BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action in the McCormick County Court of Common Pleas on December 14, 2016. [Doc. 1-1.] The Complaint alleged causes of action for breach of contract; breach of contract with fraudulent intent; wrongful discharge in violation of the South Carolina Teacher Employment and Dismissal Act (“TEDA”), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 59-25-410 et seq.; and retaliation against Defendant and its Board of Trustees and Superintendent Don Doggett. [Doc. 1-1 at 4–14.] Plaintiff was represented by counsel when the Complaint was filed in state court. [Id.at 14.] However, on October 25, 2018, the state court granted counsel’s motion to be relieved. [Doc. 1-4.] Plaintiff has proceeded pro se since his counsel was relieved.

On March 24, 2017, Defendant and its Board of Trustees and Superintendent filed a motion to dismiss, asserting among other arguments that Plaintiff’s retaliation cause of action should be dismissed because South Carolina does not recognize a common law cause of action for retaliation and TEDA does not grant teachers the right to bring retaliation claims. [Docs. 1-2; 1-3 at 7–9.] On December 4, 2017, the state court dismissed Defendant’s Board of Trustees and Superintendent and dismissed Plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, but declined to dismiss the causes of action against Defendant for breach of contract; wrongful discharge in violation of TEDA; and retaliation. [Doc. 1-5.] With respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the state court “believe[d] that the determination of whether to allow this cause of action to proceed should be made after further discovery.” [Id. at 7.] The state court also granted Plaintiff fifteen days to amend his Complaint if he wished to amend and pursue any of the dismissed claims. [Id. at 2, 7.] Plaintiff did not amend his Complaint in state court.

On December 14, 2017, Defendant served its First Set of Interrogatories and First Requests for Production to Plaintiff. [Docs. 1-12; 39-2.] On February 5, 2018, having received no discovery responses from Plaintiff, Defendant filed a motion to compel in state court. [Doc. 1-7.] The state court granted Defendant’s motion to compel on June 11, 2018. [Doc. 1-9.] When Plaintiff did not respond to the discovery requests, Defendant filed a motion for sanctions on July 19, 2018. [Doc. 1-10.] On August 27, 2018, the state court ordered that “Plaintiff must serve answers to discovery on or before 9/7/2018. If not served the case will be dismissed.” [Doc. 1-11.]

Subsequently, Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s First Set of Interrogatories and First Requests for Production. [Docs. 1-13; 39-7.] Based on an interrogatory response, Defendant removed the action to this Court on September 21, 2018. [Doc. 1.]

*2 On September 25, 2018, Defendant notified Plaintiff of purported deficiencies in his responses to Defendant’s First Requests for Production and stated that if he did “not cure the ... deficiencies, [Defendant would] be forced to seek enforcement of [the] Order of August 28, 2018, which required that answers to discovery be served by September 7, 2018, or the case [would] be dismissed.” [Doc. 39-8 at 5.] On April 18, 2019, Defendant asked Plaintiff to cure the deficiencies outlined in its September 25, 2018, letter before his deposition, which was scheduled for May 3, 2019. [Doc. 39-9.]

On May 24, 2019, Defendant filed a motion for sanctions, asserting that as of that date, Plaintiff “ha[d] not produced his 2015–2017 tax returns with accompanying W-2s and 1099s, nor ha[d] Plaintiff produced copies of the text messages stored on his personal cell phone.” [Doc. 39 at 3–4.] Accordingly, Defendant asks the Court to dismiss this action as a sanction for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the August 28, 2018, state court order. [Doc. 39.] Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant’s motion, and the time to respond has passed. Accordingly, the motion is ripe for review.

APPLICABLE LAW

Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines the sanctions a court may levy on a party who refuses to cooperate in discovery. Under Rule 37(a), “a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). Under Rule 37(b), a district court may impose sanctions, including dismissal of claims, for a party’s failure to comply with the court’s discovery orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A); see also Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976) (stating that the question on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the action pursuant to Rule 37, “not whether this Court, or whether the Court of Appeals, would as an original matter have dismissed the action”); Hathcock v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 53 F.3d 36, 40 (4th Cir. 1995)(“[T]he express terms of Rule 37 permit a trial court to impose sanctions when ‘a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.’ ” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2))). “While the imposition of sanctions under Rule 37(b) lies within the trial court’s discretion, ‘[i]t is not ... a discretion without bounds or limits.’ ” Hathcock, 53 F.3d at 40 (quoting Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., 561 F.2d 494, 503 (4th Cir. 1977)). Likewise, Rule 37(d) provides that a court may order sanctions, including dismissal, if “a party, after being properly served with ... a request for inspection under Rule 34, fails to serve its answers, objections, or written response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A), (d)(3). With the sanction of dismissal, “the ‘range of discretion is more narrow’ than when a court imposes less severe sanctions.” Hathcock, 53 F.3d at 40 (quoting Wilson, 561 F.2d at 503). Dismissal of a party’s case for failure to comply with a court order or a discovery request “is a severe sanction which must be exercised with restraint, caution and discretion.” Zaczek v. Fauquier Cty. Va., 764 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 (E.D. Va. 1991) (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980); Davis v. Williams, 588 F.2d 69, 70 (4th Cir. 1978)).

To warrant dismissal, the offending party’s conduct in the litigation must demonstrate a “pattern of indifference and disrespect to the authority of the court.” Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Richards & Assocs., Inc., 872 F.2d 88, 93 (4th Cir. 1992); see Wilson, 561 F.2d at 499–516. A court must consider four factors to determine whether the offending party’s conduct demonstrates such a pattern and disrespect for the court. See Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 872 F.2d at 92. Specifically, a court must consider:

Id. (citing Wilson, 561 F.2d at 503–06).

Additionally, the Fourth Circuit has emphasized the significance of providing a party with a clear warning regarding the possibility of dismissal before entering such a sanction. Hathcock, 53 F.3d at 40. While a district court may dismiss a party’s case for noncompliance with the court’s discovery order where the party’s action constitutes “ ‘flagrant bad faith’ ” and “ ‘callous disregard’ ” of his responsibilities, Nat'l Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643, the Fourth Circuit has held the dismissal power should be exercised only when the record clearly reflects “ ‘delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff,’ ” Dove v. CODESCO, 569 F.2d 807, 810 (4th Cir. 1978) (quoting Durham v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 385 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1967)).

DISCUSSION

Given the circumstances of this case, the Court declines to order the extreme sanction of dismissal. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1450, “[a]ll injunctions, orders, and other proceedings had in [a state court] action prior to its removal shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the district court.” See also Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 530 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (“After removal, orders issued by the state court are considered orders of the district court.”). Accordingly, the state court’s August 27, 2018, order remains in effect in this case. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also “apply to a civil action after it is removed from a state court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(1). In general, discovery is prohibited before parties confer as required under Rule 26(f). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1).

Here, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seem to contradict the prior state court order compelling discovery. Additionally, Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s discovery following the state court’s order; Defendant contends, however, that Plaintiff’s responses were incomplete. But Defendant failed to follow up regarding the purported deficiencies for almost seven months—from November 25, 2018, until April 18, 2019—and no court has issued a ruling regarding whether Plaintiff’s tax returns and text messages must be disclosed. During that seven-month time period, the parties conferred as required under Rule 26(f) and subsequently reported to the Court on February 26, 2019, that they were “unaware of any issues regarding disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information.” [Doc. 28 at 2.]

On this record, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff’s conduct constitutes “flagrant bad faith” warranting dismissal. However, Plaintiff shall, by July 8, 2019, produce to Defendant (a) his 2015 through 2017 tax returns with accompanying W-2 forms and 1099 forms and (b) copies of text messages stored on his personal cell phone that are responsive to Defendant’s discovery requests.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for sanctions [Doc. 39] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is denied to the extent Defendant seeks dismissal of the action. However, Plaintiff shall, by July 8, 2019, produce to Defendant (a) his 2015 through 2017 tax returns with accompanying W-2 forms and 1099 forms and (b) copies of text messages stored on his personal cell phone that are responsive to Defendant’s discovery requests. Should Plaintiff fail to comply with this Order, the action may be subject to dismissal under Rule 37 and/or Rule 41 for failure to comply with this Order. Now that this action is in federal court, Plaintiff is cautioned to review both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Civil Rules for the District of South Carolina and to ensure compliance with these Rules and this Court’s Orders.

*4 IT IS SO ORDERED.