*1 Two related motions filed by State Farm were heard on November 20, 2017, pursuant to notice. (Dkt. 286, 287). The first is a motion for sanctions (default, monetary sanctions, and forensic examination) against Amale Bazzi (aka Amanda Bazzi, aka Amanda Makki). (Dkt. 247, 250, 251). This motion is fully briefed. (Dkt. 259, 261, 262, 272). The parties filed their joint statement on October 19, 2017. (Dkt. 285). The second motion is a motion to compel against defendants Bazzi and Pointe. (Dkt. 269, 270). This matter is also fully briefed. (Dkt. 277, 279). The parties filed their joint statement of resolved and unresolved issues on November 9, 2017. (Dkt. 296). For the reasons discussed below, State Farm’s motion to compel is GRANTED and State Farm’s motion for sanctions is GRANTED in part.

B. Motion to Compel (Dkt. 269)

1. Meet and Confer

At bottom, these motions are about defendants' failure to comply with prior orders of this Court regarding their discovery obligations. A review of the procedural history leading to this present dispute is helpful. In his November 4, 2016 Order, Judge Borman established a process to help the parties resolve discovery issues informally. (Dkt. 174) (“November 4 Order”). This Order provides that the parties advise Judge Borman when a discovery motion is contemplated by either side, after they have conducted a good faith meet and confer as required by Local Rule 7.1(a). Id. If those efforts fail to resolve the matter, then the parties must provide the Court with a short joint statement describing the dispute. If deemed appropriate, the Court would then refer the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for an informal discovery conference with the hope of avoiding motion practice. Id.

On April 17, 2017, the undersigned held a hearing to address a joint statement on a discovery dispute, as referred by Judge Borman. (Dkt. 270, Ex. A). On April 18, 2017, the undersigned issued an Order requiring, among other things, that “[w]ithin 21 days of entry of this order, defendants Bazzi and Pointe Physical Therapy must provide complete substantive responses to” State Farm’s discovery requests and “disclose whether a given response is limited or qualified in any way, and must state the reasoning for said limitation or qualification in their response.” (Dkt. 270, Ex. B, Text-Only Order) (“April 18 Order”). On May 9, 2017, defendants served what State Farm describes as “grossly deficient” revised responses. (Dkt. 270, Exs. C-G, Pointe’s revised responses to document requests and interrogatories; Bazzi’s revised responses to document requests and interrogatories; chart of deficient responses). According to State Farm, their responses are incomplete, and contain boilerplate objections, including objections raised for the first time in May 2017 and their interrogatory answers are also unverified.

Defendants claim that State Farm failed to comply with the meet and confer requirements before filing this motion. On September 5, 2017, State Farm’s counsel emailed defendants' counsel and advised that he intended to file a motion to compel against defendants Bazzi and Pointe “to provide complete discovery responses and productions in response to State Farm’s discovery requests.” (Dkt. 277, Ex. 1, Email of September 5, 2017, from Attorney Matthew Ryan). According to Attorney Matthew Ryan, the dispute “had already been the subject of a meet and confer conference with [previous counsel].” Mr. Ryan represented that at the April 17, 2017 conference, the undersigned “ordered Pointe and Bazzi to revise their discovery responses and authorized State Farm to file a motion to compel if State Farm continued to consider Pointe and Bazzi’s revised responses deficient, having exhausted the meet-and-confer and joint-statement process.” (Dkt. 277, Ex. 1). Defendants point out that this is not contained in the April 18 Order. State Farm also provided defendants with a chart (Dkt. 269-8) that set forth the relief requested, and also offered to have a telephone discussion with defendants regarding their deficient responses and productions. (Dkt. 279, Ex. 3).

*2 While State Farm was obligated to seek concurrence relating to the motion to compel, which it clearly did, it was not required to engage in yet another “meet and confer.” Rather, State Farm has complied with the process established by Judge Borman in the November 4 Order. The parties conducted a meet and confer before filing the joint statement that led to the April 18 Order. And, the Court held a lengthy conference on the joint statement and issued an Order requiring supplementation after concluding that defendants' discovery responses were inadequate. Rather, at this point, it was incumbent on defendants' new counsel to confer with prior counsel regarding the April conference and what was required under the April 18 Order. Additionally, defense counsel should have met with his clients before the hearing on these motions to determine whether they were in compliance with the April 18 Order. It is clear that counsel did not do so, given the concessions at the hearing regarding some of the most obvious deficiencies, such as the improper redactions of the tax records and the failure of Bazzi to sign her interrogatory responses. Inexplicably, defendants did nothing to attempt to address the deficiencies in their discovery responses, despite this motion having been filed over two months before the hearing. The Court will address each of the specific discovery issues raised by State Farm below.

2. Financial Information/Pointe Ledgers/Banking Information

Despite court orders stating that defendants' financial information is relevant and discoverable, State Farm says that defendants are withholding this critical information. Specifically, (1) Bazzi produced heavily redacted tax returns with missing forms and schedules, (2) Pointe refused to produce an unredacted general ledger, (3) Bazzi refused to produce any general ledgers, and (4) Bazzi improperly objected to providing her personal banking information.

State Farm contends that Bazzi should be required to produce her complete, unredacted tax returns. The undersigned agrees. In October 2015, Magistrate Judge Hluchaniuk ordered defendants to produce federal tax returns in response to State Farm’s discovery requests. (Dkt. 138, Pg ID 4546) (“Plaintiff is permitted to obtain federal tax return information for these defendants for the years 2011-14 during this first phase.”). Defense counsel conceded that the redactions were not proper. Thus, unredacted tax returns must be produced.

As to banking information, Interrogatory No. 4 asks Bazzi to identify:

(Dkt. 269, Ex. M). In response, Bazzi identified one bank account held by Pointe and the account number. She objected to providing personal banking information as “outside the scope of discovery.” Id. Bazzi’s response is deficient the Court has already concluded that State Farm can obtain Bazzi’s personal and professional bank records through subpoenas. (Dkt. 235, denying Pointe and Bazzi’s motion for protective order regarding subpoenas for their bank records). Additionally, this interrogatory requires Bazzi to identify bank information for all entities through which she submitted bills and/or any entity acting on her behalf, which, at the very least, includes New Era II, and should include other entities as well, including Medical Evaluations, Get Well, Transport Us, Affiliated, Master Direct, MCM, and RSM. (Dkt. 269, Ex. M, 10/26/2015 Interrog. No. 4) (requiring Bazzi to “[i]dentify all bank accounts held in Your name,” and defining “Your” to include “any ... entity acting on [Bazzi’s] behalf”).

Bazzi not only failed to substantively answer this interrogatory, she also failed to sign her answers to interrogatories. Bazzi’s failure to sign her interrogatory responses as required by Rule 33(b)(5) not only violates the rule, but leaves the Court skeptical as their completeness. Indeed, Bazzi objects to providing personal account information and only provides Pointe’s bank information. She does not state whether any other bank accounts exist are responsive to the request. (Dkt. 269-7, Pg ID 10887). She must do so and cannot simply ignore the scope of the request. Bazzi must provide a specific, complete, and signed response to this interrogatory. In addition, Pointe must provide their unredacted general ledgers.

3. Other General Ledgers

*3 According to State Farm, Bazzi has other general ledgers in her possession, custody or control that must be produced in response to RFP 7, which requests “[a]ll of Your and/or any Defendant’s general ledgers and/or balance sheets.” In her revised response, Bazzi refers State Farm only to Pointe’s general ledger. At a minimum, and by her own admission, Bazzi was also the majority shareholder of defendant New Era PT Services, Inc. (“New Era II”). (Dkt. 269, Ex. F, interrog. 9). In addition, State Farm asserts that Bazzi likely has other general ledgers in her possession, custody or control, pointing to the affidavit of Ram Gunabalan, M.D. (Dkt. 270, Ex. H).[1]

Defendants assert that State Farm’s request that Bazzi and Pointe produce the general ledger or balance sheet belonging to the other defendants is unreasonable. Furthermore, Bazzi may not have maintained general ledgers or balance sheets for herself personally or for all of the entities to which State Farm claims she is connected. State Farm’s assumption that because Bazzi was a shareholder or may have had an interest in other entities she therefore has access to or is in possession of the entity’s general ledgers is also unreasonable. Many of the alleged discovery deficiencies appear to be based on statements made by Gunabalan in his self-serving affidavit, which is not to be relied on and does not automatically mean that Bazzi has access to the requested documents.

The problem with Bazzi’s response is that, once again, she fails to provide a substantive answer. As she was previously ordered to do, she must identify her ownership interests in any entities that fall within the scope of the request and produce all the responsive documents that she has a legal right to obtain. Her claimed lack of access is not persuasive. A party may discover documents within another party’s possession, custody, or control. Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(a). The meaning of possession, custody, or control, for the purposes of Rule 34, includes actual possession, custody, and control as well as “the legal right to obtain the documents on demand.” Duracore Pty Ltd. v. Applied Concrete Tech., Inc., 2015 WL 4750936, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 11, 2015) (quoting In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1995))(citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Deloitte & Touche, 145 F.R.D. 108, 110 (D. Colo. 1992)). “In light of the Rule’s language, ‘[a] party responding to a Rule 34 production request cannot furnish only that information within his immediate knowledge or possession; he is under an affirmative duty to seek that information reasonably available to him from his employees, agents, or others subject to his control.’ ” Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 353 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (Rosen J.) (quoting Gray v. Faulkner, 148 F.R.D. 220, 223 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). But “ ‘[t]he relationship between the party and the person or entity having actual possession of the document is central in each case. The party must be able to command release of the documents by the person or entity in actual possession.’ ” Gen. Envtl. Science Corp. v. Horsfall, 25 F.3d 1048 (Table), at *10 n. 15 (quoting Estate of Young v. Holmes, 134 F.R.D. 291, 294 (D. Nev. 1991)). While Bazzi complains that State Farm’s position is based on the Gunabalan affidavit, this does not assuage her obligation to identify all entities of which she is a shareholder or owner and where she has legal access to such entities' documents.

*4 Additionally, responses to document requests require a Rule 26(g) certification. Rule 26(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedurecertification requirement “obliges each attorney to stop and think about the legitimacy of a discovery request, a response thereto, or an objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee notes, 1983 Amendment. By signing a Rule 26(g) certification, an attorney “certifies that [he or she] has made a reasonable effort to assure that the client has provided all the information and documents available to [the client] that are responsive to the discovery demand.” Id.; see also Gorrell v. Sneath, 292 F.R.D. 629, 636 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that lack of knowledge is a sufficient response to an interrogatory). Indeed, counsel’s signature on the responses is a “certification” that a reasonable investigation was conducted to locate responsive documents. As explained in DiLuzio v. Vill. of Yorkville, Ohio, 2016 WL 7406535, at *33 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 780605 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2017), under Rule 26(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

Id. (quoting Brown v. Tellermate Holdings, Ltd., 2014 WL 2987051, at *17 (S.D. Ohio July 1, 2014)) (quotations and alterations omitted). Sanctions for violating that Rule are authorized in Rule 26(g)(3) and can be imposed if the attorney fails to fulfill the “duty to make a reasonable investigation to assure that their clients have provided all available responsive information and documents.” DiLuzio, at *33 (quoting Bernal v. All Am. Inv. Realty, Inc., 479 F.Supp.2d 1291, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2007)).

Bazzi must produce all responsive documents in her possession, custody, or control and those for which she has the legal right to obtain and her attorneys must provide a Rule 26(g) certification that she has done so. In addition, the Court instructs Bazzi to provide a declaration of what attempts were made to locate responsive supplemental documents, which custodians' records were searched, including email accounts, and how the custodians were selected. Bazzi’s declaration must also indicate whether she believes that a sufficiently diligent search was made based on the tools and resources available for the same and whether the discovery responses were supplemented to the best of her ability to do so. Finally, defendants must identify which documents are responsive to which requests. These requirements – the declaration and the identification of documents as responsive to particular requests -- applies to all supplemental responses to document requests, not just those discussed in this section.

4. Relationships with Other Defendants

In RFP Nos. 9-11, State Farm requested documents reflecting communications among defendants, payments between defendants, and contractual or business relationships with any defendant. (Dkt. 269, Exs. C, E). Defendants claim there “are no responsive documents unless contained within the patient files” or “unless contained within [Pointe’s produced] ... general ledger.” Id. In response to RFP No. 11, which requests documents reflecting relationships among defendants, defendants merely state that “[t]he operating and LLC agreement for Pointe Physical Therapy has previously been produced.” Id. State Farm asserts that Gunabalan’s affidavit and document production unequivocally establish that Bazzi has withheld extensive documentation responsive to RFP Nos. 9-11. State Farm similarly maintains that Bazzi should also be ordered to completely respond to Interrogatory No. 9, which requests that she “[i]dentify and describe the nature and extent of any contracts, agreements, financial or business arrangements, and/or any other relationships, between You and any Defendant.” (Dkt. 269, Ex. F). In response, Bazzi answered “[i]n addition to her interest in Pointe, New Era PT Services is owned by Hala Moussa (25%); Gigi John (25%) and Amale Bazzi (50%).” Id. According to State Farm, not only is Bazzi’s response regarding Pointe insufficient, but Bazzi failed to describe her significant relationships with other defendants.

*5 According to defendants, the alleged deficiency regarding their responses to State Farm’s Request for Production Nos. 9-11 have more to do with State Farm’s blind reliance on the Gunabalan affidavit and its general dislike of defendant’s discovery responses. State Farm also asserts that it already has in its possession “emails and attachments” responsive to its discovery requests. According to State Farm, it already has the responsive information and documents. The balance of the State Farm’s allegation of discovery deficiencies are essentially that Bazzi refused to corroborate or admit to the allegations made against her in Gunabalan’s affidavit.

Defendants' position is not tenable. State Farm’s argument is not simply “blind reliance” on the Gunabalan affidavit. Rather, the affidavit is evidence tending to show that defendants' document production is not complete. And, simply because State Farm now has some emails that Gunabalan produced, does not mean that they have all the responsive documents or that defendants are relieved of their discovery obligations. For example, in reviewing the specific requests contained in RFP No. 9, it is quite unlikely that all responsive documents for 9(a)-(e) would be found in patient files. This request asks for documents reflected contractual relationships, financial arrangements, referral agreements, along with recruitment and solicitation. It is highly unlikely that such documents would be found in patient files, which suggests that defendants did not look for responsive documents in any place where they are likely to be found. Surely defendants have business records other than general ledgers and patient files that can and must be searched. In addition, since Bazzi produced no emails, but plainly has an email account, the diligence of her search in responding to this request is questionable.

Defendants object to the request for documents regarding “business relationships or business opportunities” as outside the scope of discovery, but say no documents are being withheld on this basis. Such documents fall well within the scope of discovery in this RICO case and the Court is unconvinced that anyone searched for responsive documents, given the general failure to comply with the April 18 Order. Again, Bazzi and Pointe must produce all responsive documents in their possession, custody, and control and for which they have a legal right to obtain. And, their attorneys must provide a Rule 26(g) certification of such.

5. Relationships with Third-Parties

According to State Farm, defendants refuse to produce documents reflecting communications with third parties involved in the fraud scheme, namely Fatmeh Chehab, Hala Moussa a/k/a Hala Makki, Gigi John, and Vinod Joshi. (Dkt. 269, Exs. C, E, RFP 15). Chehab is Bazzi’s sister and had a managerial role at Mundy, a Prescribing Clinic with which Bazzi has falsely maintained she had no relationship. (Compl. ¶ 40; Dkt. 269, Ex. H ¶¶ 39, 41, 88, 90). Chehab also co-owned RSM with Bazzi, an entity that paid Mundy’s payroll expenses and received 50% of its profits. (Dkt. 269, Ex. H ¶¶ 41–42; Ex. O, RSM’s Articles of Incorporation). Hala Moussa is the president of defendant New Era II, purportedly managed defendant Medical Evaluations, and is the paper owner of Get Well, which transported many patients identified in the Complaint and charged SFMAIC exorbitant fees. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 40, 52–53; Ex. H ¶¶ 61, 83; see also Dkt. 190 at 6989). Moussa was formerly married to Bazzi’s cousin. (Compl. ¶ 25). Vinod Joshi is the paper owner of defendant New Era Physical Therapy, PC, and Gigi John was the incorporator and resident agent of New Era II and is the president and minority owner of Pointe. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 23; see Dkt. 269, Ex. D, Interrog. No. 2; Ex. P, Interrog No. 2). RFP No. 15 seeks the following documents:

Defendants have objected to producing any responsive documents, claiming that documents that “pertain[ ] to persons or entities unrelated to the 209 patients identified in the complaint are not relevant to any issue in this case and are outside the scope of discovery.” (Dkt. 269, Exs. C, E, RFP No. 15). According to State Farm, defendants' objection based on relevance and “the scope of discovery” is untimely as it was lodged for the first time in their May 9, 2017 Revised Responses and thus was waived. See Galinis v. Branch Cty., 2015 WL 2201696 at *2 (W.D. Mich. May 11, 2015). Moreover, State Farm contends that the objection is unfounded. RFP No. 15 is narrowly tailored, seeking documents that go to the heart of State Farm’s allegations—that the Management Group (including Bazzi): (1) owned and/or controlled the Treatment Facilities (including Pointe), Prescribing Clinics, and related third parties (such as Get Well), which provided fraudulent services to patients, and (2) worked with third parties to improperly solicit and refer patients.

While State Farm contends that defendants failed to produce information related to Fatmeh Chehab, Hala Moussa, Mundy Pain Clinic, Get Well Transportation, and other persons who are not parties to this case, defendants maintain that State merely seeks discovery in the Vitalcase, which has not opened yet.[2] Defendants also assert that State Farm’s overly broad request for “communications” amongst the identified parties and non-parties presumes that the communications had were in writing or can somehow be obtained and then produced in written form. According to defendants, it is entirely possible that no such documents exist or, if they once existed, are no longer electronically accessible by defendants. State Farm claims that Gunabalan produced responsive emails, including, perhaps, some of those communications with the parties in the Vital case, yet, according to defendants, State Farm continues to harass them and demand that they re-produce the same documents State Farm claims it already has.

Defendants' belated objections suffer from the same problems identified above and defendants must conduct a diligent and complete search for records, as they were previously ordered to do on April 18, 2017. Nothing about Gunabalan’s production of documents relieves defendants of their own discovery obligations or the requirement that they comply with Orders of this Court. Bazzi must produce all responsive documents in her possession, custody, or control and those for which she has the legal right to obtain, along with the declaration described above, and her attorneys must provide a Rule 26(g) certification that she has done so.

*7 Moreover, the Court is troubled by defendants' argument that some electronic documents may no longer be available. Parties “have an obligation to preserve evidence within their custody or control upon ‘notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation.’ ” Coach, Inc. v. Dequindre Plaza, L.L.C., 2013 WL 2152038, at *7 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (citations omitted). “As a general matter, it is beyond question that a party to civil litigation has a duty to preserve relevant information, including ESI, when that party ‘has notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation or ... should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation.’ ” John B. v. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448, 459 (6th Cir. 2008)(quoting Funitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)). At the latest, defendants were on notice of their duty to preserve documents when this lawsuit was filed on April 29, 2014. (Dkt. 1). For these reasons, the Court ORDERS that defendants provide a declaration by a person with knowledge of their efforts to preserve documents related to this litigation, including emails, and indicating whether and to what extent relevant documents were not preserved.

6. Billing Companies

State Farm requested all documents reflecting contractual relationships or financial arrangements with billing companies, including Quick Healthcare and GMB, as well as all communications with those billers. (Dkt. 269, See Exs. C, E, RFPs 34, 36). Defendants did not object to these requests, but rather, referred State Farm to Pointe’s production of Quick Healthcare billing records. However, Gunabalan produced at least one document involving GMB, which Bazzi did not produce, supporting State Farm’s allegation that Bazzi directed physicians to write disability certificates. (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 49–55; Dkt. 269, Ex. H-29, 3/23/10 email from Bazzi to Gunabalan). According to State Farm, it is likely that Bazzi has more documents in her possession, custody, or control reflecting communications, contractual relationships, and financial arrangements with GMB and/or Quick Healthcare, and she should be ordered to produce them.

In response, defendants state that State Farm again presumes that the statements in Gunabalan’s affidavit are true and that because Gunabalan produced what State Farm deems a “responsive” document that (1) defendants had access to the document and (2) that defendants have access to more responsive documents. Defendants argue that the Court should not accept either of these assumptions or make a determination in reliance on State Farm’s assumptions.

The Court finds it implausible that a reasonably diligent search of defendants' business records only revealed about 100 pages of Quick Healthcare billing records. (Dkt. 269-6, Pg ID 10877). Defendants must produce all responsive documents in their possession, custody, or control and those for which they have the legal right to obtain, along with the declaration described above, and their attorneys must provide a Rule 26(g) certification that she has done so.

7. Referrals, Marketing, and Solicitation

State Farm requested documents and information pertaining to the solicitation and referral of patients at issue and defendants' advertising and marketing efforts. (Dkt. 269, Exs. C, E, RFP Nos. 27–28, 44); Ex. D, Interrog. Nos. 4, 13; Ex. F (Interrog. Nos. 3, 10). According to State Farm, defendants have not objected to providing responsive information, but their responses are evasive and deficient. In response to State Farm’s request for payments to or from any attorney regarding a patient at issue and documents related to Bazzi’s or any defendant’s marketing and advertising material, including expenses, Defendants again refer State Farm to Pointe’s redacted general ledger. (Dkt. 269, Exs. C, E, RFP Nos. 27, 44). State Farm also requested documents reflecting relationships and financial arrangements with attorneys, to which Bazzi has failed to respond herself, instead copying Pointe’s response. (Dkt. 269, Ex. E, RFP No. 28 (“Pointe states there are no responsive documents....”)). According to State Farm, this answer is not credible in light of Gunabalan’s affidavit, in which he stated that Bazzi coordinated having non-attorneys who worked for Weiner & Associates come to the building where Pointe and Choice were located to sign up clients who were brought by Bazzi. (Dkt. 269, Ex. H ¶¶ 80–81).

*8 State Farm also asked Bazzi to identify each person or entity that referred any patient at issue to any “entity acting on her behalf” or to any Defendant, to which Bazzi evasively answered that she “is an individual and was not referred any patient.” (Dkt. 269, Ex. F, Interrog. No. 10). According to State Farm, Bazzi’s answer is nonresponsive, and she should be required to identify all responsive information. Similarly, State Farm asked that Pointe identify each person or entity that referred any patient at issue to it. In response, Pointe referred State Farm to its patient files. (Dkt. 269, Ex. D, Interrog. No. 13). Moreover, Pointe has refused to answer whether and to what extent it had referral relationships with other individuals and/or entities regarding patients in the Complaint.

Finally, State Farm’s interrogatories requested that Pointe and Bazzi identify entities or individuals that provided services, including marketing services, to any defendant. (Dkt. 269, Exs. F, D, Interrog. No. 3 (Bazzi), Interrog. No. 4 (Pointe)). Neither defendant identified Bazzi’s company, Master Direct, which Pointe’s general ledgers claim it paid for “consulting” or MCM, Bazzi’s company, which Pointe’s general ledgers reflect payments for “marketing.” State Farm maintains that Bazzi and Pointe should provide all information responsive to Interrogatory No. 3 (Bazzi) and No. 4 (Pointe).

In response, defendants assert that the alleged discovery deficiencies regarding referrals, marketing, and solicitation are based on the allegations State Farm made in its Complaint and the statements made in the Gunabalan Affidavit—namely statements in which Gunabalan provides speculative “facts” and his “understanding” of the supposed “arrangements.” Defendants acknowledge that they did not object to these discovery requests, but defendants now object to State Farm’s new discovery request to confirm and underwrite the statements in the Gunabalan affidavit.

Defendants belated objections suffer from the same problems identified above and defendants are ordered, once again, to conduct a diligent and complete search for records. And, defendants must produce all responsive documents in their possession, custody, or control and those for which they have the legal right to obtain, along with the declaration described above, and their attorneys must provide a Rule 26(g) certification that they have done so. In addition, Bazzi and Pointe must provide specific, complete, and signed responses to these interrogatories.

8. Ownership and Control of Providers

According to State Farm, Bazzi has refused to answer interrogatories and produce documents related to her ownership and control of defendant entities and related third parties that are central to this case. State Farm asked Bazzi to identify all entities in which she had a financial interest during the time the patients identified in the Complaint treated and describe the nature of her interest. (Dkt. 269, Ex. F, Interrog. No. 13). Bazzi objected to the interrogatory as “overbroad” and then referred State Farm to her response to Interrogatory No. 9 which references an unspecified interest in Pointe and a 50% interest in New Era II. Id. As set forth above, Bazzi had financial interests in several entities during the time the patients at issue treated, including but not limited to, RSM, Master Direct, MCM, and likely, Get Well, Transport Us, and Affiliated. Thus, State Farm maintains that she should provide all responsive information.

Second, State Farm asked Bazzi to identify her family members who worked for, managed, or owned any entity that provided services to the patients at issue, and also identify their relationship to her, where they worked and the time period, and their roles/duties. Id. (Interrog. No. 11). Bazzi objected as “outside the scope of discovery” but stated that: (1) Sue Makki is her cousin and worked as “Front Desk”; (2) Yousef Bakri is her son-in-law and worked as “Manager”; and (3) Malaak Bazzi is her step-daughter and worked as “Receptionist.” This answer is incomplete and insufficient, and her relevancy objection lacks merit in light of the extensive evidence that Bazzi exerts control over entities and hides her ownership by having family members installed as paper owners and to have them work in her facilities. (Dkt. 193 at 7286–89). Bazzi does not indicate where each of these family members worked, when, or their duties. Also, Bazzi omitted from her answer family members who should have been included. For example, Bazzi’s daughter, Nesreen Bazzi, is the paper owner of Affiliated, an MRI facility that provided services to patients at issue in the Complaint. (Dkt. 235 at 8936–37). Moreover, Gunabalan explained in his affidavit that Bazzi’s sister, Fatmeh Chehab, managed Mundy and that (1) Mundy made payments to Master Direct, a management company owned by Bazzi in exchange for patient referrals, and (2) as noted above, Bazzi and Chehab incorporated RSM, which paid Mundy’s payroll expenses and received a share of Mundy’s profits. (Dkt. 269, Ex. H ¶¶ 39, 41, 46; see also Dkt. 247 at 9329–30).

*9 Third, State Farm asked Pointe to provide information regarding its employees, independent contractors, officers, and directors, including: (a) the dates or time period during which the individual worked for You and/or served as an officer or director; (b) their titles and duties, including whether the individual was an employee or independent contractor; (c) any relevant licenses held by such individual and the time period during which those licenses were valid; and (d) any relevant education or training by each such individual. (Dkt. 269, Ex. D, Interrog. No. 1). In response, Pointe provided two charts. (Dkt. 269, Ex. Q). State Farm maintains that the charts are deficient because they do not include job duties or titles, relevant licenses or the time periods during which the relevant licenses were valid, any relevant education or training. With respect to when the individuals worked for defendants, they provided this information for some but not all individuals. In addition, the charts omit information regarding officers and directors.

Fourth, State Farm requested all documents related to the ownership of and corporate formalities followed by Pointe, any other defendant, or any “entity acting on [Bazzi’s] behalf,” including certificates of incorporation, operating agreements, and documents relating to the decision to open or form such entities, including any correspondence reflecting the decision to form and open the entities. (Dkt. 279, Exs. C, E, RFP Nos. 5, 12). In response, defendants referred State Farm to Pointe’s undated operating agreement (RFP No. 5) and claimed that other documents are available to State Farm from the State of Michigan (RFP Nos. 5, 12). State Farm maintains that defendants' responses to RFP Nos. 5 and 12 are deficient because defendants do not identify which documents are responsive to the requests, and have only produced one responsive document while acknowledging that others are within their possession, custody, or control.

Lastly, State Farm requested all lease agreements entered into and any lease payments made by or on behalf of Pointe, Bazzi, any other Defendant, or any “entity acting on [Bazzi’s] behalf.” (Dkt. 269, Exs. C, E, RFP Nos. 13–14). This is an important request as lease information may reflect the ownership or control of defendants and related providers, as well as connections among the participants in the scheme. Regarding lease payments, defendants once again improperly refer State Farm to Pointe’s redacted general ledger. (Dkt. 269, Exs. C, E, RFP No. 14). With respect to lease agreements, Bazzi’s response refers only to Pointe’s production of lease-related documents, and it is unclear from her response whether there are additional responsive documents in her possession, custody, or control.

In response, defendants assert once again that State Farm’s issue with their responses to this category of discovery requests is that defendants did not affirm the allegations in the Gunabalan affidavit. Any alleged deficiency regarding the requests related to the certificates of incorporations or other corporate documents can easily be satisfied by State Farm accessing public records available to it. “It is well established that discovery need not be required of documents of public record which are equally accessible to all parties.” Evenson v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 2014 WL 6617263 (S.D. Ohio 2014).

Again, the issue is not simply that the answers provided by defendants do not match the Gunabalan affidavit, it is that information in the affidavit and the documents produced by him suggest that defendants' answers are incomplete. As previously ordered, defendants are again directed to conduct a diligent and complete search for records and provide complete answers. Bazzi and Pointe must provide specific, complete, and signed responses to these interrogatories. Defendants must also produce all responsive documents in their possession, custody, or control and those for which they have the legal right to obtain, along with the declaration described above, and their attorneys must provide a Rule 26(g) certification that they have done so.

9. Contact Information

*10 Bazzi has refused to identify addresses and phone numbers used in her personal or professional capacity, and email addresses used in her professional capacity. (Dkt. 269, Ex. F, Interrog. No. 7). In light of her role in the fraud scheme and her ownership and/or control over the Treatment Facilities and Prescribing Clinics, email addresses she used in her professional capacity are discoverable to identify her communications. Moreover, her physical addresses and phone numbers would assist SFMAIC in better understanding Bazzi’s connections with other participants in the fraud scheme. For example, the Complaint alleges Bazzi’s connection to Transport Us, which transports patients to defendants' facilities. Compl. ¶ 52. Transport Us is registered to Tanya Bazzi, who shares an address with Bazzi. Id. State Farm says it should be able to discover whether Bazzi shares other professional and personal addresses and phone numbers with other participants in the scheme.

In response, defendants state that had State Farm observed the meet and confer requirements, this particular discovery deficiency could have easily been resolved. Defendants will, however, point out that Bazzi’s address appears on the Profit and Loss Statement in the tax return attached as State Farm’s Exhibit J to its Motion to Compel.

State Farm is looking for far more than just Bazzi’s physical address. And, defendants do not appear to have any objection to supplementing this request, although it is troubling that they still have not done so. Bazzi must provide a specific, complete, and signed response to this interrogatory.

C. Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. 247)

Among the variety of discovery sanctions available in a district court’s “arsenal,” the entry of a default judgment against a defendant or an order of dismissal against a plaintiff are the court’s “strongest weapon[s].” Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mack, 270 Fed. Appx. 372, 376 (6th Cir. 2008) (“A district judge holds a variety of sanctions in his arsenal, the most severe of which is the power to issue a default judgment.”); Regional Refuse Sys., Inc. v. Inland Reclamation Co., 842 F.2d 150, 154 (6th Cir. 1988) (“Dismissal of an action for failure to cooperate in discovery is a sanction of last resort.”). The Supreme Court has justified these harsh sanctions by acknowledging their value as both a specific and general deterrent:

National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976). Rule 37(b)(2) provides that where a party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery ... the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders[,]” including, but not limited to, “prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, ... striking pleadings in whole or in part[,] ... dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part[,] ... [or] rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2). A court may also, in addition to or as an alternative to the above-mentioned orders, direct “the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure” to comply with the court order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C).

A court must consider four factors when determining whether a plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed (or a default judgment entered against a defendant) pursuant to Rule 37: (1) whether the party’s failure to cooperate in discovery is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault; (2) whether the party’s adversary was prejudiced by the party’s failure to cooperate in discovery; (3) whether the party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4) whether less drastic sanctions were imposed or considered before dismissal was ordered. Bank One of Cleveland, N.A. v. Abbe, 916 F.2d 1067, 1073 (6th Cir. 1990). “Although no one factor is dispositive, dismissal is proper if the record demonstrates delay or contumacious conduct,” United States v. Reyes, 307 F.3d 451, 458 (6th Cir. 2002), i.e., conduct that is “ ‘perverse in resisting authority’ and ‘stubbornly disobedient,’ ” Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Dept., 529 F.3d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 2008)(quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 497 (1986)).

*11 This Court also has the inherent authority to sanction litigants, which “derives from its equitable power to control the litigants before it and to guarantee the integrity of the court and its proceedings.” Dell, Inc. v. Elles, 2008 WL 4613978, *2 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-50 (1991)). Indeed, the court has the inherent power to sanction a party when that party exhibits bad faith, including the party’s refusal to comply with the court’s orders. Chambers, 510 U.S. at 43-50. It is within a court’s inherent authority to “fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Dell, at *2 (quoting Chambers, 510 U.S. at 44-45); see alsoGonzalez v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 2008 WL 4277258, *1 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (“this court enjoys inherent authority to control its docket in promoting economies of time and effort for the court, the parties, and the parties' counsel.”). Nevertheless, the use of default judgment against a defendant under Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(vi) is an extreme sanction. See Buck v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Farmers Home Admin., 960 F.2d 603, 607-08 (6th Cir. 1992). Consequently, the Court would not impose such a sanction absent “a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct” by the offending party and when “no alternate sanction would protect the integrity of the pre-trial proceedings.” Id. at 608; see also Bank One of Cleveland, N.A. v. Abbe, 916 F.2d 1067, 1073 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Just as ‘[d]ismissal of an action for failure to cooperate in discovery is a sanction of last resort that may be imposed only if the court concludes that a party’s failure to cooperate in discovery is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault ...,’ so, too, is entry of default judgment.”).

“Although no one factor is dispositive, dismissal is proper if the record demonstrates delay or contumacious conduct” id., i.e., conduct that is “ ‘perverse in resisting authority’ and ‘stubbornly disobedient.’ ” Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Dept., 529 F.3d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 2008)(quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 497 (1986)). However, the pre-dismissal warning for failure to comply with the district court’s orders is pivotal to the determination of willfulness. See Harris v. Callwood, 844 F.2d 1254, 1256 (6th Cir. 1988).

Here, with respect to State Farm’s request for default judgment as a sanction, the undersigned concludes that imposing such a sanction would be an abuse of discretion, given that no warning from the Court was given to defendants regarding the potential for default if they failed to cooperate in discovery.[3] As noted in Harris, the Sixth Circuit has “frequently reversed district courts for dismissing cases because litigants failed to appear or comply with pretrial orders when the district courts did not put the derelict parties on notice that further noncompliance would result in dismissal.” Harris, 844 F.2d at 1256. No such order putting defendants on notice is contained in this record. While State Farm points to admonishment by the Court, (Dkt. 225 at 8381, cautioning Bazzi that, moving forward, it “will be less reluctant to award sanctions for failures to cooperate in good faith in discovery”), this is not sufficient to justify case-terminating sanctions without first exploring other options, particularly where defendants have not been previously sanctioned. Thus, it would be an abuse of discretion to award case terminating sanctions without having provided a more specific warning as to that precise sanction.

*12 At this time, the undersigned is not inclined to award sanctions in the amount of $100,000 in costs or a forensic review. The $100,000 figure has not been substantiated by State Farm as relating to their efforts to obtain the particular discovery at issue. The Court will also deny the request for a forensic review because the Court has determined that new defense counsel should have an opportunity to ensure compliance with the April 18 Order and this Order. Should defendants fail to do so, the panoply of sanctions will be on the table for the court’s full consideration, including an award of further costs and attorney fees, a forensic review at the cost of defendants, and a default judgment.

However, the Court believes that the costs and fees associated with bringing the motion to compel are an appropriate sanction, given defendants' readily apparent failure to comply with the April 18 Order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 (b)(2)(C). Grizzly Auto Transport v. Tran Tech, Inc., 2009 WL 1803210, *4 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (An award of attorney fees under Rule 37 is merely one of the options available as a sanction for the failure to comply with an order.) The Court does not find that defendants' failure to comply with the April 18 Order was substantially justified or that an award of sanctions is otherwise unjust. State Farm is directed to submit a Bill of Costs and declaration regarding the fees incurred in pursuing the motion to compel only.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Order, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 72.1(d). A party may not assign as error any defect in this Order to which timely objection was not made. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). Any objections are required to specify the part of the Order to which the party objects and state the basis of the objection. When an objection is filed to a magistrate judge’s ruling on a non-dispositive motion, the ruling remains in full force and effect unless and until it is stayed by the magistrate judge or a district judge. E.D. Mich. Local Rule 72.2.