SHELIA HOLMES, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL DYNAMICS ORDNANCE AND TACTICAL SYSTEMS, INC.,1 Defendant Civil Action No.1:18cv00019 United States District Court, W.D. Virginia Filed June 17, 2019 Counsel Richard F. Hawkins, III, The Hawkins Law Firm, P.C., Richmond, VA, for Plaintiff. Connie May-Ting Ng, John Byron Flood, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Washington, DC, for Defendant Sargent, Pamela M., United States Magistrate Judge MEMORANDUM ORDER *1 In this action, I am asked to rule on a motion for an attorney's fee, (Docket Item No. 35) (“Motion”). Based on the reasoning set out below, the Motion will be granted, but a fee in a reduced amount of $1,035.16 will be awarded to defendant. General Dynamics Ordnance And Tactical Systems, Inc., (“General Dynamics” or “defendant”), filed a Motion To Compel Discovery Responses, Document Production And Medical Authorizations From Plaintiff, (Docket Item No. 23) (“Motion to Compel”), in this action on December 19, 2018. Following a hearing, held by conference call on January 4, 2019, the undersigned granted the motion to compel and ordered General Dynamics to provide it with evidence substantiating its costs and fees. (Docket Item No. 29). General Dynamic's counsel now seeks an attorney's fee, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 37(a)(5)(A), in the amount of $2,900.00 for a total of 13.8 hours of work for two separate attorneys in connection with the drafting, filing and litigating of the motion to compel and 4.0 hours of work for a paralegal who assisted in the preparation and filing of the motion to compel. Although the Motion states it is for “fees and costs,” counsel does not seek any costs associated with the motion to compel. The plaintiff has responded to the Motion, not objecting to the award of an attorney's fee, but to the amount requested. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 37(a)(5)(A) states as follows: If the motion [to compel] is granted ... the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party ... whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees. But the court must not order this payment if: (i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Lead counsel for General Dynamics, John B. Flood, has filed a Declaration with the Motion, (Docket Item No. 35-1) (“Flood Declaration”), as well as invoices, (Docket Item No. 35-2), setting forth the activities undertaken and the time spent in drafting, filing and litigating the motion to compel. In his Declaration, Flood states that he is a shareholder in the law firm of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., (“Ogletree Deakins”). (Flood Declaration at 1.) He states that he has more than 20 years of experience practicing law and is admitted to practice in the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia and Oklahoma, as well as multiple federal courts. (Flood Declaration at 1.) Flood states that, while he is the lead attorney handling this case, he was assisted by Connie Ng, an associate with Ogletree Deakins, in bringing the motion to compel. (Flood Declaration at 1-2.) He states that Ng has been practicing law since 2011 and is admitted to the bars of Virginia, Maryland and the District of Columbia. (Flood Declaration at 2.) Flood states that both he and Ng billed the defendant at an hourly rate of $382.50 throughout the proceeding. (Flood Declaration at 2.) Finally, Flood states that the services charged were necessary and were actually performed. (Flood Declaration at 2.) *2 The invoices attached to the Motion show that Flood performed 4.2 hours of the 17.8 total hours of work on the motion to compel for which an attorney's fee is sought and that Ng performed 9.6 hours of work on the motion. The invoices further reflect that Anne S. Falcone, a paralegal, performed 4.0 hours of work on the motion to compel. The invoices indicate that both Flood and Ng billed General Dynamics at an hourly rate of $382.50, while Falcone's services were billed at an hourly rate of $180.00. By the defendant's computation of time at these hourly rates, its services rendered on the motion to compel amounted to $5,998.50. However, in the Motion, the defendant states that it is voluntarily agreeing to reduce the total fee sought to $2,900.00, recognizing that the actual fees incurred “may be higher than the customary fees which have been awarded in comparable situations within this jurisdiction.” Additionally, in the brief in support of the motion to compel, defense counsel set out the timeline of events leading up to the filing of that motion. On April 24, 2018, the plaintiff filed her Complaint, the only remaining claim of which is that the defendant violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, (“ADA”), by discriminating against her when it terminated her employment based on her failure to wear protective footwear while working in the defendant's production facility. On July 31, 2018, this court issued a Scheduling Order ordering the parties to provide Initial Disclosures by August 10, 2018. (Docket Item No. 18). The parties later agreed, however, that such disclosures would be exchanged on August 27, 2018. (Docket Item No. 24-1). The plaintiff did not provide Initial Disclosures on August 27, 2018. After August 27, 2018, communications between counsel continued regarding the date when the plaintiff would provide Initial Disclosures. However, the plaintiff still provided no Initial Disclosures. (Docket Item No. 24-2). On October 12, 2018, counsel for the defendant submitted to the plaintiff its First Set Of Interrogatories To Plaintiff and Defendant's First Set Of Requests For Production Of Documents To Plaintiff. (Docket Item No. 24-3). The Requests for Production included a request that the plaintiff return fully executed medical authorizations to the defendant. As of the date of the filing of the Motion to Compel, the plaintiff had failed to provide her Initial Disclosures, provide any responses to the defendant's Interrogatories, any responses to the defendant's Requests for Production, and she had not provided any executed medical authorizations to allow the defendant to obtain complete copies of her medical records, which are directly relevant to this matter. Defense counsel contacted plaintiff's counsel on multiple occasions in an attempt to resolve the plaintiff's discovery deficiencies. On November 16, 2018, counsel for the defendant asked plaintiff's counsel when it could expect the plaintiff's Initial Disclosures, which were more than three months overdue from the date in the court's Scheduling Order, and discovery responses, which were four days overdue. (Docket Item No. 24-4). Plaintiff's counsel responded that he would send both the Initial Disclosures and discovery responses by November 21, 2018. Plaintiff's counsel failed to do this on November 21, 2018. On November 29, 2018, defense counsel sent an email to plaintiff's counsel, stating that she had expected to receive the plaintiff's Initial Disclosures and responses to discovery requests on November 21, 2018. (Docket Item No. 24-5). Defense counsel further advised plaintiff's counsel that this failure to provide Initial Disclosures and discovery responses was negatively impacting their efforts in discovery, including their ability to determine if they would require an affirmative expert on the issue of the plaintiff's claim for damages, including whether she had properly mitigated damages. Therefore, defense counsel stated they would ask the court for 30 days after the completion of the plaintiff's deposition to designate any such expert. Defense counsel asked that plaintiff's counsel let them know whether he would consent to such a request of the court. On December 4, 2018, plaintiff's counsel stated he expected to send the plaintiff's Initial Disclosures and discovery responses, including fully executed medical authorizations, by the afternoon of December 5, 2018. (Docket Item No. 24-6). However, plaintiff's counsel failed to do this on December 5, 2018. On December 6, 2018, the parties filed a Joint Motion To Extend Close Of Discovery from December 31, 2018, to January 31, 2019. (Docket Item No. 22.) On December 19, 2018, defense counsel filed the motion to compel with the court. (Docket Item No. 23.) By Order dated January 4, 2019, the court granted the defendant's motion to compel, and it continued the trial dates and associated dates. (Docket Item No. 29). *3 Based on the above, I find that counsel for the defendant made a good faith effort to obtain the requested discovery before seeking the court's intervention. I also find that the opposing party's failure to properly respond to discovery was not substantially justified. Here, the plaintiff did not respond to discovery at all until compelled to do so. The “substantially justified” standard is met “if there is a genuine dispute as to proper resolution or if a reasonable person could think [that the failure to produce discovery is] correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact.” Harrison v. Carrington Mort. Servs., LLC, 2017 WL 1612135, at *2 (W.D. Va. Apr. 18, 2017) (quoting Sky Cable, LLC v. Coley, 2015 WL 4873167, at *3 (W.D. Va. Aug. 12, 2015)). In this instance, the only reason that plaintiff's counsel offered for his repeated delays in providing the discovery requests was his heavy workload and/or busy work schedule.[2] Thus, I cannot find that the plaintiff's complete failure to respond to the defendant's discovery requests under these circumstances meets this standard. Next, when determining whether awarding an attorney's fee is unjust, the court looks to the following factors: (1) whether the noncomplying party acted in bad faith; (2) the amount of prejudice the noncompliance caused the adversary; (3) the need for deterrence of the particular sort of noncompliance; and (4) whether less drastic sanctions would be more effective. See Harrison, 2017 WL 1612135, at *2. First, the court cannot find that plaintiff's counsel's noncompliance was in bad faith. However, I find that the defendant was prejudiced by the noncompliance, in that it was required to send multiple requests to plaintiff's counsel, over a period of approximately four months,[3] for Initial Disclosures and answers to written discovery. In the end, none of this information was provided, and the defendant was forced to file a motion to compel with the court. Additionally, in email correspondence with plaintiff's counsel, counsel for the defendant advised that such a failure negatively impacted their ability to determine their need for an affirmative expert on the issue of the plaintiff's damages, including whether she properly mitigated. In the brief in support of the motion to compel, defense counsel alleged that, at that time, the trial in the matter was scheduled for April 9-11, 2019, thereby prejudicing the defendant's rights to pursue discovery, to prepare a potential motion for summary judgment and to prepare for trial, if necessary. Defense counsel further stated that, without the plaintiff's Initial Disclosures, discovery responses or the production of any documents, it could not depose the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery prejudiced the defendant's ability to defend itself against the plaintiff's claims and to make an informed decision regarding the necessity of engaging an expert witness on the issue of damages. Moreover, the court finds it necessary to deter the type of noncompliance at issue here. Plaintiff's counsel did not allege any reason for his repeated failure to comply with discovery except for a heavy workload and/or busy work schedule. This type of noncompliance cannot be condoned by the court. Finally, there is no argument that less drastic sanctions would be more effective, nor has plaintiff's counsel suggested what might constitute such “less drastic sanctions.” *4 For all of these reasons, I find that an award of attorney's fees in this case is justified under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 37(a)(5)(A). The next issue for the court to decide is what a reasonable attorney's fee in this case would be. An award of expenses under Rule 37(a)(5)(A) must be reasonable. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A). The Supreme Court, in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), held that “[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable attorney fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” This is known as the “lodestar” figure. See Grissom v. The Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Swimways Corp. v. Aqua-Leisure Indus., Inc., 2017 WL 3262135, at *1 (E.D. Va. July 31, 2017). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has long recognized the use of the 12 factors set forth in Johnson v. Ga. Hwy. Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), to determine the reasonableness of a fee award. See Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n.28 (4th Cir. 1978) (adopting the 12 Johnson factors). These 12 factors are as follows: (1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client and circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19. This lodestar method generates a presumptively reasonable fee. See Swimways Corp., 2017 WL 3262135, at *2 (citing Pennsylvania v. De. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564 (1986)). However, it is within the court's discretion, upon consideration of the lodestar factors, to adjust the lodestar figure up or down. See Lyle v. Food Lion, Inc., 954 F.2d 984, 988-89 (4th Cir. 1992). When requesting attorney's fees, “[t]he moving party has the burden of ‘establishing the reasonableness of the requested amount both by showing the reasonableness of the rate claimed and the number of hours spent.’ ” Swimways Corp., 2017 WL 3262135, at *2 (quoting Rutherford Controls Int'l Corp. v. Alarm Controls Corp., 2009 WL 4015357, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 17, 2009) (citations omitted)); see also McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 91 (4th Cir. 2013). Although the court looks to all the lodestar factors, in connection with a discovery motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 37, the first, second, third, fifth, ninth and twelfth factors are the most relevant. See Swimways Corp., 2017 WL 3262135, at *3 (citing Flame S.A. v. Indus. Carriers, Inc., 2014 WL 4809842, at *4 (E.D. Va. 2014)). The court need not examine each of the lodestar factors “in exacting detail.” Swimways Corp., 2017 WL 3262135, at *3 (citing Stewart v. VCU Health Sys. Auth., 2012 WL 1120755, at *2 (E.D. Va. 2012)). Attorney's fees ultimately rest within “the sound discretion of the [court], who is in the best position to determine whether, ... [and to what extent], they should be awarded.” Swimways Corp., 2017 WL 3262135, at *3 (quoting Guidry v. Clare, 442 F. Supp. 2d 282, 295 (E.D. Va. 2006)). *5 I will first address whether the hourly rate sought is reasonable. Although both of the defendant's counsel, Flood and Ng, customarily charge an hourly rate of $382.50, they seek to be compensated at a reduced hourly rate. As stated above, the party seeking a fee award bears the burden of proving that the hourly rate sought is reasonable. See McAfee, 738 F.3d at 91. In determining the reasonableness of the requested hourly rate, the court must consider the prevailing market rate in the relevant community, taking into account the experience of the lawyers whose rate is being reviewed. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1989); Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 1994); Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718-19. The prevailing market rate may be established by affidavits reciting fees concerning fee awards in similar cases and evidence of counsel's billing practices. See Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1402 (4th Cir. 1987). As stated above, Flood has submitted a Declaration, stating that he has more than 20 years of experience practicing law and is admitted to practice in the District of Columbia, multiple state jurisdictions and multiple federal jurisdictions. In the Declaration itself, however, Flood does not state that the hourly rates customarily charged by him and Ng are reasonable, nor does he address the reasonableness of any reduced hourly rate. In the Motion, Flood simply states that the hourly $382.50 rate is consistent with counsel's experience and expertise, as well as the rates of other attorneys in the region.[4] Additionally, Flood states that these hourly rates are reasonable according to the “adjusted Laffey Matrix[5] ... which has been found by the Fourth Circuit to be a ‘useful starting point to determine fees.’ ” (Docket Item No. 35 at 5 (quoting Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Holiday, 591 F.3d 219, 229 (4th Cir. 2009)). Flood argues that this $382.50 hourly rate is well below the Laffey Matrix's guidelines for the year beginning June 1, 2018, which for Flood would be $511.50 per hour below the rate set forth in the Matrix and for Ng would be $72.50 below the Matrix's rate. Although defense counsel states in the Motion that, based on the number of hours spent in relation to the motion to compel, the reduced amount of $2,900.00 sought would reflect an hourly rate of $208.63, the court is unclear how defense counsel arrived at this amount. This court routinely recognizes $75 as a reasonable rate for nonattorney time. See Chapman v. Astrue, 2009 WL 3764009, at *2 (W.D. Va. Nov. 9, 2009) (citing Alexander S. v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373, 1377 n.1 (4th Cir. 1997) (paralegal services compensated at $65.00 per hour where lead counsel compensated at $225.00 per hour and associate counsel at $100.00 per hour). Therefore, any nonattorney time awarded in this case will be awarded at a rate of $75 per hour. Here, 4.0 hours of paralegal work at an hourly rate of $75.00 would amount to $300. That leaves $2,600.00 of the requested fee, which, if divided by the remaining 13.8 hours of attorney time expended on the motion to compel, would result in an hourly rate of $188.41. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “[the plaintiff] must produce satisfactory specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for which she seeks an award.” Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 244 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). I find that the statements and arguments contained in the defendant's brief are insufficient, in and of themselves, to establish that defense counsel's requested hourly rate is a customary fee for like work in this area. See Lismont v. Alexander Binzel Corp., 47 F. Supp. 3d 443, 459 (E.D. Va. 2014) (amount of a reasonable fee must be established by clear and convincing evidence). *6 In the absence of sufficient evidence, “the [c]ourt may set a reasonable hourly rate based upon its own knowledge and experience.” Flame S.A., 2014 WL 7185199, at *14 (citation omitted). Several fairly recent cases from the Western District of Virginia have found rates much higher than the hourly rate sought here to be reasonable. See Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Jacobsen, 2015 WL 7302443 (W.D. Va. Nov. 18, 2015) (finding $300.00 for the most experienced attorneys in a motion to compel was a reasonable rate); Hudson v. Pittsylvania Cnty., 2013 WL 4520023, at *4 (W.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2013) (finding that a $400.00 hourly rate for a case in Danville, Virginia, was unreasonable and reducing it to $350.00); Three Rivers Landing of Gulfport, LP, et al. v. Three Rivers Landing, L.L.C., et al., 2014 WL 1599564, at *4 (W.D. Va. Apr. 21, 2014) (reducing attorneys' hourly rate from $685.00 to a blended hourly rate of $385.94 to $332.29); Sky Cable, 2014 WL 4407130, at *4 (reducing hourly rate for attorneys' fees from $340.00 to $540.00 to a cap of $350.00). While none of these cases originated in the Abingdon Division, this court has specifically rejected the argument that the relevant geographical area or community is that in which the court actually sits. See Wolfe v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 2015 WL 858875, at *3 (W.D. Va. Feb. 27, 2015) (rejecting defense counsel's argument that the hourly rate of attorneys appearing in the Abingdon division of the court should be less than those appearing in the Roanoke division). Based on the foregoing, I find that an hourly rate of $188.41 for attorneys of both Flood's and Ng's experience is reasonable. I next will turn to whether the amount of time for which defendant's counsel seeks compensation is reasonable. For the reasons that follow, I find that some of the time should be reduced or eliminated. As stated above, defense counsel seeks an award of fees for 13.8 hours of attorney time and 4.0 hours of nonattorney time. However, an examination of the invoices submitted by counsel in this case shows that some of the time should be reduced or eliminated. For instance, while the plaintiff undoubtedly prolonged the discovery process, Rule 37 does not allow parties to recover every cost associated with discovery review, some of which, in this case, would have been incurred regardless of the plaintiff's noncompliance. See Swimways Corp., 2017 WL 3262135, at *4. Instead, Rule 37 requires an award of “reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A) (emphasis added). Here, defense counsel's itemization of time spent on the motion to compel included a total of 0.70 hour of time for attempts to confer with plaintiff's counsel about curing her alleged discovery deficiencies. However, defense counsel has a duty to make a good faith effort to confer with the plaintiff regarding such deficiencies before filing a motion to compel. That being the case, I will not allow fees for any of this time. Also, defense counsel seeks 0.20 hour of time for reviewing the status of the plaintiff's failure to respond to written discovery requirements and her failure to provide Initial Disclosures, as well as strategizing about the next steps regarding the same. I find that this is not an expense incurred in making the motion, and it also will not be allowed. Likewise, defense counsel seeks 0.10 hour of time for receipt of an email from plaintiff's counsel extending the close of discovery by 30 days, which also is not an expense incurred in making the motion. Thus, this time also will not be allowed. Additionally, the invoices reflect a total of 1.10 hours of time spent by Flood “strategizing” about the defendant's options in relation to the plaintiff's failure to respond to written discovery requests and to provide Initial Disclosures, including filing a motion to compel. Once again, I cannot find that this is an expense incurred in making the motion to compel, and it will not be allowed. In the same vein, the invoice shows that Flood spent 0.10 hour communicating with someone, whose identity has been redacted, regarding the next steps to be taken in relation to the plaintiff's failures to respond to discovery, and Ng, similarly, spent 0.70 hour of time performing such activities. None of this time will be allowed. Ng spent 1.10 hours of time reviewing and analyzing the Scheduling Order, plaintiff's Complaint, the discovery requests to plaintiff and multiple emails with plaintiff's counsel regarding the outstanding Initial Disclosures and discovery responses for the purpose of preparing the motion to compel. I find this should be classified as an expense incurred in making the motion, and I further find this request to be reasonable. Therefore, I will allow it. Ng spent a total of 4.8 hours of time drafting, revising and finalizing the motion to compel, Falcone spent 1.20 hours beginning the drafting of the motion to compel, and Flood spent a total of 2.2 hours reviewing and editing it. Additionally, Ng spent 2.6 hours conducting legal research regarding sanctions for failing to comply with discovery, including the granting of signed medical authorizations. I find that an attorney of Ng's experience should have been able to draft such a memorandum in 1.0 hour, especially given the lack of novel issues or complex legal arguments involved in this motion to compel. This was an uncontested motion to compel based on the plaintiff's complete failure to provide any of the requested discovery or Initial Disclosures. The motion itself is two pages in length, and the supporting brief is eight substantive pages, but could have been shorter. I further find that it was not necessary to conduct any great amount of legal research, but will allow 1.0 hour of time for this, as the issue regarding the signed medical authorizations is not of a garden variety. I also find reasonable 1.0 hour for Falcone's work on the motion to compel, as well as 1.0 hour for Flood's review and editing of the motion to compel. Flood also spent 0.20 hour of time scheduling a hearing on the pending motions, which I find reasonable and will allow. Lastly, Falcone spent 2.80 hours reviewing, revising and finalizing for filing with the court the motion to compel and preparing multiple exhibits in support of the same. I will allow 2.0 hours of paralegal time for this. *7 Based on the reasons stated above, the court must determine if a total of 4.3 hours of attorney time at a $188.41 hourly rate, resulting in a total fee of $810.16 is reasonable in this case in light of the factors to be considered under Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19. As stated above, in connection with a Rule 37 discovery motion, the first, second, third, fifth, ninth and twelfth Johnson factors are the most relevant. See Flame S.A., 2014 WL 4809842, at *4. Regarding the first, second and third factors, I find that the motion did not involve any novel issues or complicated legal arguments. It was a routine and straightforward discovery motion. Therefore, although both Flood and Ng are, in fact, both skilled attorneys with multiple years of experience, a much lesser skilled and lesser experienced attorney could have drafted and litigated this motion to compel. Therefore, I find that 4.3 hours is a reasonable amount of time for them to have spent on drafting and litigating the motion to compel in this court. As for the ninth Johnson factor – the experience and reputation of the attorney – I find that both defense counsel are competent and skilled lawyers who have practiced law for multiple years and are admitted to practice in multiple jurisdictions. As to the fifth and twelfth factors – the customary fee for like work and attorney's fee awards in like cases – Flood addressed only the $382.50 hourly fee that both he and Ng customarily bill, stating simply that this is their hourly rate. In the Motion itself, he stated that the $382.50 rate charged is consistent with counsel's experience and expertise, as well as the rates of other attorneys in the region. However, defense counsel's “region” is Washington, D.C., not Southwest Virginia. As regards the reduced hourly rate of $188.41, several fairly recent cases from this district have found higher rates than the one sought here to be reasonable. Finally, all of the fees allowed by the court directly relate to the preparation of the motion to compel and hearing on the motion to compel. Having considered all of the above, the court finds that a total attorney's fee of $1,035.16 is reasonable in this case. This total fee is comprised of $810.16 for counsel's work and $225.00 for the paralegal's work. As stated above, an award of fees under Rule 37(a)(5)(A) may be made against a party, the party's counsel or both. In this case, I find that the award should be entered against plaintiff's counsel only. The evidence before the court shows that the only justification plaintiff's counsel ever offered for his continuing failure to comply with discovery was related to his work load / work schedule. Therefore, I find it was plaintiff's counsel's conduct that necessitated the filing of the motion to compel. Thus, the Motion is GRANTED, and defendant is awarded a fee in the amount of $1,035.16. Footnotes [1] The Defendant has requested that General Dynamics Mission, Inc. be substituted as the proper party defendant in this case, as it assumed operational responsibility for the Marion, Virginia, production plant where the plaintiff formerly worked. [2] Plaintiff's counsel made such statements in emails after the Initial Disclosures were due per the court's Scheduling Order, but before defense counsel served its written discovery on the plaintiff. Specifically, in an email dated August 21, 2018, plaintiff's counsel asked Flood to agree to extend the time for producing the Initial Disclosures, stating “Yesterday and today have been brutal and tomorrow isn't going to be any better for me.” (Docket Item No. 24-1 at 2.) Again, in an August 24, 2018, email to defense counsel, plaintiff's counsel stated, “This week was insanely busy” after once again advising defense counsel that he would not be able to meet an agreed upon deadline for production of the Initial Disclosures. (Docket Item No. 24-1 at 5.) [3] At the time the defendant filed the motion to compel, the Initial Disclosures were more than four months overdue, and the responses to written discovery and document requests were more than a month overdue. [4] The court notes that Ogletree Deakins is located in Washington, D.C. [5] The Laffey Matrix originated from the case of Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354, 371 (D. D.C. 1983), overruled on other grounds by 746 F.2d 4 (C.A. D.C. 1984), in which the court ruled that hourly rates for attorneys practicing civil law in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area could be categorized by years of practice and adjusted yearly for inflation. See http://www.laffeymatrix.com/history.html (last visited June 11, 2019). The court finds that it need not consider the adjusted Laffey Matrix in this case, as it pertains to the reasonableness of attorney's fees in the D.C. metropolitan area, not in Southwest Virginia. In N.L.R.B. v. Cobalt Coal Ltd., 2018 WL 5292052, at *2 (W.D. Va. Oct. 25, 2018), this court allowed use of the adjusted Laffey Matrix to determine the reasonableness of the rates charged by attorneys for the NLRB practicing in Washington, D.C. because NLRB work is “highly specialized.” This court noted that it may consider rates charged by attorneys in other communities when a case's “complexity and specialized nature” might mean that no local attorney, with the required skills, would be available, and the party choosing the attorney from elsewhere acted reasonably in doing so. Cobalt Coal Ltd., 2018 WL 5292052, at *2 (quoting Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 317 (4th Cir. 1988)).