Paul C. STEPNES, Pete Girard, Jan Girard, David B. Holland, Terry Yzaguirre, Ray Neset, Bennett Ross Taylor, Jr., and Judith Wallen Taylor, Plaintiffs, v. Peter RITSCHEL, individual capacity; Jane Moore, individual capacity; City of Minneapolis; CBS Broadcasting, Inc., foreign corporation; and Esme Murphy, individual; Defendants Civ. No. 08-5296 (ADM/JJK) United States District Court, D. Minnesota Signed February 18, 2010 Counsel Jill Clark, Esq., Jill Clark, PA, counsel for Plaintiffs. James Anthony Moore, Esq., and Sara J. Lathrop, Esq., Assistant Minneapolis City Attorneys, counsel for Defendants Peter Ritschel, Jane Moore, and City of Minneapolis. Jeanette Melendez-Bead, Esq., Michael D. Sullivan, Esq., and Chad R. Bowman, Esq., Levine Sullivan Koch & Shulz, LLP, and John P. Borger, Esq., and Mary Andreleita Walker, Esq., Faegre & Benson LLP, counsel for Defendants CBS Broadcasting, Inc., and Esme Murphy Keyes, Jeffrey J., United States Magistrate Judge REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION *1 This matter is before this Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike the Answer of Peter Ritschel (Doc. No. 103), which has been referred to this Court for a Report and Recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636 and D. Minn. Loc. R. 72.1. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ motion concerns Defendant Sergeant Peter Ritschel’s (“Sergeant Ritschel”) handling of Plaintiff Paul Stepnes’s computers after they were seized pursuant to a search warrant. The subsequent examination of those computers’ hard-drive information violated an order by Hennepin County District Judge Charles A. Porter, Jr. The motion was taken under advisement following the February 9, 2010 hearing. (Doc. No. 165.) For the reasons that follow, this Court recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion be denied to the extent it seeks to strike Sergeant Ritschel’s Answer. However, this Court also recommends that Sergeant Ritschel be required to pay Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees incurred in this litigation as a result of his misconduct. BACKGROUND[1] In this case, Stepnes has alleged that Sergeant Ritschel, Defendant Jane Moore, and the City of Minneapolis violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when he was arrested on May 28, 2008, for his promotion of a contest in which contestants could win a house that Stepnes owned, which was located on Irving Street in Minneapolis, Minnesota. (See Doc. No. 2, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 118-24.) After his arrest, police officers seized several of Stepnes’s computers pursuant to a search warrant. In part because he believed that those computers held privileged communications with his attorneys, Stepnes brought an emergency motion in Hennepin County District Court for the return of his property. (See Doc. No. 35, Aff. of Jill Clark in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Spoliation Sanctions, to Compel Production and for Other Relief (“9/10/09 Clark Aff.”), Attach. 1, Ex. 1 (indicating that two computers seized from Stepnes’s residence contained attorney-client-privileged information).) At a hearing on May 30, 2008, Hennepin County Judge Charles A. Porter, Jr., told the Minneapolis Police Department (“MPD”) that it needed to compile a detailed inventory of the items seized from Stepnes, and continued the hearing until June 2, 2008. (Id., Attach. 3, Ex. 3 at 19-20.) During the May 30, 2008 hearing, Stepnes’s counsel specifically raised the issue of attorney-client privilege, and Judge Porter stated that Sergeant Ritschel and the City of Minneapolis had taken no steps to protect Stepnes’s privilege. (Id. at 5, 11.) Sergeant Ritschel was present at the May 30, 2008 hearing. (Doc. No. 135, Decl. of Jill Clark, Esq., Filed in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. to Strike the Answer of Peter Ritschel (“Clark Decl.”) ¶ 2, Ex. 3, Tr. of Ritschel Depo. (“Ritschel Depo.”) 6.) *2 At the continued hearing on June 2, 2008, Judge Porter told the MPD that it could copy Stepnes’s computers’ hard drives, but that the MPD needed to provide Judge Porter with a copy before reviewing the information so that the judge could review the information in cameraand determine whether some information on the hard drive was protected by the attorney-client privilege. (9/10/09 Clark Aff., Attach. 4, Ex. 4 at 29-30, 37.) Judge Porter issued no written order. Sergeant Ritschel did not attend the June 2, 2008 hearing. (Ritshcel Depo. 48.) Following the June 2, 2008 hearing, Judge Porter encountered technical difficulties in reviewing the copy of the hard drives that MPD had created. (See 9/10/09 Clark Aff., Attach. 7, Ex. 9; Id., Attach. 14, Ex. 18.) The MPD offered to assist in the review of the hard drives, but Judge Porter did not want MPD personnel to be involved in any in camera review. (Id., Attach. 7, Ex. 9.) Judge Porter attempted to arrange for the MPD to provide equipment or technical advice, but his attempts were unsuccessful. (Id.) As a result, Judge Porter never conducted an in camera review of Stepnes’s hard-drive information. (Id., Attach. 14, Ex. 18 ¶ 1 (“After much effort, the Court was unable to read the hard drive and thus has not issued any Order related to its production.”).) Minneapolis Police Department crime lab examiner Officer Dale Hanson, the individual initially responsible for creating the copies of Stepnes’s hard drives, learned from either Chris Dixon, an attorney for the City of Minneapolis, or from Sergeant Ritschel, that Judge Porter had placed restrictions on the MPD’s review of Stepnes’s hard drives. (Clark Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 2, Deposition Tr. of Dale Hanson (“Hanson Depo.”) 8.) Officer Hanson recalled that Dixon told him not to examine the copy of the hard drives. (Id. at 17.) In November 2008, after several months had passed without any authorization from Judge Porter for the MPD to conduct its own review of Stepnes’s hard-drive information, Officer Hanson asked Dixon about the status of the hard-drive review. (Id. at 30, Ex. 2.) Around the same time, Officer Hanson asked Sergeant Ritschel whether Sergeant Ritschel still wanted him to examine Stepnes’s computer information. (Id. at 23.) Sergeant Ritschel told Officer Hanson to go ahead with the review of Stepnes’s hard-drive information. (Id.; Ritschel Depo. 7.) There is no dispute in this matter that Sergeant Ritschel violated Judge Porter’s order when he told Officer Hanson to examine the hard-drive information. And Judge Porter has, in collateral proceedings, found that such a violation occurred and awarded Plaintiffs their reasonable attorney fees incurred in litigating that violation in his court. (Doc. No. 163, Feb. 2, 2010 Aff. of James A. Moore (“2/2/10 Moore Aff.”) ¶ 2, Attach. 1.) In response to an earlier motion brought by Plaintiffs in this matter, this Court ordered that Sergeant Ritschel appear in the undersigned’s courtroom for a deposition regarding the handling of the hard-drive information. (Doc. No. 58; 9/24/09 Hrg. Tr. 59-61.) During Sergeant Ritschel’s deposition, he provided several responses regarding why he told Officer Hanson to examine Stepnes’s hard drives. At one point, Sergeant Ritschel explained that he discussed the attorney-client-privilege issues with Chris Dixon concerning the hard drives, and he understood that Judge Porter had issued an order about those hard drives, but did not know anything specific about Judge Porter’s order’s terms. (Ritschel Depo. 6-7.) Sergeant Ritschel later stated that even though he recalled multiple emails circulating about Judge Porter’s desire to review Stepnes’s hard drives before the MPD conducted its examination, he only understood that Judge Porter wanted to see the hard drives and did not know why. (Id. at 9.) However, Sergeant Ritschel acknowledged that he signed a work order relating to the copying of Stepnes’s hard drives on June 2, 2008, instructing Officer Hanson to avoid attorney-client-privileged materials. (Id. at 11.) *3 Sergeant Ritschel denied telling Minneapolis City Attorney Sara Lathrop that someone from the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office told him that Judge Porter had authorized the MPD to go ahead with the search. (Id. at 18-19, 26.) However, Ms. Lathrop’s initial recollection was that Sergeant Ritschel had represented as much to her; Sergeant Ritschel explained that this was the result of a miscommunication. (Id.) Sergeant Ritschel testified that he explained to Ms. Lathrop that in giving Officer Hanson the go-ahead to examine Stepnes’s hard-drive information, he was relying on a search warrant that authorized seizing Stepnes’s computers. (Id. at 21-25.) Sergeant Ritschel later explained that it was his understanding that Judge Porter wanted to see the hard-drive information from Stepnes’s computers because “he was going to look for information that was related to attorney-client privilege.” (Id. at 49.) And Sergeant Ritschel said that in November 2008, because he had not heard anything from Judge Porter, he assumed Judge Porter had reviewed Stepnes’s hard drive and found nothing, thus allowing the MPD to proceed with its examination. (Ritschel Depo. 49-50.) Stepnes’s counsel was not aware that the MPD had examined Stepnes’s hard drives until April 2009, approximately seven months after this lawsuit was filed. When Stepnes’s counsel learned that the hard drives had been copied, she promptly informed Ms. Lathrop that Stepnes claimed the hard-drive information had been wrongfully seized. (9/10/09 Clark Aff., ¶ 8, Attach. 7, Ex. 11(a).) Stepnes’s counsel informed Ms. Lathrop that the Defendants in this matter should not review the information until Plaintiffs first reviewed the MPD’s copies and determined what should not be disclosed. (Id.) In June 2009 Ms. Lathrop amended her clients’ document disclosures in this matter pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) to include a copy of the hard-drive information. (Id., Attach. 12, Ex. 16ii.) The supplemental disclosure stated that the hard-drive information being disclosed “purports to contain a folder of emails to or from [Stepnes’s counsel]. While these emails, upon information and belief, do not contain privileged information, counsel for these Defendants has not reviewed those folder or their contents and does not contend that these emails are evidence in this case.” (Id. at 2.) Shortly thereafter, Stepnes’s counsel informed counsel for all Defendants that Stepnes was asserting attorney-client privilege for communications between Stepnes and any of his attorneys. (Id., Attach. 12, Ex. 16i(b).) On September 1, 2009, Stepnes sought relief in this Court by filing a motion regarding the violation of Judge Porter’s order and asserted that Defendants possessed hard-drive information protected by the attorney-client privilege as a result of Sergeant Ritschel’s violation. (Doc. No. 23.) As mentioned above, the undersigned granted Plaintiffs limited relief on that motion, allowing Plaintiffs to depose Sergeant Ritschel and Officer Hanson. (Doc. No. 58.) This Court explained that, following those depositions, it would take up any application for attorney fees that Stepnes’s counsel may seek by way of a sanction. (9/24/09 Hrg. Tr. 71.) Later, in an attempt to prevent any further harm from the disclosure of privileged communications, Stepnes sought a stay of these proceedings until Judge Porter determined whether his order had been violated. (Doc. No. 75.) But, this Court denied that motion and explained that any further relief Stepnes sought as a result of the attorney-client-privilege issue would need to be the subject of a separate motion. (Doc. No. 101, 11/5/09 Hrg. Tr. 36-38.) In response, Plaintiffs filed the current motion seeking to strike Sergeant Ritschel’s Answer in this matter. DISCUSSION *4 The remedy Plaintiffs seek in this matter is to have Sergeant Ritschel’s Answer stricken, ultimately resulting in the entry of judgment by default against him. This Court begins its inquiry into Plaintiff’s requested remedy with the observation that “ ‘[t]here is a strong public policy, supported by concepts of fundamental fairness, in favor of trial on the merits[.]’ ” Sierra Petroleum Co., Inc. v. YSM, Inc., Civ. No. 07-1526 (PJS/RLE), 2008 WL 189957, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 2, 2008) (quoting Jackson v. Beach, 636 F.2d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). “[E]ntry of Judgment by Default is a drastic remedy which should be used only in extreme situations.” Id. However, in appropriate cases, default judgment can be “in the range of acceptable sanctions” issued by a district court for discovery violations. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 545 v. Hope Elec. Corp., 380 F.3d 1084, 1105 (8th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs’ motion to strike Sergeant Ritschel’s Answer, however, does not properly invoke any specific Federal Rule of Civil Procedure relating to discovery violations. This is most likely because the circumstances here do not fit neatly into any particular rule. Rather, it appears that Plaintiffs’ motion is properly grounded in this Court’s inherent power to supervise and sanction parties in order to achieve fair disposition of cases. See Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 986 F.2d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that the Supreme Court has held “that a court may assess attorneys’ fees when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons” and that the Court allows dismissal “upon a finding of bad faith, willfulness, or fault” as an exercise of the court’s inherent power). However, “[a] court must exercise its inherent powers with restraint and discretion, and a primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction.” Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1262 (8th Cir. 1993). Lesser sanctions than dismissal, such as the assessment of attorney fees, can be appropriate when a party “has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Jaquette v. Black Hawk County, Iowa, 710 F.2d 455, 462 (8th Cir. 1983). The parties have not alerted this Court to any binding precedent regarding the issues presented by Plaintiffs’ motion to strike Sergeant Ritschel’s Answer. Here, the nature of the misconduct for which Plaintiffs seek the ultimate remedy of Sergeant Ritschel’s default is his allegedly intentional violation of Stepnes’s attorney-client privilege and his “contemptuous” conduct during his deposition. (Doc. No. 134, Pls.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Their Mot. to Strike the Answer of Peter Ritschel (“Pls.’ Mem.”) 7-9.) Some courts have dismissed pleadings where a party or his counsel wrongfully obtains information in violation of another party’s attorney-client privilege. See Perna v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 916 F. Supp. 388 (D.N.J. 1995) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims where he surreptitiously and deliberately went into opposing counsel’s briefcase, removed and copied work-product materials, and gave them to his own counsel); see also Lipin v. Bender, N.Y.S.2d 340, 342-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (concluding that willful violation of attorney-client privilege justified dismissal of complaint). In Perna, the District Court for the District of New Jersey adopted a six-factor test for determining when the sanction of dismissal is warranted for a party’s misconduct regarding another party’s confidential information, including: (1) the existence of any extraordinary circumstances; (2) whether the offending party acted with bad faith; (3) whether lesser sanctions could deter similar conduct in the future; (4) any link between the misconduct and the matters in controversy in the case; (5) the prejudice to the wronged party and the public interest; and (6) the degree of wrongdoing. 916 F. Supp. at 398; see also Maldonado v. N.J. ex ret. Admin. Office of the Courts-Probation Div., 225 F.R.D. 120, 132-36 (D.N.J. 2004) (applying the Perna factors in denying motion to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for the misconduct of the plaintiff and/or his counsel). The Perna factors serve as a useful guide in determining whether striking Sergeant Ritschel’s Answer is an appropriate sanction. *5 This Court finds that Sergeant Ritschel acted with wanton disregard for Stepnes’s rights when he ordered the examination of Stepnes’s computer, thereby violating Judge Porter’s order. Sergeant Ritschel’s education and experience regarding sensitive information is relevant to the first Perna factor, which addresses the existence of exceptional circumstances. See Maldonado, 225 F.R.D. at 133-34 (applying the first Perna factor and considering the degree of an offending parties’ awareness of the interests at stake). Sergeant Ritschel is an experienced police officer, and as such, he should be aware that courts often limit police officers’ conduct when they are investigating individuals’ communications with their attorneys. Moreover, Sergeant Ritschel was present at the May 30, 2008 hearing, which was scheduled one day after he seized Stepnes’s computers, and at which both Judge Porter and Stepnes’s counsel specifically discussed the potential encroachment of Stepnes’s right to keep his privileged communications confidential. This Court is skeptical of Sergeant Ritschel’s assertion that he was ignorant of the fact that Stepnes sought the hearing, in part, to challenge the potential examination of Stepnes’s computer information by the police. On the other hand, Sergeant Ritschel has no formal training with respect to the attorney-client privilege, and at the time he violated Judge Porter’s order, he had not yet looked at Stepnes’s computers’ contents. The record also suggests that Sergeant Ritschel’s violation of Judge Porter’s order was willful. See Perna, 916 F. Supp. at 399 (considering whether misconduct was intentional). Although Sergeant Ritschel claimed that he did not know the contents of Judge Porter’s order because he was not present during the June 2, 2008 hearing, he knew that Judge Porter wanted to see copies of the hard drives from Stepnes’s computers. Sergeant Ritschel was also aware that Judge Porter wanted to look at those copies before the MPD conducted its examination. When he had not heard anything from Judge Porter by November 2008, Sergeant Ritschel unilaterally decided, without checking with the city attorney, that he could go forward, and he told Officer Hanson to examine Stepnes’s hard drives. Sergeant Ritschel based this assumption only on the passage of time. Sergeant Ritschel justified his action by saying that it was his understanding that the review of the discs could go forward because Judge Porter had not acted to block the review. In other words, even though Sergeant Ritschel at one point said that he did not know the contents of Judge Porter’s June 2, 2008 order at all, in November he invented the idea that Judge Porter meant that the examination could go forward so long as Judge Porter said nothing about it after June 2. Sergeant Ritschel’s invention bears no resemblance to the actual terms of Judge Porter’s order. Counsel for Sergeant Ritschel attempted to excuse Sergeant Ritschel’s violation of Judge Porter’s order by suggesting that it was the result of a miscommunication. But if Sergeant Ritschel were confused about what he was authorized to do, he could have gone to the simple expedient of checking with the city attorney handling the case to determine what the contents of Judge Porter’s order were. Instead, as Sergeant Ritschel’s counsel plainly and candidly stated at the February 9, 2010 hearing, “Sergeant Ritschel blew it.” (Doc. No. 165.)[2] Plaintiffs also assert that Sergeant Ritschel committed sanctionable misconduct based on his behavior at his deposition in this Court’s courtroom. Sergeant Ritschel’s answers regarding his understanding of Judge Porter’s order and whether he was justified in going forward with ordering the examination of Stepnes’s computers were evasive. He explained at one point that he did not know what Judge Porter’s order had related to at all, yet he admitted that shortly after the hearing in which Judge Porter issued the order relating to attorney-client privilege, he executed a work order instructing Officer Hanson to avoid attorney-client privileged material. At another point Sergeant Ritschel claimed that his justification for ordering the examination in September 2008 was the search warrant—yet the search warrant merely authorized the seizure of the computers and their retention subject to court orders. Then, when asked near the end of the deposition why he told Officer Hanson to proceed with the examination, he testified that he assumed Judge Porter had looked at the hard-drive information and found nothing because he had not heard from the judge that there was information on the computer that could not be used. If Sergeant Ritschel knew nothing about Judge Porter’s order, then this explanation makes no sense. And if he knew what Judge Porter had ordered, then his description of the order’s terms is so far from its actual content that it cannot be the result of an excusable misunderstanding. Ultimately, Sergeant Ritschel’s reasoning bears no resemblance to Judge Porter’s order or to Sergeant Ritschel’s own prior statements that he had no idea what the contents of that order were. Based on these facts and this Court’s observation of Sergeant Ritschel’s demeanor during his deposition, this Court concludes that he obstructed the truth-seeking purpose of that proceeding and that his testimony was not credible. *6 Although Sergeant Ritschel disregarded Judge Porter’s order and his evasive conduct during his deposition regarding the attorney-client-privilege issues constitutes serious misconduct related to this litigation, this Court does not consider it an appropriate sanction to strike his Answer in this matter. First, his misconduct does not relate to the matters in controversy in this case—i.e., his behavior at the deposition and violation of Judge Porter’s order have nothing to do with whether Plaintiff suffered a false arrest in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. See Perna, 916 F. Supp. at 401 (addressing the link between the misconduct and the matters in controversy in the litigation). Second, it is not clear that imposition of a lesser sanction would not be sufficient to deter similar conduct in the future, and Sergeant Ritschel’s misconduct was not so severe that a lesser sanction would be unjust. See id. at 400-01 (considering the deterrent effect of the sanction and the severity of the misconduct). And third, Sergeant Ritschel’s misconduct does not appear to have prejudiced Plaintiffs to the point where they cannot obtain a fair resolution on the merits of their claims. Id. at 401 (considering the prejudice to the wronged party). Rather, the prejudice Plaintiffs have most obviously suffered as a result of Sergeant Ritschel’s misconduct was the need for Stepnes’s counsel to expend considerable effort attempting to uncover the events that lead to the violation of Judge Porter’s order and to determine the extent to which Stepnes’s confidential communications with his attorneys had been breached. This Court concludes that such harm does not warrant striking Sergeant Ritschel’s Answer. But it does justify the imposition of a lesser sanction against him. A fair sanction here would require Sergeant Ritschel to pay Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees incurred in this litigation due to Sergeant Ritschel’s violation of Judge Porter’s order and his conduct at his deposition regarding the attorney-client-privilege issue. Stepnes’s counsel was required, as a result of Sergeant Ritschel’s conduct, to undertake extraordinary efforts to protect the confidentiality of her client’s communications with his attorneys. And Sergeant Ritschel’s dissembling testimony at the deposition obscured that proceeding’s truth-seeking function in such a manner that occasioned further work by Plaintiffs’ counsel including Plaintiffs’ current motion for sanctions. Stepnes’s counsel would not have had to undertake these efforts had it not been for Sergeant Ritschel’s misconduct. Under these circumstances, this Court concludes that an appropriate sanction is to require Sergeant Ritschel to pay Plaintiffs’ counsel’s reasonable fees incurred in this litigation as a result of that misconduct. This Court emphasizes that the fees Sergeant Ritschel should pay to Plaintiffs are those that have been incurred only in this litigation because Stepnes’s counsel has already obtained an award of fees and costs from Sergeant Ritschel and the City in connection with the collateral proceedings before Judge Porter in Hennepin County District Court. (2/2/10 Moore Aff. ¶ 2, Attach 1.) And those fees should be limited to the efforts expended by Plaintiffs’ counsel in this litigation that directly relate to Ritschel’s conduct, not any effort necessitated by Defendants CBS Broadcasting, Inc., and Esme Murphy’s alleged violation of the attorney-client privilege. Thus, within seven days of this Report and Recommendation, counsel for Plaintiffs shall submit a detailed application for attorney fees that clearly sets forth the work done in this matter that directly resulted from Sergeant Ritschel’s misconduct, a description of the nature of that work, and the amount of time spent on it. Counsel for Plaintiffs shall also provide the Court with a copy of the application for attorney fees presented to Judge Porter in connection with the collateral proceedings in his court so that this Court can ensure that no fee award here is duplicative. Upon receipt of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s application, this Court will issue a Supplemental Report and Recommendation reflecting its calculation of a reasonable sanction. Because this Court will issue such a Supplemental Report and Recommendation after receiving Plaintiffs’ counsel’s submissions discussed in this paragraph, this Court will delay the timing for filing objections to this Report and Recommendation. Objections to this Report and Recommendation will, therefore, be due fourteen days after this Court issues its Supplemental Report and Recommendation, at which time any objections to that Supplemental Report and Recommendation will also be due. RECOMMENDATION IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: *7 1. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike the Answer of Peter Ritschel (Doc. No. 103), be DENIED to the extent it seeks to strike Sergeant Ritschel’s Answer and enter judgment by default against him; 2. Defendant Peter Ritschel be required to pay Plaintiffs’ counsel’s reasonable attorney fees incurred in this litigation as a result of the misconduct identified in this Report and Recommendation; 3. Following receipt of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s application for attorney fees, this Court will issue a Supplemental Report and Recommendation further recommending an award of attorney fees to Plaintiffs’ counsel as a sanction for Defendant Peter Ritschel’s misconduct; 4. The Declaration of Jill Clark, Esq., Filed in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike the Answer of Peter Ritschel (Doc. No. 135), and the accompanying exhibits, as well as this Report and Recommendation, be UNSEALED, and that counsel for Plaintiffs shall re-file the declaration and its attachments with the appropriate redactions of personal identifiers. Under Local Rule 72.2(b) any party may object to this Report and Recommendation by filing with the Clerk of Court, and serving all parties a writing which specifically identifies those portions of this Report to which objections are made and the basis of those objections. Any such objections shall be filed within 14 days of the Supplemental Report and Recommendation discussed in this Report and Recommendation. Failure to comply with this procedure may operate as a forfeiture of the objecting party’s right to seek review in the Court of Appeals. A party may respond to the objecting party’s brief within 14 days after service thereof. All briefs filed under this rule shall be limited to 3500 words. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which objection is made. This Report and Recommendation does not constitute an order or judgment of the District Court, and it is therefore not appealable directly to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Unless the parties stipulate that the District Court is not required by 28 U.S.C. § 636 to review a transcript of the hearing in order to resolve all objections made to this Report and Recommendation, the party making the objections shall timely order and file a complete transcript of the hearing within fourteen days of receipt of the Report. Footnotes [1] The record from which this Court draws this background information includes the Declaration of Jill Clark, Esq., in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike the Answer of Peter Ritschel (Doc. No. 135). Plaintiffs filed this declaration under seal because certain items attached to it as exhibits have been marked as confidential. It appears that the items were marked confidential because they refer to discussions involving attorneys in the Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office regarding Stepnes’s computers. However, at a previous hearing on September 24, 2009, this Court ruled that there has been a waiver of the attorney-client privilege with respect to Sergeant Ritschel and Officer Dale Hanson’s communications with attorneys in the Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office regarding the examination of Stepnes’s computers. (Doc. No. 74, Tr. of Sept. 24, 2009 Hrg. (“9/24/09 Hrg. Tr.”) 61-62.) Moreover, the vast majority of the attachments to the declaration are not confidential. The only matters in these documents that this Court has identified that should not be publicly disclosed are personal identifiers that should be redacted from certain documents. Therefore, this Court recommends that these documents be unsealed after the personal identifiers have been properly redacted. This Court will file its Report and Recommendation under seal, however, to permit any party to object to the unsealing of the Declaration of Jill Clark, Esq., in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike the Answer of Peter Ritschel (Doc. No. 135). Should the District Court agree with this Court’s recommendation that the declaration be unsealed, counsel for Plaintiffs shall re-file the declaration and its attachments with the appropriate redactions. [2] The transcript of the February 9, 2010 hearing has not yet been filed in this case. Sergeant Ritschel’s counsel’s comments concerning his client’s actions can be found in the recording on file with this Court. (See Doc. No. 165, Minute Entry for Feb. 9, 2010 Hrg., 2/9/2010 CD Recording at 14:57:26.)