Vickie BROWN and Eric Scott Jones, Plaintiffs, v. Derek THOMPSON and Gordon Trucking, Inc., Defendants Civ. No. 08-6323 (ADM/RLE) United States District Court, D. Minnesota Signed December 15, 2009 Counsel Susan Bowden, Bowden Cyr Mortel PLLC, St. Paul, MN, for Plaintiff Amy E. Thompson, Timothy J. O'Connor, Lind Jensen Sullivan & Peterson, PA, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants Erickson, Raymond L., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 This matter came before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to a general assignment, made in accordance with the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), upon the Defendants’ Motions to Compel. A Hearing on the Motions was conducted on December 10, 2009, at which time, the Plaintiffs appeared by Susan Bowden, Esq., and the Defendants appeared by Timothy J. O’Connor, Esq. For reasons expressed at the Hearing, and briefly reiterated below, we deny the Defendants’ Motion to Compel the Inspection of Hard Drives and Computer Records, as the Motion is currently framed, and grant their Motion to Compel the Depositions of the Plaintiffs’ Expert Witnesses. II. Procedural and Factual Background The Plaintiffs Vickie Brown (“Brown”), and Eric Scott Jones (“Jones”), commenced this action on or about November 13, 2008, in the Minnesota State District Court for Otter Tail County, and it was removed by the Defendants on December 10, 2008. See, Notice of Removal, Docket No. 1. The Plaintiffs bring claims of negligence and respondeat superior, for which they seek the recovery of damages for personal injury, medical expenses, wage loss, emotional distress, pain and suffering, and loss of consortium, arising out of a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by the Defendants’ negligence. See, Amended Complaint, Docket No. 34, ¶¶1-27. The Defendants now bring two (2) Motions to Compel against the Plaintiffs. In their first Motion, the Defendants seek an Order compelling the inspection of Brown’s hard drive, and computer records. See, Defendants’ Motion to Compel Inspection of Hard Drives and Computer Records, Docket No.98. In their second Motion, the Defendants seek an Order compelling the deposition of the Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses Dr. David B. Lund (“Dr. Lund”), and Dr. Dean Knudson (“Dr. Knudson”), without prepayment. See, Defendants Motion to Compel Depositions, Docket No. 103. Specifically, the Defendants claim that they are entitled to depose Dr. Lund without further payment, because he has already been adequately paid, and further payment would be unreasonable. In addition, the Defendants assert that they are entitled to depose Dr. Knudson, without prepayment or a fee agreement, because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require either. In connection with the Motion to Compel the Depositions of Dr. Lund and Dr. Knudson, the Defendants also seek their fees and costs in bringing the Motion, in the amount of $1,500.00. III. Discussion A. Defendants’ Motion to Compel Inspection of Hard Drives and Computer Records. The Defendants’ request to inspect Brown’s hard drive, and other computer records, is governed by Rule 34(a)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides as follows: A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of Rule 26(b) to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in the responding party’s possession, custody, or control: (A) any designated documents or electronically stored information -- including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations -- stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable form *2 [Emphasis added]. In turn, Rule 26(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that the “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” and, to be discoverable, the “information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 34(a), which was amended in 2006 primarily to address issues related to electronic discovery, explain as follows: As with any other form of discovery, issues of burden and intrusiveness raised by requests to test or sample can be addressed under Rules 26(b)(2) and 26(c). Inspection or testing of certain types of electronically stored information or of a responding party’s electronic information system may raise issues of confidentiality or privacy. The addition of testing and sampling to Rule 34(a) with regard to documents and electronically stored information is not meant to create a routine right of direct access to a party’s electronic information system, although such access might be justified in some circumstances. Courts should guard against undue intrusiveness resulting from inspecting or testing such systems. [Emphasis added]. Here, the Defendants’ stated purpose for inspecting Brown’s hard drives, and computer records, is to assess the scope and nature of Brown’s computer usage. The Defendants argue that this information is relevant to her wage loss claims, since she alleges that she is unable to resume her online business as a result of her injuries from the accident. As such, the Defendants argue that they should be allowed to inspect Brown’s hard drives in a personal laptop, and in a desktop computer, and to inspect her social networking accounts. See, Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Inspection of Hard Drives, Docket No. 100, at pp. 5-6. In response, the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants’ request should be denied, because it is highly intrusive, and because the information can be obtained through less intrusive means. See, Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Compel Inspection of Hard Drives, Docket No. 104., at pp. 4-5. In addition, the Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants have offered only vague assertions as to the need to inspect Brown’s computers; that a review of her computer usage is irrelevant to her ability to conduct business activities; that an inspection will not be relevant because the computers are used by Brown’s husband, and a personal friend; that the inspection is unnecessary because Brown has admitted to using the computer to send emails, visit websites, and play games for therapy; and that the computer contains Brown’s most personal and private communications, including privileged communications between attorney and client. Id. at pp. 5-9. In addition, the Plaintiffs assert that the request is simply a “fishing expedition” that is designed to uncover information that would “embarrass, impeach, or impugn the Plaintiffs.” Id. at p. 6. *3 By way of additional background, prior to the accident, Brown was self-employed as an online dealer of antique jewelry. See, Affidavit of Timothy J. O’Connor In Support of Motion to Compel Production of Hard Drives and Computer Records, (“First O’Connor Aff.”), Docket No. 101, at Exhibit 1, p. 2. Brown started the business in 2005, which she operated for approximately twenty (20) weeks before the accident occurred on January 24, 2006. Id. at pp. 2-3. The Plaintiff alleges that she has been unable to resume that business since the accident, as a result of the ongoing effects of her injuries from the accident. Id. Brown’s business required her to attend auctions, flea markets, and garage sales, in search of antique jewelry to purchase, which she would then research, clean, and restore. See, Affidavit of Susan Bowden in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Compel Inspection of Hard Drives, (“First Bowden. Aff.”), Docket No. 105, at Exhibit 4, pp. 129-131. After restoring the jewelry, Brown would put the jewelry for sale on eBay. Id. at 130. The process would require her to upload pictures to the eBay website, and to write descriptions of the jewelry being sold. Id. at p. 131. Turning to Browns’ claimed injuries, the Plaintiffs assert, as pertinent here, as follows: [Brown] sustained a traumatic brain injury with cognitive impairment as a result of the collision. She has ongoing problems with memory and concentration, and difficulty sleeping with recurrent nightmares of the collision. [Brown] has also experienced resultant seizures, anxiety and depression. See, First O’Connor Aff., at Exhibit 1, p. 4. In addition, Brown describes ongoing cognitive issues, including “difficulty in task sequencing, word retrieval, poor attention and difficulty in multitasking.” Id. at Exhibit 3, p. 1. Dr. Lund, who is Brown’s treating psychologist, opines that Brown’s symptoms may be permanent. Specifically, Dr. Lund’s Expert Report states as follows: The * * * symptoms that she continues to experience are permanent [sic] nature. The literature suggests that after approximately 2 years most if not all of the physiological recovery after the brain injury will have occurred and since she is outside of that time frame, her symptoms are permanent. The emotional distress that she continues to experience will be variable over time. As she adjusts and copes with these changes her emotional stress should subside. Despite this, however, she will continue to struggle on a permanent nature with these emotions and psychological distress. * * * One of the major issues we have struggled with in therapy is attempting to have her more activated both vocationally and socially. Because of her condition which causes her to be easily overwhelmed, this has been quite difficult. Given her tendency to break down emotionally quite easily, it is suggested that she limit the amount [sic] stimulation she is exposed to in her environment. For example, she becomes easily overwhelmed with crowds of people with multiple conversations occurring simultaneously. These situations should be avoided. Also, she should not attempt to perform cognitively demanding tasks. We have attempted to have her return to her jewelry business but this did not work due to her cognitive and emotional issues. At this time, it does appear that she is totally disabled and very well may be on a permanent basis. Time will tell if she is able to be employed but at least for the next several years this should be on a part time, low stress basis. *4 First O’Connor Aff., supra at Exhibit 3, pp. 2-3. In addition, on April 22, 2008, Dr. Lund reported, in his progress notes for Brown, that she had attempted to get on the computer but that she could not tolerate it “due to feeling overwhelmed.” Id. at Exhibit 2, p. 2. Although Brown claims that she has been unable to resume her jewelry business, she has continued to engage in various computer activities since her accident, including using email to communicate with friends and family; using Facebook.com, and other social networking websites; accessing Shelfari.com, which is a public forum for discussing books; and playing computer games for therapy. Id at Exhibit 5, pp. 2-4, and Exhibit 4 at pp. 48-50. She engages in those computer activities “at least a couple of times a week.” Id. at Exhibit 5, p. 3. Brown owns her own laptop computer, in addition to a home desktop computer that she shares with her husband. According to Brown, the laptop is also used by her friend Brittney Solilh (“Solilh”). See, First Bowden Aff., supra at ¶9. Solilh uses the computer to access email, use the Internet, and to correspond on eBay, and Solilh’s personal information, including her bank account and eBay account information, is stored on the computer. Id. At the outset, we note that “Courts have been cautious in requiring the mirror image of computers where the request is extremely broad in nature and the connection between the computers and the claims in the lawsuit are unduly vague or unsubstantiated in nature.” Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v. Liberman, 2006 WL 3825291 at *4 (E.D. Mo., December 27, 2006), quoting Balboa Threadworks, Inc. v. v. Stucky, 2006 WL 763668 at *3 (D. Kan., March 24, 2006). Nevertheless, where a party shows that relevant information can be obtained through the inspection of a computer, that information is discoverable. See, e.g. Physicians Interactive v. Lathian Systems, Inc., 2003 WL 23018270 at *10 (E.D. Va., December 5, 2003)(allowing inspection of hard drive, with the assistance of a computer forensics expert, where computers may contain evidence of attacks on the Plaintiff’s server, and the evidence could be easily erased or manipulated); Simon Property Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 641 (S.D. Ind. 2000)(allowing mirror imaging where there were “troubling discrepancies with respect to the defendant’s document production.”); Balboa Threadworks, Inc. v. Stucky, supra at *4 (The Court allowed mirror imaging in a copyright infringement action where the infringement was alleged “to have occurred through the use of computers to download copyrighted material, [so] the importance and relevance of computer evidence is particularly important.”); Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 (D. Minn. 2002)(allowing mirror imaging of hard drive in copyright infringement action where computer may have contained evidence of infringing activity, and the evidence would be overwritten through continued use); Bianco v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation, 2008 WL 4661241 at *2 (E.D. Pa., October 22, 2008) (noting that, in evaluating a party’s right to inspect a computer, the “courts have considered numerous factors, including: evidence that the defendant is withholding the requested information, evidence that the defendant is unable or unwilling to search for the requested information on its own, and the extent to which the defendant has complied with discovery requests.”), citing Scotts Co v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co, 2007 WL 1723509 at *2 (S.D. Ohio, June 12, 2007) (rejecting request for intrusive examination of defendant’s computers and information systems on the mere suspicion that it might be withholding relevant information), Calyon v. Mizuho Sec. USA Inc., 2007 WL 1468889 at *3-5 (S.D. N.Y., May 18, 2007)(noting that cases related to computer inspections focus on the relationship of the claims or defenses to the computer, or whether the party provided incomplete discovery responses), and Bethea v. Comcast, 218 F.R.D. 328, 329-30 (D. D.C. 2003) (mere speculation that a party has not fully complied with discovery requests does not justify computer inspection where records were voluminous and contained much irrelevant information). *5 We recognize that Brown’s computer usage has some relevance to her claims, and to the Defendants’ defenses, since it cannot be denied that her business, before the accident, involved the use of computers. However, the Defendants’ request is far too broad and invasive to be permitted, as currently framed. While it is clear that relevant electronically stored information is discoverable, such discovery must be subject to reasonable limits, just like any other form of discovery. See, Henderson v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2009 WL 1152019 at *1 (E.D. Wis., April 29, 2009)(a party “cannot simply request all of [the opposing party’s] electronically-stored information and search it at will,” as “[i]t must instead request specific categories of information and allow [the opposing party] an opportunity to search their own data and produce responsive materials.”). Here, the Defendants have failed to frame their request, with any reasonable degree of particularity, so as to allow a meaningful evaluation by the Court. Given the Defendants’ extremely broad formulation of the requested search, it is not clear what specific information the Defendant is seeking, apart from everything on the respective hard drives. As a consequence, the proposed inspection goes far beyond what is necessary to cull out relevant information, and fails to acknowledge, or address, the sensitive information that is likely to be available on the computers, including personal, private, and privileged, communications and information. Nor has the Defendant described how it intends to distinguish Brown’s use of the computers from the use by others who have access to both computers. Moreover, the Defendants have failed to propose any parameters, procedures, or protocols, that would govern their intended electronic discovery. The case law, as it pertains to mirror imaging and computer inspections, establishes that specific procedures are necessary to protect confidential and privileged information, and to protect against abuse. See, Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., supra at 653-654 (allowing inspection, but establishing particularized procedures for the recovery of deleted information from the computer at issue); Balboa Threadworks, Inc. v. Stucky, supra at *5 (“No searches of the mirror images obtained through the use of this Order shall be conducted until the parties have agreed on an appropriate search protocol that will address the issue of attorney-client privilege and non-business related personal information which may be located on the computer hard drives.”); G.D. v. Monarch Plastic Surgery, P.A., 239 F.R.D. 641, 648-650 (D. Kan. 2007)(setting forth detailed procedures governing a request for computer inspection and mirror imaging); Calyon v. Mizuho Securities USA Inc., supra at *3 (recognizing that, where the Courts have permitted computer inspection, they have adopted procedures to protect privileged and private information). Without any such procedures parameters, and protocols, we cannot, at this time, conclude that the intrusive search proposed by the Defendants is warranted. Accordingly, we deny the Defendants’ Motion, in its current form, as it is far too broad and vague, concerning the information to be sought, and the procedures to be employed in obtaining relevant, nonprivileged information. However, as we explained at the Hearing, if the Defendants are able to reframe their request, most likely with the assistance of a computer expert, so as to prescribe the specific information being sought, and a competent protocol to be followed in the inspection, we will reconsider the request. B. Defendants’ Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony of Plaintiffs’ Expert Witnesses. In their second Motion, the Defendants seek an Order compelling the deposition testimony of Drs. Lund and Knudson without further payment. Specifically, the Defendants assert that they should not be required to tender prepayment to the Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses prior to the taking of their depositions. In addition, they seek fees and costs that were incurred by the advancement of the Motion. *6 In the way of additional background, on September 23, 2009, the Defendants noticed the deposition of Dr. Lund, which was to occur on October 12, 2009. See, Affidavit of Timonthy O’Connor in Support of Motion to Compel Depositions, (“Second O’Connor Aff.”), Docket No. 96, at Exhibit 1. The deposition was subsequently continued to October 14, 2009, at the request of Dr. Lund. Id. at Exhibit 2. On October 13, 2009, the Defendants were notified that Dr. Lund would be unable to attend the deposition that had been scheduled for the following day. Accordingly, the deposition was rescheduled to November 2, 2009. Id. at Exhibit 3. Prior to the deposition, Defendants requested information concerning Dr. Lund’s expert fees. On October 6, 2009, Nellie Smith (“Smith”), who is a paralegal employed by counsel for the Plaintiffs, responded by email, writing that “I have spoke with Experts in this matter and what I have been informed is that Dr. Lund [sic] prepayment is $2500.00.” See, Affidavit of Susan Bowden in Opposition to Motion to Compel Expert Depositions, (“Second Bowden Aff.”), Docket No. 108, at Exhibit 4. In that email, Smith did not specify the hourly rate, or the other costs, that are associated with the deposition of Dr. Lund. In addition, Susan Bowden (“Bowden”), who is counsel of Record for the Plaintiffs, avers that she never represented to counsel for the Defendants, that the $2,500.00 prepayment represented full payment for the deposition. Id. at ¶7. Timothy J. O’Connor (“O’Connor”), who is counsel for the Defendants, avers that he was never told that the $2,500.00 “prepayment” was a partial payment or deposit. See, Second O’Connor Aff., supra at ¶3. Thereafter, on November 2, 2009, Dr. Lund appeared for his deposition at 9:00 o’clock a.m., at the office of counsel for the Defendants, which is located in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Id. At that time, Dr. Lund informed O’Connor that he would have to conclude his deposition testimony at 11:00 o’clock a.m. Id. O’Connor agreed to conduct the remainder of the deposition on November 18, 2009. Id. Dr. Lund did not inform him that an additional payment would be required, and O’Connor avers that Dr. Lund later informed him that an additional $1,600.00 would be required as prepayment before he would appear for the second portion of his deposition. Id. at Exhibit 4. According to Dr. Lund, he had already performed $2,500.00 worth of services broken down as follows: 6.5 hours of preparation at $200 per hour, 2 hours of travel time at $200 per hour, and 2 hours of testimony at $400 per hour.[1] Dr. Lund advised that he would not appear without the second payment, and the Defendants refused to pay the additional amount, so the second portion of Dr. Lund’s deposition was cancelled, and the Defendants proceeded to file this Motion. Id. at Exhibit 4. With respect to Dr. Knudson, his deposition was originally scheduled for November 24, 2009. Second O’Connor Aff., supra at ¶4. On November 19, 2009, which was five (5) days before Dr. Knudson’s deposition was scheduled, Bowden sent an email to O’Connor asking to move the deposition to a different time. Id. at Exhibit 8. In that email, Bowden did not advise that Dr. Knudson was awaiting an executed fee agreement, or a deposit. According to the Defendants, the Plaintiffs’ counsel subsequently contacted O’Connor on the afternoon of November 23, 2009, in order to inform him that Dr. Knudson would not testify the next day as scheduled. Id. at ¶4. The Defendants aver that “nothing could be done to alter this decision because Dr. Knudson had filled [sic] schedule for November 24, 2009.” Id. O’Connor avers that he then received a voicemail from Plaintiffs’ counsel shortly before 5:00 o’clock p.m., advising that, if he signed and faxed the retainer agreement to Dr. Knudson by 5:00 o’clock p.m., the doctor would appear for the deposition. Id. O’Connor attests that he did not return to his office until after 5:00 o’clock p.m. that day, thereby missing the “short window of opportunity.” Id. *7 According to the Plaintiffs, Smith contacted Dr. Knudson’s office in order to discuss the time schedule for the deposition. See, Second Bowden Aff., supra at ¶9. On November 23, 2009, Smith was informed that Dr. Knudson had not yet blocked off time for the deposition because he had not received a signed fee agreement. Id. Smith was informed that Dr. Knudson’s appointments would be cancelled for the next day, as soon as the Plaintiffs received the signed fee agreement. Id. In addition, a $900.00 retainer fee would be required, according to the terms of the fee agreement. Id. at Exhibit 5. Bowden avers that, as soon as she was informed that the deposition would not proceed, she attempted to resolve the issue, so that the deposition could occur as scheduled, by calling the Defendants to make arrangements. See, Second Bowden Aff., supra at ¶13. Rule 26(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that “[u]nless manifest injustice would result, * * * the court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery.” The Court has the discretion to determine what constitutes a reasonable fee, in connection with expert testimony. See, Hurst v. United States, 123 F.R.D. 319, 321 (D.S.D. 1988). “[T]he weight of authority holds that Rule 26(b)(4)(C) permits recovery of fees for an expert’s preparation time and travel time in connection with his deposition.” See, Fee v. Great Bear Lodge of Wisconsin Dells, LLC, 2005 WL 1323162 at *3 (D. Minn., March 3, 2005), quoting Emmenegger v. Bull Moose Tube Co., 33 F. Supp.2d 1127, 1136 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Hose v. Chicago and North Western Trans. Co., 154 F.R.D. 222, 248 (S.D. Iowa, 1994)(allowing for the compensation of time spent reviewing records in order to prepare for a deposition). Here, we are troubled by the arbitrary billing practices exhibited by the Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, with respect to the prepayments that are being demanded from the Defendants prior to the experts’ appearance for depositions. In particular, we find Dr. Lund’s request for an additional $1,600.00, prior to the second portion of his deposition, to be particularly problematic in light of the fact that the deposition was continued to another day at his own request. We also note that the Record suggests that Dr. Lund did not require similar prepayments of the Plaintiffs, prior to rendering services for them. See, Second O’Connor Aff., supra at Exhibit 10. As we explained at the Hearing, although expert witnesses are entitled to reasonable fees in relation to the services they render, they are not entitled to arbitrarily set the price for their services, or charge excessive and unequal fees so as to skew the playing field between the parties.[2] Accordingly, if the Plaintiffs intend to call either doctor as an expert at Trial, we direct Drs. Lund and Knudson to appear for their depositions without prepayment, and with any billing to be submitted, and payment tendered, following the completion of the depositions. As we noted at the Hearing, the Plaintiffs’ experts must comply with the directives of the Court, if they intend to testify in this matter, or else our search for the truth will be unnecessarily skewed by forces which should play no role in the resolution of the parties’ claims and defenses. Moreover, we recognize that more than six (6) hours of preparation seems excessive, in light of the three (3) hours that were billed to the Plaintiffs for the preparation of Dr. Lund’s Expert Report. It also strikes us as excessive to charge additional travel time for a resumed deposition of Dr. Lund when the resumption was solely at Dr. Lund’s request. See, Fee v. Great Bear Lodge of Wisconsin Dells, LLC, supra at *4 (excluding travel time from reasonable fee where the travel expenses were incurred as a result of the expert’s own request to conduct an inspection). *8 Given these concerns, we conclude that it is best to allow the depositions to proceed without a prepayment hurdle, and to resolve any fees or costs dispute after the depositions have been completed. Such a course of proceeding will allow the parties to resolve their differences before engaging the Court but, if a resolve is elusive, the Court can assure that the interests of justice are properly served. We decline to render any decision which, at this time, would not be properly informed, and would simply be advisory. Lastly, the Defendants seek an Order directing the Plaintiffs to pay their reasonable expenses in bringing the Motions to Compel. Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(A), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]f the Motion [to Compel] is granted * * * the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent * * * whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.” However, Rule 37(a)(5)(A) further provides that the award of fees is not permitted if the movant filed the Motion prior to conferring with the opposing party in good faith, if the opposing party’s noncompliance was substantially justified, or if other circumstances exist that would make the award of fees unjust. Here, we find no basis to award fees and costs at this juncture, and will defer a ruling on that aspect of the Motion until we are obligated to resolve any lingering dispute over the charged expert fees and costs. If, however, the issues are resolved through a proper “meet and confer,” then we conclude that the interests of justice would not support the granting of the request for fees at this time, but we do not rule out the propriety of fees if the circumstances so warrant at a future date. NOW, THEREFORE, It is -- ORDERED: 1. That the Defendants’ Motion to Compel Inspection of Hard Drives and Computer Records of Plaintiff Vickie Brown [Docket No. 98] is DENIED, as currently framed. 2. That the Defendant’s Motion to Compel Depositions of the Plaintiffs’ Expert Witnesses [Docket No. 103] is GRANTED in part, as more fully detailed in the text of this Order. Footnotes [1] Notably, this amounts to exactly $2,500.00. In addition, the Defendants emphasize that Dr. Lund spent six and a half (6.5) hours preparing for the deposition, but he spent only a little over three (3) hours in preparing his Expert Report on behalf of the Plaintiffs. See, Second O’Connor Aff., supra at Exhibit 10. [2] The Defendants represent that Dr. Lund has his office within a fifteen (15) minute walk from the location where his deposition would be taken, but charged $400.00 in travel time. Since the information neither proves, nor disproves, the represented walking distance, we make no finding in this respect but, if the parties do not reach an accord on this issue, then we will take additional evidentiary submissions on the reasonableness of the experts’ charges.