David G. Velde, as Trustee of the Daniel S. Miller Bankruptcy Estate, Plaintiff, v. Brian Nelson, Defendant, David G. Velde, as Trustee of the Daniel S. Miller Bankruptcy Estate, Plaintiff, v. Mark Wavra, Defendant, David G. Velde, as Trustee of the Daniel S. Miller Bankruptcy Estate, Plaintiff, v. Thompson Brothers Farms, LLP, Defendant, David G. Velde, as Trustee of the Daniel S. Miller Bankruptcy Estate, Plaintiff, v. Mitch Wavra, Defendant Civ. No. 04-4957(RHK/RLE), Civ. No. 05-794(RHK/RLE), Civ. No. 05-797(RHK/RLE), Civ. No. 05-798(RHK/RLE) United States District Court, D. Minnesota Filed January 10, 2006 Counsel Rodenberg & O'Connor, Chtd, Michael S. Dove, Gislason & Hunter LLP - New Ulm, New Ulm, MN, for Plaintiff. Jon R. Brakke, Leah Marie Warner, Tami L. Norgard, Vogel Law Firm, Fargo, ND, for Defendant Erickson, Raymond L., United States Magistrate Judge MINUTE ORDER *1 This matter came before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to a general assignment, made in accordance with the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), upon the Defendants’ Motions to Compel Discovery, which was filed in each of these cases, and which involves an identical set of issues. A Hearing on the Motions was conducted on January 5, 2006, at which time, the Plaintiff appeared by Justin P. Weinberg, Esq., and the Defendants appeared by Leah Marie Warner, Esq. For reasons expressed at the close of the Hearing, and briefly reiterated below, we deny the Defendants’ Motions to Compel, but without prejudice. II. Factual Background These actions concern the Plaintiff’s attempt to recover funds payed to the Defendants prior to the commencement of a Bankruptcy filing. These actions were originally filed, as a single case, consisting of one Plaintiff and multiple Defendants, but was subsequently assigned, and reopened, as twelve (12) individual cases. On September 16, 2005, the Defendants, pursuant to Rule 36, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, served Requests for Admissions, related Interrogatories, and a Demand for Production of Documents, upon the Plaintiff. On October 18, 2005, the Plaintiff provided his responses to those discovery requests. Those responses included qualified and partial admissions, as well as unequivocal denials, to the Requests for Admissions. The related Interrogatories, which were served by the Defendants, asked the Plaintiff, in instances where the Plaintiff provided a Response other than an unqualified admission, to: [S]tate each and every fact upon which the Plaintiff * * * relies in failing to admit said Request for Admission. The Plaintiff * * * is required to annex his answers hereto copies of all documents, correspondence, memoranda, reports, contracts, draft agreements, and/or data compilations (including electronic data such as e-mail) in any form or format relating to or establishing the existence of such facts. If any documents, etc. have been destroyed, damaged, altered, or cannot be located, describe said documents, etc. with specificity and circumstances of the loss, etc. If the Plaintiff * * * claims lack of information as a basis of the failure to admit said Request for Admission, the Plaintiff is required to specify all inquiries, investigations, etc. it has made in an effort to obtain facts necessary to respond to said Request for Admission. See, e.g., Civ. No. 05-798, Docket No. 13, at 6-7. The Plaintiff, in instances where he provided a denial, or a partial, or qualified admission to the Request for Admissions, responded to the related Interrogatory by noting that no evidence existed to support the statements in the Defendants’ pertinent Request for Admission. See, e.g., Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Compel, Civ. No. 05-798, Docket No. 18, at 1-2. The Defendants have argued that those responses are incomplete, and are insufficient to comply with the Plaintiff’s discovery obligation. See, Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel, Docket No. 18, at 1-2. III. Discussion *2 We begin our analysis by noting what is not at issue before us. The Defendants have not sought relief, pursuant to Rule 36, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, concerning the substance, or sufficiency, of the Plaintiff’s Responses to the Requests for Admissions. See, Reply Memorandum to Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Compel, Civ. No. 05-798, Docket No. 23, at 2.[1] Instead, the Defendants attack the sufficiency of the Plaintiff’s Answers to the Interrogatories that are related to the Requests for Admission, and that were answered either with a denial or a qualified admission. Our Court of Appeals has explained that “[t]he purpose of our modern discovery procedure is to narrow the issues, to eliminate surprise, and to achieve substantial justice.” Mawby v. United States, 999 F.2d 1252, 1254 (8th Cir. 1993), quoting Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller, 402 F.2d 134, 143 (8th Cir. 1968). As such, the Rules are meant to insure that parties can obtain “[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties.” Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller, supra at 143, citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). Contention Interrogatories facilitate the discovery process by “narrow[ing] and defin[ing] issues for Trial beyond what may be ascertained from the parties’ pleadings.” See, Transclean v. Bridgewood Services, Inc., 77 F. Supp.2d 1045, 1062 (D. Minn. 1999). Here, the information sought is both relevant to the underlying actions, and discoverable. However, each of the disputed Answers, which were furnished by the Plaintiff in response to the Defendants’ Interrogatories, consisted of a statement that, except as expressly admitted, there was no evidence to support the statement in the Defendant’s related Request for Admission. At the Hearing, we advised the parties of our view, which we have also previously expressed, as follows: [O]f necessity, the Court must accept, at face value a party’s representation that it has fully produced all materials that are responsive to a specific discovery request. As we stated at the Hearing, we have no means to test the veracity of such avowals, other than to appropriately sanction a recalcitrant party for failing to responsibly honor its discovery obligations. In our view, the failure to produce evidence, without just cause, which is relevant within the context of Rule 26, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, bears a close relationship to the “spoliation of evidence,” and should be sanctioned accordingly. See, Sylla-Sawdon v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company, 47 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 822 (1995); Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 986 F.2d 263, 267 (8th Cir. 1993); SDI Operating Partnership, L.P. v. Neuwirth, 973 F.2d 652, 655 (8th Cir. 1992); Scout v. City of Gordon, 849 F. Supp. 687, 690-91 (D. Neb. 1994); Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 551 (D. Minn. 1989); cf. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 86 F.3d 811, 817 (8th Cir. 1996). In the language of Cervantes, “a word to the wise is enough.” Don Quixote, Part II, Book IV, Chapter 37, at page 692. *3 Lumber v. PPG Industries, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 641, 643 n. 1 (D. Minn. 1997). Given the foregoing, we find that the Plaintiff’s Answers to the Interrogatories were sufficient, given that the Plaintiff is not obligated to create a document that does not otherwise exist, and is precluded, as a matter of physical fact, to disclose evidence that the Plaintiff denies as existent. While the substance of the Plaintiff’s Responses to the Defendants’ Requests for Admissions, and their related Interrogatories, may be disappointing to the Defendants, such is the nature of the “beast” known as discovery. Therefore, we deny the Defendants’ collective Motions to Compel. We also take note that each party appeared to make a good faith and genuine effort in presenting the Motions, and the opposition to the Motions, for a disposition, and therefore, we deny all parties’ requests for fees and costs. NOW, THEREFORE, It is -- ORDERED: That the Defendants’ Motions to Compel [04-4957, Docket No. 12; 05-794, Docket No. 11; 05-797, Docket No. 11; and 05-798, Docket No. 11] are DENIED, but without prejudice. Footnotes [1] The Local Rules of this Court require that memoranda of law, which address nondispositive Motions, are to be filed by the moving party at least fourteen (14) days before the Hearing on the Motions, unless otherwise ordered by a Judge. See D. Minn. LR 7.1(a). In addition, the same Rules provide that, “[e]xcept with the permission of the Court, no memoranda of law will be allowed except as provided in these rules.” D. Minn. LR 7.1(f). Here, the Defendants’ reply memoranda were filed three (3) days prior to the Hearing, were unsolicited by the Court, and were, therefore, not properly before us. However, in order that we might be properly informed on the issues before us, we have considered the memoranda in our resolution of the Motions presented, after the Plaintiff was afforded, and declined, an opportunity to respond to the memoranda in writing.