracts between Haines & Krieger and its clients related to the submission of consumer disputes, including but not limited to form or template retention agreements or contracts. Mot. at 130 at 5. In filing its response to the motion to compel, Haines & Krieger insisted that it is too burdensome to provide a response because doing so would require it to “comb through all of its files.” Resp. at 14. At the hearing, however, Mr. Krieger testified that there are no responsive documents. See Docket No. 177 at 45. Experian now indicates that it is satisfied by the testimony that no documents exist responsive to this request. See Docket No. 178 at 31. Accordingly, this aspect of the motion to compel will be denied as moot. C. Request for Production 3 This request seeks the production of all documents that refer or relate to form retention agreements or contracts between Haines & Krieger and its clients related to representation in bankruptcy proceedings, including form or template agreements. Mot. at 5. Haines & Krieger resists this aspect of the motion to compel by arguing that the agreements are irrelevant and that production of responsive documents would be unduly burdensome. Resp. at 14-15; Docket No. 136-15 at ¶ 11. As to relevance, Haines & Krieger contends that its bankruptcy retention agreements are unlikely to have any bearing on credit repair work later performed for that client. See Docket No. 178 at 32. Experian counters that Haines & Krieger has acted as a credit dispute mill, and that its model is predicated on keeping clients in this pipeline from the bankruptcy stage through the credit dispute stage and then into the Fair Credit Reporting Act litigation stage. See Mot. at 2-4. Hence, Experian argues that bankruptcy retention agreements bear on the manner in which Haines & Krieger is compensated, including for later credit repair work. See id. at 11. Moreover, Mr. Krieger testified that credit repair issues are frequently addressed as part of bankruptcy litigation. See, e.g., Docket No. 177 at 50-51. Given the broad scope of relevancy for discovery purposes, the Court finds that bankruptcy retention agreements are relevant to the issues in this case, including whether Haines & Krieger obtained valuable consideration for its credit repair work. As to undue burden, Ms. Ferranti testified at the hearing that it would take roughly two minutes to find and pull a bankruptcy retention agreement. Docket No. 177 at 177. Experian has indicated that it will be satisfied with a single template retention agreement, identifying Mr. Cardinali’s as a possible example. Docket No. 178 at 31-32. There is no undue burden in complying with this request as so narrowed, and the Court will order Haines & Krieger to produce the bankruptcy retention agreement between Haines & Krieger and Mr. Cardinali. Accordingly, this aspect of the motion to compel will be granted consistent with the above. D. Request for Production 4 *9 This request seeks the production of all documents that refer or relate to form retention agreements or contracts between Haines & Krieger and its clients related to representation in civil litigation outside the bankruptcy context, including any form or template agreements. Mot. at 5-6. Haines & Krieger resists this aspect of the motion to compel by arguing that the scope of the request is overly broad and that production of responsive documents would be unduly burdensome. Resp. at 15; Docket No. 136-15 at ¶ 12. Again, Experian offered to limit the scope of this request to particular cases brought by Haines & Krieger. See Mot. at 13. As to overbreadth, Haines & Krieger states in conclusory terms that the topic should have been limited to Fair Credit Reporting Act cases that implicate Section 1681i. See Resp. at 15. There is no elaboration on why that is so, or why retention agreements for other Fair Credit Reporting Act cases would not be relevant to the question of whether Haines & Krieger acted as a credit repair organization. See id. Haines & Krieger bears the burden of establishing why the discovery is improper, Goodman, 369 F.2d at 169, and its conclusory argument on overbreadth does not suffice to meet that burden, see, e.g., F.T.C. v. AMG Servs., Inc., 291 F.R.D. 544, 553 (D. Nev. 2013). As to undue burden, Ms. Ferranti testified at the hearing that it would take a minimal amount of time to find and pull such a retention agreement. See Docket No. 177 at 209-10. As such, the Court finds that Haines & Krieger must produce the retention agreements for 30 suits brought against Experian in this District. The Court leaves it to the parties to confer on an appropriate method of determining which 30 suits should be selected. Accordingly, this aspect of the motion to compel will be granted consistent with the above. E. Request for Production 5 This request seeks the production of all documents that refer or relate to compliance with the Credit Repair Organizations Act. Mot. at 6. Haines & Krieger resists this aspect of the motion to compel by arguing that it is unclear which responsive documents would be exempted from production as including legal analysis. Resp. at 15.[12] That position is meritless. To the extent it has a proper basis for doing so, a subpoenaed nonparty may withhold responsive documents on privilege grounds subject to the production of a privilege log. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2)(A)(ii); see also Berrey v. Plaintiff Inv. Funding LLC, Case No. CV-14-00847-PHX-BSB, 2014 WL 6908525, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 9, 2014). Haines & Krieger must diligently search for responsive documents, must provide a privilege log identifying any assertions of privilege, and must produce all documents for which privilege is not asserted on that privilege log.[13] *10 Accordingly, this aspect of the motion to compel will be granted consistent with the above. F. Request for Production 6 This request seeks the production of documents sufficient to show Haines & Krieger’s revenue since January 1, 2014 related, directly or indirectly, to the drafting and mailing of consumer disputes. Mot. at 6. Haines & Krieger resists this aspect of the motion to compel by arguing that the topic is overly broad and that production of responsive documents would be unduly burdensome. Resp. at 15-16.[14] Again, Experian offered to limit the scope of this request to a subset of cases brought by Haines & Krieger. See Mot. at 13; see also Docket No. 178 at 37. Ms. Ferranti testified at the hearing that she could determine revenue by looking at a specific case file. See Docket No. 177 at 216; see also id. at 31-32 (testimony from Mr. Krieger as to notations within the file revealing revenue). Sufficient evidence has not been advanced that providing those revenue figures for a subset of cases would be unduly burdensome. As such, the Court finds that Haines & Krieger must produce the revenue received for 30 suits brought against Experian in this District. The Court leaves it to the parties to confer on an appropriate method of determining which 30 suits should be selected. Accordingly, this aspect of the motion to compel will be granted consistent with the above. G. Request for Production 7 This request for production seeks documents sufficient to determine the number of consumer disputes drafted or mailed by Haines & Krieger since January 1, 2014. Mot. at 7. Experian has withdrawn this request for production. Docket No. 178 at 42.[15] Accordingly, the motion to compel production of these documents will be denied as moot. H. Request for Production 8 This request for production seeks documents sufficient to show the state of residency for the consumers for whom Haines & Krieger drafted and mailed disputes. Mot. at 7. Experian has withdrawn this request for production. SeeDocket No. 178 at 42-43. Accordingly, the motion to compel production of these documents will be denied as moot. I. Request for Production 9 This request for production seeks documents sufficient to determine the number of consumer disputes mailed to Experian by Haines & Krieger since January 1, 2014. Mot. at 7-8. Experian has withdrawn this request for production. Docket No. 178 at 43. Accordingly, the motion to compel production of these documents will be denied as moot. J. Request for Production 10 This request for production seeks documents sufficient to identify all consumers on whose behalf Haines & Krieger has drafted or mailed a consumer dispute, but whom Haines & Krieger has not represented in litigation arising under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Mot. at 8. Haines & Krieger resists this aspect of the motion to compel by arguing that such information is irrelevant and that production of responsive documents would be unduly burdensome. Resp. at 16-17; Docket No. 136-15 at ¶ 18. While it is clear that Haines & Krieger can easily produce a list of its clients for whom “FCRA files” have been created in relation to assistance with drafting or mailing a consumer dispute, see Docket No. 177 at 201-02, it is not clear that there is a feasible means by which it can then identify the clients for whom Fair Credit Reporting Act litigation was not subsequently initiated by Haines & Krieger.[16] Accordingly, this aspect of the motion to compel will be denied. K. Request for Production 11 *11 This request for production seeks all retention agreements or contracts between Haines & Krieger and Plaintiff. Mot. at 8. Haines & Krieger resists this aspect of the motion to compel by arguing that the documents should have been sought from Plaintiff himself, rather than from Haines & Krieger, and that the documents are irrelevant. SeeResp. at 17.[17] Construing the first argument as asserting an undue burden, Ms. Ferranti testified that it would take a few minutes to obtain the responsive documents, and Haines & Krieger’s counsel acknowledges there is no burden. Docket No. 177 at 240; Docket No. 178 at 46-47. There is no undue burden. As to relevance, the agreements between Plaintiff and Haines & Krieger bear on whether Haines & Krieger may have received consideration for its efforts in drafting and sending his consumer dispute, which in turn bears on whether Haines & Krieger acted as a credit repair organization. This discovery is relevant. Cf. Docket No. 95 at 4-5. Accordingly, this aspect of the motion will be granted. L. Request for Production 12 This request for production seeks all documents referring or relating to agreements or contracts between Haines & Krieger and co-counsel Knepper & Clark. Mot. at 9. Haines & Krieger resists this aspect of the motion to compel by arguing that this discovery is irrelevant and that production of responsive documents would be unduly burdensome. Resp. at 17-19; Docket No. 136-15 at ¶ 19. As to relevance, Experian’s contention is that, regardless of the lack of any direct compensation at the consumer dispute phase, Haines & Krieger obtains valuable consideration for that work because of the subsequent Fair Credit Reporting Act litigation. See, e.g., Mot. at 1. Experian supports this position based on its expectation that, inter alia, Haines & Krieger receives a portion of the attorneys’ fees ultimately collected in that litigation that is inconsistent with the amount of work Haines & Krieger actually performs in the litigation. See, e.g., Docket No. 178 at 47.[18] In essence, Experian contends that Haines & Krieger receives consideration for drafting and sending consumer disputes in the form of later renumeration of attorneys’ fees arising out of Fair Credit Reporting Act litigation in which it does not perform substantial work. The Court agrees with Experian that this discovery is relevant. As to undue burden, the Court will limit the scope of this request to responsive documents pertaining to this case.[19] As so limited, there is no undue burden. Accordingly, this aspect of the motion to compel will be granted consistent with the above. V. NOTICE TO COUNSEL Although the Court has done so on several occasions previously, it feels compelled to once again remind counsel of their obligations to one another and to the Court.[20] Litigation in general and discovery in particular are subject to an overriding requirement that attorneys act in good faith. E.g., Asea, Inc. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 1981). The guiding principles of navigating the discovery process are not obstruction and nastiness, but rather they are cooperation, practicality, and sensibility. E.g., Cardoza v. Bloomin’ Brands, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1145 (D. Nev. 2015). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been amended for the specific purpose of emphasizing the importance of common-sense cooperation between counsel, and to curb the culture of scorched earth litigation tactics. E.g., Flamingo Trails, 316 F.R.D. at 331 (citing Roberts, 312 F.R.D. at 603-04). Similarly, the oath taken upon becoming a barred attorney in this state requires an acknowledgment of the need for civility, as is also required by the rules of this Court. See Local Rule 1-1(c). The need for compliance with these obligations is especially important when hundreds of similar cases are litigated with the same attorneys. E.g. Olesczuk v. Citizens One Home Loans, 2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis 153342, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 4, 2016). “Obstructive refusal to make reasonable accommodation ... not only impairs the civility of our profession and the pleasures of the practice of law, but also needlessly increases litigation expense to clients.” Hauser v. Farrell, 14 F.3d 1338, 1344 (9th Cir. 1994). *12 The attorneys in this case have been litigating against each other in hundreds of cases for several years. The attorneys in this case may be litigating against each other in hundreds more cases for years to come. The discovery process does not need to involve arguments about whether a deposition exhibit was slid across a table or thrown at opposing counsel. But see Docket No. 131-2 at 16. The discovery process does not need to involve an admission from counsel that the process for resisting discovery consisted exclusively of attorney-client communications for the specific purpose of attempting to shield those facts from the Court. But see Docket No. 177 at 147. The discovery process does not need to involve discussion of the crime-fraud exception about the discovery process itself. But see id. at 163. The process of Experian obtaining discovery from Haines & Krieger in this case involved all of the above and much more, all flowing from the failure of counsel to be reasonable. Zealous advocacy does not require allowing a discovery dispute to devolve in this manner. VI. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed more fully above, Experian’s motion to compel is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The compelled documents must be produced by July 10, 2019.[21] IT IS SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] Pin-citations to the record refer to the pagination assigned by CM/ECF. [2] The briefing and hearings included a salmagundi of arguments. The Court has considered all arguments presented. Any argument not explicitly addressed herein has been rejected to the extent it is inconsistent with the outcome of this order. See, e.g., Roy v. Cty. of Los Angeles, Case No. CV 12-09012-AB (FFMx), 2018 WL 3439168, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2018) (citing, inter alia, Clemons v. Miss., 494 U.S. 738, 747 n.3 (1990)). [3] Haines & Krieger previously objected to the setting of the hearing to United States District Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey on the ground that it would be mooted by the intervening deposition. See Docket No. 161 at 17-19. That objection was overruled. Docket No. 167 at 5. Haines & Krieger does not explain why it failed to raise this additional “discovery on discovery” argument in the objection to the order setting the hearing and, instead, waited until the hearing had commenced to raise the argument. [4] Ms. Ferranti tried to backtrack in various ways. For example, she proffered that she answered “I don’t know” repeatedly at her deposition because she may have been confused by the questions. See, e.g., Docket No. 177 at 167. Such an explanation makes no sense, as Ms. Ferranti proved capable of responding to deposition questions by asserting that they are too vague or confusing to answer. See, e.g., Docket No. 131-2 at 15 (responding to six consecutive questions with a non-answer and a request to rephrase the question). Ms. Ferranti also suggested that her “I don’t know” answers were appropriate because the questions were beyond the scope of the Rule 30(b)(6) topics for which she had specifically prepared, see, e.g., Docket No. 177 at 160, an excuse that also lacks merit, see, e.g., Campbell v. Facebook Inc., 310 F.R.D. 439, 450 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (collecting cases finding that “a notice of deposition ... constitutes the minimum, not the maximum, about which a deponent must be prepared to speak” and the scope of questioning at a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is limited by the general discovery standard for relevance). [5] The value of a declaration regarding undue burden is significantly lessened if the declarant was not privy to meet-and-confer efforts to alleviate any burden. The value of Ms. Ferranti’s declaration in particular is further diminished given that it quotes from Experian’s attempts to narrow the requests through the meet-and-confer process. Docket No. 136-15 at ¶ 13 (“Further, Experian’s narrowed request excluding ‘any internal legal memoranda or similar legal-analysis documents’ is unclear ...”). No attempt was made to square Ms. Ferranti’s ignorance on the stand of these meet-and confer efforts with her declaration purporting to have knowledge of them. [6] At the hearing, counsel made the baseless argument that the undersigned prohibited the filing of a motion to quash the subpoena to appear for hearing testimony. Docket No. 177 at 135. Counsel pointed to the Court’s order that the metastatic briefing on the underlying discovery dispute be streamlined. SeeDocket No. 128. That order dictated how the motion to compel would be briefed and indicated that the Court would not entertain cross-motions addressing the same issues. A motion to quash a subpoena to testify at a hearing is not a “cross-motion” to a motion to compel. Nowhere did the identified order address whether motion practice may be appropriate regarding appearances at any subsequent hearing. [7] The Ninth Circuit has not settled this issue, and decisions from district courts within the Ninth Circuit also reflect this trend. See, e.g., Sanchez Y Martin, S.A. de C.V. v. Dos Amigos, Inc., Case No. 17-CV-1943-LAB-JMA, 2018 WL 2387580, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 24, 2018); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Alere, Inc., Case No. 18-CV-291-BEN-WVG, 2018 WL 2267144, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 17, 2018); Kantor v. Big Tip, Inc., Case No. 2:15-cv-01871-RAJ, 2017 WL 2634207, at *1 (W.D. Wash. June 19, 2017); In re Pro-Sys Consultants, Case No. 16-mc80118-JSC, 2016 WL 6025155, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016); Chambers v. Whirlpool Corp., Case No. SA CV 11-1733 FMO (JCGx), 2016 WL 9451361, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016); Jennings v. Moreland, Case No. CIV S-08-1305 LKK CKD P, 2012 WL 761360, at *1 & n.2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2012); Chevron Corp. v. E-Tech Int’l, Case No. 10cv1146-IEG-WMC, 2010 WL 3584520, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010); Performance Credit Corp. v. EMC Mortg. Corp., Case No. SACV 07-383 DOC (RNBx), 2009 WL 10675694, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2009); Tubar v. Clift, Case No. C05-1154 JCC, 2007 WL 214260, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 25, 2007); Green v. Baca, Case No. CV 02-204744-MMM-MAN(x), 2005 WL 283361, at *1 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2005). [8] Experian contends that Mr. Krieger was evading service, especially given the process server’s affidavit reflecting that Mr. Krieger’s secretary stated that “he’s not coming out for this.” See Docket No. 177 at 8; see also Docket No. 169. The Court initially overruled the service objection in part based on that affidavit. See Docket No. 177 at 8-9. A day after the Court’s ruling, counsel sought reconsideration by raising a hearsay objection to the affidavit. Id. at 127. The time for raising that hearsay objection was when counsel presented his argument initially, not by seeking reconsideration after the Court ruled. See, e.g., Miller v. Nationstar Mortg., Case No. 6:11-cv-1337-Orl-22DAB, 2013 WL 12158133, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 29, 2013) (refusing to reconsider service order based on newly raised hearsay objection to process server’s affidavit). Moreover, courts evaluating the sufficiency of service have found that the affidavit of a process server qualifies as a business record that falls within a hearsay exception under Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Martynuska v. Nat’l Payment Relief, LLC, Civil Action No. RDB-14-0265, 2014 WL 4214866, at *8 n. 6 (D. Md. Aug. 22, 2014) (overruling hearsay objection to process server affidavit that included representation from employee that she was authorized to accept service); see also In re Neal, Case No. CIV 06-421-TUC-CKJ, 2008 WL 11445440, at *4 n.4, *7 (D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 2008) (concluding that process server affidavit was a business record for purposes of Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence). Lastly, the law and the facts support a finding that service was effective even without considering Experian’s argument that Mr. Krieger actively evaded service. [9] By not advancing meaningfully-developed argument in the responsive brief in support of the other objections lodged, any such arguments have now been forfeited. See Kiessling v. Rader, 2018 WL 1401972, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 20, 2018) (“The appropriate time to raise these additional arguments has passed as Defendants should have raised these arguments before Judge Koppe”); see also Kor Media Grp., LLC v. Green, 294 F.R.D. 579, 582 n.3 (D. Nev. 2013) (courts only consider meaningfully-developed arguments). The Court notes for the record, however, that the objections are not meritorious. For example, Haines & Krieger objects that the term “template” is vague. E.g., Mot. at 5. At the hearing, Mr. Krieger similarly quibbled with the use of that term, insisting that his firm instead uses “rehashed documents.” See, e.g., Docket No. 177 at 87; id. at 89 (explaining that Haines & Krieger uses a consumer dispute “letter that is rehashed”). Such evasive word play is not a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery. Cf. United States ex rel. Englund v. Los Angeles Cty., 235 F.R.D. 675, 684 (E.D. Cal. 2006). [10] At the hearing, Haines & Krieger argued that there is no need to produce any of these consumer dispute letters because Experian already has access to the letters through other litigation. See Docket No. 178 at 26. As a threshold matter, this argument is waived because it should not have been raised for the first time at the hearing. See, e.g., Stanley v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 11 F. Supp. 3d 987, 999 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Even considering the argument on its merits, however, it misses the mark. Although it has been acknowledged in this case that Haines & Krieger was involved in drafting and sending Plaintiff’s own consumer dispute letter, Docket No. 87-3 at 19-20, the letter itself does not reflect that fact, see Docket No. 1-8; see also Hearing Exh. 7 (providing examples of other letters). Experian pulling letters from the docket would not show that Haines & Krieger was involved in drafting them, but this critical detail will be clear when Haines & Krieger produces letters as being responsive to this document request. [11] At the hearing, Experian asked the Court to also compel letters that Haines & Krieger sent to bankruptcy clients regarding credit repair. See Docket No. 178 at 28-29. Those letters are not within the scope of Experian’s compromise offer and they will not be compelled. [12] At the hearing, Haines & Krieger’s counsel argued that, “[j]ust as the response says, there is nothing that – there’s nothing to produce here, there really isn’t.” Docket No. 178 at 36. This misstates the record, regardless of which “response” is being cited. The response to the subpoena does not indicate that there are no responsive documents that could be produced. See Mot. at 6. The response to the motion similarly does not indicate that there are no responsive documents that could be produced. Resp. at 15. Haines & Krieger must undertake a reasonable search for responsive documents and, if no responsive documents are found, it must provide a proper certification. See, e.g., Scientific Games Corp. v. AGS LLC, Case No. 2:17-cv-00343-JAD-NJK, 2017 WL 3013251, at *2 (D.Nev. July 13, 2017)(citing Rogers v. Giurbino, 288 F.R.D. 469, 485 (S.D. Cal. 2012)). [13] Without elaboration, Ms. Ferranti’s declaration also contends that it would be overly burdensome to respond. See Docket No. 136-15 at ¶ 13. Such a bald assertion is insufficient. E.g. Flamingo Trails No. 7, 316 F.R.D. at 334. [14] Ignoring the “indirectly” aspect of the request, Haines & Krieger also responds that it receives no compensation for drafting and mailing consumer disputes. See Resp. at 15. Again, Haines & Krieger cannot avoid discovery by disputing the fact to be discovered. [15] Later in the hearing, Experian sought to reconsider that concession. Docket No. 178 at 52-53. At the end of the day, however, Experian has effectively conceded the difficulty in obtaining this information. [16] Consumer dispute matters give rise to the creation of an “FCRA file” at Haines & Krieger’s office, whereas the filing of a lawsuit gives rise to the creation of a “litigation file.” See, e.g., Docket No. 177 at 194-95. A “litigation file” would be created for various types of litigation, not just litigation involving a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. See id. at 229-30. Accordingly, it does not appear that the information sought could be derived by merely printing a list of all consumers with an “FCRA file” and a list of all clients with a “litigation file,” as the latter list would be overinclusive. [17] Counsel also mentioned at the hearing the potential privileged nature of the documents. Docket No. 178 at 46. The person asserting privilege bears the burden of establishing the elements of that claim. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 1992). The response to the motion provides no argument of any kind to support a privilege objection, Resp. at 17, let alone explanation why this argument was not already foreclosed by prior Court order, see Docket No. 95 at 6 (quoting Reiserer v. United States, 479 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007)). [18] Haines & Krieger’s counsel vouched at the hearing that Haines & Krieger pulls its weight in the litigation work. See Docket No. 178 at 50 (“I can tell you right now that is absolutely the case. Everybody earns their keep, period.”). On the other hand, Experian points to deposition testimony from Mr. Krieger that may contradict that representation. See id. at 47. This is not a factual issue for the undersigned to resolve, but the Court instead notes only that this is not a “fishing expedition” as argued by Haines & Krieger. See id. at 51. [19] Hence, Haines & Krieger must produce any standard agreement that applies to all Fair Credit Reporting Act litigation involving Knepper & Clark (including this one), and it must also produce any agreement specific to this case. [20] Given the past responses to similar admonitions, the Court also feels compelled to make clear that this notice should not be construed as an invitation for counsel to bring to the Court petty and superfluous disputes in an effort to paint one another as unreasonable. [21] Experian requests in cursory fashion the imposition of sanctions. See Mot. at 13. Similarly, Experian provided limited argument at the hearing regarding the imposition of sanctions. See Docket No. 178 at 10. Since that request was not presented in meaningful fashion, the Court expresses no opinion on the issue.