*1 Before the Court is Plaintiff Dish Network, LLC's (“Plaintiff's”) Motion to Compel Defendants Jadoo TV, Inc. and Sajid Sohail's Production of Documents filed on May 24, 2019 in the joint stipulation format pursuant to Local Rule 37-2 (the “Motion”). (Dkt. No. 75.) The caption page of the Notice of Motion refers to “Defendants Jadoo TV, Inc. and Sajid Sohail's Production of Documents.” (Dkt. No. 75.) In the body of the Motion, Plaintiff identifies Jadoo TV, Inc. and Sohail collectively as “JadooTV.” (Joint Stip. at 1.) Here, for clarity and ease of reference, the Court refers to the defendants separately as “JadooTV” and “Sohail.”

On May 31, 2019, a week after Defendants filed the Motion, Jadoo filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy indicating that it had filed a voluntary petition for relief in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California. (Dkt. No. 78.) On June 12, 2019, Defendant Sohail filed a Supplemental Memorandum regarding the Motion (“Dft's Supp. Memo.”). (Dkt. No. 80.)

On June 26, 2019, the Court heard oral argument on the Motion. (Dkt. No. 85.) At the hearing, Plaintiff's counsel confirmed that, due to JadooTV's bankruptcy filing, this action is stayed as to JadooTV and the motion to compel is now only directed at Sohail in his individual capacity. (Id.) Accordingly, the Court determined that “in light of [JadooTV's] bankruptcy filing, it would be helpful to have supplemental briefing from the parties on whether Sohail may be compelled to produce emails and other documents that he created in his capacity as a corporate officer of [JadooTV].” (Id.) On July 3, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a supplemental brief citing authority that addresses whether a corporate officer of a company that is subject to a bankruptcy stay can be compelled to produce corporate documents related to the individual's work activities for the bankrupt debtor and whether any such documents are considered to be in the possession, custody, or control of the individual officer for the purposes of discovery as to that person in his individual capacity. (Dkt No 87.) On July 9, 2019, Defendant Sohail filed a Supplemental Opposition regarding the Motion along with a Declaration of Sajid Sohail in Support of Supplemental Opposition to the Motion (“Dft's Supp. Opp'n”). (Dkt. Nos. 90, 91.) Upon receipt of Defendant Sohail's Supplemental Opposition, the Court took the matter under submission for decision.

Plaintiff's Complaint in this copyright infringement action, alleges that defendant JadooTV's engaged in “a wide-ranging, deliberate, multi-year effort ... to transmit television channels it failed to license in blatant disregard of DISH's exclusive rights.” (Complaint ¶ 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that JadooTV initially “designed its service to directly stream unlicensed television channels through the Jadoo branded set-top box,” but later “changed the way it offered unlicensed channels by requiring users to download extra software files to their Jadoo set-top boxes to integrate those channels.” (Id. at ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleges that “[t]oday, the latest model Jadoo set-top boxes are sold to users preconfigured to locate and install software files needed to integrate the unlicensed television channels and seamlessly incorporate those channels into the Jadoo on-screen electronic program guide.” (Id. at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff further alleges that JadooTV and defendant Haseeb Shah “provide unlicensed video on demand content to Jadoo users, including infringing versions of the programs that air on the unlicensed television channels.” (Id. at ¶ 4.) On that basis, Plaintiff alleges that “JadooTV and its co-defendants are liable for copyright infringement.” (Id. at ¶ 5.)

*2 Plaintiff identifies Sohail as “the founder, chief executive officer, president, and an owner of Jadoo TV, Inc.” and alleges that “Sohail authorized, controlled, participated in, and received direct financial benefits from the infringing activities of Jadoo TV, Inc.[.]” (Id. at ¶ 8.) The Complaint asserts claims against JadooTV and Sohail for direct copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501 (Count I); inducing and materially contributing to copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501 (Count II); and vicarious copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501 (Count III, (alternative to Count I)). (Id. at ¶¶ 63-93.) Plaintiff seeks permanent injunctive relief under 17 U.S.C. § 502, statutory damages or profits attributable to the infringement of registered and unregistered works under 17 U.S.C. § 504(b); attorneys' fees and costs under 17 U.S.C. § 505; and impoundment and disposition of all infringing articles under 17 U.S.C. § 503. (Id. at pp. 26-27.)

I. The Disputed Discovery Requests and Jadoo TV, Inc.'s Opposition

The Motion as initially filed sought an order compelling “JadooTV”—meaning both JadooTV and Sohail, individually—to produce documents in response to Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents (“RFPs”) served on February 7, 2019. (Id. at 2.) In RFP Nos. 71 and 73, Plaintiff seeks documents relating to JadooTV's eMedia technology:

(Id.) Plaintiff also seeks an order compelling defendants to “produce all non-privileged documents that it agreed to produce as a result of the parties' meet and confer discussions. (Id.) Specifically, the Motion seeks an order compelling defendants to respond to Plaintiff's RFP Nos. 1-3, 6-7, 14-21, 23-28, 32, 34-41, 44-46, 48, 50-53, 55, 57-65, 68-70. 72 74-81, 83, 85-86, 89-103, 105, and 111-112.)[1] Plaintiff contends the information sought is highly relevant to the claims and defense at issue in the lawsuit and “JadooTV has not produced a single document in this case ... has not gathered, and does not intend to gather, documents from Defendant Sohail or any other custodians[.]” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys' fees costs related to the Motion. (Id.)

JadooTV's primary argument in opposition was that Motion was “pointless” because JadooTV expected to file for bankruptcy protection that “will automatically stay DISH's case against Jadoo TV, Inc., “well before June 26 when this motion is noticed to be heard.” (Joint Stip. at 4.) Therefore, Jadoo TV urged that the Motion be denied without prejudice and Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fee should be denied. (Id. at 5.)

II. Jadoo TV's Bankruptcy Filing and Automatic Stay of this Lawsuit

True to its promise, JadooTV filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy on May 31, 2019, which automatically stayed this litigation as to debtor JadooTV, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). (See Dkt. No. 78.) On June 12, 2019, Defendant Sohail filed a Supplemental. Memorandum regarding the Motion (“Supp. Opp'n”) in which he acknowledged that JadooTV's petition for bankruptcy “operated to stay this case against JadooTV” and suggested that “[t]he case against Sohail is also very likely to be stayed.” (Supp. Opp'n at 2.) Sohail further argued that “[e]ven if the case against Mr. Sohail is not stayed, the Court should refrain from compelling Mr. Sohail to produce any documents in this case because most, if not all, of the documents DISH seeks in its motion are in JadooTV's possession, custody, or control – not Mr. Sohail's.” (Id.)

III. The Parties' Supplemental Briefing After Oral Argument

*3 As noted above, after hearing oral argument on the Motion, the Court requested supplemental briefing from the parties on the impact, if any, of JadooTV's bankruptcy petition and stay on Sohail's individual obligation to respond to Plaintiff's RFPs. (Dkt. No. 85.) Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief in Support of the Motion to Compel Sajid Sohail's Production of Documents (“Plt's Supp. Br.” [Dkt. No. 87]) argues that the bankruptcy stay against debtor JadooTV does not apply to non-debtor Sohail in his individual capacity. (Plt's Supp. Br. at 2-3.) Therefore, Plaintiff argues, Sohail can be compelled to “respond to discovery requests aimed at establishing his individual liability.” (Id.)

Plaintiff acknowledges that “some courts have extended the automatic stay to non-bankrupt co-defendants when ‘unusual circumstances’ warranted,” but emphasizes that the Ninth Circuit has not adopted the “unusual circumstances exception.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff further argues that even if he Ninth Circuit had adopted the “unusual circumstances” exception, “to apply the exception, Sohail and JadooTV would need to request the bankruptcy court to ‘extend the automatic stay under its equity jurisdiction.’ ” (Id. (citing In re Chugach Forest Prods., Inc., 23 F.3d 241, 247 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994)).) Finally, Plaintiff contends that as the founder, CEO and owner of JadooTV, “Sohail is in control of the relevant JadooTV documents for purposes of discovery relating to Sohail” in his individual capacity and he should be compelled to produce these documents. (Plt's Supp. Br. at 6.)

In his Supplemental Brief (“Deft's Supp. Br.” [Dkt. No. 90]), Sohail contends that Plaintiff's effort to obtain discovery from Sohail “subverts the automatic stay” resulting from JadooTV's chapter 11 case. (Deft's. Supp. Br. at 1.) Sohail urges that he should not be compelled to respond to Plaintiff's discovery requests because of an indemnity agreement between Sohail and JadooTV. (Id.) Sohail also maintains that the allegations against Sohail in his official capacity as CEO and president of JadooTV are indistinguishable from Plaintiff's claims against debtor JadooTV and render Sohail “indispensable to JadooTV's successful reorganization efforts in the chapter 11 case.” (Id.) Sohail contends, therefore, that the Court should find that discovery and other litigation against Sohail should be stayed “as an extension of the automatic stay in favor of JadooTV” and the Motion should be denied. (Id.)

Under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may obtain discovery concerning any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). As amended in December 2015, Rule 26(b)(1) identifies six factors to be considered when determining if the proportionality requirement has been met, namely, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to the relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Id. Relevant information need not be admissible to be discoverable. Id.

Rule 37 provides that “[a] party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3). The party seeking to compel production of documents under Rule 34 has the “burden of informing the court why the opposing party's objections are not justified or why the opposing party's responses are deficient.” Best Lockers, LLC v. American Locker Group, Inc., Case. No. SACV 12-00403 CJC (ANx), 2013 WL 12131586, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2013).

*4 District courts have broad discretion in controlling discovery. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). When considering a motion to compel, the Court has similarly broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes. Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Productions, 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Hallet, 296 F.3d at 751).

I. The Discovery Sought is Relevant and Proportional to the Needs of the Case Against Sohail Individually

Notably, Sohail does not argue that the discovery sought with respect to his potential individual liability is not relevant to the claims or defenses in the action or that the requests are not proportional to the needs of the case within the meaning of Rule 26. Indeed, Plaintiff argues that in meet and confer discussions held prior to JadooTV's bankruptcy filing, the parties reached agreements regarding a majority of the RFPs that are the subject of the Motion including RFP Nos. 1-3, 6-7, 14-21, 23-28, 32, 34-41, 44-46, 48, 50-53, 55, 57-65, 68-70. 72 74-81, 83, 85-86, 89-103, 105, and 111-112. (See Joint Stip. at 10-65.) Plaintiff now asks that Sohail be compelled to produce what “JadooTV” already agreed to produce. (Id. at 2.)

It is undisputed that JadooTV's bankruptcy petition automatically stayed this litigation and all discovery as to JadooTV. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)1). The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that “[t]he sweep of the automatic stay is broad and ‘serves as one of the most important protections in bankruptcy law.’ ” Porter v. Nabors Drilling USA L.P., 854 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2017). But the Motion is no longer directed at the debtor, JadooTV. Rather, the Motion seeks to compel co-defendant Sohail respond to the RFPs in his individual capacity.[2] Further, the Complaint clearly asserts individual claims against Sohail. (See Complaint, Counts I, II, III.) That said, the Complaint expressly alleges that Plaintiff's copyright infringement allegations against Sohail, arise directly out of Sohail's role as founder, CEO, president, and owner of JadooTV. (Complaint at ¶ 8.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he acts Sohail engaged in as an agent of JadooTV, Inc. are believed to have been within the scope of such agency.” (Id.)

Thus, the resolution of the Motion turns on whether the scope of the automatic stay of litigation as to JadooTV also precludes Plaintiff's ability to seek discovery against Sohail individually. For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes it does not.

II. Automatic Bankruptcy Stay Does Not Extend to Non-Debtor Sohail

It is well established that an automatic bankruptcy stay does not extend to non-debtors. In re Chugach Forest Prods., Inc., 23 F.3d 241, 246 (9th Cir. 1994) (“as a general rule, the automatic state of section 362(a) protects only the debtor, property of the debtor or property of the estate. It does not protect non-debtor parties or their property.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This principle applies even when the individual co-defendant is closely associated with the bankrupt debtor or even a senior executive of the debtor. See, e.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 23 B.R. 523, 529 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (collecting cases and noting that stay under section 362 does “not encompass actions against related but independent codefendants”); Seiko Epson Corp. v. Nu-Kote Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“It is clearly established that the automatic stay does not apply to non-bankrupt co-defendants of a debtor even if they are in a similar legal or factual nexus with the debtor.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

*5 Sohail, an officer and owner of JadooTV, insists that his individual interests are so intertwined with the debtor corporation's property that the “exceptional circumstances” doctrine should be applied to extend the bankruptcy stay to preclude discovery as to him. (Deft's Supp. Br. at 2.) In particular, Sohail argues that an indemnity agreement between himself and JadooTV, among other things, “warrants the finding that discovery and other litigation against Sohail should be stayed[.]” (Deft's Supp. Opp'n at 1.) But mere fact of the indemnity agreement does not preclude Plaintiff from seeking discovery from Sohail.

Indeed, should any judgement of liability be ultimately found against Sohail individually, the indemnity agreement may provide the basis for Sohail to file his own proof of claim in the JadooTV bankruptcy proceeding. See, e.g., In Re Meruelo Madduz Properties, Inc. Nos. CC-12-1479-TaPaKi, 09-13356-VK, 2013 WL 1615784 at *8 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 15, 2013) (discussing advancement claims included in “timely filed Proofs of Claim which were based, in part on the Indemnity Agreement.”)

III. The Ninth Circuit Has Not Adopted the “Unusual Circumstances” Exception

Some courts have recognized an “unusual circumstances” exception to the general rule that a bankruptcy stay does not extend to non-debtor defendants. The Fourth Circuit has held that “unusual circumstances” may justify an extension of the stay to nonbankrupt codefendants when

A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 (1986); and see Matter of S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142, 1148 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting Fourth Circuit's recognition of “very limited situations” where a section 362(a) stay may apply to actions against nonbankrupt defendants). At least one court in this circuit has noted that “unusual circumstances” may be found “when proceeding against non-debtor defendants would impose a substantial discovery burden on the debtor defendant.” Bradford Technologies, Inc. v. Biggers, No. C 11-4621 EDL, 2014 WL 12641953, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2014) (internal citations omitted). That said, even in Bradford, the court ultimately concluded that there was “no evidence of unusual circumstances here sufficient to overcome the general rule” that the stay only applies to the debtor. (Id.) This Court reaches the same conclusion here.

As Plaintiff points out, the Ninth Circuit has not adopted the “unusual circumstances” exception. See Chugach Forest Prods. Inc., 23 F.3d at 247 (stating “[i]n the Ninth Circuit, the vitality of the ‘unusual circumstances’ exception is not clear,” citing decisions that have not recognized the exception, and declining to resolve the issue); see also Klinkenborg Aerial Spraying and Seeding, Inc. v. Rotorcraft Dev. Corp. 690 Fed Appx. 540, 541 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We have never adopted the ‘unusual circumstances’ exception in the Ninth Circuit and we decline to do so here.”). Sohail argues that although the Ninth Circuit has not adopted the “unusual circumstances” exception, it has also not explicitly rejected it either. (Deft's Suppl. Opp'n at 1-2.) This argument is unpersuasive. Sohail cites In re O'Reilly, 2014 WL 460767, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2014) noting that the District Court in that unpublished case “affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling that the ‘unusal circumstances’) exception applied to say the case against a law firm shareholder[.]” (Deft's Suppl. Opp'n at 2.) O'Reilly, however, affirmed a decision of the bankruptcy court, in a case involving allegations of fraudulent transfer and alter ego claims. O'Reilly, 2017 WL 460767, at * 4. Further, and more importantly, O'Reilly was not a case where the district court itself applied the “unusual circumstances” doctrine, but instead specifically noted that “section 362(d) gives the bankruptcy court wide latitude in crafting relief from the automatic stay[.]” Id. at *3 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted (emphasis added).) The other cases on which Sohail relies are equally distinguishable because they are not binding on this Court, pre-date Chugach, and were based on findings by the bankruptcy courts exercising their unique jurisdiction with respect with respect to the automatic stay. See, e.g., In re Family Health Servs., Inc. 105 B.R. 937, 942 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989); In re Circle K Corp., 121 B.R. 257, 261 (Bankr. D. Ariz 1990). Accordingly, the Court here declines to step into a breach where the Ninth Circuit has, thus far, expressly declined to do so.

*6 Finally, as emphasized in Klinkenborg, “even if we were to adopt ‘unusual circumstances’ exception, the exception requires the bankruptcy court to extend the automatic stay using its equity jurisdiction.” (Id. at 540-41.) The bankruptcy court has not done so here.

IV. Plaintiff's Request for Attorneys' Fees

Rule 37 requires that when a motion to compel is denied, the court “must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the movant, the attorney filing the motion, or both to pay the party or deponent who opposed the motion, its reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney's fees. But the court must not order this payment if the motion was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(B). Discovery conduct is “substantially justified if it is a response to a genuine dispute or it reasonable people could differ as to the appropriateness of the contested action.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563 (1988).

Here, Plaintiff seeks an award of costs and attorney's fees incurred in bringing the motion. (Joint Stip. at 2.) The Court finds that Sohail's wholesale refusal to produce documents in response to Plaintiff's properly served discovery requests is unjustified. First, in the months prior to JadooTV's bankruptcy, Sohail had no principled basis to refuse to comply with Plaintiff's discovery requests seeking information relevant and proportionate to Plaintiff's claims against Sohail in his individual capacity. Further, in light of well-settled authority confirming that an automatic bankruptcy stay does not extend to a non-debtor co-defendant, even one who may be closely affiliated with the debtor, Sohail's opposition to the Motion based on the assertion that “the case against Sohail is also very likely to be stayed” was tenuous at best. (Deft's Supp. Br. at 2 [Dkt No. 80].) Consequently, an award of reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, that Plaintiff incurred in bringing the Motion is warranted.

Accordingly, in the absence of an order of the bankruptcy court expressly extending the automatic stay to Sohail, the Motion is GRANTED as to Defendant Sohail in his individual capacity. No later than ten (10) days from the date of this Order, Sohail shall produce any non-privileged responsive documents in his personal possession, custody, and control in response to Plaintiff's RFP Nos. 1-3, 6-7, 14-21, 23-28, 32, 34-41, 44-46, 48, 50-53, 55, 57-65, 68-70, 72 74-81, 83, 85-86, 89-103, 105, and 111-112. This Order specifically requires Sohail to search any personal email accounts or other electronically stored databases, home offices or other locations and/or repositories that are separate from facilities owned and/or controlled by JadooTV. To the extent that Sohail, after a reasonable and diligent search, asserts that he has no responsive documents in his possession, custody or control, Sohail must provide supplemental written responses so indicating within ten (10) days of the date of this Order. Any documents for which Sohail asserts a privilege must be listed on a Privilege Log.

*7 Further, pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(A), Plaintiff's request for its expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in bringing the Motion is GRANTED. Therefore, the following briefing schedule governs a motion for an award of expenses incurred in bringing the Motion to Compel: (1) Plaintiff shall file and serve his opening brief on or before August 21, 2019; (2) Defendant Sohail shall file an Opposition no later than 21 days after service of the motion; and (3) Plaintiff shall file an optional Reply (of no more than 5 pages) to the Opposition no later than 14 days after service of the Opposition. A hearing is scheduled on the motion for expenses for October 2, 2019 at 11:00 a.m. in Courtroom 580 of the Roybal Federal Building, 255 E. Temple Street, Los Angeles, California 90012.

IT IS SO ORDERED.